Reed Irvine - Editor
|October A, 1999|
What if Sandy Berger, President Clinton’s national security adviser, received a letter from the director of the FBI informing him that a member of the staff of the Chinese embassy had been spotted entering the residence of a known Chinese spymaster in Los Alamos and that electronic surveillance had revealed that he had given the spymaster tens of thousands of dollars? What if the recorded conversation had made it clear that the money was to be used to procure highly secret information on the weapons being developed at the Los Alamos laboratories? What if the only action taken by Mr. Berger in response to this information was to warn the Chinese ambassador in Washington that the residence of their Los Alamos spymaster had been bugged by the FBI and that the transfer of funds to the spymaster had been recorded?
This would be seen as evidence that the national security adviser was aiding and abetting Chinese espionage in this country. Demands for Berger’s head would come from the politicians and the press alike. Janet Reno’s somnolent Justice Department would find it impossible to ignore demands for an investigation of the national security adviser’s ties to the government of Communist China.
Even in the scandal-ridden Clinton administration, it is hard to imagine such treachery on the part of a close adviser to the President, but there is now hard evidence that something like this—only worse—actually happened 56 years ago during the third term of President Franklin D. Roosevelt. A book published by the CIA and the National Security Agency (NSA) titled Venona, Soviet Espionage and the American Response, 1939-1957, tells us that on May 7, 1943, FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover sent a personal message similar to the one described above to Harry Hopkins, an adviser so close to President Roosevelt that he literally lived in the White House from 1940 to 1944 as if he were a member of the Roosevelt family. John T. Flynn, a journalist and author, wrote that Hopkins was the most powerful man in the country, next to the President himself.
The message from Hoover to Hopkins read: "Through a highly confidential and reliable source (euphemism for a bug) it has been determined that on April 10, 1943, a Russian who is an agent of the Communist International paid a sum of money to Steve Nelson, National Committeeman of the Communist Party, USA, at the latter’s home in Oakland, California. The money was reportedly paid to Nelson for the purpose of placing Communist Party members and Comintern agents in industries engaged in secret war production for the United States Government so that information could be obtained for transmittal to the Soviet Union. "The Russian agent of the Communist International has been identified as Vassili Zubilin, Third Secretary of the Embassy of the USSR. New York City is his headquarters. Both Nelson and Zubilin will meet in the near future with other leaders of the Communist International (Comintern) apparatus active in the United States. It has likewise been determined through a highly confidential and completely reliable source that the National Headquarters of the Communist Party, USA, particularly, Earl Browder, General Secretary of the Communist Party, USA, are aware of and have approved of the assignment which has been given to Nelson by the Communist International."
After describing Steve Nelson’s long career as a Communist, including spying for the Soviets in 1931 and 1932, and his high-ranking position in the party, Hoover said, "Steps are being taken by the Federal Bureau of Investigation to identify all members of the Communist International apparatus with which Steve Nelson and Vassili Zubilin are connected, as well as the agents of that apparatus in various war industries....These matters are being brought to your attention at this time for your confidential information inasmuch as the investigation is continuing."
When the Hoover letter was published in Venona, Soviet Espionage and the American Response in 1996, nothing was said about what Harry Hopkins did with this alarming information. A new book, The Sword and the Shield, The Mitrokhin Archive, by Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitro-khin, tells what Hopkins did according to information found in KGB files in Moscow that had been copied by Mitrokhin. As a KGB officer, he had copied or made notes about thousands of KGB files. British intelligence smuggled both him and his six trunks filled with the copied documents out of Russia in 1992.
Based on Mitrokhin’s documents, the book states, "Hopkins had established a remarkable reputation in Moscow for taking the Russians into his confidence. Earlier in the year he had privately warned the Soviet embassy in Washington that the FBI had bugged a secret meeting at which Zarubin (also known as Zubilin) had passed money to Steve Nelson, a leading member of the U.S. Communist underground." The reference for this is volume 6, chapter 12 of Mitrokhin’s typed copies of KGB files. The endnote says, "Hopkins had been personally briefed by Hoover on Zarubin’s visit to Nelson (citing the Hoover letter quoted above). Hoover would doubtless have been outraged had he known that Hopkins had informed the Soviet embassy."
Ray Wannall, former FBI assistant director for counterintelligence, agrees. Wannall says it is his opinion (but not neces-sarily that of the FBI) that this proves what he had long suspected—that Harry Hopkins was a Soviet agent. No doubt the bug the FBI had planted in Steve Nelson’s residence that Hoover referred to in his letter to Hopkins, was disabled soon after Hopkins tipped off the Soviets. This may have aroused the FBI’s suspicions, but there is no evidence in the public record so far that the bureau ever determined that Hopkins himself was part of the Comintern’s spy apparatus.
That charge was first made public in 1990 by another valuable KGB defector, Oleg Gordievsky, the KGB resident (station chief) in London prior to his defection in 1985. For a decade prior to his defection, he had been a double agent, working closely with British intelligence. His book, KGB: The Inside Story, which was also written with Christopher Andrew, confirmed that Washington, including the White House itself, harbored a plethora of Soviet agents during and following World War II. His most sensational revelation came from Iskhak Akhmerov, the undercover KGB officer who, during the war, had responsibility in the U.S. for all the KGB agents referred to as "illegals," those like Steve Nelson who lacked the diplomatic cover enjoyed by agents like Zubilin.
Akhmerov himself was one of the illegals. He used at least three aliases in recruiting and dealing with his agents. He lived somewhere on the East Coast and it is believed that he had a clothing business that he used as his cover. Gordievsky revealed that Akhmerov had told KGB officers in Moscow that Harry L. Hopkins was "the most important of all Soviet war-time agents in the United States." Gordievsky said he had checked this with other KGB officers in the directorate in charge of illegals and also with the U.S. experts in the KGB’s code section. He said they "all agreed that Hopkins had been an agent of major significance."
Christopher Andrew, a Cambridge don who has specialized in Soviet intelligence, disagreed with this assessment, and he succeeded in getting Gordievsky to back away from it. In KGB: The Inside Story he writes, "Gordievsky, however, came gradually to the conclusion, as he discussed the Hopkins case (with Andrew), that Hopkins had been an unconscious rather than a conscious agent. That interpretation of Hopkins’ connection with the KGB best fits the evidence on his career in the West." In an interview on CNN, Gordievsky did say that he thought Hopkins was an unconscious agent, meaning that he did not know that Akhmerov was a covert KGB spymaster.
It is impossible to believe that Gordievsky and Andrew actually believe this. In The Sword and the Shield, after telling how Hopkins informed the Soviets of the FBI’s surveillance of Steve Nelson and Zubilin, Andrew writes, "There is plausible but controversial evidence that, in addition to passing confidences to the Soviet ambassador, Hopkins sometimes used Akhmerov as a back channel to Moscow, much as the Kennedys later used the GRU officer Georgi Bolshakov. Hopkins’ confidential information so impressed the Centre that, years later, some KGB officers boasted that he had been a Soviet agent. These boasts were far from the truth. Hopkins was an American patriot with little sympathy for the Soviet system."
He wants us to believe that Hopkins was secretly meeting with a small businessman that he probably knew only as "Bill" or "Michael" to give him secret information to be sent to Moscow and getting messages back from Stalin himself without realizing that he was dealing with a Soviet spy. That is an insult to the intelligence of both Hopkins and the readers. The comparison with the Kennedys having used Bolshakov as a back channel to Moscow is absurd, since Bolshakov was with the Soviet embassy, not an illegal like Akhmerov. Andrew says, "So far as is known, Hopkins never discussed with anyone his occasional meetings with Akhmerov. Until revealed by Gordievsky, they remained unknown and unsuspected." If Hopkins thought that he had found a remarkable legal unofficial channel for com- municating with Stalin, he would have had no reason to ever discuss it with anyone. The total secrecy proves he knew he was dealing with a Soviet spy.
There is one Venona intercept that confirms that Hopkins was giving Akhmerov secret information to be sent to Moscow. It is a partially-decoded message dated May 29, 1943 from Akhmerov to the head of the KGB’s foreign intelligence section. It reports a conversation in the U.S. that involved Roosevelt, Churchill and two other individuals identified only as 19 and Zamestitel. It says, "19 reports that Roosevelt and Churchill invited 19 to join them, and Zamestitel openly told Churchill (words missing) second front against Germany this year....19 thinks that Roosevelt is not informing Zamestitel of important military decisions and that therefore Zamestitel may not have exact knowledge of (words missing) with the opening of a second front against Germany and its postponement from this year to next year. 19 says that Zamestitel is an ardent supporter of a second front at this time and considers postponement" (only a few words decoded from here on).
The Venona notes suggest that Vice President Henry Wallace might be Zamestitel, which means deputy in Russian. They do not identify 19, Akhmerov’s secret source. The Sword and the Shield says it was "probably" Hopkins, saying in an endnote, "A detailed, meticulous and persuasive study by Eduard Mark (a military intelligence analyst) concludes that it is probable virtually to the point of certainty that Hopkins was 19."
This makes sense, because Hopkins was almost always at Roosevelt’s elbow in meetings of this type. He was clearly not Zamestitel, because Roosevelt was not keeping anything from him. If it is that obvious, why didn’t the Venona notes identify Hopkins as 19? Perhaps they could not believe or did not want to reveal that Hopkins was a Soviet agent. The fact that Andrew and Mitrokhin make such a positive identification in an endnote may be intended as a clue to scholarly readers that they are not as naive as Andrew’s exoneration of Hopkins suggests.
Discussing Hopkins’ role as Roosevelt’s adviser at the Teheran conference in KGB: The Inside Story, Andrew notes that the KGB regarded Hopkins as its agent, but "Hopkins’ own view of his role was quite different." Andrew says he was "an American patriot with no desire to introduce the Soviet system in the United States, but he believed the Soviet Union would without question... dominate Europe on the defeat of the Nazis... and that Soviet-American friendship held the key to the postwar world." The same could be said of Alger Hiss and a number of the other identified Soviet agents if they were judged only by their public statements, not their covert actions.
Hopkins was actually a great admirer of Stalin. He told Robert Sherwood, the author of Roosevelt and Hopkins, that he and Roosevelt were confident that we would be able to live with the Russians in peace after the war "as far into the future as any of us could imagine," provided Stalin remained in control. He said, "We felt sure we could count on him to be reasonable and sensible and understanding, but we could never be sure who or what might be back of him there in the Kremlin." That confidence explains why Hopkins was so willing to help the brutal dictator survive and obtain his major objectives, including the domination of Eastern Europe and, it appears, the development of the atomic bomb.
In notes for his unpublished memoirs Hopkins wrote, "If Russia wants a socialist state....that is surely their own busi-ness. They are absolutely sure it is going to work better for the 180 million citizens of the Soviet Union than a capitalist econo-my would work. They do not think much of the way the capital-ist economy worked in places like France, Belgium and Holland just before the war. They seem to have a pretty healthy respect for ours, however....There are plenty of people in Amer-ica who would have been perfectly willing to see our armies go right on through Germany and fight with Russia after Germany was defeated. They represent nobody but themselves and no government worth its salt in control of our country would ever permit that group to influence our official actions."
It is not known when and how Akhmerov’s contact with Hopkins was initiated, but Gorievsky says Akhmerov claimed credit for persuading Hopkins to visit the Soviet Union in July 1941, only a month after Hitler’s invasion. This would suggest that they may have been in touch during the period when the Communists were opposed to our aiding Britain’s war effort. Hopkins carried a message from Roosevelt to Stalin promising "all possible aid...in obtaining munitions, armaments and other supplies" needed to meet Stalin’s urgent requirements. Stalin recognized Hopkins’ importance. He met with him twice for a total of six hours, gave him access to senior officials and even provided him with a bomb shelter stocked with caviar, champagne, chocolates and cigarettes.
Igor Bogolepov, a Soviet defector who had been employed in the Soviet Foreign Ministry, was a good friend of the late Bernard Yoh, a member of AIM’s staff for many years. He told Yoh that shortly after the German invasion of the Soviet Union, he was told by his boss that they expected the U.S. to provide a lot of aid, but they also thought that our government would require significant concessions in return. Bogolepov was ordered to prepare a list of possible demands the U.S. might make as a condition for providing aid. He went to work, listing such things as restoration of freedom of religion and other reforms. Before long, he was told not to bother with it. He asked why and was told that it was no longer necessary, because "our man has been put in charge of the whole aid operation." "Our man," he said, "was Harry Hopkins."
The Sword and the Shield supports this story, saying that in addition to persuading Roosevelt that aid to Russia was worth the risk, "Hopkins also pleased the Russians by insisting on aid without strings." It says Maj. Ivan Yeaton, the American mili-tary attaché, got into a fierce argument with Hopkins during his visit to Moscow over whether or not we should demand the right to send military observers to the Russian front in return for our aid. Hopkins opposed this. Yeaton wrote in his book, The Memoirs of Ivan D. Yeaton, "When I impugned the integrity and methods of Stalin he could stand it no longer and shut me up with an intense, ‘I don’t care to discuss the matter further.’"
Hopkins fitted the pattern for potential KGB recruits perfectly. He was a leftist and his position and his influence on FDR made him a very desirable target for recruitment. He was known to have a lifestyle that was beyond his means. He had to pay his first wife alimony of $5,000 a year, half his government salary. This put him in such a severe financial bind that a fund was created to give him $5,000 a year so he could pay his alimony and maintain his lifestyle. This had been reported in the Saturday Evening Post in April 1941. John T. Flynn in his book, The Roosevelt Myth, says the fund was raised from social workers, but that is so implausible that it may have been a cover story. Gordievsky surmises that Akhmerov stroked Hopkins by feeding him supposed secret messages from Stalin, but it would be surprising if Akhmerov had not offered to provide Hopkins with some financial assistance.
Any illegal action he had taken on behalf of the Soviets and any secret favors received from them would have provided the KGB with a sword to hold over his head. His secret meetings with Akhmerov alone would have provided the KGB with leverage over him even if they passed each other nothing more incriminating than sugar and cream for their coffee. Hiss, the Rosenbergs, Harry Dexter White and all the other American Soviet agents that Gordievsky describes as having committed illegal acts to aid the Soviets were in the KGB’s pocket. They had to do its bidding or risk exposure. Hopkins would have been caught in the same vise.
It is easy to see why Harry Hopkins would be more valuable to the Soviets than would Alger Hiss. He was the closest thing to a chief of staff that FDR had. He had the President’s ear on a wide variety of issues. Hiss, an upper level bureaucrat at the State Department had far less influence on policy, but he collected and transmitted to the Russians a wide variety of useful information. Both he and Hopkins accompanied President Roosevelt to the Yalta conference in February 1945, but Hiss’s responsibilities were confined to matters involving the nascent United Nations. He was accused of helping the Soviets get three votes in that organization. He may have given them information about our negotiating positions on various issues, giving them a big advantage in the negotiations.
Hopkins was in a far better position than Hiss to shape our plans and to influence decisions. Would Hiss, the witting, willing Soviet agent, have given the President advice radically different from that proffered by the supposedly "unconscious agent," Harry Hopkins? It would have been hard to devise a more pro-Russian policy than that pushed by Hopkins at Yalta. Hiss was willing to break the law to furnish the Soviets with information. Hopkins not only gave them information that helped them in their negotiations with Roosevelt and Churchill, but he also persuaded Roosevelt to give in to their demands.
It was Harry Hopkins who persuaded the ailing Roosevelt to travel all the way to Yalta to meet with Stalin in February 1945 to iron out plans for the postwar world. Hopkins overcame the opposition of all the President’s other close advisers. Sherwood quotes Hopkins as saying, "(M)ost did not like or trust the Russians anyway and did not understand why the President of the United States should cart himself all over the world to meet Stalin. This argument carried no weight with me. The all-important thing was to get the meeting. There was not a chance of getting that meeting outside the Crimea. The President’s advisers gave me a lot of acid criticism when they found out that I was the one who had talked to Gromyko about the possibility of going to the Crimea. When they descended on the President to urge him not to go, the President wavered again and cooked up a lot of counter proposals, none of which made any sense." Hopkins noted that Churchill was also none too keen about going to the Crimea, but Hopkins ultimately prevailed. The consequences were disastrous for Eastern Europe and the West.
Some of the decisions reached at Yalta were kept secret. When they leaked out they gave rise to considerable disillusionment, acrimony and bitterness. But Harry Hopkins, who was at Roosevelt’s elbow during the meetings, told Sherwood, "We were absolutely certain we had won the first great victory of the peace....The Russians had proved they could be reasonable and farseeing...." Within weeks those high hopes were dashed as the Soviets showed their true colors. Sherwood wrote, "It was beginning to be feared that a monstrous fraud had been perpetrated at Yalta, with Roosevelt and Churchill as the unwitting dupes."
Hiss was accused of having helped the Soviet Union get three extra votes in the U.N., an absurd concession, but not the worst thing to come out of the Yalta conference. The failure of our negotiators to obtain guarantees of the freedom of the countries of Eastern Europe, especially Poland, soon became a major bone of contention. At the suggestion of Averell Harriman and Charles Bohlen, President Truman asked Hopkins to go to Moscow in May 1945 to discuss this and other serious disagreements with Stalin. Gordievsky says that Akhmerov "helped persuade Hopkins, who was very ill at the time, that he had once again a crucial role to play."
At this crucial meeting, Hopkins appealed to Stalin’s "reasonableness." He stressed the importance of allowing free elections, free speech, freedom of religion and other human rights in Poland, but he told Stalin the U.S. had no interest in seeing anyone connected with the anti-communist Polish government-in-exile in London involved in the new provisional government of Poland. He said we would accept any Polish government that was both desired by the people of Poland and also friendly to the Soviet Union. The result was that the Communist puppet government remained in power. Andrew and Gordievsky say, "The KGB believed that with Hopkins’ help it had triumphed over American imperialism." Could Hiss, the conscious agent, have done any worse?
JUST NINE YEARS AGO, I WROTE AN AIM REPORT ABOUT THE REVELATION BY KGB DEFEC-tor Oleg Gordievsky that Harry L. Hopkins, President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s most influential adviser, had been regarded by the KGB (then called the NKVD) as "the most important of all Soviet wartime agents in the United States." This had been revealed in KGB: The Inside Story, co-authored by Gordievsky and Christopher Andrew. This obviously meant more to those of us who had lived through FDR’s twelve years in the White House. We remembered the important role that Harry Hopkins had played in shaping the New Deal, wartime policies and the postwar fate of central Europe. The discovery that the KGB considered him to be their most valuable agent did not come as a complete surprise.
MAJ. GEORGE RACEY JORDAN, WHO SERVED AS LEND-LEASE EXPEDITER AT THE ARMY AIR Corps base at Great Falls, Montana, claimed in his book, Major Jordan’s Diaries, that Harry Hopkins had called him in 1943 and ordered him to expedite the shipment of 15 crates that Jordan believes contained uranium to the Soviet Union. An investigation in 1949 found that three shipments of uranium had been made to the USSR, the first two of them by air through Great Falls, Montana. There was a very strict embargo on uranium exports during the war. Jordan claimed that it was circumvented by procuring the uranium in Canada. Gen. Leslie Groves, who headed the Manhattan Project, testified before the House Committee on Un-American Activities that uranium could have not have been exported "without support of U.S. authorities." He said that any such shipment would have to have been "entirely secret." He had not been told of any uranium shipments to the Soviet Union.
I REPORTED THESE CHARGES IN THE OCTOBER-B 1990 AIM REPORT, AND ONE OF OUR readers, Richard Heener, sent us an article that exposed several errors in Maj. Jordan’s story but provides confirmation of a very suspicious and highly secret shipment of radioactive material to the Soviet Union. The article, published in Air Classics magazine, was by Ben L. Brown, who Jordan identified as the pilot of the C-47 that flew the boxes of uranium from Great Falls to Fairbanks, Alaska. Brown says that in early 1945, he and Capt. Frank Lewis flew a C-47 that was being delivered to the Soviet Union to Great Falls, where two large boxes were loaded onto the plane. They were told they contained spare parts, but a brownish-black sandy material had leaked through cracks in the wood, and they found that the boxes were heavier than they expected.
THEY WERE TOLD THAT TWO RUSSIAN GUARDS WOULD BE ON THE FLIGHT TO FAIRBANKS, Alaska. That was a first. Actually, several Russians boarded the plane, two of them carrying submachine guns. Capt. Lewis tried to touch some of the material that had leaked out, and one of the Russians cried, "Nyet, nyet! Burn hands," suggesting that he knew it was radioactive. Brown and Lewis were alarmed by that and decided they better find out what the mysterious cargo was. They were told it was a top secret flight, that no one knew what it was all about, and that they should "shut up, fly the damn plane and forget the whole thing" or they would have problems. According to Brown’s account, Jordan was wrong about the date, about the number of boxes, about where and why the powder leaked out and who touched it. These errors raise questions about other parts of Jordan’s story, including his claim that Hopkins had personally called to tell him to expedite this shipment, but Brown’s account strongly suggests that this was a secret shipment of uranium to the USSR.
I WROTE IN THE OCTOBER-B 1990 AIM REPORT, "If HARRY HOPKINS COVERTLY HELPED THE Soviets circumvent the embargo on uranium exports, he was guilty of treason comparable to that of the Rosenbergs. This is a story our media should not ignore." They have ignored it. The documentary evidence uncovered by the House Committee on Un-American Activities confirmed that uranium was flown to the Soviet Union from Great Falls. Ben Brown’s article indicates that the shipments were cloaked in the greatest secrecy. Gen. Groves’ testimony proves that this had to be arranged by someone very high in the government. Harry Hopkins, who was in charge of Lend-Lease, is the only official identified as a Soviet agent who had the power to circumvent the embargo on uranium exports. Jordan may have made up the story about the phone call, but Harry Hopkins remains the prime suspect. The verdict will have to wait until the KGB records pertaining to these shipments are found and made public.
IN 1990, THE NEW YORK TIMES REPORTED GORDIEVSKY’S REVELATION THAT HOPKINS was considered to be a most valuable KGB agent, but it also said that he believed that Hopkins was "an American patriot" who was "an unconscious agent." I have good reason to believe that both Andrew and Gordievsky know that is nonsense. I can see that it is politically incorrect to report all the evidence that shows Harry Hopkins was a Soviet agent. That tarnishes the image of Franklin D. Roosevelt. I well recall shedding tears when I heard that Roosevelt had died. Newt Gingrich claims FDR as one of his great heroes. But his reputation is diminished if it becomes known that he allowed himself to be manipulated by a Soviet agent.
THERE ARE MANY PEOPLE WHO PREFER THAT SUCH TRUTHS NOT BE MADE KNOWN. IT IS like Sen. Nickles saying that the Republicans in Congress don’t want to try to find out the truth about Vince Foster’s death because if the official line is exposed as a lie, it means that President Clinton was somehow involved and that is "too horrible for us to deal with." Those who dare tell unpopular truths may find themselves ostracized. Their books may not be accepted for publication. If they are published, they may get reviews that impugn the credibility of the author. Perhaps that is why Gordievsky, as he discussed the Hopkins case with his co-author, "came gradually to the conclusion that Hopkins had been an unconscious rather than a conscious agent." I hope that Mr. Andrew’s political correctness has not led him to suppress information provided by Gordievsky and Mitrokhin that might not sit too well with our media. If he was focusing on what might make news and help boost sales of The Sword and the Shield, giving little attention to Hopkins is understandable. A Nexis search did not find a single American paper that reported his new revelations about Hopkins.
I ALSO FOUND IT INTERESTING THAT THE BOOK REPORTS THAT SIX OUT OF THE TEN TOP- rated Soviet agents in France in the 1970s were journalists. It gives only their code names even though the information it provides about the top three indicates that the authors know who they are. For example, they say that ANDRÉ had access to the highest levels in the Pompidou administration and that he was used to pass "slanted information calculated to increase the President’s suspicion of the United States." BROK, the next highest paid journalist-agent, is said to have been recruited as an ideological agent in 1946, but he went on the KGB’s payroll within a few years to supplement his income as a journalist and to buy an apartment. In the mid-1970s he was paid over 100,000 francs a year. He played a leading role in active measures against President Giscard d’Estaing. The book says Mitrokhin’s files provide support for the charge that Le Monde had a pro-Soviet bias. It says his notes "identify two senior journalists and several contributors who were used, in most cases doubtless unwittingly, to disseminate KGB disinformation."
THE BOOK DEVOTES OVER FIVE PAGES TO THE EFFORTS OF THE KGB TO USE FRENCH journalists and manipulate the media, but it identifies only one such journalist by his real name, Pierre-Charles Pathé. He is named because he was arrested in 1979 and prosecuted for disseminating Soviet disinformation through publications that he produced with money supplied by the KGB. The Italian media are given similar treatment, again avoiding identifying the Soviet agents by name. But there is no comparable discussion of American journalists and publications. Is this because Mitrokhin was not interested in American journalists and made few if any notes about them, or is it because the KGB had no success in recruiting them?
IN THEIR NEW BOOK, VENONA, JOHN EARL HAYNES AND HARVEY KLEHR DISCUSS 18 U.S. journalists who have been mentioned in the Venona intercepts or in Soviet archives to which they have had access. These included Winston Burdett of CBS News, Peter Rhodes of United Press International, Richard Lauterbach, John Scott and Stephen Laird of Time magazine, Walter Sol Bernstein of The New Yorker and later a Hollywood screenwriter, Johannes Steele, radio commentator and columnist, Ricardo Setaro of CBS News, Joseph Barnes of The New York Herald Tribune, Joseph Berger, a reporter turned speech writer for Roosevelt, Truman and other Democrats, Leon Pearson, (Drew Pearson’s brother), David Karr, Drew Pearson’s employee, and I.F. Stone. Not one of them is listed in the index of The Sword and the Shield, probably because the Venona intercepts are limited to messages sent in the mid-1940s and Mitrokhin’s archive does not go back that far. But the Vietnam War produced a climate that was conducive to KGB recruitment of journalists. Perhaps the same concerns that led Christopher Andrew to withhold the names of the French and Italian journalists also led him to avoid discussing what success, if any, the KGB had in recruiting U.S. journalists.