June 24, 1992

The Honorable Robert Gates
Director of Central Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, DC 20505

Dear Director Gates:

As you are aware, the Senate Select Committee is committed to an exhaustive and thorough investigation of the POW/MIA issue. Above all, our Committee is resolved to formulate its final conclusions, truthfully, based on the knowledge that no potential body of evidence has been overlooked or shielded from scrutiny. Anything less will invite severe and justified criticism of both the Administration and this Committee.

The Committee, therefore, requests your continued assistance in making available further relevant sources of information to Committee investigators for review. Thus far, your staff has been superb in its support of this investigation; we thank you for that assistance. We ask, however, for even greater latitude and access to areas which have been previously circumscribed by traditional security procedures.

Specifically, it is important that appropriately cleared investigators be able to review actual files in their entirety. Unlike the other intelligence agencies, CIA has not, as a rule, made available its complete files for review. While CIA has been very helpful in extracting specific documents if previously identified or known, this does not resolve the key question of what other information may reside in CIA's files.

We would, therefore, ask you to begin by permitting access to two areas critical to this investigation; DDO's operational files on the POW/MIA issue, and the President's Daily Intelligence Briefing, and "Special Briefs" prepared by CIA from 1972 through at least 1989. Obviously, we are only interested in reviewing POW/MIA related briefs and will work with you to establish the necessary procedures to protect sensitive sources and methods.
Again, this Committee appreciates your continuing spirit of cooperation and looks forward to working with you toward the successful conclusion of this investigation.

Sincerely,

Bob Smith  
Vice Chairman  

John F. Kerry  
Chairman

JFK/kb/bt
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
July 1, 1992

CONTACT: Deborah DeYoung
202/224-2075

COMMITTEE TO VOTE THURSDAY
ON PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF POW/MIA DOCUMENTS

WASHINGTON -- Members will consider measures designed to press for immediate and comprehensive declassification and release of POW/MIA documents at a public meeting Thursday, Chairman John F. Kerry, D-Massachusetts, and Vice Chairman Bob Smith, R-New Hampshire, announced today.

The meeting will begin at 9 a.m. on Thursday, July 2 in Room 106 of the Dirksen Senate Office Building.

This action follows a recommendation of the Committee's Declassification Task Force, headed by Sen. Charles Robb, D-Virginia, and Sen. Charles Grassley, R-Iowa.

"Too much time has passed -- and too much false information has been circulated -- to wait any longer for full declassification," Kerry said. "If U.S. teams are to have any credibility in the future, the public must know what has been done in the past on behalf of our missing servicemen."

"There is no national security reason to continue to keep POW/MIA documents, now in the possession of the Select Committee, hidden from the American people," Smith added.
SUBJECT:
Letter to Chairman John Kerry and Vice Chairman Bob Smith re response to the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs Letter to the President Relative to Declassification of Documents.

Review and Passage to DCI for Signature please
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)</th>
<th>DATE RECEIVED</th>
<th>OFFICER'S INITIALS</th>
<th>COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Executive Registry</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Executive Director</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Deputy Director of Central Intelligence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Director of Central Intelligence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Return to Director of Congressional Affairs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. DD/SA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Honorable John F. Kerry  
Chairman  
Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs  
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Pursuant to the Senate Resolution 324 on the Declassification of POW/MIA materials, the July 1, 1992 letter to the President on the same issue and the July 9, 1992 Committee elaboration of its request, Agency documents requested by the Committee are being reviewed and this letter constitutes an interim response.

With regard to those Agency documents that CIA has transferred to the Director of the National League of Families, copies of those documents were deposited with the Library of Congress on January 14 of this year and are available there for the Committee's review and copying. A small portion of those documents are currently being reviewed by the Defense Intelligence Agency's Central Documents Office to ensure their compliance with the McCain law.

Concerning the 120 documents related to Laos and Vietnam that have been provided to the Committee, some 30 of those reports have been declassified with some redaction, and the remainder will be redacted and declassified to meet your August 15, 1992 deadline.

The specific overhead photography requested by the Committee is currently being reviewed for declassification. Either the photography or line drawings based on the photography will be made available to the Committee as requested by the July 23, 1992 deadline.

We will be reviewing the materials requested in annex "A" of the Committee's July 9, 1992 letter and believe that we will be able to complete the declassification process of those materials by the July 23 deadline. Those included in the addenda to Annex "A" pose more of a problem. The
Typescript Study of June 1992 on the Vietnam prison systems will be reviewed for declassification. Given its length and complexity, this may not be completed by 23 July. The typescript on the Lao Ministry of Interior, given its current and sensitive nature, cannot be declassified.

Finally, we will be reviewing other Agency files for additional materials that can be declassified.

As we complete various aspects of this process we will be working with the Committee to ensure that the materials are made available in the most expeditious manner possible.

An original of this letter is also being sent to Vice Chairman Smith.

Sincerely,

Robert M. Gates
Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Letter to Kerry/Smith, POW/MIA re Response to the Letter to the President Relative to Declassification of Documents

OCA/Senate/RWMagner:jah/ (21 Jul 92)

Distributed: Original
The Honorable Bob Smith
Vice Chairman
Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Vice Chairman:

Pursuant to the Senate Resolution 324 on the Declassification of POW/MIA materials, the July 1, 1992 letter to the President on the same issue and the July 9, 1992 Committee elaboration of its request, Agency documents requested by the Committee are being reviewed and this letter constitutes an interim response.

With regard to those Agency documents that CIA has transferred to the Director of the National League of Families, copies of those documents were deposited with the Library of Congress on January 14 of this year and are available there for the Committee's review and copying. A small portion of those documents are currently being reviewed by the Defense Intelligence Agency's Central Documents Office to ensure their compliance with the McCain law.

Concerning the 120 documents related to Laos and Vietnam that have been provided to the Committee, some 30 of those reports have been declassified with some redaction, and the remainder will be redacted and declassified to meet your August 15, 1992 deadline.

The specific overhead photography requested by the Committee is currently being reviewed for declassification. Either the photography or line drawings based on the photography will be made available to the Committee as requested by the July 23, 1992 deadline.

We will be reviewing the materials requested in annex "A" of the Committee's July 9, 1992 letter and believe that we will be able to complete the declassification process of those materials by the July 23 deadline. Those included in the addenda to Annex "A" pose more of a problem.

23 July 1992
Typescript Study of June 1992 on the Vietnam prison systems will be reviewed for declassification. Given its length and complexity, this may not be completed by 23 July. The typescript on the Lao Ministry of Interior, given its current and sensitive nature, cannot be declassified.

Finally, we will be reviewing other Agency files for additional materials that can be declassified.

As we complete various aspects of this process we will be working with the Committee to ensure that the materials are made available in the most expeditious manner possible.

An original of this letter is also being sent to Chairman Kerry.

Sincerely,

Robert M. Gates
Director of Central Intelligence
July 1, 1992

The Honorable George Bush
The White House
Washington DC 20500

Dear Mr. President:

We are writing to request that you issue an executive order to declassify and publicly release all documents, files, and other materials in the government's possession that relate to American POWs or MIAs lost in Southeast Asia.

Mistrust and suspicion of the government's role and actions on POW/MIA matters through the years have hindered efforts to resolve questions related to our lost American servicemen, and we believe declassifying documents will begin to provide POW/MIA families the answers they need and deserve.

Pursuant to Section 1082 of the FY 1992-1993 National Defense Authorization Act, the Defense Department has begun to declassify certain documents, but the effort targets only a fraction of POW/MIA materials in the government's possession. We believe it is in the interests of all those concerned to achieve much broader declassification, and have attached a list of documents that encompasses the full range of information that we believe should be released as expeditiously as possible. We reserve the right to add to our request should we desire additional documents needed to complete our investigation.

We understand that for reasons of national security, some materials to be released to the public require redaction. However, our investigation has convinced us that the vast majority of materials related to the POW/MIA issue now protected by the National Security Classification System could be released to the public in full with absolutely no harm or risk to national security or to the families' right to privacy.
As a starting point, already-redacted documents now in the possession of the Committee could be declassified and released very swiftly, in time for our August hearings. Additionally, we request that the Nixon and Kissinger papers, described in the attached list, be declassified no later than August 13th.

We firmly believe that the public interest would be served if all POW/MIA documents in the government's possession were declassified, and we hope you share our opinion.

Sincerely,

BOB SMITH
Vice Chairman

JOHN MCCAIN
United States Senator

HANK BROWN
United States Senator

CHUCK GRASSLEY
United States Senator

NANCY LANDON KASSEBAUM
United States Senator

JOHN F. KERRY
Chairman

THOMAS A DASCHLE
United States Senator

HARRY REID
United States Senator

CHARLES ROBB
United States Senator

ROBERT KERREY
United States Senator

Sincerely,
The Committee requests that all of:

* KISSINGER PAPERS -- The Committee requests that the entire files which relate to the POW/MIA issue of Dr. Henry Kissinger, former Special Presidential Envoy to the Paris Peace Accords, National Security Advisor, and Secretary of State, be declassified.

* NIXON PAPERS -- The Committee requests that all files of former-President Richard Nixon which relate to the POW/MIA issue be declassified.

* FORD PAPERS -- The Committee requests that all files of former President Gerald Ford which relate to the POW/MIA issue be declassified.

* CARTER PAPERS -- The Committee requests that all files of former President Jimmy Carter which relate to the POW/MIA issue be declassified.

* REAGAN PAPERS -- The Committee requests that all files of former President Ronald Reagan which relate to the POW/MIA issue be declassified.

* BUSH PAPERS -- The Committee requests that all files of President George Bush which relate to the POW/MIA issue be declassified.

* WAGG DOCUMENTS -- The Committee requests that all WAGG memoranda, minutes of meetings and other documents related to the POW/MIA issue be declassified.

* LIVE SIGHTING & HEARSAY REPORTS -- Pursuant to Section 1082 of the FY 1992-1993 Defense Authorization bill, the Committee requests expedient public disclosure of these reports. Additionally, the Committee requests that all case file data accompanying these reports be declassified.

* OTHER REPORTS -- In addition to first hand and hearsay reports, the POW/MIA Fact Book issued by the Defense Department states that nearly 12,000 reports pertaining to dog tags, bones, and crash and grave site information from the war years exist. The Committee requests that these reports be declassified.

* CASUALTY FILES -- Pursuant to Section 1082 of the FY 1992-1993 Defense Authorization bill, the Committee requests that all DIA and Service casualty files, pending
DIA HISTORICAL FILES -- The Committee understands that POW/MIA-related archival information from 1956 to 1980 was retrieved to the National Archives in 1984. Apparently the files were retrieved by DIA in 1985, and later returned in 1988. The Committee requests the declassification of all these files which include documents relating to DoD policy decisions made through Operation Homecoming and the fall of Saigon.

CURRENT DIA POW/MIA POLICY FILES -- The Committee requests the declassification of all policy memoranda, documents, materials, reviews, and internal assessments pertaining to the POW/MIA issue created by DIA since 1980. Such documents would include the Gaines Report and the Tighe Report.

LAST KNOWN ALIVE/IN CAPTIVITY FILES -- The Committee understands that DIA holds working casualty files, approximately 130 in number, relating to servicemen last known to be alive and in captivity. The Committee requests the declassification of these files.

DIA INTELLIGENCE FILES -- There are approximately 1,100 such files that correspond to MIAs who are non-KIA/ENR status. The Committee requests they be declassified.

FILES OF DR. ROGER SHIELDS, FORMER DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AFFAIRS WITH RESPONSIBILITY FOR POW/MIA AFFAIRS (1971-1976) -- Dr. Shields' files contain DoD policy documents from 1971 to 1976 relating to POW/MIA matters, and we understand that they are currently being stored in 26 separate boxes. The Committee requests that all of these materials be declassified.

FILES OF FORMER DEPUTY DEFENSE SECRETARY WILLIAM CLEMENTS -- The Committee has reason to believe Mr. Clements' files include important materials related to the government's handling of the POW/MIA issue, and the Committee requests that these papers associated with the former Defense Secretary be declassified.

FILES OF FORMER DEFENSE SECRETARIES CASPAR WEINBERGER AND FRANK CARLUCCI RELATED TO THE POW/MIA ISSUE -- The Committee requests that all memoranda, background papers, talking papers, meeting minutes, personal cables, "breakfast meeting" papers prepared for or by Secretary
NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY PRODUCT REPORTS -- 1,359
war-time product reports and 630 post-war product reports
presently exist, and the Committee requests that all of
them be declassified. This would include all third party
reports pertaining to the POW/MIA issue in NSA's
possession. Understanding that this information is
governed by the National Security Act, which provides for
a 50 year time period before public disclosure of such
documents, the Committee believes data in these reports
could be declassified in carefully redacted form.

SERVICE INTELLIGENCE FILES -- The Committee requests
that all Service intelligence archives from 1971 to 1975
be declassified. This information has not been provided
to date by the Services, despite repeated requests by the
Committee.

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF DOCUMENTS -- The Committee requests
that POW/MIA related policy as well as operational
documents issued by the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the
war and until the fall of Saigon be declassified. The
Committee believes important historical documents held by
the Joint Chiefs detail cross border operations, proposed
rescue operations and negotiations that merit full
disclosure to the American public.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY DOCUMENTS -- CIA
maintains custody of its wartime files. The
Committee has learned that CIA has transferred 250
volumes of POW/MIA information to the Director of
the National League of Families, over a period of years
in the 1980s. If such a transfer of documents has
occurred, the Committee requests that those documents
be immediately declassified. In addition, any other
POW/MIA related document held by CIA the Committee
requests be declassified.

CIA DOCUMENTS SENT TO THE SELECT COMMITTEE -- A file of
roughly 120 CIA documents related to Laos and Vietnam has
been sent to the Select Committee. The Committee
requests that all these documents be declassified.

PHOTOGRAPHY AND IMAGERY -- The Committee requests that
all imagery collected by National Technical Means
indicating the possible presence of American POWs
in Southeast Asia after 1973 be declassified. This would
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL DOCUMENTS -- The Committee requests that all NSC memoranda, minutes of meetings, National Security Decision Directives, and other documents related to the POW/MIA issue be declassified.

STATE DEPARTMENT TELEGRAMS ON THE POW/MIA ISSUE -- The State Department has delivered to the Committee a file of several thousand telegrams concerning POW/MIA matters and related issues treated in U.S. Embassy and State Department cable traffic between 1973 and 1990. The Committee requests that all these materials be declassified.

FILES OF MR. FRANK SIEVERTS, FORMERLY THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT FOR POW/MIA MATTERS TO THE DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE (1969-1977) -- The Committee requests that the entire files of Special Assistant Frank Sieverts be declassified. Additionally, the Committee requests the declassification of all State Department memoranda, policy documents, and diplomatic cables relating to the negotiation of the Paris Peace Accord in 1973.

SPECIFIC MEMORANDA AND DOCUMENTS -- The Committee requests that a cable from Admiral Thomas Moorer to CINCPAC dated March 22, 1973, a memo from Assistant Secretary Eagleburger to then Secretary of Defense Elliot Richardson dated March 27, 1973, and a letter from Richardson to Dr. Kissinger dated March 28, 1973, all be declassified. Additionally, the Committee requests declassification of satellite imagery of Sam Neua showing the "Walking K", satellite imagery of the Hon Gai prison building, showing the "Walking K" in morse code, written interpretations of that imagery, and, finally, JSOC materials on the Gnommarath incursion.
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON POW/MIA AFFAIRS
ACTION TO DECLASSIFY DOCUMENTS RELATED TO POW/MIA MATTERS

On 2 July 1992, the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs voted unanimously to ask the President to issue an executive order declassifying all POW/MIA-related documents available in the U.S. Government inventory. A letter containing this request has been sent to the President.

-- The Senate document attached to the letter lists 250 volumes of POW/MIA information already released by the Agency to the Director of the National League of Families (Anne Mills-Griffith). These documents have already been declassified by the Agency.

-- The attachment requests declassification of an estimated 120 other Agency documents related to Vietnam and Laos which are now in the Committee's possession. We believe that these documents are related to live sighting reports and can be easily declassified.

-- The Senate request includes imagery

-- The Senate requests that any other POW/MIA-related document held by the Agency be declassified. The latter request will be the most difficult for the Agency to honor. This will require careful review and consideration.

Since this is a late-breaking event, it is too early to determine what will follow. We have learned from the Select Committee Staff that a Committee meeting is scheduled for 23 July 1992 to weigh the response from the Executive Branch. Staffers predict that if the response is judged to be inadequate, there will be a motion to invoke Senate Resolution 400. This resolution, via the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence mechanism, would require a vote before the entire Senate to force the President's hand on this issue.
WARNING: This output is from a TOP SECRET system, processing data with multiple SCI compartments and handling caveats. Reliable human review of each page for appropriate classification control, and handling markings is required prior to dissemination from TOP SECRET Agency control.

WARNING: This printer cover sheet is to be treated as classified and properly disposed.
MEMORANDUM FOR: D/OC\n\nFROM: Robert W. Magner
Deputy Director for Senate Affairs

SUBJECT: Response to the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs Letter to the President Relative to Declassification of Documents

1. Attached is the prioritized schedule for declassification that was able to get from the Committee earlier this week. It provides for a bit more time to comply but is still overarching in its requirements. I have highlighted those portions relative to CIA in the attachment. Outlined below is a status report on what the Agency has been asked for and the status of our response. You may want to share this with the DCI, and we may want to consider a letter to the Committee giving the status of our compliance and the problems we may encounter in that regard.

Documents to be declassified by 23 July 1992:

  Status: DO is seeking to identify and will undertake the declassification procedure.

- Photography and Imagery--All designated imagery listed in Attachment "C" collected by National Technical means indicating the possible presence of American POWs in Southeast Asia after 1973. This should include all photography revealing possible distress signals or symbols.
  Status: OIA/DI is reviewing the specific cases and has consulted with CRES.
Documents to be declassified by 15 August 1992:

• CIA: All POW/MIA related documents that CIA has transferred to the Director of the National League of Families over a period of years in the 1980s.

Status: These documents which amount to eight boxes of 125 volumes of CIA materials which have been redacted and released to the League. The documents were also declassified in the process of releasing. A set of the documents has been provided to the Central Documents Office at DIA for legal review prior to passage to the Library of Congress. To comply we would have to copy the documents, which are held in the FOIA office or request that the Committee do so. Given the fact that these were passed to the League under FOIA we may have to address some legal concerns. Additionally, as in the case of the JFK files, the DCI may want to have the documents reviewed prior to release to determine if more information in them can be made available insofar as the original redaction occurred in some cases over a decade ago. This of course would greatly delay the whole process.

• CIA: Declassify all other POW/MIA related documents held by CIA.

Status: While there are documents in the Agency operational files that could be declassified, they are interwoven with other documents that are sensitive in nature, relate to sources and methods. Considerable resources would be required to undertake this separation and review, and it is highly doubtful if the 15 August deadline could be met. Frankly, my experience with the Committee would suggest that for the present at least we could ignore this aspect of the requirement provided that we are forthcoming in other areas.
SUBJECT: Response to the Senate Select Committee on
POW/MIA Affairs Letter to the President
Relative to Declassification of Documents

CIA: CIA Documents sent to the Select Committee--The 120 CIA documents related to Laos and Vietnam that have been sent to the Select Committee should be declassified.

Status: 30 of these reports have been redacted and declassified and the rest are in train. With the additional personnel that the DO has put on the job the 15 August deadline can be met. Beyond the 120 reports provided to the Committee there are an additional 370 reports which were contained in DIA live sighting files which have been redacted in those files which the Committee also possesses. The DO is preparing to declassify these reports as well. Four to six additional personnel have been placed on the project.

Documents to be released 15 September 1992:

- CIA: Photography and Imagery--All imagery collected by National Technical Means indicating possible presence of American POWs in Southeast Asia after 1973 and not previously designated for declassification.

Status: There are only the specific photographs listed in the request for 23 July above.

2. Comment: Essentially we are in pretty good shape. My understanding is that the DO will be bringing this issue to the DCI's attention on Monday. At this point the DCI needs to know the dimension of the problem and the fact that he will have to make some decisions in the near term.

Robert W. Magner

Attachment
14 August 1992
OCA 2420-92/3

The Honorable John F. Kerry
Chairman
Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

In response to the request contained in the July 9, 1992 letter to the National Security Council, enclosed are declassified versions of the six groups of CIA POW/MIA intelligence reports on Laos and Vietnam which were previously sent to the Committee in redacted form. The groups are separated according to reports categories, with three groups of reports each on Laos and Vietnam.

An original of this letter is also being sent to Vice Chairman Smith.

Sincerely,

Robert W. Magner
Deputy Director for Senate Affairs

Enclosures
1. Logs of Documents
2. Documents
14 August 1992
OCA 2420-92/4

The Honorable Bob Smith
Vice Chairman
Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Vice Chairman:

In response to the request contained in the July 9, 1992 letter to the National Security Council, enclosed are declassified versions of the six groups of CIA POW/MIA intelligence reports on Laos and Vietnam which were previously sent to the Committee in redacted form. The groups are separated according to reports categories, with three groups of reports each on Laos and Vietnam.

An original of this letter is also being sent to Chairman Kerry.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

Robert W. Magney
Deputy Director for Senate Affairs

Enclosures
1. Logs of Documents
2. Documents

ALL PORTIONS CLASSIFIED SECRET
SUBJECT: Letter to Kerry/Smith, POW/MIA Cmte
re Declassification of Documents per
9 July 1992 Request to NSC
Vice Admiral Bobby R. Inman, USN
Deputy Director of the
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Admiral Inman:

The House Task Force on American POW/MIAs in Southeast Asia will hold hearings in December to assess progress and recent developments concerning the POW/MIA issue. The first hearing, scheduled for early December (8, 9, or 10 -- schedule to be determined), will include testimony from representatives of the United States intelligence community.

We respectfully request your appearance at the above mentioned hearing. The Central Intelligence Agency last testified on this subject on March 17, 1976. It is critically important that the Central Intelligence Agency testify at this time.

As you know, the Task Force is charged with oversight responsibility for assessing United States Government efforts to resolve the POW/MIA dilemma. We would anticipate your addressing testimony to current resources -- both intelligence and operational -- being utilized on behalf of the POW/MIAs, progress since 1976, suggestions for improving intelligence collections and pertinent questions, such as:

- What is the priority of the POW/MIA issue at CIA?
- What are the resources being assigned to this problem within CIA?
- What are the roadblocks to resolving this issue? How can these barriers be eliminated?
- Has the United States intelligence community achieved smooth cooperation among its members on this issue?
- At what point does DIA pass primary tasking to CIA?
- What more can the United States Government do to assist
the intelligence community on this issue?

- What more can the United States intelligence community do on this issue?

In light of the importance assigned this problem by the Reagan Administration, your testimony is eagerly awaited.

Sincerely,

ROBERT K. DORMAN
Chairman, Task Force on American Prisoners and Missing in Southeast Asia

RKD: fr
The Honorable Jesse A. Helms  
United States Senate  
Washington, D.C. 20510  

Dear Jesse:  

Thank you for your letter regarding the prisoners of war. The names _______ and that of her husband, _______ have come up three times since 1981 associated with live prisoners of war reports. Each of these reports has proven groundless. The story regarding a Socialist Republic of Vietnam desire to return prisoners of war using _______ as a conduit to the highest level of the United States Government does not make sense since Vietnamese officials had every opportunity to deliver such a message as recently as February 1984 when Deputy Assistant Secretary Richard Armitage visited Hanoi for POW/MIA discussions.

Additionally, _______ request for assistance in travel documents is unnecessary and perplexing since permanent resident aliens, like citizens, are free to travel to North Korea, Cuba and Vietnam without restriction.

I am afraid that _______ past stories, the patent improbability of her present story and the inaccurate assertion regarding the need for travel documents indicate a need for a degree of skepticism and cautious dealing. _______ was wise in requesting authentication of the prisoner's existence before proceeding further.

The Central Intelligence Agency stands ready to pursue any lead, no matter how tenuous, that might result in the recovery of a live American prisoner of war. If _______ indeed provides any authenticating data, we shall be pleased to evaluate the material and pursue.

Sincerely,

William J. Casey  
Director of Central Intelligence
Attachment:
As Stated
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA : Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
      Deputy Director for Operations

FROM : Chief, East Asia Division

SUBJECT : Source of Prisoner of War Information

1. Attached is a draft letter in response to the 9 April 1984 letter from Senator Jesse Helms.

2. Summary: The attached package from Senator Helms details a contact made by [person] (son of Evangelist [person]) with [person] who claims she is in contact with the highest level Vietnamese authorities who wish to establish a private channel and return perhaps as many as 200 live American POW's. She requested assistance in insuring that if she visits Vietnam, she still will have free entry to the United States where she is a permanent resident alien despite her residence in Paris.
The Honorable William J. Casey  
Director  
Central Intelligence Agency  
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Bill:

Enclosed are the documents we've just discussed by telephone.

As will be obvious when you examine the enclosures, [redacted] has enlisted my support. Both [redacted] and his son are reasonably convinced that the people involved are "for real."

Please let me have your reaction. I don't want [redacted] and his son to be caught in a cockeyed situation -- but, on the other hand, if there is the slightest possibility of gaining the release of surviving Americans, if any, of course both you and I would like to see that happen.

I appreciate your help, my friend.

Sincerely,

JESSE HELMS:pd

Enclosures
April 6, 1984

Dear Senator Helms:

Enclosed is the material that you asked me to send to you. It is in two parts. The first is a complete narrative of everything that has taken place. Names of the principals, addresses, and phone numbers. The second is a brief summary of the narrative.

Enclosed are copies of two telexes; a photocopy of their Green Cards and Social Security cards; and a permit to re-enter the United States, as well as photographs of [redacted] and her husband. This is her second husband who is approximately ten years younger than she.

The material enclosed is extremely confidential. [redacted] and her family are quite concerned for their safety. They feel that if this information were to get into the hands of the wrong people, their lives would be in serious jeopardy. She has repeatedly asked me to be very careful. So, I request the same.

If you have any questions, please don't hesitate to call me. My office number is [redacted] and my secretary's name is [redacted]. My home number is [redacted]. Any help and consideration that you can give in this matter will be greatly appreciated by myself and many others.

Sincerely,

Mr. J. A. Helms
Recently, I met, through an old friend of mine by the name of [redacted], a Vietnamese woman by the name of [redacted], known to me as [redacted] (pronounced [redacted]). She lives in Paris, France. Her brother is in the present Government of Vietnam and is closely associated with the Chairman of the Communist Party.

The Government of Vietnam has made it known to [redacted] that they are interested in discussing, privately, the fate of MIA's and POW's in Vietnam. They have asked her, for several years, to find a channel with direct access to the White House for reasons of confidentiality. When [redacted] learned that I was the son of [redacted], she felt that I could possibly be that channel. I met with [redacted] in Brussels, Belgium, on January 8, of this year with my brother-in-law, [redacted], and [redacted] nephew, [redacted].

[redacted] shared that as many as 200, maybe more, Americans were still captive in Vietnam and that certain high-ranking members of the Vietnamese Government were vitally interested in establishing contact with the current leadership of the present Administration at the highest level. She emphasized, again and again, the issue of confidentiality, which was her stated reason for wanting direct access to the White House. We firmly stated to her, that while we were willing to assist in this matter, two things had to be clear: 1) We were not authorized to act and/or negotiate as agents of the United States Government, 2) We would only pursue this matter further once we had positive proof that American citizens were still alive and being held against their wills in Vietnam. This proof would
have to be in the form of personal interviews; video tapes of the interviews; and positive identification of the men in question; such as finger prints, etc. [ ] felt that all of this would be possible and she said that she would present this to the Vietnam Government. She later reported that she had communicated our position to them by telephone from Paris as well as through special courier.

[ ] informed us that the Government of Vietnam would be willing to meet all of those requirements, but they requested that she travel personally to Vietnam to meet with the appropriate people to work out the details.

[ ] has a resident alien card for the United States as well as a permit to re-enter this country and the equivalent French documents. However, she is prohibited to travel to Cuba, North Korea, and Vietnam. What is needed immediately is some type of temporary passport or other documents that would allow her to travel to Vietnam and then re-enter the United States and France. She has been, and is, in touch with the authorities of North Vietnam on a continuous basis. The time seems to be of the essence as they have requested her immediate return to negotiate these arrangements. Her inability to secure travel documents might seriously jeopardize her credibility with the said authorities.
NARRATIVE

In the late 1970's, I met a young man in Singapore by the name of [redacted], a Montagnard tribesboy from Vietnam. He was working for Food For The Hungry aboard the ship, The [redacted], which was picking up refugees in the South China Sea. [redacted] was helping to finance the project and my father asked that I evaluate its progress. [redacted] served as the Chaplain. Over the years I have maintained contact with this young man.

His father was one of the leading evangelists in South Vietnam and was killed by the communists in 1978. One of his younger brothers was also killed at the same time. When South Vietnam fell to the communists in 1975, he and his brother had to flee; however, the rest of his family remained.

[redacted] currently lives at: [redacted] He is married to the former [redacted], and they have one son; [redacted] 18 mos. His wife's parents, [redacted], reside at [redacted] called me shortly before Christmas, 1983, to tell me that a friend of his, a Vietnamese refugee by the name of [redacted], address: [redacted] had shared with him that he had an aunt and uncle who were very close to the present leadership of Vietnam and that this aunt and uncle, [redacted] address: [redacted] had shared with him that North Vietnam was still holding American prisoners and that

✓
North Vietnam was hoping to make contact with Americans they could trust.

I told that this was out of my hands and that he should see someone in the CIA, a senator, etc. I told him that I felt this was above my abilities to help. He, therefore, contacted called me to say that he felt that this contact was very real. He pleaded with me to go to Paris to meet I agreed, but felt that I should take one of the members of my Board of Directors who was also my brother-in-law, address: called me to say that he felt that this contact was very real. He pleaded with me to go to Paris to meet I agreed, but felt that I should take one of the members of my Board of Directors who was also my brother-in-law, address: A date was set for January 8. The meeting was changed from Paris to Brussels, Belgium, because was afraid of being spotted speaking with us in Paris.

We met at the Sheraton Hotel in downtown Brussels. I had a commitment which did not allow me to get into Europe early; however, my brother-in-law, went a day early with, had dinner and a preliminary conversation with and her husband. I arrived the next morning.

After introductions and a brief discussion, we had the following conversation. Present were: and her, husband.

(The following is taken from personal notes. Every question and answer has been translated by)
What do you expect from us?

Personally, we have no need, but I am a patriot of my country. I want to see my country delivered from the communists.

The reason we are here is because has told us that you have evidence that Americans are still being held against their wills in Vietnam. Do you have evidence that this is true?

Yes, I have personally seen them. All their names have been changed to Vietnamese names.

Why?

Security reasons. They don't want outside world and inside groups to know. This is a very closely guarded secret. Many in the Government do not know that these men exist.

Why after 12 years do the Vietnamese want to release Americans?

I am not sure exactly. They have written me on numerous occasions and they have called me asking me to find a way to get to the top American leaders to hold a private conversation.

Why would you want to talk to me? Why not go directly to a senator like Jeremiah Denton?

I don't know many Americans nor do I know Americans I can trust.

When was the last time the Government of Vietnam asked you to find a way to reach Americans?

1982 in writing, but every time I talk by phone they mention it again.

They put this in a letter?

Yes.

Is it safe?

It's all in code.
Why would you want to talk to me? How can you trust me?
Our nephew, says that is his close friend and that we can trust. has said we can trust you.

(The next few minutes were interrupted because pulled out a picture book and explained briefly her connections with the Government. Her brother was a member of the Communist Party of South Vietnam in the mid-1950's. They tried to arrest her brother and she helped him to escape to Cambodia and then to North Vietnam. During the war, she sold rice to the Viet Cong as well as the South Vietnamese Government. She then showed pictures of her big rice mill which is located in the Mekong Delta.)

Do the communists still allow you to operate your mill?
Yes. They took it over briefly then gave it back. One of my sons is there and now running the mill for me.

Your brother, where is he?
Vietnam.

What is his position?
He is Assistant to the Chairman of the Communist Party.

Who is he?

(She then showed me pictures of her brother with the Chairman. I then showed her pictures of my family. Then I showed her a family portrait which showed me with my father and brother-in-law. She expressed gratitude and believed who we were.)
When was the last time you were in Vietnam?

1976.

Would Vietnam let you go back?

Yes, but I am afraid of the KGB, but my daughter can go. The door is open.

Let me summarize the heart of the problem. How do we confirm that POW's exist so that we can go to see them without the KGB knowing?

My daughter will go to see my brother. She will tell him that we have made contact with #1. We must have positive evidence. I cannot have pictures or photographs that have been given to me by Vietnamese officials. Nobody would believe it. I must see for myself. We must have concrete evidence. I have to see some of these men for myself.

That will be no problem. They will arrange for you to come into the country or they will put them on a boat and let you see them off the coast of Macau or Hong Kong.

Let me summarize. Message will go from daughter, an official will come out to tell us necessary steps we take, we then meet POW's on a boat or we go into Vietnam.

That is correct.

If by boat, will they actually go to Macau or Hong Kong?

Don't know, but after we see the prisoners they will give them to us. But, we must keep it quiet, no press can be allowed to know of their release.

How do I know that the POW is not a traitor?
They will give sufficient evidence and if you have a name of anyone who you suspect is being held, give me his name and if he is alive, I will bring him to you.

(Brief discussion, notes not kept about daughter who was spending Christmas in home in Paris. She would also go back with daughter to deliver message.)

Please understand I am not a communist. Neither are most of the top leadership of Vietnam. They now realize the mistakes they have made and that they are the ones who have actually lost. What they want to do is be free of all outside influence. They want the Russians out and they would like to have positive relations with Americans. They would like to give the Americans back, kick the Russians out, if the Americans would guarantee to recognize them and to give assistance, and if they failed to get the Russians out, would they give asylum to the present leadership if they failed in their attempt?

We are not members of the Government nor can we speak for the Government. I think we are going ahead of ourselves at this point. First, let us take one step at a time.

This is a good year to do this. It is an election year.

Yes. We have thought of this. I have a personal request. I would like to see a church in Paris for Vietnamese. I want all the Vietnamese people to know about God.

I will help in any way I can. I understand that there are already very good Vietnamese churches.

We would like to help start one.

I will pay half of his salary and expenses if you will meet it.
Agreed.

(For a brief time, had a discussion among themselves concerning the possible men that Vietnam might release to them.)

Vietnam must release five men to us; otherwise, our Government might not believe what we say.

I don't think that will be a problem. I personally have seen four men, Americans that are being held in the basement of

Where does the army in Vietnam stand?

Solidly behind number one man.

You want good relations with America, do you also want good relations with China?

Absolutely not. (Only America.) If not America, they would like to stay where they are now.

Americans were there a few years ago. Why do they want us back?

After war, they saw their mistakes, now they want freedom and assistance in economic recovery. Russia has not followed up on its promises.

then addresses)

We will have expenses. Will you help pay for my daughter's ticket to Vietnam?

I will agree to pay for your daughter's expenses but only after I have seen the evidence that Americans do exist.

(We had general discussion about when the daughter would go and when they would expect an answer. They felt that it would be
several weeks. I had a trip to make to Beirut, Lebanon, for the remainder of that week. The following week, when I returned to my home, I received a phone call from [ ] stating that [ ] wanted to see me and that she would come to the United States. We agreed and set Saturday, January 28 aside to meet in [ ], North Carolina. [ ] had also asked to meet my mother. [ ] arrived at my father's office in [ ] at 10 a.m. Those present were: [ ] and myself. [ ] said that she wanted to be convinced of our commitment before we proceeded any further. We had a brief discussion concerning our commitment. The fact that we had gone to Brussels and the fact that we were meeting with her, were signs of our good faith. She agreed. She mentioned that she was going to go to Hong Kong to make contact with representatives of the trade delegation that had been sent out to meet with her. [ ] and I also mentioned to her that we felt that we could not take the responsibility of any prisoners being released to us because we were not entitled to do so and also we could not guarantee that it could be kept quiet, which could jeopardize the future of those left behind. She said that if we could not guarantee the security of these men that she would also advise that we not accept these POW's. Finances were brought up again. She asked if I would pay for her, her husband, and her nephew, and [ ], so they could travel with her to Hong Kong. I said no. Only after I have seen the evidence would I agree to that, but I would pay for [ ] expenses. She said that was agreeable to her. She went to Hong Kong and somehow
missed the delegation by one day. She made a brief trip into China, for purposes of which I am not aware, and back to the United States, for purposes of which I do not know. Then she went back to Paris. At that point, she was told by the number one man to come to Vietnam so that she could meet with him to discuss her contacts with me.

Over the past several weeks we have had many phone calls back and forth. All contacts have been made through [redacted] faces a basic problem. She has French and American travel documents but her travel documents have three countries she is not allowed to visit: Cuba, North Korea, and Vietnam. If she goes back to Vietnam, she will not be able to re-enter the United States or France and her immigrant status will be jeopardized. I asked why not let the Embassy of Vietnam in Bangkok issue her a diplomatic passport which would permit her to travel from Bangkok to Vietnam and back to Bangkok. She said, "Please understand, I am not a communist. If I accept their passport, I will be identified as one of them. I do not want to be identified as one of them. The only thing that keeps her from going back to Vietnam are her travel documents.

She has asked that we help her obtain a temporary passport [redacted] which would enable her to travel to Vietnam and back, or a waiver [redacted] which would allow her to go through Vietnam and then re-enter the United States and France.

Her home is in Paris. She also has a small boutique she operates. So, there are two concerns: the re-entry to the United States and also re-entry to France.

(I then had a long talk with my father. He felt I should
contact Senator Helms. This is where we now stand.)

After the two face-to-face meetings that [ ] and [ ] had with [ ], several questions remained in their minds.

What is [ ] basic motivation? There seems to be an apparent contradiction between the fact that she states anti-communistic convictions and that she is in permanent contact with the North Vietnam Government. On the other hand, it is undeniable that she has gone through great personal inconvenience, perhaps danger, and certainly financial expense—she has paid for all her traveling and related expenses for the trips to Europe, Southeast Asia, the United States, etc.—in the pursuit of this project. Another question which was not answered to their satisfaction, is related to the motivation of the North Vietnamese Government in trying to establish validity in the overall argument presented by [ ] to justify continued involvement in this project with the utmost seriousness and urgency. The fact that the lives of hundreds of American citizens could possibly be affected, justifies in their eyes, taking the limited and intelligent risks associated with this pursuit.

The matter which needs immediate attention has to do with the documents. Although in possession of a resident alien card for the United States and a permit to re-enter this country, [ ] is prohibited from travel to Cuba, North Korea, and Vietnam. She needs some type of temporary passport or other documents that would allow her to travel to North Vietnam and then re-enter the United States and France. The authorities of North Vietnam have reportedly requested, as recently as a few days ago, her immediate
return to negotiate these arrangements. Her inability to secure travel documents might seriously jeopardize her credibility with the said authorities as well as the success of this endeavor.
C.I.A. Headquarters
Langley Park, Virginia

Dear Sir;

A week and a half (give or take a day or two) ago, I sent a letter to you and your Agency; in regards to me & the men I have Recruited to Return to North Vietnam, to Perform a Covert Operation into That Country.

I sent the letter to you @ The Agency Addressed to Your Headquarters in Washington D.C., not realizing your Agency is located in Langley Park, Virginia, Mr. Director. I have no way of knowing if you received such a letter from me, laying out the details of Covert Operation titled "Come Back Home" into North Vietnam by me & my men.

Anyway this letter will inform you; until you can either locate such letter I've already sent or send someone to see me, on the covert operation objectives we will accomplish, once we enter North Vietnam again.

I must state now; that me and my men have no intention of threatening the national security of our country, the United States of America, or being hatred upon its President Mr. Ronald Reagan & the American bureaucracy (government) & its citizens by our operation into North Vietnam Mr. Director.

When we enter such country, we will carry no identification whatsoever to identify us as Americans, until we have emerged from the jungles of North Vietnam in 6 months sir.

The reasons why me and the 39 men I have Recruited are returning to North Vietnam and risking our lives to accomplish such operation are as follows:

1) To being every American Serviceman or woman held captive in Jungle Prison Camps from the Vietnam War still being held in North Vietnam

2) To being every CIA Field Officer still alive who is being held captive in Jungle Prison Camps, Home to you & The Agency and their Country of Families;

3) To take Hand Held Video Tape Camera footage of troop movements–War crimes

Date: September 30th
Vietnam Documents we find and other important stuff That can be useful to your Agency,

4) to Bring Back with us Paper Documents that we find For your Agency as well a Maps & ectera,

5) to Capture if possible any high ranking North Vietnamese or russian military leaders to smuggle back to our Country and your agency.

One of the men I have Recruited has in his possession, a letter smuggled out of North Vietnam from his brother who is still being held prisoner in a Vietnamese Jungle Prison Camp named in the English Language of "Camp 7"; me with such proof at hand that American’s are still held as prisoners of the Vietnam war - me and my men are returning to bring them home Mr. Director.

The reason why I wrote & sent the First Letter to you & the agency to the Washington D.C. Address; was to find out if you & the agency had balls enough to want to join our covert operation into North Vietnam Sin.

If you & the Agency, especially your covert operation's section desire to join us; me & my men would require that you arrange for the following to uphold your part of the operation Mr. Director:

1) to enable us to be stationed at General George C. Patton's empty Headquarters here at Fort Benning Georgia for a period of 7 weeks to train to refresh ourselves, weapons and to be able to reen Airborne training and be briefed by your Agency's knowledges in North Vietnam (I have the complete 7 week training schedule already)

2) to equip me & my men with advanced weaponry & devices from other countries, & help falls onto the United States of America if someone is caught using the use of Israeli Uzi 9mm Submachine pistol with Silencers / Walther PPK 9mm Pistols with Silencers / A.T.I.S. Inc. XM18 rotating 12 gauge Weapon System & other foreign weapons & gear for our covert operation)

3) Each man including me on the 30 man unit is to be paid $25,000.00 up front at the start of the training & operation - and upon completion of the operation each man will receive a bonus of $25,000.00 for a total of $75,000.00 per man for a grand total of $3,750,000.00 (just much of a boost in your Agency's bank account)

4) you shall arrange transportation to & from North Vietnam & any other logistics as the American's & Documents we bring with us in this operation. Due at least 1 no more than 2 Air Drops of Ammo & Food at prearranged dates and times over our 6 month operation into North Vietnam.

If you & your Agency can come to terms with the conditions 1-4 above as we require that you do then your next step is to get in contact with me. Since I'm Delegated the Recruiter, Spokesman, Plan, & Commander of operation "Come back home" as soon as you can.
One word of warning to you & your agency Mr. Director- If my men smell a double cross at all we have the capabilities to pull the operation off on our own and sell our story to several agencies upon our return from North Vietnam.

We have the manpower- will a determination to accomplish our planned objectives; and we have the financial backing if you & your agency fail to work with us Mr. Director.

As for weapons- we can in one night's work get everything from MiG 21s- M20s- M60s- 81mm Grenades- Plastic Explosives- LAVs & Shells- 122mm Armored Pinasing Cannons- Primer Detonating Cord & explosives (everything America made) that we need for our North Vietnam Covert Operation.

In all reality we don't need you & your agency around us. But we want to give you an idea of working with trained professionals who can guarantee a 100% or better accomplishment of our objectives and operation. Everyone of us 20 (total) will return from North Vietnam sir.

We have the manpower- skills to succeed in what we do- do your agency have the guts as men to participate in such a covert operation like we will do, or are you all a bunch of thumb sucking little boys scared of what we can do Mr. Director.

If you desire to work with my men & me you & the agency have until Monday October 5th, 1984 to contact me; otherwise we will do what we have planned on our own. I laugh at you and your agency when we all return from North Vietnam sir.

We are men set out to do a man's service and job for our country & his people, and we will succeed in bringing your fellow Americans' stuff home from North Vietnam. We are not boys like some who are worried about their federal jobs and expensive clothes & things Mr. Director.

Do your agency desire to work with us or all you all a bunch of scared kids.

Yours.

As see you all soon or when my men & me returned from North Vietnam as heroes.
TO: C/OCA SENATE

REMARKS

Ps. This shows just how long Sen. Smith has been blessed with the report. Time has not lessened his order, either

DO NOT use this form as a RECORD of approvals, concurrences, disposals, clearances, and similar actions.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with Representatives Bob Smith (R., NH) and John Rowland (R., CN) Regarding MIA/POW Issue

1. On 18 December 1987 I met with Representatives Bob Smith and John Rowland in 115 Cannon House Office Building. The purpose of the meeting was to show them a January 1977 Field Report [redacted] and the 1983 [redacted] on the same report, which they were demanding to see. The two Congressmen were angry, confrontational and frustrated, though they were more rational and polite than they had been on the telephone. In sum, the two Congressmen who are on a Subcommittee on missing U.S. servicemen in Indochina are trying to track down any information they can find on MIAs and POWs, and at the same time, determine how the U.S. government has handled any of that information. They have become increasingly frustrated because they feel that the DIA has withheld much information from them, and they have escalated their demands for more information by submitting a "Resolution of Inquiry" before Congress.

2. The CIA's most recent involvement with these two Congressmen began as follows:

(a) From an unidentified individual the Congressmen acquired the number of our raw report [redacted] and began to press the DIA to provide that report (copy attached hereto);

(b) The DIA correctly referred to the Agency as the originator of the report for permission to release it;

(c) Early during the week of 14 December, Mr. Smith attempted to call the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) on this matter, and the DCI's secretary called us (OCA) to determine what Mr. Smith was calling about:

All Portions—SECRET—
(d) Mr. Smith's staffer called OCA to demand that we provide the report;

(e) One of our OCA officers correctly informed the staffer that we may well not be able to provide Mr. Smith with a raw report, which is factual because we do not usually provide the Congress with raw reports, even to our own Oversight Committees;

(f) On 16 December we learned that Rep. Rowland was also trying to call the DCI, and we called him back to ask if we could help. We learned it was also about the raw report, which we tried to locate in our own system. We then learned after extensive checking that the report had been rescinded and that we could not even find our own copy, and thus we asked DIA to bring us the file, including the copy of our rescinded report;

(g) On 17 December we made direct contact with Mr. Rowland and attempted to explain the situation about the rescinded report, which we were trying to locate and for which we were trying to get permission to show him. He was reasonable but warned that Mr. Smith was getting more and more angry;

(h) Also on the same day the DIA team came to Headquarters with a copy of the whole file and the raw field report we ourselves could not retrieve from the system;

(i) On the afternoon of 17 December and throughout most of 18 December we worked with the DDO to get permission to show the Congressmen the report, and the DDO was cooperative;

(j) Meanwhile, I talked with Mr. Rowland or his staffer several times on 18 December to tell them that we were doing our best, that we would probably be able to get the report for them. In our final call Mr. Rowland became furious and informed me that he and Mr. Smith were filing the "Resolution of Inquiry", asked that the Director call him, and implied that I was in trouble. I told him that the Director was very busy, that I was trying my best to cooperate but that if he wanted to get tough about this, he could and should go through the HPSCI to get what he wanted;

(k) A couple of hours later we got permission from the DDO to show the report and the rescind notice and I was on my way to the Hill.
When I arrived at 115 Cannon both Mr. Smith and Mr. Rowland were waiting for me, polite and controlled but clearly angry. I apologized for the delay and explained that it is highly unusual for us to share raw reports with anyone other than the Intelligence Community, including even our own Oversight Committees, because such information is usually fragmentary, often misleading and is unevaluated. But we were cooperating, so I showed them the two documents. At first they just about flipped with frustration. Just what had we and the government done with the information we learned in 1977? Why had it taken two weeks for Mr. Smith to get his hands on what might have been a significant document? It took at least twenty minutes of polite, but at times, very firm explanation about how such reports are handled, "third party" rules on releasing reports, and the risks we all take especially when it comes to a highly emotional subject.

When a semblance of calm returned, the two Congressmen told me their story, and as a vet of Indochina (which I told them I was), I could not help but be sympathetic with their frustration. Mr. Smith has been working this issue for some time; he too is a Vietnam veteran, Navy. They have amassed a great deal of information on this subject and have made a number of trips to Hanoi to get remains back. They honestly believe that they are not being treated candidly by the DIA, and they feel real pressure from constituents and a sincere obligation to the MIA/POWs to pursue this issue. They explained that there are 2,041 acknowledged MIA/POWs, and they say they know for a fact that Hanoi has 97 boxes of remains "on the shelf", of which some 60 have been handed over in bits and dribbles. Forensic research shows that most of the bodies were never even buried, though lately some remains show signs that the bones were buried after sitting on a shelf, just to make them look as though they were recently dug up. They anticipate receiving more on their trip to Hanoi 4-14 January 1988, probably part of the 97 they say they know about. The two Congressmen appear convinced that the Vietnamese and the Laotians are holding live POWs and many more remains, held hostage because former President Nixon in 1973 promised the North Vietnamese 3.25 billion dollars as the war ended -- and Congress has refused to grant that aid.

Mr. Smith then went on to say that former Director Bill Casey admitted as much right in Mr. Smith's office several months before Casey became ill. He said that Bill Casey sat right there on that couch, in front of five Congressmen and
said, "Sure, we f----d up. We did leave men behind in Indochina, but what do you want us to do now? Do you want us to start bombing again, or to negotiate with those Communists?"

I stressed to the two Congressmen that the DIA is the focal point for this whole issue and that we provide the DIA with any and all information we may collect on this subject. They acknowledged this, even complimented [redacted], but said that all they will get is "being jacked around". Even Secretary of Defense Carlucci recently tried to side-step the issue during a recent meeting, saying, "we're working on it". I offered a DDI briefing on the subject, but the Congressmen did not take me up on the offer.

After all of this emotion and frustration had been vented, Mr. Smith said to me that if I were called to testify because of his "Resolution of Inquiry", that would not be necessary because he recognized that I was trying to cooperate, in a sense only a messenger with bad news, and that I should refer anyone to him should I be summoned.

We then chatted briefly about my own career and I was able to slip out with my head still on my shoulders and the skin on my back, though there were no wishes for happy holidays. We will hear from them again.

I have prepared a draft letter for Judge Webster to send to Mr. Smith, and we will alert the DIA people about this meeting because they are going to feel the heat soon. I also believe it would be prudent for the DCI to invite Messrs. Smith and Rowland to a breakfast or some sort of meeting.

Deputy Director, House Affairs
Office of Congressional Affairs

Attachment
The Honorable Peter J. Visclosky  
House of Representatives  
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Mr. Visclosky:

The Director has asked me to respond to your letter of January 3, 1991 that forwarded the correspondence of your constituent, ___________ expressed concern after reading a speech by US Army Lieutenant Colonel James "Bo" Gritz in the Post-Tribune about an alleged covert effort to create an international police force which would supersede the Constitution of the United States. In addition, he is concerned with the fate of certain American prisoners of the Vietnam War and those reported missing in action whose safe return to the US is being delayed by ties to covert operations.

Please advise ___________ that there is no plan by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to create an international police force that would supersede the Constitution of the United States. ___________ should also be aware that as an agency of the US Government created by statute, the CIA is subject to the close and continuing scrutiny of the US Congress through the House and Senate Intelligence Committees.

As concerns the issue of American prisoners of the Vietnam War, please advise ___________ that the Department of Defense is the point of contact for the US Government regarding all matters relating to POW/MIAs. Should ___________ wish to contact that office, the address is as follows:

Defense Intelligence Agency  
Attn: Congressional Affairs  
DI-3, Room 2D246  
Washington, DC 20340-2033.
The Honorable Peter J. Visclosky

Please note that it is the policy of this office to correspond with the concerned congressional office regarding constituent inquiries; we do not respond directly to constituents. Therefore, this response is being forwarded to your office for use in replying to [Blank].

Thank you for writing on behalf of [Blank].

Sincerely,

E. Norbert Garrett
Director of Congressional Affairs
SUBJECT: Letter from Congressman Visclosky on Behalf of
The Honorable William H. Webster  
Director  
Central Intelligence Agency  
Washington, D.C. 20505

January 3, 1991

Dear Mr. Webster:

I am writing on behalf of ________________________, a resident of Indiana's First Congressional District.

________________ has contacted my office to express his concerns about an alleged covert effort to create an international police force which would supersede the Constitution of the United States. He is also concerned with the fate of certain American prisoners of the Vietnam War and those reported missing in action whose safe return to the U.S. is being delayed by ties to covert operations. He cited a newspaper article from the Post-Tribune, a newspaper in Gary, Indiana, that described a speech by decorated Vietnam veteran and retired U.S. Army Lieutenant Colonel James "Bo" Gritz. For your information, I have enclosed a copy of the Post-Tribune article.

________________ would like to know the veracity of Mr. Gritz's claims. I would appreciate your investigating these allegations and replying to ________________________ directly at:

Thank you for your prompt attention to this matter.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

Peter J. Visclosky  
Member of Congress

PJV:cg  
Enclosure  

cc:
Across the Region

Stern warning sounded

Conservative speaker details dangers facing U.S.

By Mark Taylor
Staff writer

SCHERERVILLE — If Bo Gritz is right, America is in for tougher times than it ever imagined possible.

"There are more enemies within our own borders than there are outside our country," retired U.S. Army Lt. Col. James "Bo" Gritz told a large audience of conservatives Friday at a Leadership Councils of America dinner at Teibel's Restaurant.

Those attending paid $25 for chicken, ribs and the chance to hear one of the most decorated Vietnam War veterans discuss the "New World Order."

He talked about collusion between American leaders, including President George Bush, international bankers and the Soviet Communist Party to develop an international police force.

He revealed America's role in drug smuggling operations out of Panama and explained that there are pending bills before Congress that would suspend the U.S. Constitution and implement martial law. "I'm here to tell you that the U.S. Constitution is hanging by a thread," he said. "There is a contingency that would allow international police to come into your homes and confiscate your arms. Bar codes on grocery products and a cash-free society fueled by credit cards, he said, will lead to a suspension of Americans' rights and a world government.

"The United States of America is in peril today of becoming U.S.A. Inc., with King George Bush as chairman of the board," Gritz said.

Gritz, a sturdily built 51-year-old resident of Sandy Valley, Nev., is allegedly the man whose life inspired the films "Rambo," "Mission MIA" and "Uncommon Valor."

Since 1979, when he retired from military service to serve in an intelligence capacity with a branch of the National Security Council, he has trekked into the jungles of Southeast Asia 10 times to find American prisoners of the Vietnam War and those soldiers reported missing in action.

"There are at least 100 still out there," Gritz said, though he admitted he'd never seen or met them directly. "We have plenty of evidence, including satellite photos, to indicate that they do exist. They're there because the bureaucrats responsible for bringing them home have trafficked in drugs to pay for covert U.S. operations instead of bringing them back."

Gritz asserted that if any POWs or MIAs do return, there will be an extensive investigation into the United States' role in smuggling drugs out of Southeast Asia to finance undercover operations such as the Iran-Contra plot of Oliver L. North.

Gritz discussed many conspiracies before the patriotic crowd of about 110, which included members of the John Birch Society, the National Council for the Encouragement of Patriotism and the Church of Christian Liberty.

He decried America's sending of troops to the Middle East to support oil interests.

"We are going to war. The Defense Department has ordered 20,000 caskets. But we have no business being in the Arabs' Holy Land," said Gritz, who trained Afghan freedom fighters during their war against the U.S.S.R. and the communist government of Afghanistan.

"We are the infidels there. And we never have such a fanatical enemy as these Mujahadeen. I don't want us to trade U.S. blood for Arab oil."

"But we're gonna win this thing," he assured the listeners. "You as individuals are more powerful than anyone in government if you act."
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with Congressman Jack Fields

1. On 12 September 1991, the undersigned and another staffer met with Congressman Jack Fields (R-TX) in the Congressman's Cannon Building office at his request. The Congressman's Administrative Assistant and another staffer also attended.

2. OCA had been led to believe that Mr. Fields wanted to impart certain information concerning US POW/MIA issues to the Agency. While POW/MIA was what the Congressman wanted to discuss, it turned out that he had questions rather than information.

3. Specifically, Mr. Fields asked whether, in light of the changes taking place in the Soviet Union, the US was raising with the Soviet Government, and/or the KGB, allegations that US POWs held in eastern Germany during WW II and liberated by Soviet troops had subsequently been transported to and imprisoned in the Soviet Union, and allegations that US POWs had been transported from Vietnam to the Soviet Union.

4. During the discussion that followed, we pointed out that the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) was the Executive Branch focal point for POW/MIA issues, and that the Department of State was the most logical agency to make an official demarche about these allegations. We also noted that the Senate had recently created a special panel to look into a broad range of POW/MIA issues, and that we expected that both DIA and CIA would be cooperating in providing relevant information.

5. Mr. Fields indicated that he had not yet been in touch with DIA. He noted that he recognized that State was the logical agency to make a demarche, but that he doubted that the Department would be aggressive on this issue. The Congressman then asked for our assistance on two specific matters. First, he asked that we supply an address to which communications to the KGB could be addressed. Mr. Fields also asked that we advise him on the best way to correspond with the current Chief of the KGB.
SUBJECT: Meeting with Congressman Jack Fields

6. The undersigned subsequently advised DIA Legislative Affairs of Mr. Fields' interest in these POW/MIA matters, and suggested that DIA take the initiative to contact the Congressman. I also briefed State Legislative Affairs on the meeting, including a comment by Mr. Fields that he and several colleagues were considering introducing legislation.

7. Comment/Follow-up Action: The meeting was friendly throughout. I detected no hidden agenda on Mr. Fields' part. I will supply (through OCA) the information requested by the Congressman, unclassified bios (if available), and any other off the shelf unclassified information that he might find helpful.

Gary M. Chase
Deputy Director of Congressional Affairs
SUBJECT: Meeting with Congressman Jack Fields
**Priority Handling**

**Congressional Action**

**SUBJECT:**
Briefing of SSCI Staffers on POW/MIA Affairs Stemming from the Vietnam Conflict

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FROM:</th>
<th>EXTENSION</th>
<th>DATE SENT</th>
<th>REQUEST NUMBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>31 Oct 91</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TO:** (Officer designation, room number, and building)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE RECEIVED</th>
<th>OFFICER'S INITIALS</th>
<th>COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after comment.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>31 Oct 91</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>4. C/OCA</th>
<th>SUSPENSE DATE:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Nov 91</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

RETURN TO:

---

**SUSPENSE DATE:**

---

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SUSPENSE DATE:</th>
<th>RETURN TO:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Briefing of SSCI Staffers on POW/MIA Affairs Stemming from the Vietnam Conflict

1. On Wednesday, 30 October 1991, at 0925 hours SSCI Minority Counsel, who will move to head the minority staff of the Senate Temporary Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs, and SSCI staffers were briefed on POW/MIA affairs stemming from the Vietnam conflict by Jim Anders, C/EA/. Also present were ADC/DO; OCA/L; C/PCS; OCA/S; and ORMS/CCA. The briefing took place in room 219 of the Hart Building.

2. began by suggesting the briefing start with the historical perspective from 1975 and proceed to the present. Mr. Anders began by noting that the Agency passes all intelligence reporting and fragmentary information concerning American POW/MIA's to DIA which is the action element in this matter. Periodic reporting guidance on POW/MIA matters is sent to the field on a worldwide basis. In fact, this guidance was just recently updated. In addition, planning for the future opening of and is in process. Over the past reports have been sent to DIA on POW/MIA matters, five have gone as reports and the remainder, more fragmentary information, has been transmitted in the series. Mr. Anders reviewed the staffing of EA/ICOG noting that it contains people, most of whom have served in Vietnam and/or Laos. In addition, there is a separate translation unit. Further, there is an Agency representative to DIA for POW/MIA affairs and there is a constant dialogue with DIA on this subject.
SUBJECT: Briefing of SSCI Staffers on POW/MIA Affairs Stemming from the Vietnam Conflict

3. I asked about and was told none were open but planning for them was proceeding. Mr. Anders noted that the Agency works closely with and Washington providing technical, and language support. In response to Mr. Anders said the Hong Kong debriefing program, which had been staffed by officers, was shut down at the request of the Hong Kong government. It had agreed, however, to supply the Agency with any POW/MIA information that should be obtained from or through the refugees. A similar agreement was obtained from the Malaysian government when the debriefing program there closed. In addition, has been approached for any information that might be contained in files since officers could have attended Vietnamese interrogations of American POW/MIA's.

4. Mr. Anders noted that if the Agency receives requests from customers--DIA and/or Stoney Beach--for follow-up based on information from a specific source, it does its utmost to satisfy the request. In the case of refugees, however, they may have moved on and no longer be available. In other cases, say when was obtained of tall, uniformed caucasian men in Hanoi, follow-up was requested from a source. In this case, however, the tall, uniformed caucasian men turned out to be Polish members of the ICCS.

5. asked if the Agency had received any POW/MIA association information/leads from NSA, for instance anything that had raised Agency interest over the past six months to a year. Mr. Anders said he could not remember any NSA information that peaked Agency interest over the past year.

6. asked if any problems--people, money--were anticipated in connection with the declassification of POW/MIA information. responded by reviewing policy guidelines concerning declassification. noted that emotional problems were sometimes encountered in conjunction with redacted material. The blanked-out portions gave the impression that something was being hidden. said the big problem is that people/staffers do not understand the intelligence process.

7. said the Temporary Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs will hold hearings 5, 6, and 7 November. Everybody will be sworn in and there will be television coverage. Those testifying will include General Vessy, Carl Ford, General
SUBJECT: Briefing of SSCI Staffers on POW/MIA Affairs Stemming from the Vietnam Conflict

Christmas, and General Ryan. In addition, a big trip is planned for January that will include Vietnam, Cambodia, Thailand, and Laos. Senators Kerry and Smith will proceed to the USSR afterward. [redacted] noted that one of the things Senator Smith has been told is that the Agency does not have anyone on the ground working the problem. This, however, is not accurate since the Agency is dealing with intelligence information. Mr. Anders noted that the gathering of POW/MIA intelligence is the subject of a worldwide OD effort, not the responsibility of a single specific person.

8. [redacted] stressed that when dealing with members and staffers of the Temporary Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs, remember they don't know how intelligence works. It would be best if they could be briefed on this by the Agency sooner rather than later. The Agency can expect to be hit by a lot of antidotal half and misinformation that must immediately be put to rest. He suggested that material be gathered to show what the Agency has done. [redacted] said he is pushing to have this a closed session. He suggested a briefing be set up for members and staffers either 1 November in the morning or 4 November. He asked if NSA should attend the 1/4 November briefing.

9. [redacted] asked if there is any concerted analytical effort to lay out the Vietnamese governmental structure and identify those organizational areas that would have responsibilities encompassing POW/MIA matters. Mr. Anders said this would be done by DIA if it is done at all. [redacted] noted that Admiral Turner, when he was DCI, made the decision to turn over all analytical responsibility for POW/MIA matters to DIA.

10. [redacted] said the priorities of the Temporary Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs will be 1) live sightings, 2) Laos because any living POW/MIA's are likely to be held there, and 3) the Soviets. He asked if there was any information to confirm the stockpiling of POW/MIA remains in Vietnam. Mr. Anders said no and noted that the Agency is very limited in what it can accomplish inside Vietnam. [redacted] said emphasis should also be laid on how the exposure of sources and methods could jeopardize ongoing efforts. [redacted] noted that POW/MIA information up to 1978 had previously been declassified. Mr. Anders said the Agency deals primarily with [redacted] office in DIA. [redacted] asked if any files were kept on fabricators. Mr. Anders said files were not kept on them per se but they were so identified in the data base.
SUBJECT: Briefing of SSCI Staffers on POW/MIA Affairs Stemming from the Vietnam Conflict

11. The briefing concluded at 1030 hours with a briefing for the Temporary Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs to be arranged.
SUBJECT: Briefing of SSCI Staffers on POW/MIA Affairs Stemming from the Vietnam Conflict

(30 October 1991)
The attached letter (with covering memo) to SECDEF Cheney regarding requests for information from the Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs is for Acting DCI's signature.

This letter has been coordinated with Chief, Operations and Resource Management Staff/DO.

Please return signed letter to C/PCS/DO for forwarding to SECDEF Cheney.
MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Acting Deputy Director for Operations

FROM: John J. O'Donnell
Chief, Policy and Coordination Staff

SUBJECT: Requests for Information from Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs

1. Action Requested: Your signature is requested on the attached letter to SECDEF Cheney regarding expected requests for information from the Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs.

2. Background: Senate Resolution 82 created a temporary Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs to review this and past Administration efforts on resolving POW/MIA cases. The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the lead Agency on POW/MIA matters, maintains files on individual POW/MIA cases, and many of these files contain CIA reports. We have been asked by Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence Duane P. Andrews to assist the Department of Defense (DoD) to respond favorably to the new Select Committee. This letter to SECDEF Cheney is designed to show our support to the Committee and a willingness to assist their efforts consistent with our responsibility to protect sources and methods.

3. Recommendation: Please sign the attached letter and return it to C/PCS/DO for forwarding to SECDEF Cheney.

Attachment:
As Stated

John J. O'Donnell
The Honorable Richard B. Cheney  
The Secretary of Defense  
Washington, D.C. 20301-1000  

Dear Mr. Secretary:  

The Agency has been contacted by Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence Duane P. Andrews concerning Senate Resolution 82 which creates a temporary Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs. It is my understanding that this Committee will request access to Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) files, some of which contain CIA-generated classified information. Assistant Secretary Andrews has asked that the Agency work with the Department of Defense (DoD) to develop guidelines concerning Committee access to these files.

In response to Secretary Andrews' request for assistance, Agency officers are working with the newly-created POW/MIA Data Release Office to review DIA files. Once these officers have determined the scope and sensitivity of the CIA-originated information in the files, we will be able to develop appropriate guidelines for use with the Committee. In addition, I have designated a senior attorney in the Office of General Counsel to work with DoD attorneys to negotiate with the Select Committee concerning access to classified information in the files. I want to assure you that the Agency will cooperate fully with the Committee, and I am confident that guidelines can be developed that will ensure full compliance with the spirit of Senate Resolution 82 while at the same time meeting our statutory duty to protect intelligence sources and methods.

I have designated Jack O'Donnell, Chief, Policy and Coordination Staff as the Agency's point of contact on this matter.

Sincerely,

Richard J. Kerr  
Acting Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Letter (with Covering Memo) to SECDEF Cheney Regarding Requests for Information from Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TO: (officer designation, room number, and building)</th>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>OFFICER'S INITIALS</th>
<th>COMMENTS (number each comment to show from whom to whom. draw a line across column after comment.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Chief, EA</td>
<td>2/7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. DC/ORMS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. AC/ORMS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. SA/DDO</td>
<td>2/9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. ADDO</td>
<td>2/9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. DDO</td>
<td>2/1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. C/OCA/S</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

RETURN TO:                                                                                                    

SUSPENSE DATE:                                                                                               

LOGGED
Mr. Stanley Moskowitz, Director
Congressional Relations
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

January 17, 1992

Dear Mr. Moskowitz:

We are writing to request your assistance in setting up a briefing, which can be accomplished in stages, and providing documentation in support of the briefing, on the following items. As we said, this can be done in stages as worked out between Committee Investigators and your office.

I. A. Organization of the Vietnamese Government
   C. Organization of the "Communist" Party of Vietnam, including Party units responsible for prisoners.
   D. Detailed Organization of the Ministry of Interior and other agencies responsible for POW's, including Command, Control, and Communications Structure.

II. A. Structure of the Prison and Camp System, including
   1. list of camp heads
   2. recruitment thereof,
   3. training,
   4. ethnic features
   5. rotation policy
   6. schedules
   7. the typical day
   8. rations and other support
   9. map depicting all camps where post-29 March 1973 reporting indicated Americans might be held captive;
   10. Photography/imagery of those camps
   11. foreign involvement
   12. inspections and other outside visitations/involvement
   13. changes in any of the above over time
   14. differential treatment according to nationality of prisoner.

III. A. Patterns and linkages, including
   1. food,
IV. All documents concerning decisions of party and government in relation to POW's, and/or evidence of policy changes over time.

V. Examination of policy toward and treatment of prisoners during the Post-War period.

VI. Review of all captured or surreptitiously acquired documents in the possession of the CIA which relate to any of the following categories:

U.S., American, foreign (farang), white, caucasian, negro, black or unidentified prisoners of war, missing in action, prisoners, air pirates, war criminals, capital offenders, or detainees, named or unnamed, alleged to be alive in Vietnam after 29 March 1973 in any situation suggesting confinement, detention, or restraint in any of the following locations:

Cao Bang Province
Ha Tuyen Province
Hoang Lien Province
Lai Chu Province
Lang Son Province
Son La Province
Vinh Phu Province
Bac Thai Province
Hanoi Province
Ha Bac Province
Quang Ninh Province
Ha Son Binh Province
Hai Hung Province
Hai Phong Province
Ha Nam Ninh Province
Thai Binh Province
Thanh Hoa Province
Nghe Tinh Province
Quang Binh Province
Quang Tri Province
Thua Thien Hue Province
Quang Nam Danang Province
Quang Ngai Province
Gia Long Kontum Province
Binh Dinh Province
Phu Yen Province
Dac Lac Province
Khanh Hoa Province
Song Be Province
Lam Dong Province
Thuan-Nhi Province
Tay Ninh Province
Dong-Nai Province
Dac Khu-Vung Tai-Con Dao Province
Ho Chi Minh Province
Long An Province
Tieng Gang Province
Dong Thap Province
Ben Tre Province
Ang Giang Province
Cuu Long Province
Hau Giang Province
Kien Giang Province
Minh Hai Province
Binh Tri Thien Province
Nghia Binh Province
Phu Kanh Province

If the information is not available by province, map grid coordinates should be provided (Southeast Asia Briefing Map - Graphic); grid coordinates applicable to this request fall within grid squares TJ, TK, TL, UR, US, UG, UH, UJ, UK, UL, VQ, VR, VS, VF, VG, VH, VJ, VK, VL, VA, WQ, WR, WS, WT, WE, WF, WG, WH, WJ, WK, WL, WA, XQ, XR, XS, XT, XU, XD, XF, XG, XH, XJ, XK, XL, XA, YS, YT, YU, YV, YA, YB, YC, YD, YH, YJ, YK, XV, ZS, ZT, ZU, ZA, ZB, ZC, ZD, ZJ, AM, AN, AP, AQ, AR, AS, AT, AU, BN, BP, BQ, BR, BS, BT, CN, CP, CQ, CR, CS, CT.

The Select Committee Investigative staff will work with your office to establish a time table for the briefing(s) requested herein and for the delivery of appropriate documents. We would like to underline the urgency of our request, and urge your cooperation as we work to resolve this issue.

Thank you for your assistance.

Sincerely,

Bob Smith
Vice Chairman

John F. Kerry
Chairman
SUMMARY OF POW/MIA RELATED ACTIVITIES INVOLVING POLICY AND COORDINATION STAFF

BACKGROUND: Senate Resolution 82 created the Temporary Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs. DOD/C3I is the focal point within DOD although formal Committee requests will be sent first to ASD/International Security Affairs. The Committee has requested access to all DIA files related to POW/MIA with immediate priority to discrepancy files and live sighting reports ("Discrepancy" relates to a servicemember known to have been alive in captivity but not returned with other American POW's at war's end). DIA holds the files since it is the lead agency for the resolution of POW/MIA matters. (This has been the case formally since November 1985 and de facto for many years prior to that).

--Representatives of PCS, OGC, OCA and DO/EA DIV met with Special Assistant to ASD/C3I Duane Andrews and reiterated CIA willingness to comply with spirit of Committee's requests. (Acting DCI sent letter to this effect to SECDEF on 19 SEP 91)

--PCS, OCA, and OGC presented CIA criteria for redacting source and method information from CIA documents held in DIA files prior to the file's being sent to the Committee. DIA and CIA redaction criteria are similar. The only difference in practice is DIA's willingness to give POW/MIA Committee staffers unfettered access to unredacted files reviewed at DIA. CIA wished to limit such access to members only.

--Acting DCI Kerr agreed to make our position more compatible with DOD/DIA/NSA's by permitting staffers access to an unredacted file on a case by case basis conditioned upon prior request and sufficient justification. (TAB A)

PCS, OCA, and OGC representatives joined DOD and DIA representatives to explain to Staff Director Frances Zwenig our criteria for deleting source and method information. We showed randomly selected exemplars showing no substantive information would be lost in the process. Zwenig reserved opinion about whether the Committee would accept this procedure. (TAB B)

EA DIV sent a GS-15 officer to DIA full time to review files and redact CIA source and method information before transmission to the Committee.
PCS, OCA, OGC, and DO/EA representatives met with Minority Staff Director Al Ptak (ex-SSCI Minority Staff) at his request to discuss CIA activities in POW/MIA matters. Ptak is scheduling followup meeting for PCS, OGC, OCA, CEA/ICOG, and IMS to brief members and cleared staffers on CIA POW/MIA collection activities and the rudiments of classification and security. (TAB C)

IMS made arrangements to have an additional FO officer assist in the redaction effort at DIA. NOTE: This is only for deletion of source and method information for Committee use and does not address the McCain Amendment which would require the declassification of every USG agency's POW/MIA records (although we could still presumably use the same criteria as FOIA declassification). The McCain Amendment is still in bill form attached to the authorization bill.
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
ROBERT M. GATES
ORAL STATEMENT
BEFORE THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON POW/MIA AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE

20 NOVEMBER 1991
Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, I am pleased to appear before you this afternoon to underscore the importance that I and the whole intelligence community attach to your efforts to work toward a final resolution of longstanding concerns about POWs and MIAs from the Indochina War. I regret that my schedule will permit only a brief appearance today. I have, however, brought with me senior members from the concerned agencies and their respective experts who are prepared to brief you on the activities of their agencies and respond to your questions. From the Defense Intelligence Agency—the lead agency for the community on this issue—is General Clapper. From the National Security Agency is its director Admiral Studeeman and from from CIA is Associate Deputy Director for Operations Ted Price.

I want to say at the outset that the work of your new committee has my full support. The subject of POW/MIAs is a difficult and highly emotional one. I am aware of the intense interest in it, and of the important role the intelligence community has played and continues to play in developing and disseminating information on it. I also recognize that there are strong views about intelligence reporting and
ITS AVAILABILITY TO THOSE DEEPLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE FATE OF INDIVIDUALS STILL MISSING IN INDOCHINA. MY HOPE WOULD BE THAT THROUGH THIS PROCESS MANY IF NOT ALL THOSE CONCERNS COULD BE PUT TO REST.

I UNDERSTAND THAT YOUR COMMITTEE STAFF HAS BEEN BRIEVED ON GUIDELINES THAT CIA AND NSA HAVE WORKED OUT WITH DIA IN SUPPORTING YOUR REVIEW. I AM COMMITTED TO HAVING THESE GUIDELINES FOLLOWED IN A WAY THAT WILL FACILITATE YOUR EFFORTS. AS DCI I HAVE THE STATUTORY RESPONSIBILITY FOR PROTECTING INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS, BUT I CAN ASSURE YOU THAT ONLY WHEN ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY FOR THE PROTECTION OF THOSE SOURCES AND METHODS WILL THERE BE ANY LIMITATIONS ON THE MATERIALS TO BE REVIEWED, AND INFORMATION OF ANY SUBSTANCE WILL BE PROVIDED.

THROUGHOUT THIS PROCESS I RECOGNIZE THAT THERE MAY WELL BE AREAS OF DIFFICULTY OR DISAGREEMENT, BUT I WANT TO ASSURE YOU THAT THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY IS COMMITTED TO WORKING WITH YOU TO REACH ACCEPTABLE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE FULL SHARING OF INFORMATION. I ALSO CAN ASSURE YOU THAT THE COMMUNITY WILL CONTINUE TO ATTACH THE HIGHEST IMPORTANCE TO COLLECTING AND DISSEMINATING INFORMATION ON THE POW/MIA ISSUE AND WILL DEVOTE SUBSTANTIAL RESOURCES WORLDWIDE TO THAT EFFORT. WE WANT TO BE AS HELPFUL AS POSSIBLE.
I WOULD NOW LIKE TO TURN TO THE AGENCY REPRESENTATIVES EACH OF WHOM HAS A PREPARED STATEMENT ADDRESSING THE ACTIVITIES OF THEIR INDIVIDUAL AGENCIES.

THANK YOU.
**Priority Handling**

**Congressional Action**

**SUBJECT:** Draft Response to Senator Kerry re his Letter Concerning the POW/MIA Issue

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FROM: C/ORMS</th>
<th>EXTENSION</th>
<th>DATE SENT</th>
<th>REQUEST NUMBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>11 Dec. 1991</td>
<td>00/07/00/35/12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TO:** Officer designation, room number, and building

1. DC/ORMS
2. C/ORMS
3. SA/DDO
   - 12/11
4. ADDO
5. DDO
6. 
7. Robert Magner, OCA/S
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 

**OFFICER'S COMMENTS**

(Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after comment.)

**DATE**

**RECEIVED**

**FORWARDED**

**COMMENTS**

- [ ] SUSPENSE DATE: 

**RETURN TO:**

- [ ] 4283
MEMORANDUM FOR: Robert W. Magner  
Senate Liaison Division  
Office of Congressional Liaison

VIA: Office of the Deputy Director for Operations

FROM: Richard W. Coffman 
Chief, Congressional and Covert Action Oversight Group  
Operations and Resource Management Staff

SUBJECT: Draft Response to Senator Kerry re his Letter Concerning the POW/MIA Issue

REFERENCE: Letter of 19 November 1991 from Senator Kerry to Mr. Gates

1. In response to Senator Kerry's referenced letter, it is proposed that the following response be sent him and signed by Mr. Moskowitz:

Dear Mr. Chairman:

The Director has asked me to convey to you his deep interest in the resolution of the POW-MIA issue and his pledge of full cooperation from the Intelligence Community. He has also asked me to respond to your letter of November 19, 1991, on the POW-MIA issue.

It has been Agency practice to provide all relevant information on POW-MIA's to the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and this information should be available in their files. In response to your request, we are undertaking a review of all files held by the Agency which bear on this issue to ensure that all pertinent data has been passed to DIA. If we find additional material, our intention is to pass it concurrently to the committee and to DIA. This will assure that this data is available to your committee.

Attached is a list of former Chiefs of Station from the countries you requested.
SUBJECT: Draft Response to Senator Kerry re his Letter Concerning the POW/MIA Issue.

The Director has asked me to serve as the point of contact for your committee. I look forward to working with you on this issue. Please advise if there is any way the Agency can be of further assistance.

Signed by

Stanley Moskowitz
Director of Congressional Affairs
November 19, 1991

The Honorable Robert M. Gates, Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, DC 20505

Dear Mr. Director:

Pursuant to our conversations with you on the POW/MIA issue, we are writing to make a formal request from the Central Intelligence Agency for all documents on POW/MIAs of the Vietnam War era. We are particularly interested in documents relating to Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam, the Soviet Union, and China.

Additionally, we ask you to assign an individual at the Agency who would be our liaison on the POW/MIA issue.

Finally, we request a list of the names and the ways to contact each of the station chiefs in Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam from 1968 to the relevant final date for each country.

Thank you very much for your helpfulness in supplying this information and we look forward to reviewing the documents.

Sincerely,

Bob Smith
Vice Chairman

John F. Kerry
Chairman

cc: The Honorable David Boren
November 19, 1991

The Honorable Robert M. Gates, Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, DC 20505

Dear Mr. Director:

Pursuant to our conversations with you on the POW/MIA issue, we are writing to make a formal request from the Central Intelligence Agency for all documents on POW/MIAs of the Vietnam War era. We are particularly interested in documents relating to Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam, the Soviet Union, and China.

Additionally, we ask you to assign an individual at the Agency who would be our liaison on the POW/MIA issue.

Finally, we request a list of the names and the ways to contact each of the station chiefs in Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam from 1968 to the relevant final date for each country.

Thank you very much for your helpfulness in supplying this information and we look forward to reviewing the documents.

Sincerely,

Bob Smith
Vice Chairman

cc: The Honorable David Boren
**OFFICE OF CONGRESSIONAL AFFAIRS**

**Routing Slip**

| ACTION INFO | ACTION INFO | ACTION INFO | ACTION INFO | ACTION INFO | ACTION INFO | ACTION INFO | ACTION INFO | ACTION INFO | ACTION INFO | ACTION INFO | ACTION INFO | ACTION INFO | ACTION INFO | ACTION INFO | ACTION INFO | ACTION INFO | ACTION INFO | ACTION INFO | ACTION INFO | ACTION INFO | ACTION INFO | ACTION INFO | ACTION INFO | ACTION INFO |
|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| 1. D/OCA   | X           |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |
| 2. DD/OCA  |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |
| 3. D/Legislation | X       |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |
| 4. D/Senate Liaison |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |
| 5. D/House Liaison |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |
| 6. D/Congressional Support |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |
| 7. Admin   |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |
| 8. Constituent Inquiries Officer |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |
| 9. FOIA Office |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |
| 10. SECURITY |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |
| 11. SPECIAL ASSISTANT |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |
| 12. DH/ICID |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |

**SUSPENSE**

**Dec 91**

**Date**

**Action Officer:** GBG MAGNER

**Remarks:** OCH 5007-91 referred to CHRM/CCE on 26 Nov

**GP 25 Nov 91**

**Name/Date**

**FORM 4422**

**EDITION DATE 6.91**
**EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT**  
**ROUTING SLIP**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TO:</th>
<th>ACTION</th>
<th>INFO</th>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>INITIAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>DCI</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>DDCI</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>D/ICS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>DDA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>DDI</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>DDI</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>D/ICS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>DDS&amp;T</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>IG</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>COMPT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>D/OCA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>GC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Chm/NIC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>D/PAO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>SUSPENSE</td>
<td>9 Dec 91</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Remarks**

OCA will prepare response for DCI signature with input from the DO.

**ER 91-3784**

*Executive Secretary*

*22 Nov 91*
DCI:

A response will be prepared for your signature with input from OCA.

OCA will respond in consultation with ________________________.

No written response is necessary.

CONCUR

I prefer ________________________.
**TO:** D/OCA

**FROM:**

**SUBJECT:** Letter to Senator Kerry re POW/MIA Issues

**CONTROL #:** OCA 5007-91  
**DATE OF REQUEST:** 13 Dec 91

**NOTES:**

Star:  
This has been painfully worked on by  
Hopefully you're willing to go along  
I'll set for your if necessary.

**COORDINATED WITH (list names as well as offices):**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>OFFICE</th>
<th>DATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C/OMRS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(see attached sheet)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>OFFICE</th>
<th>DATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SA/DDO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>OFFICE</th>
<th>DATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DDO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**ACTION REQUIRED BY:** D/OCA

**Signed:** 12/13/91  
For your signature
The Honorable John F. Kerry  
Chairman  
Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs  
United States Senate  
Washington, D.C. 20510  

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Your letter of January 17, 1992 requesting Agency information on POW/MIAs in Vietnam was received on January 23. Agency officers have discussed it in detail with the senior staff of the Committee, and a response will be forthcoming shortly.

A copy of this letter is also being provided to Vice Chairman Smith.

Sincerely,

/s/ Stanley M. Moskowitz  
Stanley M. Moskowitz  
Director of Congressional Affairs
SUBJECT: Interim response to Kerry/Smith re POW/MIA's
The Honorable Bob Smith  
Vice Chairman  
Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs  
United States Senate  
Washington, D.C. 20510  

Dear Mr. Vice Chairman:

Your letter of January 17, 1992 requesting Agency information on POW/MIA's in Vietnam was received on January 23. Agency officers have discussed it in detail with the senior staff of the Committee, and a response will be forthcoming shortly.

A copy of this letter is also being provided to Chairman Kerry.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

Stanley M. Moskowitz  
Director of Congressional Affairs
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

FROM: D. Gerald Falls
Chief, Alien Affairs

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Meeting with Staff Director of Newly Formed Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs

1. On 04 October 1991 (AGC/SAD), (OCA/LEG), and I went to the Senate joining DOD/DIA representatives to meet with Ms. Frances Zwendi, recently appointed Staff Director of the Temporary Senate Select Committee for POW/MIA Affairs. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss with Committee representatives criteria the intelligence community would use in deleting certain information from intelligence documents generated by various agencies. CIA representatives went to explain criteria we had developed for CIA documents only. Meeting participants are listed at Tab A.

2. DIA presented its list of various agency criteria which will be used to redact information from intelligence documents before the documents are sent to the Senate for their use. (The various criteria are set out at Tab B; the CIA criteria are a faithful reiteration of ones we earlier presented to DIA.) Much discussion took place related to the criteria that would be used to sanitize documents before they are sent to the Senate. We explained our criteria and offered representative documents to show that redaction did not greatly affect the intelligence value of the original document. Ms. Zwendi seemed to appreciate the rationale behind the proposed redactions. However, she offered the following key points:

   a. She would defer acceptance on the redaction criteria until other staffers were appointed. (COMMENT: Since this involves funding and selection, full staffing may take a few months yet.)

   b. She related that Committee Chair Sen Kerry now wants to send staff investigators to DIA to review all the files there rather than have the sanitized file forwarded to the Senate. (The committee expects to have 20 investigative staffers and ten analytical staffers assigned for the project.)
c. The Committee's activities will be a two phased operation: phase one will be a review of the 100 or so "live sighting" files, and phase two will be a broader review to determine why the POW/MIA issue remains unresolved after almost twenty years.

3. DOD/DIA stated investigators running free in DIA would disrupt their operations and they were against this proposition. CIA reiterated our concern that we could not grant staffers wholesale access to CIA unredacted documents. Our position is that staffers may look at the original document only upon demonstration of a compelling need, and that this, itself, is contrary to normal practice wherein only members are permitted such access.

4. The meeting closed with Ms. Zwengi stating we would all get together again in a "couple of weeks" to discuss the issues further.

5. COMMENT: We shall investigate whether an SSCI staffer might attend the next meeting to give the new committee staff a sense of past practice in release of information to Congress.

Attachments as stated

D. Gerald Falls
TAB A TO MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD DATED 7 OCTOBER 1991 RE:
MEETING WITH STAFF DIRECTOR OF NEWLY FORMED SENATE SELECT
COMMITTEE ON POW/MIA AFFAIRS

PARTICIPANTS

SENATE:
-- Frances Zwengi: Staff Director, Temporary Senate
Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs.
-- Rick Kessler: Staffer, Senate Foreign Relations
Committee
-- Nancy Stetson: Staffer, Senate Foreign Relations
Committee
-- Bill Woodward: Staffer, Senate Foreign Relations
Committee
-- Mike DiSilvestro: Senate Security Officer

OSD
-- Ron Knecht: Special Assistant to Duane Andrews,
Assistant Secretary of Defense for C3I.
-- Mike Betterman: OSD/Legal Affairs

DIA
-- Bill Allard: General Counsel
-- Margie Munson: Chief, Data Release Office
-- Barbara Duckworth: Deputy Chief, Data Release
Office

CIA

SECRET
**REPORT ORIGINATOR** | **REDACT** | **RATIONALE**
---|---|---
DoD HUMINT | STONY BEACH team members' names | Compromise the safety and mission of US collection personnel
 | Detailed source data/biographic reports/source numbers | Jeopardize safety of sources
 | Ongoing clandestine operational data | Reveal extent and involvement of US intelligence operations; cause extreme embarrassment to the Thai or other foreign governments
NSA | Ongoing operations | When SIGINT reporting related to ongoing operations is received, it will be reviewed to ensure operations would not be jeopardized or collection methods compromised. Content that would reveal ongoing POW/MIA operations or other intelligence sources will be protected.
 | Not applicable | Historical SIGINT can be released at the Secret SCI level
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STATE</th>
<th>U.S. Government policies under negotiation</th>
<th>Would compromise ongoing US foreign policy positions and interests</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ASD/ISA</td>
<td>Not applicable</td>
<td>Classified cables can be released</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OVERHEAD IMAGERY</td>
<td>Not applicable</td>
<td>Images can be released at the SECRET/NOFORN/WNINTEL level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEBRIEFS</td>
<td>Not releasable</td>
<td>Executive Order 11652 dated 8 Mar 72; ASD/ISA memo I-86/19832, dated 3 Jan 87; release of this information would violate confidentiality agreements with returned POWS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Source/asset identifying data</td>
<td>Jeopardize safety of sources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agency employee identification</td>
<td>Compromise the safety and mission of US government personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Foreign liaison identifying information; third agency information with appropriate referral information added; place acquired (when clandestine collection involved); field report number; cryptonyms; current operational activities.</td>
<td>Reveal extent and nature of US government clandestine operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Methodology</td>
<td>Identifies sensitive operational methods and capability</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Intelligence Reports/Evaluation of Reports

Employee identification could open unauthorized lines of communication or create pressures for unauthorized release of intelligence material. In addition, for analyst evaluation of reports, information received at a later date may have confirmed, changed or invalidated an earlier evaluation. The current agency position on the analysis over time is more relevant to understanding the case, and would be provided as required.

NOTES:

1. Although material has been redacted based on guidelines established above, all the documents retain their original classification.

2. Material extracted from the file will be noted on the file index (e.g., "source biographic sheet is not included").

3. Information that has been extracted or redacted from original file can be reviewed by committee members. Staff will be allowed to review the original files on a case-by-case basis.

4. All classified material requires handling and protection in accordance with Senate Resolution 400 as adopted by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.
TO: D/OCA
FROM: [Redacted]
SUBJECT: Letter to Senators Kerry/Smith re: POW/MIA Issues

NOTES:

COORDINATED WITH (list names as well as offices):
- see attached router

ACTION REQUIRED BY: D/OCA

For your signature:

Signed
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)</th>
<th>DATE RECEIVED</th>
<th>FORWARDERED</th>
<th>OFFICER'S INITIALS</th>
<th>COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after comment.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Chief, EA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. OIA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. C/ORMS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. BC/ORMS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. C/ORMS</td>
<td>5 March 92</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. SA/DDO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. ADDO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. DDO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. C/OCA/S</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
MEMORANDUM FOR: Robert W. Magner  
Chief, Senate Liaison Division  
Office of Congressional Affairs

VIA: Office of the Deputy Director for Operations

FROM: James D. Anders, Jr.  
Chief, Indochina Operations Group

SUBJECT: Imagery of Possible Detention Facilities in Laos

REFERENCE: Letter of 17 January 1992 from Senators Kerry and Smith of the Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs to the DCI

1. This is in reply to the letter of 17 January 1992 which requested imagery or photography of prison camps or detention facilities. CIA's Office of Imagery Analysis has been able to locate dated imagery of several suspected detention facilities in Laos which are available for review at CIA Headquarters by appropriately cleared and designated Committee personnel. OIA has advised us that it has no file prints of any post-29 March 1973 suspect detention facilities in Vietnam or Cambodia, and no knowledge of the existence of any office-produced POW/MIA imagery files other than those relating to the aforementioned suspect detention facilities in Laos.

2. We have also requested the National Photographic Interpretation Center review their archives for material on this subject and will advise the Committee of the results of this search as soon as possible.
For your signature

[Signature]
The Honorable John F. Kerry  
Chairman  
Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs  
United States Senate  
Washington, D.C. 20510  

Dear Mr. Chairman:  

This is in response to your letter dated January 17, 1992 which requested information concerning decisions of the Vietnamese government and party in relations to POWs, and/or evidence of policy changes over time. The enclosed material from the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) addresses some of these issues. We have also included as part of this package some additional material on the POW issue which the Committee may find useful for background.

TAB A: Analysis on the POW/MIA issue prepared by FBIS based only on selected Foreign Public Media  
September 7, 1972 - January 23, 1992

TAB B: Foreign Media Report on the return of US MIA remains by SRV  
74 - November 1991

TAB C: Foreign Media Reports on live sightings and the whereabouts of remains as monitored by FBIS  
May 3, 1977 - June 13, 1990

TAB D: Official SRV Statements on the POW/MIA issue as monitored by FBIS  
June 30, 1990 - January 30, 1992

TAB E: Official SRV Statements on POW/MIA issue as monitored by FBIS  
January 28, 1974 - September 18, 1989
TAB F: Selected Vietnamese media commentaries on POW/MIA issues as monitored by FBIS
January 28, 1974 - January 21, 1992

TAB G: Foreign Media Reports on meetings between Vietnamese and US delegations on the POW/MIA issue as monitored by FBIS
October 4, 1974 - February 1, 1992

All of this material is unclassified and will also be provided to the Department of Defense Central Documentation Office for inclusion in the repository for declassified information on POW/MIAs at the Library of Congress.

Sincerely,

76/ Stanley M. Moskowitz

Stanley M. Moskowitz
Director of Congressional Affairs

Enclosure
SUBJECT: Letter to Senator Kerry re POW/MIA Issues
(Incoming letter dated 17 Jan)
**FROM:** James D. Anders, Jr.
C/EA/ICOG

**DATE SENT:** 5Mar92

**REQUEST NUMBER:** B846-92-0025/046

**EXTENSION**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TO:</th>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>OFFICER'S INITIALS</th>
<th>COMMENTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chief, EA</td>
<td>5/6/3/6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C/ORMS</td>
<td>3/9/92</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DC/ORMS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief, ORMS</td>
<td>13 MAR 1992</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SA/DDO</td>
<td>3-16</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADDO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C/OCA/S</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
MEMORANDUM FOR: Robert W. Magner
Chief, Senate Liaison Division
Office of Congressional Affairs

VIA: Office of the Deputy Director for Operations

FROM: James D. Anders, Jr.
Chief, Indochina Operations Group

SUBJECT: Decisions of the Vietnamese Government and Party in Relation to POW's

REFERENCE: Letter of 17 January 1992 from Senators Kerry and Smith of the Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs to the DCI

1. This is in reply to the letter of 17 January 1992 which requested information concerning decisions of the Vietnamese government and party in relation to POW's, and/or evidence of policy changes over time. The following material from the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) addresses some of these issues. We have also included as part of this package some additional material on the POW issue which the Committee may find useful for background.

TAB A: Analysis on the POW/MIA Issue Prepared by FBIS Based Only on Selected Foreign Public Media 7 Sep. 72 - 23 Jan. 92

TAB B: Foreign Media Reports on the Return of U.S. MIA Remains by SRV, 74 - Nov. 91

TAB C: Foreign Media Reports on Live Sightings and the Whereabouts of remains as Monitored by FBIS 3 May 77 - 13 June 90

TAB D: Official SRV Statements on the POW/MIA Issue as Monitored by FBIS, 30 June 90 - 30 Jan. 92

TAB E: Official SRV Statements on POW/MIA Issue as Monitored by FBIS, 28 Jan. 74 - 18 Sep. 89
SUBJECT: Decisions of the Vietnamese Government and Party in Relation to POW's

TAB F: Selected Vietnamese, Media Commentaries on POW/MIA Issue as Monitored by FBIS
28 Jan. 74 - 21 Jan. 92

TAB G: Foreign Media Reports on Meetings between Vietnamese and U.S. Delegations on the POW/MIA Issue as Monitored by FBIS
4 Oct. 74 - 1 Feb. 92

2. All of this material is unclassified and will also be provided to the Department of Defense Central Documentation Office for inclusion in the repository for declassified information on POW-MIA's at the Library of Congress.

James D. Anders, Jr.
MEMORANDUM FOR: Robert W. Magner  
Chief, Senate Liaison Division  
Office of Congressional Affairs  

VIA: Office of the Deputy Director for Operations  

FROM: James D. Anders, Jr.  
Chief, Indochina Operations Group  

SUBJECT: Request for Information on Vietnamese Government Decisions in Relations to POW's  

REFERENCE: Letter of 17 January 1992 from Senators Kerry and Smith of the Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs to the DCI.  

1. This is in reply to Part IV of the 17 January 1992 letter requesting information on decisions of the Vietnamese Communist Party and Government in relation to POW's. We are prepared to provide a briefing on this subject to appropriately cleared and designated Committee personnel.  

2. We are providing the four attached documents which we hope will be useful for the committee. The first (TAB A), is a February 1992 Directorate of Intelligence (DDI) assessment entitled "Vietnam: Adjusting Its Strategy on the POW/MIA Issue". The second (TAB B), is a September 1987 DDI Special National Intelligence Estimate entitled "Hanoi and the POW/MIA Issue". The third (TAB C), is a June 1984 DDI memorandum entitled "Vietnam: Using the MIA Issue as a Bargaining Chip". The forth document (TAB D), is a 1989 DDI assessment entitled Perestroyka, Lao Style: Implications for Vietnam and the United States" which makes some reference to Laos and the POW/MIA issue.  

James D. Anders, Jr.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Staff Briefing, Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs

1. On the afternoon of 28 January 1992 in Hart 211 Jim Anders, C/ICOG, and the undersigned met with Frances Zwenig, Committee Staff Director, Dino Carluccio, Deputy Staff Director, and Committee Counsel, Bill Codinha, to review the status of Committee requests. Blythe Thomas from the SSCI staff, who carries the POW/MIA portfolio for that committee, also attended.

2. Ms. Zwenig opened the session by asking if a portion of a 1987 SNIE on POW/MIAs addressing the issue of French POWs on Indochina could be declassified for Committee use. (Approval for this declassification was obtained the following day. Copy attached). She then outlined the status of the Committee's anticipated travel to Southeast Asia saying that it appeared likely that the trip, scheduled to commence on 7 February, may well be postponed. Magner asked to be informed immediately of any decision because we would be informing ____ to travel to Bangkok to meet with the Committee as discussed with the DDO by Senator Kerry the previous week.

3. The meeting then turned to a review of the three letters recently sent by the Committee to the Agency requesting detained information and briefings on Vietnam and Anders explained that some of these requests were duplicative to earlier requests, covered areas more appropriately dealt with by DIA or represented areas where the Agency had few holdings. The three memos were reviewed point by point and the Committee was advised what we could and could not answer, and a mutually satisfactory arrangement on providing the responses was reached. Anders made the point that it would be especially useful to know what the Committee was looking for in a particular piece of correspondence and that it would be helpful to work with the Committee staff in framing questions. The staff also made the point that it was tasking several agencies on the same issues and was not interested in coordinated responses, but the responses of individual agencies even if thin or incomplete.
4. The staff also asked about the status of our response to earlier letters. Magner explained that the responses had been provided to Senate Security more than a week earlier (a point confirmed with Senate Security later and the Committee so advised). The staff then asked that we provide copies of the reporting requested. It was agreed that an ICOG officer would bring the reports in question to S-407 for Committee staff review and then return them to the Agency. Zwenig said that Bill Taylor of the staff had been selected to review those files.

5. Carluccio at the end of the meeting asked about three specific reports on Laos. Later that day he phoned the numbers to Magner. Insofar as he identified them by date time groups rather than number, Magner asked where the information had been obtained. Carluccio indicated that the data had come from the Air Force but would not go further. It is possible that just as the Committee has been seeking to obtain NSA material from the Air Force, it may also be seeking to get around the third agency rule with regard to Agency material as well.

Robert W. Magner
Deputy Director for Senate Affairs
Office of Congressional Affairs

Attachment
ANNEX B

The French Experience

In more than three decades since the end of the first Indochina war, the French Government has yet to receive a full accounting for its missing servicemen. (a)

By 9 September 1954, the deadline for release of all prisoners of war under the Geneva Agreements, the Vietnamese Communists had returned about one-third of the prisoners listed by the French. By May 1955, when the last French forces pulled out of North Vietnam, the number of men from the French Expeditionary Corps listed as "missing or failed to return from captivity" totaled 8,746, of whom 2,995 were French nationals. (b)

When accused of withholding prisoners, the Hanoi government subsequently asserted that it had released all POWs in accordance with the Geneva Agreements, and that any missing personnel whom they had not listed as having "rallied" to their side should be considered as killed in action or dead from wounds. In 1955-56, under the supervision of the International Control Commission (ICC), Hanoi released a total of 450 non-French soldiers of the Foreign Legion for repatriation to Central and Eastern Europe. Reliable Western observers in Vietnam during this period said that hundreds more legionnaires were released via China without the required notice to the ICC or the French Command. Later, during the 1960 and early 1970s, the Hanoi government repatriated hundreds of non-French personnel to their native countries as a result of actions initiated by their embassies, without informing the French authorities or the ICC. There are indications that some of these persons may not have been in Vietnam on their own volition. (c)

Most of those not repatriated prior to the September 1954 deadline were not French nationals from Metropolitan France but were East Europeans, North Africans, and other nationalities who had served in the French Expeditionary Corps. The only French nationals who are known to have been returned to French authorities after 1954 were 40 enlisted men released in 1962 and flown to France with their Vietnamese families. Some, if not all reportedly were tried as deserters in France. (d)

French POWs were held in North Vietnam after the execution of the Geneva Accords in 1954, and that no members of the French Far East Expeditionary Corps were being held against their will in 1971. (e)

The Remains Issue

While the French Government apparently is satisfied that all French prisoners were released at the end of the Indochina war, it is clear that the Hanoi government did not honor the terms of the Geneva Agreement to account for all French troops who were under Vietnamese control after the end of the war. (e)

The remains of over 22,000 French nationals and legionnaires were initially buried in Vietnam. In February 1955, the French High Command and the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) signed a graves agreement to establish protocols for repatriation of the remains of men who had fallen on both sides in the conflict. They were to take "all necessary measures" to complete the task by 1 July 1956—17 months after signature of the agreement. In the following 21 years, as of February 1976, the Vietnamese returned to France fewer than 1,500 sets of remains. All of the remains released by Hanoi had been buried by the French in military cemeteries in North Vietnam. Hanoi has not returned the remains of any of the men listed by the French as missing in action or as having died in captivity. Despite the substantial political and economic concessions the French have made to Hanoi since 1954, France has never received a full accounting for its missing and dead. (e)

In contrast, in South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, where the host governments cooperated with the French, the French Graves Service was able to reinter in the French cemetery at Tan Son Nhut—Saigon—the remains of virtually all French military personnel who had died in those countries. (e)

In August 1986 Paris and Hanoi reached an agreement concerning the repatriation of the remains of an estimated 25,000 French soldiers killed during the first Indochina war. The operation is expected to take two
ANNEX B

The French Experience

In more than three decades since the end of the first Indochina war, the French Government has yet to receive a full accounting for its missing servicemen.

By 9 September 1954, the deadline for release of all prisoners of war under the Geneva Agreements, the Vietnamese Communists had returned about one-third of the prisoners listed by the French. By May 1955, when the last French forces pulled out of North Vietnam, the number of men from the French Expeditionary Corps listed as "missing or failed to return from captivity" totaled 8,746, of whom 2,995 were French nationals.

When accused of withholding prisoners, the Hanoi government subsequently asserted that it had released all POWs in accordance with the Geneva Agreements, and that any missing personnel whom they had not listed as having "rallied" to their side should be considered as killed in action or dead from wounds. In 1955-56, under the supervision of the International Control Commission (ICC), Hanoi released a total of 450 non-French soldiers of the Foreign Legion for repatriation to Central and Eastern Europe. Reliable Western observers in Vietnam during this period said that hundreds more legionnaires were released via China without the required notice to the ICC or the French Command. Later, during the 1960s and early 1970s, the Hanoi government repatriated hundreds of non-French personnel to their native countries as a result of actions initiated by their embassies, without informing the French authorities or the ICC. There are indications that some of these persons may not have been in Vietnam on their own volition.

Most of those not repatriated prior to the September 1954 deadline were not French nationals from Metropolitan France but were East Europeans, North Africans, and other nationalities who had served in the French Expeditionary Corps. The only French nationals who are known to have been returned to French authorities after 1954 were 40 enlisted men released in 1962 and flown to France with their Vietnamese families. Some if not all reportedly were tried as deserters in France.

French POWs were held in North Vietnam after the execution of the Geneva Accords in 1954, and that no members of the French Far East Expeditionary Corps were being held against their will in 1971.

The Remains Issue

While the French Government apparently is satisfied that all French prisoners were released at the end of the Indochina war, it is clear that the Hanoi government did not honor the terms of the Geneva Agreement to account for all French troops who were under Vietnamese control after the end of the war.

The remains of over 22,000 French nationals and legionnaires were initially buried in Vietnam. In February 1955, the French High Command and the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) signed a graves agreement to establish protocols for repatriation of the remains of men who had fallen on both sides in the conflict. They were to take "all necessary measures" to complete the task by 1 July 1956—17 months after signature of the agreement. In the following 21 years, as of February 1976, the Vietnamese returned to France fewer than 1,500 sets of remains. All of the remains released by Hanoi had been buried by the French in military cemeteries in North Vietnam. Hanoi has not returned the remains of any of the men listed by the French as missing in action or as having died in captivity. Despite the substantial political and economic concessions the French have made to Hanoi since 1954, France has never received a full accounting for its missing and dead.

In contrast, in South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, where the host governments cooperated with the French, the French Graves Service was able to rein in the French cemetery at Tan Son Nhat, Saigon, the remains of virtually all French military personnel who had died in those countries.

In August 1986 Paris and Hanoi reached an agreement concerning the repatriation of the remains of an estimated 25,000 French soldiers killed during the first Indochina war. The operation is expected to take two years, with the costs, estimated at $2.5 million, being borne by France.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

24 January 1992

SUBJECT: Briefing for POW/MIA Committee Staff Member by re His Forthcoming Article

1. At 1400 hours on 24 January 1992 met with Investigator for the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs. has written a draft article for publication in the press on the POW issue. As a courtesy, the Committee was provided an advance copy on 23 January. This led to the request to meet with The article recounts the story of three Americans who were held by the Vietnamese after the fall of Saigon and the end of the war. It reviews this issue in the context of claims by Oleg Kalugin that the Soviets interrogated American POWs in Vietnam as late as 1978.

2. opened the meeting by reviewing Kalugin's recent testimony before the committee offering his own comments that Kalugin was most credible and that he, believed him. summarized his article, stressed that essentially all he knew as in the text. He did not know who Kalugin was talking about but allowed that any one of the three individuals cited in his article could have been involved although the time frame was wrong. asked for specifics on the return of the remains of Tucker Gougleman. said that he believed that they were returned in 1977 and was not aware of any controversy over whether or not the remains were genuine. offered his opinion that if there were three individuals in Vietnam—whether POWs or not—it suggested that the Vietnamese were not completely forthcoming and that the issue needed to be pressed. He also recounted his own relationship with and the latter's keen interest in the issue, particularly the status of

3. did not probe and seemed primarily interested in a simple reconfirmation by Beck of the statements in his article. made it very clear that he believed that there were as many as 60 POWs held by the Vietnamese after 1973, that they were interrogated by the Soviets and did not return to the United States. also said that he believes that was a very good witness, was highly believable but that was less credible because of his claims that there were up to 1,600 POWs held after 1973.
4. ______ asked ______ about a number of individuals that could be mutual acquaintances from their mutual service in Vietnam prior to 1975. ______ had only vague recollections. This did not appear to be investigative probing but simply and effort to establish some mutual ground. ______ seemed satisfied with the discussion and did not indicate any further interest in talking with ______. The meeting ended after about 35 minutes with no followup. On departing ______ who has been working for the Committee for only four days, said that there were some 10 investigators on the Committee together with six professional staff. His qualifications would appear to stem from his role as DAO in Saigon after the close out of MACV in 1973.

Robert W. Magner
Deputy Director for Senate Affairs
Office of Congressional Affairs
MEMORANDUM FOR: Robert W. Magner  
Chief, Senate Liaison Division  
Office of Congressional Affairs

VIA:                      Office of the Deputy Director for Operations

FROM: James D. Anders, Jr.  
Chief, Indochina Operations Group

SUBJECT: CIA Information Pertaining to Station Personnel in Laos and Vietnam, U.S. Personnel who did not return from Laos; and Air American Security Officers

REFERENCE: Letter of 20 December 1991 from Senators Kerry and Smith of the Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs to the DCI

1. This is in reply to the letter of 20 December 1991 which requested information on former senior Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) personnel in Laos and Vietnam and on U.S. citizens who had not returned from Laos from 1961 to the present as a result of assignments in or over Laos prior to 1975.

2. The full names for CIA Chiefs of Station Vientiane from 1961

3. The Agency possesses two lists relating to U.S. citizens who have not returned from Laos during the period 1961 to the present. The first is the DIA list of "U.S. Unaccounted for in Southeast Asia". The second is a list compiled at CIA Headquarters on 30 September 1969, entitled, "American Air Contractor Operating Crew Fatalities (in) Laos, 1961 to Present". A copy of the second list is attached. That list...
showed two American civilians as missing in Laos: Air America employee Eugene H. DeBruin, who is still listed as missing; and Bird & Son employee Ernest Brace, who returned on 28 March 1973.

4. We have reviewed our files but have not located any lists received by the United States Government from foreign governments, contacts or individuals which relate to U.S. individuals who have not returned from Laos. We will be reviewing a considerable volume of archived files in the coming week and will advise the committee if any material on this subject is located.

5. In addition to the 1969 list of "American Air Contractor Operating Crew Fatalities (in) Laos, 1961 to Present" mentioned above, the following U.S. citizens, all of whom were working for Air America, did not return from Laos:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Date Lost</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Type of Aircraft</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>James H. Ackley</td>
<td>7 March 1973</td>
<td>Laos</td>
<td>C-123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eugene DeBruin</td>
<td>5 Sept. 1963</td>
<td>Laos</td>
<td>C-46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clarence Driver</td>
<td>7 March 1973</td>
<td>Laos</td>
<td>C-123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>George Ritter</td>
<td>27 Dec. 1971</td>
<td>Laos</td>
<td>C-123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roy Townley</td>
<td>27 Dec. 1971</td>
<td>Laos</td>
<td>C-123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edward Weissenback</td>
<td>27 Dec. 1971</td>
<td>Laos</td>
<td>C-123</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6. All six of these individuals also appear on the DIA listing of "U.S. Unaccounted for in Southeast Asia". Of the above individuals, DIA lists DeBruin as a POW. Ackley, Driver, Ritter and Townley are listed as missing in action. There is a presumptive finding of death in Weissenback's case.

7. The other American civilians who remain missing in Laos had no affiliation with the Agency. They are Charles Duffy, who disappeared in 1961, and on whom there is a presumptive finding of death; Charles Dean, captured in 1974, whose gravesite has been identified by Laos; and Alan L. Blewett, lost while flying in a Navion aircraft in 1962, on whom there is also a presumptive finding of death.
Attachment: "American Air Contractor Operating Crew Fatalities Laos, 1961 to (1969)"

James D. Anders, Jr.
The Honorable John F. Kerry  
Chairman  
Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs  
United States Senate  
Washington, D.C. 20510  

Dear Mr. Chairman:

The Director has asked me to respond to your letter of December 20, 1991 which requested copies of CIA-originated intelligence reports on any prisoners of war, missing in action, detainees or others in Laos after January 27, 1973. This includes live-sighting reports. We have prepared copies of these reports and have them available for review at CIA Headquarters by appropriately cleared and designated Committee personnel. These reports were disseminated to the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) at the time they were received. The province and/or the specific location is given in each report.

In addition, we will review the DIA live-sighting files to ensure all the CIA reports requested in the letter are made available to the Committee for its review. Retrieval of many of these reports is a by-hand process as they are not available for retrieval electronically. Therefore, by also reviewing the DIA files we hope to ensure the Committee has access to all information requested.

A copy of this letter is also being provided to Vice Chairman Smith.

Sincerely,

/s/ Stanley M. Moskowitz

Stanley M. Moskowitz  
Director of Congressional Affairs
SUBJECT: Letter to Senators Kerry/Smith re Laos and POW/MIA
Issue Letter of 20 Dec
The Honorable Bob Smith  
Vice Chairman  
Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs  
United States Senate  
Washington, D.C. 20510  

Dear Mr. Vice Chairman:

The Director has asked me to respond to your letter of December 20, 1991 which requested copies of CIA-originated intelligence reports on any prisoners of war, missing in action, detainees or others in Laos after January 27, 1973. This includes live-sighting reports. We have prepared copies of these reports and have them available for review at CIA Headquarters by appropriately cleared and designated Committee personnel. These reports were disseminated to the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) at the time they were received. The province and/or the specific location is given in each report.

In addition, we will review the DIA live-sighting files to ensure all the CIA reports requested in the letter are made available to the Committee for its review. Retrieval of many of these reports is a by-hand process as they are not available for retrieval electronically. Therefore, by also reviewing the DIA files we hope to ensure the Committee has access to all information requested.

A copy of this letter is also being provided to Chairman Kerry.

Sincerely,

stanley m. moskowitz
Director of Congressional Affairs
**SUBJECT:** Letter to Senators Kerry/Smith re Laos and POW/MIA Issue Letter of 20 Dec

**NOTES**

**COORDINATED WITH (list names as well as offices)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>OFFICE</th>
<th>DATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>See attached sheet</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**ACTION REQUIRED BY** D/OCA

For your signature

Signed
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FROM: Jim Anders</th>
<th>EXTENSION</th>
<th>DATE SENT</th>
<th>REQUEST NUMBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C/EA/ICOG</td>
<td></td>
<td>15 Jan 92</td>
<td>DD/O 0025/014-92</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)</th>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>OFFICER'S INITIALS</th>
<th>COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after comment.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. C/EA</td>
<td>1-7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Richard Coffman C/ORMS</td>
<td>16 Jan 92</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. AC/ORMS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. SA/DDO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. ADDO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. DDO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Robert Magner, D/OCA/S</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

RETURN TO:
MEMORANDUM FOR: Robert W. Magner  
Chief, Senate Liaison Division  
Office of Congressional Affairs

VIA: Office of the Deputy Director for Operations

FROM: James D. Anders, Jr.  
Chief, Indochina Operations Group

SUBJECT: CIA Information Pertaining to POW/MIA's in Laos after 27 January 1973

REFERENCE: Letter of 20 December 1991 from Senators Kerry and Smith of the Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs to the DCI

1. This is a reply to the letter of 20 December 1991 which requested copies of CIA-originated intelligence reports on any prisoners of war, missing in action, detainees or others in Laos after 27 January 1973. This includes live-sighting reports. We have prepared copies of these reports and have them available for review at CIA headquarters by appropriately cleared and designated Committee personnel. These reports were disseminated to the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) at the time they were received. The province and/or the specific location is given in each report.

2. In addition, we will review the DIA live-sighting files to ensure all the CIA reports requested in the letter are made available to the Committee for their review. Retrieval of many of these reports is a by-hand process as they are not available for retrieval electronically. Therefore, by also reviewing the DIA files we hope to ensure the Committee has access to all the information requested.

James D. Anders, Jr.
Mr. Robert Gates  
Director of Central Intelligence  
Central Intelligence Agency  
Washington, DC 20505  

Dear Bob:

We are writing to request information from the Central Intelligence Agency pertaining to Laos and the POW/MIA issue. This information is essential for the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs to carry out its responsibilities under Senate Resolution 82 and Senate Resolution 185.

Specifically, we request the following items:

1. Please provide the committee copies of all intelligence reports from all sources, including foreign intelligence, in the possession of the Central Intelligence Agency or for which the CIA is the originating agency, relating to U.S., American, foreign (farang), white, caucasian, negro, black or unidentified prisoners of war, missing in action personnel, prisoners, air pirates, war criminals, or detainees, named or unnamed, alleged or confirmed to be alive after January 27, 1973 in any situation suggesting confinement within Laos.

2. Please provide the information requested in item #1 by province and grid coordinate breakdown.

Provinces applicable to this request include:

PHONGSALI (PHONG XA LY) PROVINCE
SAM NEUA (XAM NEUA) (HUA PHAN) PROVINCE
LOUANGPHABANG (LUONG PHA BANG) PROVINCE
LOUNG NAMTHA (LUONG NAM THA) PROVINCE
UDOMSAI (U DOM XAY) PROVINCE
XIANGKHOUANG (XIENG KHOANG) PROVINCE
Xaignabouri (XAY NHA BU LY) PROVINCE
VIENTIANE (VIENG CHAN) PROVINCE
KHAMMOUAN (KHAM MUON) PROVINCE
SAVANNAKHET (XA VAN NA KHEET) PROVINCE
SARAVAN (XA LA VAN) PROVINCE
CHAMPASAK (CHAM PA XAC) PROVINCE
ATTAPU (AT TA PU) PROVINCE
BO KEO PROVINCE
BO-LI-KHAM XAY PROVINCE
SE KOONG PROVINCE

Grid coordinates applicable to this request include the following grid squares:

PB, PC, PD, QV, QA, QB, QC, QD, QE, QQ, RV, RA, RB, RC, RD, RE, SF, SG, SH, SJ, SK, TE, TF, TG, TH, TJ, TK, UF, UG, UH, UD, VE, VF, VG, VH, VJ, UJ, WA, WB, WC, WD, WE, WF, XA, XB, XC, XD,XE, YA, YB, YC AND YD.

Your cooperation in providing this information to the select committee prior to January 20, 1992 will be most appreciated.

If any of these items contain classified information, please provide such material directly to the Office of Senate Security, S.407, U.S. Capitol.

Should you have any questions on this matter, please contact Mr. Dino Carluccio on the committee staff at (202) 224-2306.

Sincerely,

[Signature]
JOHN F. KERRY
Chairman

[Signature]
BOB SMITH
Vice Chairman
The Honorable John F. Kerry  
Chairman  
Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs  
United States Senate  
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

The Director has asked me to reply to your letter of January 17, 1992 which requested copies of all CIA intelligence reports on American prisoners or detainees in Vietnam after March 29, 1973. We are providing all of the reports we have identified to date in that category. We are continuing to review our archives, to ensure that all such reports are located and delivered to you.

Tabs A and B are groups of two different types of CIA intelligence reports which were disseminated to Intelligence Community members concerned with POW/MIA affairs. We have declassified these reports for the use of the Committee.

Tab C contains intelligence reports which were sent exclusively to the Defense Intelligence Agency for intelligence and operational purposes. Although we have redacted certain source information, these documents remain classified. If you need any of the original unredacted documents for review, please inform us, and we will make them available to you.

With regard to the requests made in paragraphs 1 and 2 of your letter, for names and addresses of Agency officers in Saigon as well as Agency personnel in Vietnam having POW/MIA responsibilities after 1973, this information has already been provided in earlier correspondence.

This letter is also being provided to Vice Chairman Smith.

Sincerely,

Stanley M. Moskowitz  
Director of Congressional Affairs

Enclosures
SUBJECT: Letter to Sen Kerry/Smith re POW/MIA
(incoming ltr dated 17 Jan)
The Honorable Bob Smith  
Vice Chairman  
Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs  
United States Senate  
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Vice Chairman:

The Director has asked me to reply to your letter of January 17, 1992 which requested copies of all CIA intelligence reports on American prisoners or detainees in Vietnam after March 29, 1973. We are providing all of the reports we have identified to date in that category. We are continuing to review our archives, to ensure that all such reports are located and delivered to you.

Tabs A and B are groups of two different types of CIA intelligence reports which were disseminated to Intelligence Community members concerned with POW/MIA affairs. We have declassified these reports for the use of the Committee.

Tab C contains intelligence reports which were sent exclusively to the Defense Intelligence Agency for intelligence and operational purposes. Although we have redacted certain source information, these documents remain classified. If you need any of the original unredacted documents for review, please inform us, and we will make them available to you.

With regard to the requests made in paragraphs 1 and 2 of your letter, for names and addresses of Agency officers in Saigon as well as Agency personnel in Vietnam having POW/MIA responsibilities after 1973, this information has already been provided in earlier correspondence.

This letter is also being provided to Chairman Kerry.

Sincerely,

Stanley M. Moskowitz  
Director of Congressional Affairs

Enclosures
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Coordinator for Missing in Action and Prisoner of War Matters, Department of State.

SUBJECT: Americans Remaining in Saigon

Attached as of possible interest to you is a report resulting from a mission containing information on Americans who reportedly were unable to leave South Vietnam before the Communist takeover. We are giving this report no additional distribution.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS:

Attachment: Report, as stated.
1. SEVERAL AMERICANS (NAMES UNKNOWN) WERE LIVING WITH THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS (ICRC) IN SAIGON PRIOR
TO THE CURRENCY EXCHANGE ON 22 SEPTEMBER 1975. THEY WERE
HOUSED AND FED FREE OF CHARGE, BUT NONETHELESS HAD OCCASIONAL
COMPLAINTS ABOUT THEIR SITUATION. ON 22 SEPTEMBER ALL OF THESE
AMERICANS, EXCEPT ONE, SHOWED UP WITH SEVERAL HUNDRED THOUSAND
OLD GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM (QVN) PIASTERS EACH, TO BE EXCHANGED
FOR NEW PROVISIONAL REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT (PRG) DONG.
BECAUSE OF THIS EVIDENCE THAT THEY WERE NOT DESTITUTE, THE
ICRC MADE THEM LEAVE ICRC PREMISES. ONE AMERICAN WAS PERMITTED
TO REMAIN. A PERSON WHO WAS ALMOST BLIND
BECAUSE OF EYE CATARACTS, THE ICRC HAS MADE SPECIAL PETITION
TO AUTHORITIES TO PERMIT [REDACTED] TO DEPART VIETNAM, WITH NO
RESULTS AS OF EARLY DECEMBER.

2. THE ICRC MADE A SPECIAL PETITION TO THE AUTHORITIES TO LET [REDACTED] LEAVE BECAUSE OF WHAT ICRC CONSIDERED TO BE HIS UNSTABLE MENTAL CONDITION. THE ICRC BELIEVES THAT THE AUTHORITIES DID ACT ON THIS PETITION IN ORDER TO PRECLUDE FUTURE PROBLEMS WITH [REDACTED] LEFT ON 2 DECEMBER 1975.

3. A MAN NAMED [REDACTED] AS OF EARLY DECEMBER, WAS WORKING IN THE ICRC MEDICAL LABORATORY.

4. IN AUGUST 1975 [REDACTED] HENT TO TAN SON NHUT AIRPORT EXPECTING TO LEAVE VIETNAM, HAVING AN EXIT VISA AND ALL HIS DOCUMENTATION IN ORDER. THE AUTHORITIES DID NOT PERMIT HIM TO LEAVE, BASING THE REFUSAL ON SOME FLIMSY EXCUSE. ICRC BELIEVES THAT THE AIRPORT AUTHORITIES SIMPLY SAID THEY HAD NOT RECEIVED PROPER NOTIFICATION, BUT HE THINKS THE REAL REASON WAS BECAUSE THE U.S. HAD VETOED PRG ADMISSION TO THE U.N. AS OF EARLY DECEMBER RESIDED AT

5.

6. ANOTHER AMERICAN WHOSE NAME IS UNKNOWN AND WHO SPEAKS VIETNAMESE, IS PEDALLING A CYCLO.
7. [Redacted] has turned his former club of sorts for Americans. He operates a restaurant there.

8. [Redacted] lives at the Miramar Hotel on Tu Do Street.

9. Whether any Americans other than [Redacted] possessed exit visas is unknown. [Redacted] the authorities are holding the remaining Americans "for ransom."
MEMORANDUM FOR:

Deputy Coordinator for Prisoner of War and Missing in Action Matters
Department of State

Chief, Prisoner of War/Missing in Action Branch
Resources and Installations Division
Directorate for Intelligence (Research Center)
Defense Intelligence Agency

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
(International Security Affairs)
International Economic Affairs
and Prisoner of War/Missing in Action Affairs

FROM:

Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT:

1. Americans Remaining in Saigon and Reported Capture of Two Americans Near Vung Tau


Attached as of possible interest to you is a report resulting from
escaped from Vietnam on 24 May 1976 and arrived in Saigon on 19 June 1976 and of an American resident of Saigon who left Vietnam in mid-summer 1976. The information on the two Americans flying at the International Red Cross compound in Saigon in May 1976 is included for your information, although possibly those two individuals are no longer in Vietnam. We have taken no further action since both sources intend to go to the United States. We are giving this report no further dissemination.
COUNTRY: VIETNAM

DATE: LATE MARCH-JULY 1976

SUBJECT: 1. AMERICANS REMAINING IN SAIGON AND REPORTED CAPTURE OF TWO AMERICANS NEAR VUNG TAU
          2. AMERICAN PRISONERS, INCLUDING WAR WOUNDED, ALLEGEDLY STILL BEING HELD IN VIETNAM

SOURCE: [Redacted]
TO TRY THESE PRISONERS. IN MAY 1976 A NORTH VIETNAMESE
CADEE WHO HAD BEEN SENT TO SAIGON TOLD A SOUTH VIETNAMESE
CONTACT THAT HE HAS SEEN "MANY" AMERICAN PRISONERS IN
HANOI WHO WERE SUFFERING FROM VAR WOUNDS OR MENTAL DISORDERS.
IN THE FIRST HALF OF 1976 NORTH VIETNAMESE OFFICERS TOLD A
SAIGON BLACK MARKETEER THAT SERIOUSLY ILL AMERICAN PRISONERS
WERE STILL BEING HELD IN NORTH VIETNAM BECAUSE THE COMMUNISTS
FEARED THEIR RELEASE WOULD HAVE AN UNFAVORABLE IMPACT ON
PUBLIC OPINION. IN EARLY JULY 1976 A NORTH VIETNAMESE
SECURITY OFFICIAL PROCESSING A GROUP DEPARTING VIETNAM AT
TAN SON NHUT AIRPORT, WHEN PURPOSELY PROVOKED BY A QUESTION
ON AMERICAN PRISONERS STILL IN VIETNAM, REPLIED THAT "THEY
WOULDN'T BE HANDLED SEPARATELY." END SUMMARY.
1. Two male Americans were living in the International Red Cross (IRC) compound in Saigon as of mid-May 1976. Both men formerly were employed at Long Binh Base, according to a secretary at the IRC. She visited her cousin, who was employed at the IRC compound, two times a month and last saw the two Americans approximately 10 days before she left Saigon on 22 May 1976.

2. One of the men was named "Johnny" or "Jimmy" (LNU). He was 28-30 years old, approximately 170 pounds, and 5 feet 8 inches tall. He had curly dark-brown hair with a goatee, brown eyes, fair complexion, much body hair, and no noticeable scars. He wore glasses and had a mannerism which was described as shrugging his shoulders often. This man was known to speak only English. His health appeared to be good.

3. The second man was named "Bill" (LNU). He was in his early 30's, was less than 5 feet 8 inches tall, and weighed about 160 pounds. He had dark-brown hair, a ruddy complexion, and no noticeable mannerisms. In addition to English, he spoke some Vietnamese and a little French.
4. IN LATE NOVEMBER 1975 WHILE ON A VISIT TO HER FAMILY IN VUNG TAU, WAS TOLD BY FAMILY SERVANTS THAT EARLIER TWO AMERICANS AND ABOUT 20 VIETNAMESE HAD BEEN CAPTURED IN THE SMALLER OF TWO MOUNTAIN AREAS NEAR BACK BEACH IN VUNG TAU. THE SERVANTS SAID THE COMMUNIST AUTHORITIES HAD REQUIRED THEM TO GO TO THE CITY CENTER WHERE THEY SAW TWO AMERICANS AND ABOUT 20 VIETNAMESE TIED TOGETHER BEING MARCHED THROUGH THE STREETS. THE AUTHORITIES STATED THESE PRISONERS HAD BEEN CAPTURED IN THE SMALLER MOUNTAIN AREA, WHICH WAS PLACED OFF LIMITS BECAUSE OF THE CONTINUED PRESENCE OF RESISTANCE FORCES THERE. THE SERVANTS DID NOT PROVIDE PHYSICAL DESCRIPTIONS OF THE AMERICANS THEY SAW. ON A SUBSEQUENT VISIT TO VUNG TAU SEVERAL WEEKS LATER, THE SERVANTS TOLD AND SHE ALSO HEARD OVER LOUDSPEAKERS THAT A MOCK TRIAL FOR THESE PRISONERS WAS CONDUCTED IN AN OPEN BEACH AREA, AT WHICH THE COMMUNIST PROSECUTORS SAID THAT ANYONE BEARING ARMS AGAINST THE COMMUNIST REGIME WOULD BE SENTENCED TO DEATH. NO PRISONERS WERE PRESENT AT THE TRIAL AND NO SPECIFIC MENTION OF AMERICANS WAS MADE DURING THE TRIAL. ALTHOUGH ALL PRISONERS WERE SENTENCED TO DEATH, DID NOT KNOW WHETHER ANY OF THE AMERICANS WERE
EXECUTED; BUT VUNG TAU RESIDENTS SAID THAT ONE VIETNAMESE
EX-COLONEL CAPTURED ON THAT OCCASION HAD BEEN KILLED.

(HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: "WHETHER THE TWO CAPTURED INDIVIDUALS
IDENTIFIED AS "AMERICANS" WERE ACTUALLY NON-AMERICAN
CAUCASIANS CANNOT BE DETERMINED; ALTHOUGH THE COMMUNIST
AUTHORITIES CLAIMED THESE "AMERICANS" WERE INVOLVED IN
RESISTANCE ACTIVITIES, THEY POSSIBLY WERE MERELY IN HIDING
IN VUNG TAU, WHICH IS A WELL KNOWN AREA FOR ESCAPE FROM
VIETNAM BY BOAT. NO FURTHER INFORMATION WAS OBTAINED ON
THE CONDITION, TREATMENT AND FATE OF THESE "AMERICANS.""

5. IN MAY 1976, A SAIGON RESIDENT ENGAGED
IN FORGING DOCUMENTS, SAID A FRIEND OF HIS TO TOLD OF SEEING
"MANY" AMERICAN PRISONERS IN THE HANOI AREA. THE FRIEND ADDED
THAT ALL OF THE PRISONERS WERE EITHER SERIOUSLY INJURED, I.E.
CRIPPLED BY WAR WOUNDS OR SUFFERING FROM MENTAL DISORDERS
RELATING TO THEIR LONG IMPRISONMENT OR HARSH TREATMENT.

A FRIEND WITH WHOM HE WAS IN FREQUENT CONTACT, WAS A NORTH
VIETNAMESE LIEUTENANT COLONEL WHO WAS A SOUTH VIETNAMESE NATIVE
WHO HAD SERVED WITH THE NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY (NVA) FOR OVER
20 YEARS. HE SAID THAT HIS FRIEND WHO WAS INVOLVED IN THE
SAIGON BLACK MARKET, HAD BECOME DISATTRACTIONED AFTER THE
"LIBERATION" OF SOUTH VIETNAM SINCE HE BELIEVED THE NORTHERNERS TOOK EVERYTHING AND DISPOSSESSED THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE.

THE TIME FRAME FOR THE OBSERVATION OF AMERICAN PRISONERS IS UNKNOWN. SINCE SOME OF THESE AMERICANS WERE REPORTEDLY SUFFERING FROM WAR WOUNDS, THEY COULD POSSIBLY BE PRISONERS OF WAR.

6. IN THE FIRST HALF OF 1976, A SOUTH VIETNAMESE GIRL INVOLVED IN SAIGON BLACK MARKET ACTIVITIES SAID THAT ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS NVA OFFICERS, WHO WERE HER CUSTOMERS, SAID THAT AMERICAN PRISONERS WERE STILL BEING HELD IN NORTH VIETNAM. THEY ALSO TOLD HER THAT SINCE THESE PRISONERS WERE ALL SICK OR BADLY INJURED, THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM (DRV) AUTHORITIES WERE AFRAID OF A POSSIBLE UNFAVORABLE IMPACT ON PUBLIC OPINION SHOULD THEY BE RELEASED. ((HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: THE TIME FRAME FOR THE CONTINUED DETENTION OF THESE AMERICAN PRISONERS IS UNKNOWN.)

7. IN JULY 1976, AT TAN SON NHUT AIRPORT, WHO WAS PROCESSING A GROUP OF FOREIGNERS
who had been permitted to leave South Vietnam, was deliberately provoked by one of them on the subject of Americans still imprisoned. When was asked what would happen to more than 10 Americans still in Vietnamese jails, replied that "they would be handled separately." Interpreted this reply to be an admission by the NVA officers that some Americans were still imprisoned in Vietnam.
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Coordinator for Missing in Action And Prisoner of War Matters Department of State

FROM: Acting Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT: Americans Left in Vietnam

Attached as of possible interest to you is a report resulting from the debriefings of [redacted] who had resided in Saigon and left in February 1975 on the subject of Americans left in Vietnam after the Communist takeover of Saigon. We are giving this report no additional dissemination.

Attachment: Report, as stated.
COUNTRY: VIETNAM

DATE: SEPTEMBER 1975 - JANUARY 1976

SUBJECT: AMERICANS REMAINING IN SOUTH VIETNAM AND DETENTION OF AMERICANS IN NORTH VIETNAM

SOURCE:

1. THE INFORMATION IN THIS PARAGRAPH WAS OBTAINED FROM A NATIONAL WHO RESIDED IN SAIGON UNTIL HIS DEPARTURE FROM VIETNAM IN FEBRUARY 1976. HE OBTAINED THE INFORMATION FROM A VIETNAMESE FRIEND, WHO FORMERLY WORKED WITH HIM IN AN AMERICAN OFFICE, AND WHO IN TURN RECEIVED THE INFORMATION FROM A RELATIVE WHOM HE HAD VISITED IN JANUARY. THE RELATIVE TOLD HIM ABOUT SEEING A CAUCASIAN MALE WHO MAY BE AN AMERICAN IN A "NEW ECONOMIC AREA" IN DINH QUAN DISTRICT, LONG KANG PROVINCE. THE RELATIVE, WHO WAS LIVING IN THIS SAME AREA, SAID THAT THE "AMERICAN" WORE TATTERED CLOTHES, HAD NO WEAPON, AND WAS "VERY Miserable." THE "AMERICAN" OBTAINED HIS FOOD FROM A SETTLER IN THE AREA. (HEADQUARTER COMMENT: HAD NO FURTHER DETAILS ON THIS CAUCASIAN, WHOSE NAME IS UNKNOWN. THE COMMUNIST
AUTHORITIES HAVE OPENED SEVERAL RURAL AREAS FOR SETTLEMENT AND CULTIVATION BY RESIDENTS FROM SAIGON AND OTHER URBAN AREAS. THESE AREAS ARE CALLED "NEW ECONOMIC AREAS."

2.  ______________  WHO LEFT SAIGON IN FEBRUARY  ______________

SAID THAT SHORTLY BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE HE SAW CAUCASIANS, WHO HE ASSUMED WERE AMERICANS, IN SAIGON.  ______________ DESCRIBED THEM AS WITHOUT FUNDS AND WORKING AS PEDICAB DRIVERS.  (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT:  ______________ DID NOT PROVIDE THE NUMBER, NAMES, OR PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION OF THESE PEDICAB DRIVERS.

ACCORDING TO  ______________  ONE AMERICAN WHO SPOKE VIETNAMESE HAS BEEN SEEN DRIVING A PEDICAB IN LATE 1975 IN SAIGON.  THERE ARE APPROXIMATELY 50 AMERICANS AND THEIR DEPENDENTS KNOWN TO BE LIVING IN SAIGON AT THIS TIME.


______________  HAD NO FURTHER DETAILS AND BELIEVES THAT THE PURPOSE OF THE COURSE
INSTRUCTOR WAS TO INDICATE THAT THE VIETNAMESE KNOW HOW TO DEAL WITH AMERICANS. AT THE TIME THIS COURSE WAS GIVEN, NINE AMERICANS, WHO HAD BEEN CAPTURED IN BAN ME THUOT IN APRIL 1975, WERE BEING HELD IN HANOI. THESE AMERICANS WERE SUBSEQUENTLY RELEASED.)
Dear Mr. Chairman:

This is in response to your letter dated January 17, 1992 which requested information concerning decisions of the Vietnamese government and party in relations to POWs, and/or evidence of policy changes over time. The enclosed material from the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) addresses some of these issues. We have also included as part of this package some additional material on the POW issue which the Committee may find useful for background.

TAB A: Analysis on the POW/MIA issue prepared by FBIS based only on selected Foreign Public Media September 7, 1972 - January 23, 1992


TAB C: Foreign Media Reports on live sightings and the whereabouts of remains as monitored by FBIS May 3, 1977 - June 13, 1990

TAB D: Official SRV Statements on the POW/MIA issue as monitored by FBIS June 30, 1990 - January 30, 1992

TAB E: Official SRV Statements on POW/MIA issue as monitored by FBIS January 28, 1974 - September 18, 1989
The Honorable John F. Kerry

TAB F: Selected Vietnamese media commentaries on POW/MIA issues as monitored by FBIS
January 28, 1974 - January 21, 1992

TAB G: Foreign Media Reports on meetings between Vietnamese and US delegations on the POW/MIA issue as monitored by FBIS
October 4, 1974 - February 1, 1992

All of this material is unclassified and will also be provided to the Department of Defense Central Documentation Office for inclusion in the repository for declassified information on POW/MIAs at the Library of Congress.

Sincerely,

78/ Stanley M. Moskowitz

Stanley M. Moskowitz
Director of Congressional Affairs

Enclosure
SUBJECT: Letter to Senator Kerry re POW/MIA issues
(incoming ltr dated 17 Jan)
This folder includes analyses on the POW/MIA issue prepared by Foreign Broadcast Information Service. The analyses in this folder are based exclusively on the content and behavior of selected foreign public media. They are issue without coordination with other U.S. Government components.
even to “discussing” substantive issues there in the absence of progress in the bilateral talks (MENA, 15 January; Cairo radio, 20 January, respectively). In addition, Jordanian acting Information Minister and Labor Minister ‘Abd-al-Karim al-Kabari reportedly said that although Jordan and Syria differed over attendance, “both agree on . . . rejecting any form of normalization of Arab-Israeli relations before progress is realized in the bilateral” talks (Amman radio, 21 January).

Vietnam–U.S.: Hanoi Continues To Deny Charges on U.S. POW’s

Hanoi has continued to reflect heightened concern about the potential for damage to its relationship with Washington from charges that in 1978 it was still holding Americans captured during the Indochina war and that Soviet KGB officers interrogated them (Trends of 15 January 1992, pages 4–6). Issuing yet another official denial of the allegations made by former Soviet KGB Gen. Oleg Kalugin, Hanoi on 20 January sent a message from its Office for the Search for Americans Missing in Action (MIA) to the U.S. MIA office in Hanoi reiterating Vietnam’s position that Kalugin’s claims are an “ill-intentioned fabrication” (Hanoi radio). The message—an apparent attempt to preempt Kalugin’s testimony before the U.S. Congress on the 21st—went on to present in great detail what it claimed were the results of Vietnam’s “serious and careful investigation” into the charges. That investigation purportedly concluded there was only one meeting between a U.S. POW and a KGB officer, in “January 1973.” Reflecting Vietnam’s concerns about the political fallout from the charges, the message called on the United States not to use the event “as an excuse to cook up a story” about American POW’s being held in Vietnam after the war.

A commentary in the party paper Nhan Dan the next day went even further in expressing Hanoi’s concern about the impact of the charges on its relationship with Washington. The commentary, carried by Vietnam’s press agency VNA and by Hanoi radio’s English-language service on 21 January, “urged” the U.S. Government and Congress to stop using the MIA–POW question as a “political issue to block the normalization of U.S.–Vietnamese ties.” It reiterated Vietnam’s position that while Hanoi considers the MIA issue a “purely humanitarian one” that it will resolve “unconditionally,” normalizing U.S.–Vietnamese relations would put an “early end to the MIA problem.”
Russia–Vietnam–U.S.

Moscow, Hanoi Rebut Charges on American Prisoners of War

Obviously worried about the political and economic fallout from allegations that Hanoi in 1978 was still holding Americans captured during the Indochina war and that Soviet KGB officers interrogated them, both Russia and Vietnam have taken pains to rebut the charges and to appear cooperative in resolving the issue.

The Russian Government is clearly trying to prevent the POW issue from damaging its budding relations with Washington. Reflecting sensitivity over the charges made by former KGB Gen. Oleg Kalugin in interviews with Western media on 2 January, Moscow took only two days to respond to the allegations. Speaking to a TASS correspondent on the 4th, a spokeswoman for the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service, which took over a number of the former KGB's functions, rebutted Kalugin's charges, saying that "it has been established" after a "thorough investigation" that there was a "one-time contact" between KGB employees and a U.S. POW being held by Vietnam in "January–February 1973." Seeking to dispel the appearance that the Foreign Intelligence Service might be concealing any information, the spokeswoman went on to say that there is "no other information" about contacts between KGB employees and U.S. POW's in Vietnam.

Russian media continued their rebuttal several days later. On 7 January Moscow radio's English-language service and TASS aired a news conference by the man Kalugin claimed had been in charge of the interrogation of the American POW's in Vietnam, retired KGB Col. Oleg Nechiporenko. While Nechiporenko confirmed that he had participated in the KGB's "only contact" with American prisoners, he rejected Kalugin's claim that the interrogations took place in 1978, asserting that the questioning took place in January 1973. Continuing to raise questions about Kalugin's allegations, he denied any knowledge of meetings between "other KGB officers" and American POW's in Vietnam, saying that after that one interview in January 1973 "there were no more contacts between Soviet and Vietnamese intelligence on the issue."
In addition to denying Kalugin's charges, Moscow appears to be trying to project an image of cooperation in resolving the POW-MIA issue. Reflecting this attitude, the Foreign Intelligence Service spokeswoman, in her statement to TASS, pointedly noted that since Russia "respects and understands" American "concerns" about the fate of its citizens, any statement regarding their whereabouts "must be taken seriously and verified." Speaking to a press briefing on 9 January, Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman Vitaliy Churkin also underscored Russia's willingness to cooperate with Washington in resolving this issue, noting that Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev had, at a meeting that day with U.S. Ambassador Robert Strauss, reached an agreement to set up a "joint Supreme Soviet-U.S. congressional commission" to investigate reports that the Russian side has information on American prisoners taken during the Korean and Indochina wars (Russian Information Agency, 9 January).

Vietnam For its part, by issuing three authoritative statements denying the allegations, Hanoi has also demonstrated concern that Kalugin's charges could set back efforts to normalize ties with the United States. Reacting more quickly than Moscow, on 3 January Hanoi’s Vietnam News Agency (VNA) said that it was "authorized" by the regime to issue a statement "categorically rejecting" Kalugin's charges as a "sheer fabrication." Continuing its campaign of rebuttal, Hanoi on 5 January aired an interview by Vietnam's ambassador to the United Nations, Trinh Xuan Lang, calling Kalugin's claims "fabrications aimed at misleading public opinion" (Hanoi TV, 5 January), following it four days later with its most authoritative comment on the charges, a 9 January VNA interview with a spokesman from Vietnam’s Foreign Ministry. In the interview, the spokesman highlighted what he claimed were the "contradictions" in Kalugin's statements, pointing to Kalugin's inability to recall the date of the alleged interrogations. Calling the allegations a "sheer fabrication," the spokesman went on to note that not only had Nechiporenko "denied" Kalugin's claims but that "CIA experts" had also found them to be "groundless." Concluding his remarks, the spokesman underscored Hanoi's willingness to cooperate in resolving the issue, saying that Kalugin was welcome to come to Vietnam with American "officials" to "make the matter clear."

Prospects

Decontrolled six months after date of publication
CHINA: Beijing Moves To Strengthen Rural Security Forces

Reflecting continued leadership concern over the potential for rural unrest, Vice Minister of Public Security Yu Lei recently called for beefing up the police apparatus in rural areas as part of the party's ongoing efforts to rebuild grassroots party and government organs. In a 21 November front-page article in Nongmin Ribao—the party's newspaper for rural cadres—Yu called specifically for the establishment of "leading groups for comprehensive improvement of public security" at the county level and for public security offices and police substations at the town and township levels. He also called for building a network of "rural public security committees"—evidently mass organizations—that would reach "down to every grassroots organization" to assist public security organs. Rural police forces, he said, are currently "far from sufficient" to handle growing rural crime, with a third of towns and townships having no police substations and the rest being woefully undermanned.

Despite Yu's claim that a crackdown on crime in recent years had "stemmed the tide" of crime to some extent and that public security in rural areas was "relatively stable," he acknowledged that there was "a grim side" to the situation, noting that many "new problems" had cropped up as a result of "significant changes in rural society" and "deepened rural reform." Stressing that the rural crime rate was rising faster than the urban crime rate, Yu went on to discuss a host of problems, including the "chaotic social order" around transportation routes that posed "a grave threat" to the masses; the "rampant" theft from and "sabotage" of oilfields, electric and hydraulic facilities, telecommunications equipment, and transmission lines; and the increase in "large-scale mass conflicts and armed street fights."

VIETNAM-U.S.: Criticism of U.S. Conditions on MIA Issue

Hanoi has given no official indication that it plans to alter its present policy of cooperation with the United States in resolving the question of Americans missing in action (MIA's) from the Indochina war, despite signs that elements in the Vietnamese leadership may be unhappy with that policy. Foreign Minister Nguyen Manh Cam assured a group of U.S. Government officials during their
7–8 December visit to Vietnam that Hanoi will “continue to cooperate” with the United States in resolving the MIA question (Vietnam News Agency, 9 December). Hanoi, he asserted, “always regards” the MIA issue as a “humanitarian” one.

Câm’s assurances stand in contrast to signs of discontent over Hanoi’s MIA policy that appeared in a signed article in the party paper Nhan Dan on 7 December. That article asserted that Hanoi has made “unilateral” concessions on the MIA issue without demanding fulfillment of “any conditions” by the U.S. side (Hanoi radio, 8 December). The article also complained that Vietnam has returned a large number of U.S. servicemen’s remains and spent “600,000 workdays” searching for MIA remains, while Washington’s “irrational attitude” in setting “all sorts” of additional conditions has “set back” a final settlement of the issue. Indicating a desire for some type of U.S. gesture of reciprocity, the article asserted that the Vietnamese people are “fully entitled to demand U.S. contributions” to aid in accounting for the “more than 300,000” Vietnamese still missing in action from the “U.S.-triggered war.” It reiterated Hanoi’s standard position that solving the MIA issue would be easier if the United States normalized relations with Vietnam and lifted its trade embargo.

TURKMENISTAN–TURKEY: Efforts To Develop Ties

As part of a broader effort to develop ties with foreign countries, Turkmen President Saparmurad Niyazov signed a series of cooperation agreements with Turkey during a 2–6 December visit to Ankara. According to Soviet press reports, agreements were signed on the opening of consulates general in Ashkhabad and Ankara and on trade and economic cooperation—including plans for joint ventures in communication, transportation, and tourism. Moreover, Turkey agreed to assist in Turkmenistan’s transition to a market economy by giving technical assistance to its banking sector and to help develop its oil and gas industries (Moscow All-Union Radio Mayak, 4 December; Moscow central TV, 7 December; Interfax, 9 December). The signing of these agreements conforms with plans announced by Turkmen Foreign Minister Avdy Kuliyev to establish relations with a wide range of countries, including the industrialized West as well as “neighboring” Muslim states, who he said “are especially important to us” (Interfax,
in order to highlight its own "liberalism and dynamism," with the long-term goal of forming a coalition after the 1994 parliamentary elections with a "weakened" Hungarian Democratic Forum, the leading party in the current governing coalition (Beszelo, 5 October).

VIETNAM—U.S.: Hanoi Cautious on Prospects for Normalization

Despite Washington's recent decision to lift restrictions on travel to Vietnam and to begin talks with Hanoi on the modalities for establishing relations, Hanoi is using a cautious approach to the prospects for normalizing Vietnamese—U.S. relations. Speaking at a 23 October press conference in Hanoi, Deputy Foreign Minister Le Mai called the U.S. moves—which were announced by Secretary of State James Baker at his meeting that day in Paris with Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Manh Cam—"a positive sign" (Hanoi radio, VNA, 24 October). However, he indicated that the establishment of Vietnamese—U.S. ties is not at hand, noting that both sides have their own "stances" on normalization. Contrasting the sides' positions on the key question of Americans missing in action (MIA) from the Vietnam war, Mai reiterated Hanoi's longstanding position that "rapprochement should not be made contingent on any political issue" and declared that Hanoi "will continue its efforts to solve the issue—normalization or not." Mai concluded that even with Hanoi's cooperative attitude on the MIA issue there is little hope for establishing ties in the near future, saying there will be "obstacles" in the "process toward normalization as long as the United States does not recognize its interests in its relations with Vietnam."

LAOS—CHINA: Expanding Sino—Lao Relations

Reflecting the rapid expansion in Sino—Lao relations since ties were normalized in October 1989, Viêntiane and Beijing recently signed a border treaty. According to the Lào press agency KPL on 26 October, the treaty—which was signed during Prime Minister Khamtai Siphandon's 22—26 October "official goodwill visit" to the PRC—calls for the establishment of a joint committee to deal with "measuring, defining, and mapping the border
U.S.-INDOCHINA: Vietnam, Cambodia React to MIA Photograph

Apparently concerned that new questions about the fate of those servicemen listed as missing in action (MIA) during the Indochina war could jeopardize prospects for normalizing U.S.-Vietnamese relations, Hanoi appears to have taken particular pains to refute recent allegations—supported by purported photographic evidence—that three U.S. pilots reported missing during the war might still be alive. Hanoi also seems to be trying to convey the impression that it remains anxious to help resolve the MIA issue. Thus, in addition to calling a press conference at its UN office in New York to answer questions from the U.S. media (Hanoi radio, 20 July), Hanoi used a highly authoritative vehicle—a Foreign Ministry note—to discredit the allegations and pledge its “cooperation” in “clarifying” the matter. The 20 July note, which was given wide play in Hanoi media that day, denied any responsibility for the fate of two of the U.S. fliers in the photograph, saying they had been “shot down in Laos,” and characterized reports that the third pilot—who it acknowledged was shot down over North Vietnam in 1966—was still alive as “groundless.” Discussing his fate in unusual detail, the note asserted that a joint U.S.-Vietnamese investigation into his case early last year had determined that he had been “blown to pieces while his aircraft was falling” after being shot down over Hai Hung Province (North Vietnam) on 16 September 1966 and that “some pieces of his remains” recovered from the crash site had been “handed over” to the United States on 10 April 1990 (VNA, 20 July).

Although Hanoi clearly implied that Laos should be questioned about the fate of two of the U.S. pilots in the photograph, Vientiane is not known to have publicly addressed the recent charges. However, Phi Thach, a deputy foreign minister of the Hanoi-backed State of Cambodia regime, in remarks to the French news agency AFP—carried by Phnom Penh’s news agency SPK on 19 July—rejected allegations that the three pilots were “detained in Cambodia,” saying that there are “no U.S. servicemen still alive in Cambodia.”
Vietnam–U.S.

Hanoi Rejects U.S. Plan for Normalizing Relations

*Hanoi has authoritatively rejected the four-phase plan put forward recently by Washington for normalizing U.S.–Vietnamese relations, even though the draft political report that the Communist Party of Vietnam has prepared for its seventh congress in mid-June has identified the restoration of those ties as one of Vietnam's foreign policy goals.*

Speaking to the Vietnam News Agency in an interview carried by Hanoi media on 15 April, a Vietnamese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman took issue with the U.S. plan, which was unveiled at bilateral talks on the 8th, saying it “demands settlement of the Cambodia issue as a condition for normalization.” She maintained that the “option” long proposed by Hanoi—prompt and unconditional normalization of relations between the two countries—was better because it not only serves the “interests” of the peoples of the two countries but also the “interests of peace, stability, and development” in Southeast Asia. She went on to imply that the failure to normalize U.S.–Vietnamese relations could impede progress on issues that are of particular concern to the United States, noting that “normal relations” will “facilitate” the settlement of “humanitarian problems and other issues of common concern, including the Cambodia issue.”

Hanoi media have pointed to recent testimony before congressional subcommittees on the Cambodia issue (Hanoi radio, 15; 16 April) and to Senator Murkowski’s presentation of a draft bill that allegedly calls for lifting the trade embargo (Hanoi TV, 13 April) as examples of the growing opposition from the U.S. Congress, business community, and the general public to the Bush
administration's Indochina policy. A commentary aired by Hanoi radio on 15 April went even further. It claimed that "pressure" from "many U.S congressmen" has already forced the administration to "take steps" toward changing its policy and went on to imply that pressure from these congressmen will eventually cause the administration to "lift the trade embargo and hold direct talks with the Phnom Penh government."

Prospects
VIETNAM–U.S.: Cautious Assessment of Prospects for Ties

Despite the historic significance of Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach’s meeting with Secretary of State Baker on 29 September—the first meeting ever between Vietnamese and U.S. officials at this level—Hanoi has been cautious in assessing the import of the meeting for U.S.—Vietnamese relations. While a Vietnamese press communique on the talks, carried by VNA on 30 September, for example, called the talks “useful and constructive,” it indicated that the establishment of U.S.—Vietnamese ties is not at hand when it noted that the two sides “held” that the process of normalization will proceed “alongside” efforts to conclude a Cambodia settlement. A commentary, aired by Hanoi radio’s English-language international service on 2 October, was even more pessimistic about the prospects for normalization. It noted that, while the talks were “important” for the normalization process, there must be “concrete deeds and policies” to achieve this goal. Suggesting that Washington has yet to adopt such policies, the commentary contrasted Vietnam’s “active” efforts to resolve the outstanding problems between the two sides—such as the issue of Americans missing in action and the question of Amerasian children—with Washington’s “erroneous action” in maintaining an embargo against Vietnam. Holding out little hope for establishing relations in the near future, the commentary concluded by saying that a “ship cannot operate without fuel” and by noting that there are “still difficulties” to be overcome before U.S.—Vietnamese relations can be normalized.

IRAN: Who Speaks for Rafsanjani?

In an apparent effort to counteract the practice in international media of very close identification of President Rafsanjani with the Tehran Times, the president’s office announced on 26 September that Rafsanjani “airs his views either personally or through his public relations office” and that “no newspaper reflects his ideas, as alleged by the foreign media” (Islamic Republic News Agency, 26 September). Far from signaling a rift between the president and the
"breakthrough" in U.S.-Vietnamese relations and as paving the way for an "early settlement" of the MIA issue.

Implications

\[ \text{Implications} \]

\[ \text{Implications} \]

\[ \text{Implications} \]

\[ \text{Implications} \]

\[ \text{Implications} \]

\[ \text{Implications} \]

\[ \text{Implications} \]

\[ \text{Implications} \]

\[ \text{Implications} \]

\[ \text{Implications} \]

\[ \text{Implications} \]

\[ \text{Implications} \]

\[ \text{Implications} \]

\[ \text{Implications} \]

\[ \text{Implications} \]

\[ \text{Implications} \]

\[ \text{Implications} \]

\[ \text{Implications} \]

\[ \text{Implications} \]

\[ \text{Implications} \]

\[ \text{Implications} \]

\[ \text{Implications} \]

\[ \text{Implications} \]

\[ \text{Implications} \]

\[ \text{Implications} \]

\[ \text{Implications} \]

\[ \text{Implications} \]

\[ \text{Implications} \]

\[ \text{Implications} \]

\[ \text{Implications} \]

\[ \text{Implications} \]

\[ \text{Implications} \]

\[ \text{Implications} \]

\[ \text{Implications} \]

\[ \text{Implications} \]

\[ \text{Implications} \]

\[ \text{Implications} \]

\[ \text{Implications} \]

\[ \text{Implications} \]

\[ \text{Implications} \]

\[ \text{Implications} \]

\[ \text{Implications} \]

\[ \text{Implications} \]

\[ \text{Implications} \]

\[ \text{Implications} \]

\[ \text{Implications} \]

\[ \text{Implications} \]

\[ \text{Implications} \]

\[ \text{Implications} \]

\[ \text{Implications} \]

\[ \text{Implications} \]

\[ \text{Implications} \]

\[ \text{Implications} \]

\[ \text{Implications} \]

\[ \text{Implications} \]

\[ \text{Implications} \]

\[ \text{Implications} \]

\[ \text{Implications} \]

\[ \text{Implications} \]

\[ \text{Implications} \]

\[ \text{Implications} \]

\[ \text{Implications} \]

\[ \text{Implications} \]

\[ \text{Implications} \]

\[ \text{Implications} \]

\[ \text{Implications} \]

\[ \text{Implications} \]

\[ \text{Implications} \]

\[ \text{Implications} \]

\[ \text{Implications} \]

\[ \text{Implications} \]

\[ \text{Implications} \]

\[ \text{Implications} \]

\[ \text{Implications} \]

\[ \text{Implications} \]

\[ \text{Implications} \]

\[ \text{Implications} \]

\[ \text{Implications} \]

\[ \text{Implications} \]

\[ \text{Implications} \]

\[ \text{Implications} \]

\[ \text{Implications} \]

\[ \text{Implications} \]

\[ \text{Implications} \]

\[ \text{Implications} \]

\[ \text{Implications} \]

\[ \text{Implications} \]

\[ \text{Implications} \]

\[ \text{Implications} \]

\[ \text{Implications} \]

\[ \text{Implications} \]

\[ \text{Implications} \]

\[ \text{Implications} \]

\[ \text{Implications} \]

\[ \text{Implications} \]

\[ \text{Implications} \]

\[ \text{Implications} \]

\[ \text{Implications} \]

\[ \text{Implications} \]

\[ \text{Implications} \]

\[ \text{Implications} \]

\[ \text{Implications} \]

\[ \text{Implications} \]

\[ \text{Implications} \]

\[ \text{Implications} \]

\[ \text{Implications} \]

\[ \text{Implications} \]

\[ \text{Implications} \]

\[ \text{Implications} \]

\[ \text{Implications} \]

\[ \text{Implications} \]

\[ \text{Implications} \]

\[ \text{Implications} \]

\[ \text{Implications} \]

\[ \text{Implications} \]

\[ \text{Implications} \]

\[ \text{Implications} \]

\[ \text{Implications} \]

\[ \text{Implications} \]

\[ \text{Implications} \]

\[ \text{Implications} \]

\[ \text{Implications} \]

\[ \text{Implications} \]

\[ \text{Implications} \]

\[ \text{Implications} \]

\[ \text{Implications} \]

\[ \text{Implications} \]

\[ \text{Implications} \]

\[ \text{Implications} \]

\[ \text{Implications} \]

\[ \text{Implications} \]

\[ \text{Implications} \]

\[ \text{Implications} \]

\[ \text{Implications} \]

\[ \text{Implications} \]

\[ \text{Implications} \]

\[ \text{Implications} \]

\[ \text{Implications} \]

\[ \text{Implications} \]

\[ \text{Implications} \]

\[ \text{Implications} \]

\[ \text{Implications} \]

\[ \text{Implications} \]
Vietnam–U.S.

Hanoi Sees Dim Prospects for Normalizing Relations

Despite the historic significance of the recent U.S.–Vietnamese agreement to establish a temporary U.S. POW/MIA office in Hanoi—a move that would establish the first U.S. presence in the Vietnamese capital since 1955—Hanoi has indicated that the agreement itself will do little to advance the two countries’ bilateral relations.

Departing from its practice of recent years, Hanoi media, in airing the joint statement on the visit on 20 April, failed to characterize the talks between Vessey and Thach. While a commentary aired on Hanoi radio’s English-language international service on 23 April acknowledged that the agreement to open the POW/MIA office was one of the bright spots in U.S.–Vietnamese relations, it made it clear that establishment of ties between Hanoi and Washington is not at hand when it noted that “many difficulties still exist on the road to normalization.” Pointing to Vietnam’s “all-out effort” to normalize relations, the commentary laid all the blame on Washington for the “slow progress” in restoring bilateral ties, saying that “responsibility” for the delay “does not rest with the Vietnamese side.” Indicating that the new U.S. plan introduced two weeks ago—which not only calls on Hanoi to resolve the MIA question but also to take an active role in settling the Cambodia conflict—is the obstacle to restoring ties, the commentary concluded that if the two governments “wish” to normalize relations, “no preconditions should be set.”

By contrast, Hanoi’s treatment of Vessey’s meeting with Thach last October was far more upbeat, suggesting that Vietnam was more optimistic about the prospects for normalization at that time. Thus, Hanoi radio on 19 October described those talks as having achieved “fine results,” and a commentary aired on Hanoi radio’s international service four days later characterized them as a
Vietnam: Mixed Signals Confuse Foreign Policy Agenda
Vietnam: Toughened Stance on MIA Issue
Vietnam: Toughened Stance on MIA Issue
HANOI MEDIA TREATMENT OF VISITS BY U.S. DELEGATIONS
This folder contains foreign media reports on the return by the Vietnamese of the remains of U.S. servicemen missing in action in Indochina monitored by Foreign Broadcast Information Service.

Information on media sources
VNA--Vietnam News Agency
AFP--Agence France Presse
Nhan Dan--daily paper published by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam
Quan Doi Nhan Dan--Vietnamese army paper
Tap Chi Cong San--monthly journal of the Communist Party of Vietnam--formerly called Tap Chi Hoc Tap
Tap Chi Quoc Phong Toan Dan--monthly army journal--formerly called Tap Chi Quan Doi Nhan Dan
Vietnam Courier--monthly publication intended for English and French speaking nations throughout the world
This folder contains foreign media reports on live sightings and the whereabouts of remains monitored by Foreign Broadcast Information Service.

Information on media sources

VNA—Vietnam News Agency

AFP—Agence France Presse

Nhan Dan—daily paper published by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam

Quan Doi Nhan Dan—Vietnamese army paper

Tap Chi Cong San—monthly journal of the Communist Party of Vietnam—formerly called Tap Chi Hoc Tap

Tap Chi Quoc Phong Toan Dan—monthly army journal—formerly called Tap Chi Quan Doi Nhan Dan

Vietnam Courier—monthly publication intended for English and French speaking nations throughout the world
FULL TEXT OF ARTICLE:

1. [Text] Kuala Lumpur, June 13 (AFP)--Nine Vietnamese boat people landed in southern Malaysia with seven barrels containing what they claimed were the remains of 30 U.S. servicemen missing in action in Vietnam, a newspaper reported Wednesday. The Vietnamese arrived Tuesday in a 16-metre (53-foot) long boat with the words "USA remains in my boat" and "This boat have USA Army remains" written across its sides, said the English-language daily, NEW STRAITS TIMES.

2. The newspaper quoted the Kota Tinggi District police chief, Roslan Dolah, as saying that the boat people, who left Vietnam on May 30, were forced to land at Tanjung Sedili beach in southern Johore State when their vessel sprung a leak.

3. Police found metallic tags on the skeletons, Mr. Roslan said. "The tags had the names, unit numbers and addresses of the servicemen believed to have been killed during the Vietnam war," he said. "We are investigating the reasons for the refugees bringing the skeletons with them...we have not come across such cases before," Mr. Roslan was quoted as saying.

4. The newspaper said the Vietnamese, aged between 18 and 56, were heading for Singapore to hand the skeletons to the U.S. Embassy there.

5. Police and refugee officials were not immediately contactable to confirm the report and the U.S. Embassy spokeswoman here declined comment. "We read about it in the newspaper. Any comment will have to come out of Washington,"
she said.

6. A Foreign Ministry official handling relations with the United States said that the National Task Force on Refugees had been directed to investigate the report.

7. Officials working with refugees here said that there had been earlier cases of Vietnamese boat people arriving in Malaysia with what they claimed to be remains of U.S. servicemen in the hope of getting better treatment from the United States. They said that they had no information on whether any of the remains previously sent for forensic examination turned out to be those of U.S. servicemen.
Police will today contact the U.S. Consulate General in Hong Kong to help identify a United States Army 'dog tag' which was found in a bag of human ashes brought into Hong Kong last night by a Vietnamese asylum seeker.

One of 24 boat people intercepted off Siu A Chau at about 8.30 pm told Marine Police that a full skeleton with the ID tag was found near a village in North Vietnam two years ago and was later cremated.

He said he believed the bones were of an American soldier missing in action from the Vietnam War.

The man said he had cremated the bones according to Vietnamese custom, in the belief that any person in possession of human ashes would receive good luck.

He brought the ashes to Hong Kong in the hope that he would be able to migrate to the US when he could return the ashes to relatives of the dead soldier.
FULL TEXT OF ARTICLE:
1. [Text] Hanoi, Aug 17 (AFP)--Six families in Ho Chi Minh City recently produced the remains of 722 people they believed to be U.S. soldiers Missing in Action (MIA) since the Vietnam war, the LAO DONG weekly newspaper said Friday.

2. They wanted to exchange the bodies for U.S. visas and were also asking 10,000 dollars for each set of remains, the trade union paper said, adding that the families had kept the bodies at their homes for six years.

3. It did not specify how the families acquired the bodies.

4. Only one U.S. soldier's name was found on the lists handed over by the families, the paper said, adding that a team of U.S. scientists had been invited to examine the remains.

5. Five such U.S. teams are now in Vietnam for the 11th joint investigation of MIAs since September 1988, under an agreement between Hanoi and Washington.

6. U.S. officials say there are 2,353 MIAs in Indochina: 1,719 in Vietnam, 545 in Laos, 83 in Cambodia and six in China.

7. Last July, a Ho Chi Minh City court condemned two people to hard labour for keeping 446 sets of human remains to barter for U.S. visas.

8. U.S. sources here said that to date, some 60 sets of remains had been identified as those of U.S. soldiers out of about 250 that have been returned
by the Vietnamese.
MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

REPORT OF AMERICANS WORKING ON ROADS NORTH OF HANOI

Jakarta Sinar Harapan in Indonesian 6 Dec 80 p 4

[Text] A Norwegian construction worker says that there are a number of Americans working like slaves in Vietnam and that they may be American soldiers who are missing in action.

In an interview with radio station KIRO in Seattle on 3 December, Stein Gudding said that he had recently left his job at a paper mill north of Hanoi and that some of his fellow workers had told him that they had happened to see a group of Americans while riding their motorcycles in a rural area.

"They were repairing the road," said Gudding. "They appeared to be prisoners of war, and they were working about 200 km from Hanoi in the direction of the Chinese border."

"They were certainly Westerners," he said. "They were Americans, and they spoke English with an American accent."

He said the Hanoi police told the Scandinavians to leave the place immediately and threatened them by pointing their guns at them.

However, before they left his friends heard the prisoners call out, "Tell the world about us." These words were spoken with an American accent.

Gudding gave the interview to KIRO by telephone from Bangkok.

In Washington, Admiral Jerry Tuttle said the report would be studied. Admiral Tuttle heads a team that handles reports on American soldiers missing in action in Indochina.

Gudding said that many Vietnamese tell of American who are still being held in their country.

5458
CSO: 4213
1. [Text] Tokyo, June 7 KYODO--A former Japanese detainee in Vietnam said Wednesday five or six American prisoners of war (POW's) were still in captivity when he left the country last January.

2. Iwanobu Yoshida, 65, a Buddhist monk, told KYODO NEWS SERVICE that there were about 10 American POW's when he was first detained in Vietnam as a political prisoner in 1975.

3. Yoshida, who is now hospitalized in Sapporo, said they were being forced to engage in construction work.

4. U.S. Government officials received the same information in Tokyo from Yoshida's eldest daughter, Keiko Takatsuka, 37.

5. "The reports are not unbelievable. There is no reason to doubt her story and her attitude," said a U.S. official who declined to be named.

6. "We'll send all reports and materials to the U.S. to be studied by experts. We will not assess or verify the reports here, though they are very interesting," the official said.

7. Takatsuka quoted Yoshida as saying he spent the last seven years in a Hanoi prison, where the POW's spoke English and called him "Jap."

8. The foreign detainees were called Americans by Vietnamese political
prisoners there. One of them helped Yoshida walk on discovering he had leg trouble, Takatsuka said.

9. Yoshida, a politician-turned-Buddhist priest, emigrated to Vietnam in 1966 and was granted citizenship by the then government of South Vietnam in 1973. He was detained as a political prisoner after the fall of South Vietnam in 1975 and spent more than 13 years in captivity. He returned to Japan last January.

10. The Vietnamese Embassy in Tokyo refuted Yoshida’s remarks and said that as the Vietnamese Government has repeatedly stated in the past, there are no American soldiers living in the country.

11. Embassy officials said they have never heard that American POW's are still being held in Vietnam.

12. The U.S. Government has insisted on the possibility that American war prisoners are still being detained in Vietnam and has demanded Hanoi provide information concerning American POW's.

13. Yoshida said he has no details about the American prisoners because they were detained in a separate building.

14. He said he was not in direct verbal contact with the Americans because he could not speak English.
Especially, Fukuda received a heavy burden by reaffirming such promises he made in the Japan-U.S. summit talks as the inflationary policy with a goal of a yearly 6.7 percent economic growth—an outstanding goal among the developed capitalist countries; more aid to developing countries; and an increase in Japan's imports. This will inevitably impose grave sacrifices on the Japanese working people.

The problem of peaceful use of nuclear energy was a focal point in the conference. The conference has clearly shown the truth as follows: The U.S. Carter administration has taken a policy of promotion of nuclear weapons and promoting the nuclear arms race. Such a policy, however, is to subordinate the peaceful use of nuclear energy in the entire world to the monopolist rule and control by the nuclear-possessing countries. This inevitably intensifies contradictions and conflicts among the countries.

BRIEFS

STEEL MISSION TO VIETNAM—Six major steelmakers, including Shinnihon Seitetsu and major export firms including Mitsubishi Shoji plan to send a joint mission to Vietnam in late June or July to negotiate steel exports to Vietnam. Vietnam wants to import 200,000 tons of steel from Japan in the latter half of this year. The Japanese steel mission will discuss deferred payment, interest, currency and other related problems. In the past, Japanese steelmakers and trading firms individually negotiated trade terms with Vietnam in exporting steel, and the coming dispatch of a joint mission will make a departure from this practice. [Tokyo NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN in Japanese 5 May 77 Morning Edition p 1 OW--FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY]

VIETNAM

ESCAPED ASSEMBLYMAN PROMISES NEW INFORMATION ON MIA'S

OW091045Y Tokyo MAINICHI DAILY NEWS in English 3 May 77 p 13 OW--FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[By contributing editor David Tharp: "Basic Rights Nonexistent in Vietnam"]

[Excerpts] Amatsukominato, Chiba Prefecture—Nguyen Cong Hoan, representative to the Socialist Republic of Vietnam's Hanoi congress, charged Saturday fundamental human rights do not exist in his country, 200,000 political prisoners are held in "reeducation" centers, and armed resistance to communist rule continues.

An anti-American leader of the "peace-bloc" under the Thieu regime, Hoan opposed U.S. intervention in Vietnam. He welcomed the communists as liberators when Saigon fell in April 1975, and was selected by the Vietnamese Communist Party as a representative to the Hanoi congress in April 1976.

"My first motivation was to help with the reconstruction of the country in 1975," he explained, "but I realized that the communists were worse than I had imagined.

"In Vietnam today, the fundamental human rights are not guaranteed. No freedom of religion, speech, or movement. In a word, there is no freedom at all except the freedom to obey the orders of the Communist Party, otherwise you will be put into prison."
"Reeducation," says Hogan, means simply to be in prison. The Paris agreement stipulated that Hanoi would not punish officers and employees of the Saigon regime, but he says 200,000 former military men and civilians are being kept in prison camps throughout Vietnam.

"The communists sent nearly all senior officials and high-ranking officials of the Saigon regime to the large prisons in Ha Bac Province near the Chinese frontier."

All religious publications have been stopped. And in former Catholic schools throughout the south all teachers must present Marxist-Leninist lectures. One film called "The Holy Days" distributed in the south reportedly shows Christian women who visit churches being raped by the priests, said Hoan.

Admission to universities and technical schools is reserved strictly for students whose parents did not serve the Saigon government in any capacity.

Many former politicians, including opposition party members under the Saigon government, have disappeared and are presumed executed, said Hoan. Newspaper articles strictly follow the party line, and when Vietnamese meet foreign journalists they are told to speak through an interpreter even though they may know the language of the newsmen, he added.

On March 19 the biggest ammunition dump at Long Binh, the former U.S. Army headquarters near Saigon, was destroyed by resisters to communist rule, Hoan said.

"The blasts lasted 4 hours and shook all of Saigon. You should see the faces of the Saigonese when they hear explosions and gunfire—they break out in smiles."

Applying for a visa to go to the United States, Hoan said he would ask the Americans to supply anti-communist guerrilla bands with weapons, food, and medicine despite the fact President Carter's administration is on the verge of normalizing relations with Hanoi.

"That's a mistake," claimed Hoan. "Hanoi will use American assistance to suppress the Vietnamese people and S.E. Asia."

"Many people in the south secretly applauded the recent U.S. veto against Vietnam's UN membership," he said, and promised to provide President Carter with information on Americans missing in action which has not been revealed by Hanoi.
This folder contains official Vietnamese statements on the POW/MIA issue monitored by Foreign Broadcast Information Service.

Information on media sources

VNA—Vietnam News Agency

AFP—Agence France Presse

Nhan Dan—daily paper published by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam

Quan Doi Nhan Dan—Vietnamese army paper

Tap Chi Cong San—monthly journal of the Communist Party of Vietnam—formerly called Tap Chi Hoc Tap

Tap Chi Quoc Phong Toan Dan—monthly army journal—formerly called Tap Chi Quan Doi Nhan Dan

Vietnam Courier—monthly publication intended for English and French speaking nations throughout the world
This folder contains official Vietnamese statements on the POW/MIA issue monitored by Foreign Broadcast Information Service.

Information on media sources
VNA--Vietnam News Agency
AFP--Agence France Presse
Nhan Dan--daily paper published by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam
Quan Doi Nhan Dan--Vietnamese army paper
Tap Chi Cong San--monthly journal of the Communist Party of Vietnam--formerly called Tap Chi Hoc Tap
Tap Chi Quoc Phong Toan Dan--monthly army journal--formerly called Tap Chi Quan Doi Nhan Dan
Vietnam Courier--monthly publication intended for English and French speaking nations throughout the world
This folder contains selected Vietnamese media commentaries on the POW/MIA issue monitored by Foreign Broadcast Information Service. Because the Vietnamese media is controlled, commentaries can be considered to reflect the official views of the Vietnamese leadership. Commentaries in the party and army papers—Nhan Dan and Quan Doi Nhan Dan respectively—the party and army journals—Tap Chi Cong San and Tap Chi Quoc Phong Toan Dan respectively—are considered to be more authoritative than those aired by the radio.

Information on media sources
VNA—Vietnam News Agency
AFP—Agence France Presse
Nhan Dan—daily paper published by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam
Quan Doi Nhan Dan—Vietnamese army paper
Tap Chi Cong San—monthly journal of the Communist Party of Vietnam—formerly called Tap Chi Hoc Tap
Tap Chi Quoc Phong Toan Dan—monthly army journal—formerly called Tap Chi Quan Doi Nhan Dan
Vietnam Courier—monthly publication intended for English and French speaking nations throughout the world
This folder contains memoir-type reports reminiscing about the U.S. air war carried by Vietnamese media and monitored by Foreign Broadcast Information Service.

Information on media sources
VNA--Vietnam News Agency
AFP--Agence France Presse
Nhan Dan--daily paper published by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam
Quan Doi Nhan Dan--Vietnamese army paper
Tap Chi Cong San--monthly journal of the Communist Party of Vietnam--formerly called Tap Chi Hoc Tap
Tap Chi Quoc Phong Toan Dan--monthly army journal--formerly called Tap Chi Quan Doi Nhan Dan
Vietnam Courier--monthly publication intended for English and French speaking nations throughout the world
The Honorable John F. Kerry  
Chairman  
Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs  
United States Senate  
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

This is in further response to the letter from the Committee dated December 20, 1991 requesting copies of all CIA intelligence reports on American prisoners or detainees in Laos after March 29, 1973. In our previous letter to the Committee on February 11, 1992, we provided the Committee with declassified CIA intelligence reports, marked as Tabs A and B. We have restored those intelligence reports to classified format. We hope these new versions prove more useful to the Committee.

Sincerely,

Stanley M. Moskowitz  
Director of Congressional Affairs

Enclosure
SUBJECT: Letter to Sen Kerry re 20 Dec 91 ltr
MEMORANDUM FOR: C/EA/ICOG
INFO: Mr. Robert Magner, OCA/Senate
FROM: C/EA/ICOGPOW
SUBJECT: Visit by Senate Committee Investigator Bob Taylor on 7 August 1992

1. Mr. Taylor was in our office this afternoon, to read the cable traffic I had extracted for him concerning the Vientiane intercept of late 1980. He was pleased with the work I had done in locating all the cables, and with the summary (attached) I had written of the incident. He asked whether he could have a copy of the summary. I said I believed so, as long as it remains classified. I have removed the two cryptonyms from my original version of the memo and suggest the attached version it be passed to him, still classified SECRET.

2. Bob asked about a November 1979 intercept involving [redacted] and NSA. He had some references to this, terminating with a February 1980 cable. I had already checked our 1979 files, since he had earlier asked for any intercepts from 1979; we had nothing on this. The Committee is talking to NSA on this, but apparently without much luck.

3. Bob asked me to check out our [redacted] files for early 1981, to see whether there was any record of a Vietnamese offer of return of American POW's in exchange for the $4-plus billion in economic aid which they said they had been promised by President Nixon. The offer was supposedly conveyed in Beijing by a Vietnamese who approached a Canadian diplomat there. How it got back to Washington (through Ottawa, possibly) is unclear, but according to Bob Taylor, Director Casey was aware of it at an NSC meeting in early 1981. I then reviewed our files, but found nothing. I said there was also no reference to it in the Executive Registry files which we had just reviewed, in response to a Committee request. I said I believed our Directorate had checked carefully on this while I was away (in China Operations, etc.) but had found nothing on it. Bob found it odd that Director Casey (or his myrmidons) did not take notes at the NSC meetings, and that there was no record of such meetings. He asked if it was possible for a message from Beijing to have gotten to the Director, and not be in our
files. Yes, I said, it could have been handled in a sensitive channel; yet people who had been in Beijing Station at that time did not recall the incident. I said if it was operational and involved POW's, it should have reached our files. I said I would check again, nevertheless. I will check with Dick Tansing on Monday on this. I believe he told me that it was thoroughly checked out when I was on leave.

4. Bob started looking around the room at the files rather longingly, as he asked me what other files we had. I described some of them, to which he kept replying, "Will we see those?". He saw that we had files on the shelf which pertained to some well-known American POW-hunters, for example. He said it would look bad if the Senate Committee could only tell the American public that while the CIA had many POW files, the Committee had been unable to see them. I said the policy was as before: if they wish to see something, they have only to request it, and we will respond; but as Director Gates had indicated, they could not simply peruse all the files. He again expressed a desire to review the MPVANISH files in their entirety. He (again) said it might take a letter from the Committee to the Director to get this going. I said the Director had already turned down that very request. I tried to appear positive and helpful, but he said ours is the only agency which has not made its files completely available to the Committee.

5. On the way out Bob said he did not see how the Committee could complete its work by the end of this year. However, he said he will be looking for another job in any event. He did not know (or didn't say) where he will go.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD: Cable Traffic Requested by Senate Select Committee Investigator Robert Taylor

1. On 12 June 1992 Mr. Taylor requested "any items concerning intercepts during 1980, especially the latter half". Perhaps he saw reference to the alleged intercept described below, while perusing NSA files. In searching our operational files, I found a number of documents, all relating to this intercept and its aftermath, and dating from 26 November 1980 to 6 March 1981. These are described as follows.

2. On 26 November 1980 Udorn Base reported that the Thai military organization SOD-121 provided a report sourced to Field Team 213 and subsourced to a "tel-con intercept" of a 23 November message from the Vientiane telegraph office to the Oudomsai telegraph office. The message said 16 Thai and 20 American POW's from Oudomsai would be transported to Phong Kheng Camp in Vientiane by 28 November. Team 213 thought this might mean that the POW's would be released, possibly on Lao National Day on 2 December. Another source reported that Team 213 had also obtained a Lao document giving parallel information. A translation of the alleged intercept was provided two days later.

3. Headquarters directed the Bangkok Station to try to authenticate this report on an urgent basis, and later suggested that low-level observation of activities at the Phong Kheng Compound might be arranged. On 28 November CIA sent a memorandum to State and DIA describing the intercept, and noting that the report should be treated with considerable skepticism pending receipt of further information. The two locations cited in the report appeared unlikely as holding areas for American POW's. Headquarters also noted that the intercept did not appear related to an earlier report alleging that 30 American POW's were being held near Nhommarath, Khammouan Province (the genesis of our reconnaissance operation). In the Thai government, only the Prime Minister and Royal Thai Army chief of staff had been notified. Queried by Udorn Base, the Thai SOD-121 commander said the intercept had come from "a new and untested source working in the Vientiane telegraph office", who had seen (or heard) the message. He also said there was no tape of it, and that there was no mechanical means to intercept it.

4. Bangkok asked Udorn to try to obtain further details on
how the message was acquired, including the type of communications equipment in the Vientiane telegraph office, whether the messages were sent in clear text or code, and whether landlines or radio was used. Udorn Base suggested asking the U.S. Embassy in Vientiane to assist, and this was done from Washington. The embassy was asked to observe and report unusual activity at the Phong Kheng compound.

5. On 29 November Udorn Base reported additional information on the intercept, as provided by the Thais. Team 213 said it had intercepted the report at Nong Khai on a PRC-25 transceiver. The message was dated 8 November and the radio message dated 18 November, though it was not transmitted until 26 November. It was in code, but the code was broken by a Lao member of Team 213, who had defected from the Lao army with "key sheets". The SOD commander provided copies of documents provided by the same asset; these were Lao Central Committee orders. The Thai provided the raw text, and the translation of the intercept. CIA asked NSA to check the authenticity of the message.

6. On 3 December Udorn Base obtained from SOD-121 hard copies of the encoded message transmitting the POW order, and also an order concerning logistical support, as well as copies of Central Committee documents containing almost the same information. Headquarters sent a copy of the encoded message to NSA for its analysis and comments.

7. NSA analyzed the enciphered message as originally intercepted by the Thais, and confirmed the accuracy of the Thai decipherment and translation, including the reference to 20 American POW's. NSA was to examine tapes from its remote collection facility in Northern Thailand, in an effort to confirm that the message was actually transmitted. NSA would disseminate information on the intercepted message, while CIA would disseminate any information on the related documentary material. Headquarters commented that while the presence of American POW's was still doubtful, the supporting evidence gave this report more substance than was normally the case with reports of POW's.

8. We received another unconfirmed report from the Thais saying the prisoners would arrive at Attapou from Vientiane on 7 December. Headquarters asked Bangkok to ask NSA in Bangkok to try to identify any aircraft movement related to this report. COS, Bangkok briefed the U.S. ambassador, who was highly skeptical of the report. On 9 December NSA Bangkok reported there had been no Soviet, Vietnamese or Lao aircraft activity from Vientiane to Oudomsai from 27 November to 8 December, or
from Vientiane to Attapou from 5 to 8 December.

9. Udorn Base reported its intensive effort to authenticate the sourcing of Lao documents as well as the intercept. The source of the documents was identified by a Thai officer as a man named VONG. However, numerous discrepancies were found in the documents VONG provided: all seemed to be typed on the same typewriter; words and titles were misspelled consistently in various documents, etc. Consequently the documents might be fabrications. Since some of the information in the documents was echoed in the Team 213 coded intercepts, this suggested those might be fabrications as well.

10. On 13 December we were still awaiting NSA's attempt to isolate the message allegedly sent from Vientiane to Oudomsai. On 17 December Bangkok reported that on 28 November the Royal Thai Air Force recorded a flight, believed to be an AN-26, from Long Chiang to Vientiane, and another plane suspected to be an AN-26 landed from the north at Attapou on 7 December. Also on 17 December, an exhaustive search by NSA failed to detect the message allegedly sent from Vientiane to Oudomsai. While this did not constitute proof of fabrication, it added to our skepticism.

11. Udorn Base reported that a Thai intercept operator, given the encoded messages concerning POW's and the Lao quartermaster department, broke the messages, but noted several inconsistencies in the POW message. These problems centered primarily around improper usage of the Lao language, similar to the problems noted earlier in the documentary reports.

12. Udorn Base reported that on 30 December Team 213 allegedly intercepted a 27 December message saying American and Thai POW's were to be removed from Attapou Province by air on 28 December. The message was supposedly sent from Vientiane to Attapou. Team 213 said the POW's were being moved due to Thai knowledge of their presence, "because the CIA wanted to check on the reliability of the document which was received by the agent at Nong Khai". Team 213 agreed to provide the encoded message for examination, but said no recording had been made of it. This seemed suspicious. Udorn felt a fabrication was occurring.

13. On 20 January 1981 the Thai source of several POW reports was polygraphed by CIA. The test did not support numerous assertions, among them his statement that he had not conspired with anyone at the 213th intercept unit to provide false information. On 6 March 1981 Bangkok Station asked Headquarters to tell DIA that the original Thai service report (the intercept) was part of a fabrication net.
MEMORANDUM FOR: William F. Sittmann  
Executive Secretary, National Security Council  

SUBJECT: Release of CIA POW/MIA Documents

1. The subject-matter documents--forwarded by you on 30 July 1992 and 21 August 1992--have been reviewed pursuant to your request. Please inform the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs that the Agency will deal directly with them regarding review and/or release of these documents in accordance with agreed-upon procedures.

2. Thank you for consulting with us on this matter.

[Signature]
Executive Secretary
SUBJECT: Release of CIA POW/MIA Documents
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

OCA 3023-92
18 September 1992

SUBJECT: POW/MIA Meeting with Senator Smith (R-NH)
18 September at 1300

1. In response to Senator Smith's letter to the DCI, and I took the Senator some of the material he requested, principally the PDB summaries which had already been reviewed by Senator Kerry. and I met with the Senator alone; his aide was not present.

2. Senator Smith had the following additional requests (or clarifications of requests):

   a. Date of PDB item of 18 May 1974:

      He asked us to check the date and get back to him on Monday, 21 September.

   b. Senator Smith was unhappy that we did not have the traffic associated with three intel reports. He said he needs to understand better the background to the sourcing of these reports; better description of better understanding of the circumstances of report acquisition. The report mainly at issue is that quoting later termed a fabrication: Smith wants to know now we determined that the report was a fabrication (or misquoting, or whatever).

   c. Finally, Senator Smith was interested in how such terms as and "POW trump card" came to be used in analytic pieces.

3. The PDB item which caught Smith's attention appears to be based on an NSA intercept of some Pathet Lao directive. The PDB item is correctly dated has called up the NID
SUBJECT: POW/MIA Meeting with Senator Smith (R-NH)
18 September at 1300 hours

of that date to trace sourcing. Other material indicates that the only US prisoner known held by the Pathet Lao at that date was a contract civilian pilot who was later released.

/S/

John L. Breckenridge
Deputy Director for Senate Affairs
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Intelligence Reports on the Activities of the Senate Select Committee on POW-MIA Affairs

1. By prior arrangement on the morning of 17 June I met with Senator John Kerry, Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on POW-MIA Affairs, to show him two bearing on his Committee's April trip to Indochina. I explained that we had sought this opportunity to make him aware of them. Kerry read both reports carefully, commenting that they did not provide a totally accurate picture although he understood that the reports contained

He took particular note of the reference in one of the reports to the fact that the Vietnamese "had had something to hide" in the immediate post-war period and asked if there was any way to follow up on that. I said we could certainly look into that but could not promise any results. He asked if the reports could be retained by the Committee, and I explained that given their sensitive nature they could not and he did not press. The Senator seemed appreciative of the effort we made and indeed the general effort the Agency has made in supporting his Committee. I told him that we have also requested a meeting with Vice Chairman Smith but had not arranged that session as yet.

Robert W. Wagner
Deputy Director for Senate Affairs
MEMORANDUM FOR: Francesco Zwenig  
Staff Director  
Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs  
United States Senate  

FROM: Robert W. Magner  
Deputy Director for Senate Affairs  

SUBJECT: Information on Organization of the Vietnamese Government and Communist Party  

1. Attached are three unclassified reference aids prepared by the CIA Directorate of Intelligence's Office of Leadership Analysis (LDA) dealing with the organization of the Vietnamese Government and the Communist Party of Vietnam which the Committee may find useful in understanding the organization of these entities:  
   -- Government Structure of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam: The Machinery of State (April 1990);  
   -- Communist Party of Vietnam (May 1987);  
   -- Director of Officials of Vietnam (February 1992).  

2. Additional copies are available should they be desired.
OCA 2290-92

SUBJECT: Memorandum to Zwenig, POW/MIA re Information on Organization of Vietnamese Government and Communist Party

OCA/Senate/RWMagner:jah/____ (15 Jun 92)
**Congressional Request for Information on Organization of the Vietnamese Government and Communist Party**

**FROM:** James D. Anders, Jr.  
C/EA/ICOG

**TO:**  
- Chief, EA  
- C/ORMS  
- DC/ORMS  
- DC/ORMS  
- O/OCA/S

**DATE:**  
- 10 JUN 1992

**OFFICER'S INITIALS:**  
- [Redacted]

**COMMENTS:**  
(Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after comment.)
MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Robert W. Taylor
Investigator
Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs
United States Senate

As a follow on to your meeting at Headquarters on 15 May 1992, I am forwarding a copy of one of the letters you reviewed; a 26 September 1984 letter from a to Director Casey.

The two other pieces of correspondence—a National League of Families letter dated 31 January 1984 and an early 1984 letter written by both originated with at the NSC and we recommend that your request for retention be directed there since they were not addressed to nor independently acquired by the CIA.

Robert W. Magner
Deputy Director for Senate Affairs
Office of Congressional Affairs

Attachment
|--------------------------------------|-----------------------------|

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TO: (Officer designations, room numbers, and buildings)</th>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>OFFICER'S INITIALS</th>
<th>COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after comment.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Chief, EA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. C/ORMS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. DC/ORMS</td>
<td>4 MAY 1992</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. C/URMS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. SA/DDO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. ADDO</td>
<td>☑</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. DDO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. O/OCA/S</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

RETURN TO:                                                    

SUSPENSE DATE:                                               

19 May 1992
Service Item Report

Service Item ID: [ ]
Priority: ROUTINE
Permanent Recall? N

Request Date: 03/19/2013:06:58 AM
Recall Reason: [ ]
Request Comments: (U) ROGER H

Service Item Comments: (U)

Requester Notes ID: [ ]
Secure Phone: [ ]
Non-secure Phone: [ ]

Recipient Name: [ ]
Recipient Address: AARC
Secure Phone: [ ]
Non-secure Phone: [ ]

Classified By: [ ]
Derived From: [ ]
Declassify On: [ ]
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs Investigator Bob Taylor Concerning Sanitized DO Documents, Imagery and a Chronology on PDB References to POWs and MIAs

1. On 18 August at 1430 hours Bob Taylor of the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs was briefed at OCA in on recent CIA work on the issue and also received declassified documents from 1976 and later dealing with efforts to determine if POWs remained in Southeast Asia. Present were DO/EA/ICOG, DI/OIA, DO/ORMS, OCA/Senate Division, Career Trainee in OCA/Senate Division, and Career Trainee in OCA/Senate Division.

2. Mr. Taylor read the PDB chronology OCA prepared on POW/MIA articles. He asked if there was ever any identification of the five POWs mentioned in the 8 May 1974 PDB article. Our answer was no, to the extent of our knowledge. Taylor also wanted to know about the status of the documents that are being researched and prepared from the Executive Registry dealing with POWs. We informed him that the documents are being prepared and will be available soon. Next, he requested release of a DO Spot Report dated 6 January 1981 concerning possible POWs in Laos. told Taylor the report will not be released

3. then briefed Taylor on a piece of from 30 December 1987 that shows a large arrow and a P. said CIA's DDI Helgerson and the DIA had been alerted about the finding. since date of the original photo does not show still-distinguishable markings. The markings were located west-south-west of Sam Nuea in excess of 100 kilometers in the "Quang Vien" Provence. Heater had a memorandum of explanation
SUBJECT: Meeting with Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs Investigator Bob Taylor Concerning Sanitized DO Documents, Imagery and a Chronology on PDB References to POWs and MIAs

which he will deliver to OCA and through the office to Taylor. Taylor, and then discussed the relation of the newest to other previously released or briefed.

4. The briefing ended at about 1530 hours.

Career Trainee
Senate Division
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: 29 October Meeting with Frances Zwenig, POW/MIA Committee

1. I met with Frances Zwenig in her office on 29 October to review where we stand on matters affecting the POW/MIA Committee. The good news is that, at least so Ms Zwenig professes, the Committee's mandate ends 2 January 1993 and is unlikely to be renewed, though she granted that Senator Smith is sure to seek a new mandate for the group from the new Congress.

2. General Sejna: I informed Frances that General Sejna is still on an Agency annuity. She said she had been aware of the fact but not of the amount. I asked that she ensure Senators Kerry and Smith knew this fact before (and if) Sejna is called to testify.

3. Sejna-bis: She had two further questions, which CE Division can answer: whether Sejna made statements about POWs when he was first debriefed by the Agency or in any contemporaneous reporting? Also, do we know whether Sejna has been involved with the private POW groups? I said the first question certainly has an answer; the second may not as Sejna is a private US citizen and may consort with whomever he wishes. (ORMS checked: the answer to the first is "not that anyone has found but CE is double-checking the original reporting;" and "no information.")

4. Access to Ops Files: Frances said that Senators Kerry and Smith intend to call the DCI this week or next to make a pitch for Committee access to the Ops files held by EA on POWs. I referred her to the 20 October letter which the DDCI signed in the Director's absence, restating the DCI's position of last June when Kerry asked the same question. Zwenig made it clear that the Agency will come under heavy and public criticism from the Committee if it does not make operational files accessible, opining CIA does not need such criticism in the current environment. See separate note to D/OCA and the DCI on this issue.

5. Committee Plans: Two sets of hearings are planned for the months ahead: in November on Soviet aspects of the POW issue; in December on DIA's overall management of the POW/MIA issue.
Frances said CIA is not needed, as of today, in the November hearings—unless we come up with information on Soviet handling of POWs, of course. She amended the statement to say that we may need to send someone to put the Sejna testimony in context if Sejna testifies; and Art Grant's quest for someone to take responsibility for the Soviet end of things is still to be resolved.

The December hearings will be different—and would seem likely a snakepit (my description, not hers). The issue will be how well DIA handled the whole account. It will begin with a panel of "experts" who have critiqued DIA's stewardship of the POW account. On 2 December, the Committee wants to have someone to testify on how CIA handled reporting on POW issues. In this formulation we are not cast in the role of excoriating DIA, but we'll have to watch this agenda closely as it develops. I asked Frances to send us something in writing setting out what the Committee wants of us in December. These hearings will end with a review of private endeavors to free POWs and finally a panel to allow the families of POW/MIAs to comment on the quality of support they received from DIA. Sounds like fun.

Frances added, of course if the Committee has not been given access to the... files they've requested, this issue will arise in the December hearings.

And in the Committee's report, which is to be published on 17 December.

6. Frances said she hopes to move on and out after 2 January, when this version of the Committee will end. She had undisguised contempt for most of the people she works with on the Committee and said she is further disappointed by government as a whole in its handling of these sorts of issues and its cooperation. She wants to get involved in export/import business in Southeast Asia but added she hasn't quite got anything set up yet.

Oddment: She said McCreary has a contract and teaches analytical methods here at CIA??? Her point was that the standards of objectivity and intellectual rigor demonstrated by McCreary on the Committee makes her wonder for the future of analysis in the CIA.
SUBJECT: 29 October Meeting with Frances Zwenig, POW/MIA Committee
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with Senator Robert C. Smith (R NH)

1. On the early afternoon of 6 March, Acting Director of the Office of Security, and the undersigned met with Senator Robert C. Smith, Vice Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs. The meeting was at Senator Smith's request to discuss the status of the Security clearance request for minority staff director. Senator Smith had reviewed the FBI report upon which the Agency determination on the clearance would be based. He had significant concerns about the report which he found inaccurate and misleading and asked to meet with the Agency official who would make the determination in this case—to offer his views.

2. opened the meeting by explaining his position and the fact that he had not, as yet, reviewed the FBI report but wanted to hear the Senator's views which he could then factor into his decision. Senator Smith explained that he had briefed on the FBI report which he had obtained from Senator Kerry and based on that briefing had prepared a point by point rebuttal. Senator Smith provided a copy of the rebuttal and then proceeded to review the points and to offer his own opinion and elaboration on the issues. Following this presentation Senator Smith asked for an expeditious resolution of the case and received 's assurances assuming that no further investigatory actions were required.

4. Senator Smith expressed his appreciation for the Agency's efforts, underscored his continued displeasure with the tone and content of the FBI report, and his eagerness to have this key staff officer properly cleared so that he could get on with his responsibilities and his role within the Committee.

Robert W. Magner
Deputy Director for Senate Affairs
Office of Congressional Affairs
SUBJECT: Meeting with Senator Robert C. Smith (R NH)
MEMORANDUM FOR: C/EA/ICOG
INFO: OCA(Senate), Mr. Robert Magner
FROM: C/EA/ICOG
SUBJECT: Visit by Senate Select Committee Investigator Robert Taylor on 15 May

1. Bob Taylor visited our office from 1400 until nearly 1600 hours today. He said he plans to return. He came to see what I had found concerning

He apologized for not bringing the 1984 Intelligence Community memorandum which prompted his inquiry, but promised to Fax it to me.
3. Impressed with our thick files dating back to the 1960's, Bob asked whether there was any reference to Sam Neua, Laos in January 1988 (the famous "U.S.A." photo). I found one Stony Beach report, which I showed him, and then I let him look (possibly an error on my part— if so, I'm sorry) further in that file. He found nothing further. Earlier, when I showed Bob the two items in the 1984 files, he noticed a January 1984 "Memorandum for the Record" from Ann Mills Griffiths of the National League of Families, concerning infighting between her group and the Vietnam Veterans of America, which was then about to be chartered. NSC POW referent sent it to us, as well as to several other agencies, with a covering note (a copy is attached) warning darkly of "worms" coming out from under the rocks. The memo was not addressed to CIA, and we did not solicit it. On those grounds, at least, I suppose we could pass it. (No one here was interested in the POW groups' infighting anyway.)

4. Bob asked if we had any examples of organizers of proposed rescue missions offering their services for substantial sums of money. I said we did, and showed him two such examples (attached) which I had read recently, both from the files. One requests "only" $220,000 ($150,000 of which is consumed by unspecified "fees"), while the other moves into the big time by asking for $3.75 million in Agency funds. The latter contains the never-to-be-forgotten (run-on) sentence, "We have the Manpower & Skill to Succeed in what we do - do you & the Agency have the Guts as Men to Partake in Such a Covert Operation Like We Will Do, or Are You All A Bunch of Thumb Sucking Little Boys Scared of What We Can Do Mr. Director." (There is no record of a response from Mr. Director...)

5. There are numerous other such offers in our files, but I did not want to start a search for them at this time. Our files are filled with that sort of thing, but I don't think we want to get
involved in digging out all the (dated) information on their operational fantasies. Bob said the Committee now has two fraud investigators, and they would like to have such items. The $3.75 million-dollar proposal was sent specifically to the Director, while the other was a copy of a letter presumably sent to numerous potential donors, which Childress sent to DIA, and DIA sent on to us. I doubt whether fraud could be proved eight years afterwards, anyway. Who's to say now that the organizers did not have teams trained and ready to go then, as they claimed? In addition, in neither instance was any money paid them (at least not by us.) In any case, I'll pass copies of those two letters to Bob, unless there are any objections.

6. Bob asked if we are declassifying our live-sightings reports, as DIA is doing. I said we are. He said the files seem to contain a great deal of alleged sightings. Was all of this reported? I said if it appeared substantial enough, an intelligence dissemination was written that last fall we had reviewed 400 CIA intelligence disseminations on live sightings, and in every case the actual information can be declassified; I told him understood that well enough, but still felt we might not have passed everything we had. then joined the conversation, and pointed out that if there was any chance for an intelligence dissemination, our reports officers would try to get it published. If the information was too fragmentary, we would still send it to DIA as a Bob then asked whether the can be declassified. I said possibly in some instances, but in others they contain a good deal of information, and could not be declassified. He then asked whether DIA passed our onward in the intelligence community. I said I don't believe they are allowed to do that. It was clear that he was groping at this point, and looking for something he could build a case (against us) on. Unfortunately I could not find the files (they are filed by year) at the moment, or would have shown him that we produce a good many of them. I also pointed out that become the subject of e.g., Mr. Nguyen of San Jose, Cal. calls a CIA field office to report that his brother-in-law in Hue has an American skeleton under his bed, and we send this information and Nguyen's address and phone number on to DIA in a Bob still did not look entirely convinced, but I said we would dig up some to show him the type of information that goes into them.

7. Bob asked if we had any other photos we had not shown him. I said I didn't have any. He asked whether had
started interviewing former Station chiefs in Laos. I said I didn't know.

He asked various other questions, jumping around a bit. He wanted to know whether we had any information on an underground complex under the Ho Chi Minh mausoleum in Hanoi, or under the Citadel area (I thought that was in Hue), prior to 1989. I asked [ ] and then phoned [ ] neither had ever heard of such a thing. Bob also said that [ ] had mentioned laundry laid out on a Vietnamese rooftop that appeared to spell out a message. I said I knew nothing about that one, either. (Bob often opens the bidding by saying he saw it in our files, then backtracks when we say we never saw it in our files, and allows as how "maybe it was in DIA files". I'm sure he uses the same device with them.) I asked him how long he expected the Committee to continue. He said until the end of the year, when it will "self-destruct". Bob seemed a bit distracted today. He appeared to be looking for some revelation which he could use to really do a number on us. Dealing with him is sort of like being polite to your polygraph examiner, knowing full well he is only trying to finish you off.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

FROM: ANN GRIFFITHS

SUBJECT: PHONE CONVERSATION CONCERNING VVA

DATE: JANUARY 31, 1984

Anne Hart (League Board Vice Chairman) reported having had a lengthy conversation with Greg Kane of VVA. Kane, at the invitation of League Board Chairman Earl Hoppert, made a presentation to the board of directors meeting on January 28th and attended the POW/MIA Seminar on January 26th. According to Mrs. Hart the following specific points were made by Kane during the conversation:

- VVA intends to write to Secretary Shultz, carbon copy to Sonny Montgomery, a letter which will pertain to the Sansone case - VVA has already told Montgomery the "facts they have from the Vietnamese" and information they have been able to obtain - Montgomery has pledged that he will look into this - VVA feels they can use the Sansone incident to reflect duplicity on the part of the U.S. government.

Details of the Sansone incident known to VVA at this time include - the C123 flew into a "V" in the side of a mountain (Monkey Mountain) - the aircraft was nearly totally destroyed as were the remains of the crew members and others aboard - those aboard consisted of several Vietnamese and two Americans; Sansone and Woodrow Wilson Vaden - no individual identifications were made other than Sansone - identifiable portion of Sansone was an arm with a tattoo and personal effects - Nguyen Cao Ky was in some way involved - the team which searched the aircraft incident site tried to sort out remains and did come up with six to eight body bags - the body bags were taken back to Saigon and buried in the Mach Dinh Chi Cemetery - one body bag included the remains of Sansone.

Kane also stated that Son Edwards and VVA have been in touch. The following points were made by Kane:

- Dick Childress, NSC staff, had told Edwards prior to his trip to Vietnam that there were secret negotiations going on and that he should not raise the POW/MIA issue - the Foreign Minister denied there were any secret negotiations going on - Kane said Childress is a liar and is lying to the families - Sonny Montgomery has pressed the Administration to relieve Childress of his duties. (Note: Kane is obviously referring to a conversation Childress had with Edwards after the State briefing when he told Edwards this was a sensitive time and requested he not raise the issue.)
Kane had also indicated a private meeting would be held with Earl Hopper, League Board Chairman. Following the League board of directors meeting, several people gathered in the cocktail lounge at Stouffer's Hotel. The group included Greg Kane. When Hopper arrived, Kane left the group to join Hopper who was accompanied by Patty Skelly, Chairman of the Board, Task Force Omega. Kane claims Hopper is not hostile to VVA, only to Bobby Muller and to the position that no live Americans are in captivity. Kane raised to Hopper the possibility of establishing an ADHOC Committee with POW/MIA related organization and the families which would be under VVA's umbrella. Hopper reportedly offered no opposition and said that this was possible.

Kane opined that by attending the League board meeting on Saturday the 28th of January, he was able to selectively pick out a few regional coordinators to use in establishing direct contact with POW/MIA families. Kane claimed that the end result of all of this would be an indictment of U.S. government involvement in the Vietnam War. Kane further mentioned to Hopper his qualms about League reaction to media inquiries at the time of VVA's trip to Hanoi to pick up the remains. VVA will attempt to direct all possible press inquiries to Earl Hopper rather than the League office, per Hopper's suggestion to do so.

It is Kane Hart's view that VVA is searching for a way to use the Sansone case to embarrass the U.S. government. Of greatest concern is to ensure that the Vaden and Sansone families have been fully briefed and told the truth about specific incident information. It is apparent that VVA must have some inside sources to have gained the detailed information they currently know about the Sansone case. It is unknown whether they are aware of the many U.S. government attempts to yet the South Vietnamese government to exhume all of the remains or whether two were subsequently exhumed. Also unknown is whether VVA is aware that Sansone's name had appeared in dog tag reports and Vaden's remains were not identified or returned.

Added note: OXFAM contacted the League office January 31st to request addresses of all League board members, regional and state coordinators to enable direct contact with the families. This information was not provided but Barbara Hendrie (OXFAM) had requested the data be shipped at their expense by Federal Express overnight mail.

Hendrie later called back and stated that she wanted to send a letter to the families and was unsure of the best way to proceed. She added that her organization had just returned from Kampuchea but that she was not at liberty to discuss the trip or the content of the letter. Hendrie was told that the letter should be sent to the League executive director and, with her approval, the letter could then be distributed. Hendrie indicated she would send the letter but appeared to be very hesitant to discuss the content or purpose.
TO: [Blank]

[NSC staff] sent the attached to me and asked that I pass it along to your agency. He also indicated that he would be sending it to the Justice Department.

Sincerely,

[Blank]
Sirs:

The purpose of this letter is to obtain the financial support needed for an operation that my associates and I have been planning for the past year.

The purpose of the operation is to locate, release, and return me, all of the American P.O.W.s (prisoners of war), still held in North Vietnam.

With the use of many varied contacts, we have acquired positive proof that approximately 200 men are still being held prisoner, out of a total of over 2500 men listed as missing and dead.

I am one member of a small group of men carefully selected, with special talents to perform this task. We have set our goals and are dedicated to see the operation through to the end regardless of risk.

We have made all of the necessary arrangements for the delivery of the equipment and supplies needed for the mission. The training will last approximately one month and the site has been chosen.

I hope you can share with me the importance and the current needs of these men, who have sacrificed so much for their country. We cannot and must not forget them.

Our financial needs are as follows:

1. Arms and equipment, plus personnel  $25,000.00
2. Transportation expenses  20,000.00
3. Room and board  10,000.00
4. Training (cost of site and time)  10,000.00
5. Miscellaneous  5,000.00
6. Fees  150,000.00

Total  $220,000.00

These costs may seem high, but the importance of the mission and the risk of possible capture and death make it worthwhile. All of the cost will cover an extended length of time in the countries involved. And will also cover the cost of a possible Air Rescue mission, including the cost of the pilots and their aircraft.

We do not expect anyone to cover the entire cost of the operation, that would be asking too much. Even though it would make things simpler and faster, but any assistance would be deeply appreciated of much help.

If any further information is required please feel free to ask. We send all of your replies and request to Mr. David L. Rogers. His address is listed above.

Our plans are set and we are ready to begin as soon as we receive the support needed.

One point I must make clear is the importance of security; any information must remain confidential in order to assure the success of the mission.

Now on behalf of the team, I thank you and hope to be hearing from you very soon.

Sincerely,

David L. Rogers
CIA Headquarters, Langley Park, Virginia.

Dear Sir;

A week and a half (give or take) ago, I sent a letter to you and your Agency; in regard to me & the men I have recruited to return to North Vietnam, to perform a covert operation into that country.

I sent the letter to you & the Agency addressed to your headquarters in Washington D.C. Not realizing your Agency is located in Langley Park Virginia, me Director, I have no way of knowing if you received such a letter. From me, laying out the details to covert operation coded "Come back Home" into North Vietnam by me & my men.

Anyway this letter will inform you; until you can either decide such letter I've already send or send someone to see me on the covert operation objectives we will accomplish, once we enter North Vietnam again.

I must state now, that me and my men have no intention of threatening the national security or our country, the United States of America, or being hated down on its President Mr. Ronald E. Reagan & the American bureaucracy (Government) & its citizens. By our operation done North Vietnam, me Director.

When we enter such country, we will carry no identification whatsoever to identify us as Americans, until we have emerged from the jungles of North Vietnam in 6 months time.

The reason why me and the 46 men I have recruited are returning to North Vietnam and risking our lives to accomplish such operation are as follows:
1) To bring every American Serviceman & woman held captive in jungle prison camps from the Vietnam War still being held in North Vietnam as of today's home that we can find;
2) To bring every CIA Field Officer still alive who is being held captive in jungle prison Camp's home to you & the Agency and their country & families;
3) To take Hand Held Video tape camera footage of troop movements not covered.
Vietnam Documents we find and other important stuff that can be useful to your Agency.

5) To bring back with us paper documents that we find for your agency as well as maps & etcetera.

5) To capture if possible any high ranking North Vietnamese & Russian Military leaders to smuggle back to our Country and your Agency.

One of the men I have recruited has in his possession a letter smuggled out of North Vietnam from his brother, who is still being held prisoner in a Vietnamese Jungle Prison Camp named in the English language of "Camp 7." Am with such proof at hand that American's are still held as prisoners of the Vietnam War - me & my men are returning to bring them home Mr. Director.

The reason why I wrote & sent the first letter to you & the Agency to The Washington D.C. Address was to find out if you & the Agency had balls enough to want to join our covert operation into North Vietnam.

If you and the Agency, especially your covert operations section desire to visit us; me & my men would require that you arrange for the following to uphold your part of the operation Mr. Director:

1) To enable us to be stationed at General George C. Patton's empty headquarters at Fort Benning Georgia for a period of 7 weeks to train to refresh ourselves weapons and to be able to redo airborne training and be equipped by your Agency.

With all things in North Vietnam I have the complete 7 week training schedule above

2) To equip me & my men with advanced weaponry & equipment from other countries, 3) No more than 2 Air Drops of Ammo & Food at Pre Arranged Drop Sites and from June of our 6 month operation into North Vietnam.

If you and your Agency can come to terms with the conditions above as we require that you do; then your next step is to get in contact with me - since I'm delegated The Recruiter, Spokesman, Plans & Commander of Operation "Come Back Home" as soon as you can.
One word of warning to You & Your Agency Mr. Director - IF my new 
me smell a double cross at All; we have the capabilities to pull the operation 
off on our own and sell our story to several Agencies upon our return 
from North Vietnam.

We have the manpower - with determination to accomplish our planned 
objectives, and we have the financial backing if you & Your Agency fail to 
work with us, Mr. Director.

As for weapons - we can in one night's work get everything from mills 
RiLES, M-203's, M-60's, 90 mm Cannons, Plastic Explosives, LAW's, Shells, mortars, 
20 mm Armament Piercing Cannons, Primed Detonating Cord & Accetel (Everything 
american made) that we need for our North Vietnam Covert Operation.

In reality we don't need you & Your Agency around us - but we wish 
to give you all the satisfaction of working with trained professionals who can 
guarantee a 95% or better accomplishment of our objectives and operation. 
everyone of us (30 total) will return from North Vietnam Sir.

We have the manpower & skill to succeed in what we do - do you & Your 
Agency have the guts & men to pull in such a Covert Operation like we 
will do, or are you all a bunch of thumb sucking little boy's scared of 
we can do, Mr. Director.

If you desire to work with my men & me, You & The Agency have 
UNTIL Monday October 31st 1984, to contact me, otherwise we will do what 
we have planned on our own, laugh at you and the Agency when we ALL 
return from North Vietnam Sir.

We are new men set to do a man's service and job for our country & 
its people, and we will succeed in bringing our fellow Americans & stuff home 
from North Vietnam - we are not boys like some who are worried about 
their Federal jobs and expensive clothes & things, Mr. Director.

Do your & your Agency desire to work with us or are all you a 
bunch of scared kids.

Yours

Michael Steven Zelnoski

PS. See you All Soon at when I say I will 
return from North Vietnam as Heroes.
MEMORANDUM FOR: Robert W. Magner  
Chief, Senate Liaison Division  
Office of Congressional Affairs  

VIA: Office of the Deputy Director for Operations  

FROM: James D. Anders, Jr.  
Chief, Indochina Operations Group  

SUBJECT: Items Requested by Senate Investigator Robert Taylor  

19 May 1992  

When Mr. Taylor visited CIA Headquarters on 15 May 1992, he requested copies of the following items from our files:  

--- A National League of Families letter dated 31 January 1984. Since we received our copy of that letter from Mr. [Name] at the National Security Council, we cannot pass it on. Mr. Taylor should ask the NSC for it.  

--- Two 1984 letters from American citizens soliciting funds for planned private missions to rescue American POW's in Southeast Asia. Attached for Mr. Taylor is a copy of the 26 September 1984 letter from [Name] to Director Casey. The other letter, which was also written in early 1984, was written by [Name] addressed only "Dear Sir". A copy of it was sent by [Name] of the NSC to [Name] at DIA (PW-MIA), asking that [Name] pass it along to CIA. [Name] indicated that he was also sending it to the Justice Department since the solicitation of funds appeared to be a scam. If Mr. Taylor wishes to have a copy of this letter, we believe he must also ask NSC for it since it was not addressed to or acquired by CIA.
C.I.A. Director
CIA Headquarters.
Ladogly Park, Virginia.

Dear Sir;

Date: September 1984.

A week and a half (give a day or two) ago, I sent a letter to
you and your Agency; in regards to me & the men I have recruited ti
return to North Vietnam, to perform a Covert Operation into that
country.

I sent the letter to you & the Agency. Addressed to your Head
quarters in Washington D.C., not realizing your Agency is located:
Ladogly Park, Virginia me Director. I have no way of knowing & you
received such a letter from me, laying out the details to Covert
Operation Cabled "Come Back Home" into North Vietnam by me & my men
Sir.

Anyway this letter will inform you, until you can either locate
such letter I've already sent or send someone to see me, to tell the
Covert operation objectives we will accomplish, once we enter North
Vietnam Again.

I must state now; that me and my men have no intention of
Threatening The National Security of our Country. The United Sta
of America, or Bringing Hatred Upon its President Mr. Ronald E.
Reagan & the American Beaureacry (Government) its Citizen's. By our op
eration into North Vietnam we Director.

When we enter such country, we will carry no identification whatso
ever, to identify us As Americans, until we have emerged to
the jungles of North Vietnam in 6 months Sir.

The Reasons why me and the 39 men I have Recruited to
Returning to North Vietnam and Risking our Lives to Accomplish such
Operation Are As Follows:

1) To Bring every American Service man & woman held captive in Jungle
Prison Camps from the Vietnam War still held in North Vietna
Not today's home that we can find;

2) To Bring every CIA Field Officer still alive who is being held ca
tive in Jungle Prison Camps home to you & the Agency and their
Country & Families;

3) To Take Hand Held Video Tape Camera Footage of Troop Movements - N
Vietnam documents we find and other important stuff that can be useful to your agency;
8) to bring back with us paper documents that we find for your agency. As well as maps & etcetera;
9) to capture it possible any high ranking north Vietnamese & Russian military leaders to smuggle back to our country and your agency.

One of the men I have recruited has in his possession, a letter smuggled out of North Vietnam from his brother, who is still being held prisoner in a Vietnamese jungle prison camp named in the English language of "Camp 7". An avec such proof at hand that America's are still held as prisoners of the Vietnamese war - me & my men are returning to bring them home we already. The reason why I wrote & sent the first letter to you & the agency to the Washington D.C. Address was to find out if you & the agency had ball's easy to want to join our covert operation into North Vietnam soon.

If you and the agency, especially your covert operations section desire to go, me & my men would require that you arrange for the following to uphold your part of the operation, as directed:

1) to enable us to be stationed at several George C. Patton's empty Headquarters at Fort Benning Georgia for a period of 7 weeks to train to refresh ourselves and to be able to rede Airborne training and be briefed by your agency known things in North Vietnam; I have the complete 7 week training schedule made.
2) to equip me & my men with advanced weaponry & devices from other countries, no heat falls onto the United States of America if someone is caught here please, the use of Israeli Uzi 9mm Submachine Pistols with Silencers - Walther PPK 9mm Pisto with Silencers - A.T.S. Inc. XM18 relating (R�guard weapons systems - 9 other Foreign Weapons & Gear for our covert operation)

3) Each man including me is to be paid $5,000.00 up front at the start of the training & operation. And upon completion of the operation each man will receive a bonus of $8,000.00. For a total of $17,000.00 per man for a team total of $3,750,000.00 (just much of a debt in your agency budget. $3,250,000.00)

4) You shall arrange transportation to get from North Vietnam to my waiting in the American's documents we bring out with us. Plus arrange for at least no more than 2 the drops of Ammo & Food at prearranged dates. And times our our 6 month operation into North Vietnam.

If you and your agency can come to terms with the condition's number 1-4 above as we require, that you do then your next step is to get in contact with me. Since I'm delegated the recruiter, spokesmen, the commander of operation "come back home" as soon as you can.
One Word of Warning to You & Your Agency Mr. Director—If my men
me smell a double cross at all, we have the capabilities to pull the operation
It on our own and sell our story to several agencies upon our return
From North Vietnam.

We have the manpower—will a determination to accomplish our plans
objectives, and we have the financial backing if you & your agency fail to
work with us Mr. Director.

As for weapons—we can in one months work get everything from
mini-guns—M203’s—MG’s—GBs—Grenades—Plastic Explosives—LAA’S & Shells—100mm
Armour Piercing Cannons—Prime Detonating Cord (Everything American)
that we need for our North Vietnam Covert Operation.

In reality we don't need you or your agency around us—But, we do
to give you all the satisfaction of working with trained professionals who can
assure a 95% or better accomplishment of our objectives and operation
everyone of us (30 total) would return from North Vietnam Sir.

We have the manpower & skill to succeed in what we do—Do your
agency have the guts as men to participate in such a covert operation like
we will do, or are you all a bunch of thumb sucking little boy's scared if
we can do Mr. Director.

If you desire to work with my men & me, the Agency have
Until Monday October 5th, 1984 to contact me, otherwise we will work
we have planned on our own, go laugh at you and the Agency when we All
return from North Vietnam Sir.

We are men set out to do a man's service and job for our country
It's people, and we will succeed in being our fellow American's a stuff home
From North Vietnam—we are not boys like some who are worried about
Their federal jobs and expensive clothes & things Mr. Director.

Do you & your agency desire to work with us or all you—all a
Bunch of Scared Kids.

Yours

Michael Steven Ziolkowski

P.S. See you All Soon on when my men return from North Vietnam as heroes. 3
**Priority Handling**

**SUBJECT:** HPSCI Staff Briefing on Reporting of U.S. POWs in the USSR Post World War II

**FROM:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)</th>
<th>DATE RECEIVED</th>
<th>FORWARDER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DC/ORMS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DC/ORMS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AC/ORMS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SA/DDO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADDO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DD/OCA/H</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**DATE SENT:** 26 June 92

**REQUEST NUMBER:** DD/O 0085/163-92

**FILE:** HPSCI

**RECEIVE FILE #:**

**RETURN TO:**
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: HPSCI Staff Briefing on Reporting of U.S. POWs in the USSR Post World War II

1. On 24 June 1992 at 1500 hours HPSCI staffers Mike Sheehy, Bill Fleshman, Steve Nelson, Chris Healy, Tom Smeeton, Ross Newland and Jack Keliher received a briefing on the extent of the Intel Community's reporting of U.S. POWs in the USSR after World War II from Jim Anders, C/EA/ICOG, and Also present were OCA, and the undersigned.

2. Mr. Anders began by referring to President Yeltsin's recent statement concerning U.S. POWs from the Vietnam War being held in Soviet prison camps. One week before Yeltsin made this statement, Volkogonov, Soviet Chairman on the Joint U.S./Russian Commission on POW/MIAs and Yeltsin's military advisor, said that no information could be found that U.S. POWs were ever sent from Vietnam to the USSR. Mr. Anders further confirmed this by stating that the Agency has absolutely no information to support such a claim. Mr. Anders told the staffers that after searching the files, he was able to find reports which provided some info on the subject.
SUBJECT: HPSCI Staff Briefing on Reporting of U.S. POWs in the USSR Post World War II

5. The briefing ended at 1530 hours with one outstanding question: Are Russian emigres routinely being asked about POWs?

Sue A. Burggraft
23 June 1992

Mr. J. William Codinha
Chief Counsel
Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Codinha,

Enclosed are the items requested during his visit to Headquarters the end of May 1992:

1. A copy of CIA report

2. The provided the attached 1976 map of "Detention Camps in Laos Identified From Imagery," which identified the approximate locations of several camps, including one west of Muang Xepone, Savannakhet Province.

We have also located information from an asset who visited in December 1986. We are prepared to show this material when he next visits our office.

Sincerely,

Robert W. Magruder
Deputy Director for Senate Affairs

Enclosure
SUBJECT: Letter to Codinha, POW/MIA, re: Visit to Headquarters in May 1992
WARNING: INFORMATION REPORT. NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

REPORT CLASS CONFIDENTIAL

COUNTRY: LAOS

SUBJ: ABSENCE OF AMERICAN POWS; AT HAT CHAM REEDUCATION CAMPT IN LUANG PRABANG, PROVINCE, LAOS; ITS LOCATION AND OPERATION

DOI: 1979-1988
A FORMER ROYAL LAO GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL WHO WAS HELD IN MAT CHAM (TH 5769) REEDUCATION CAMP, LOCATED IN MUANG NGDJ DISTRICT, LUANG PRABANG PROVINCE, LAO PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC, FROM 1975 UNTIL HE ESCAPED IN 1985 AND FLED TO THAILAND, STATED THAT HE HAD NEVER SEEN OR HEARD ABOUT ANY AMERICAN POWS WHILE IN REEDUCATION. HE FURTHER STATED THAT HE BELIEVED THAT ANYONE WHO SAID THAT THEY HAD SEEN AN AMERICAN POW WHILE IN REEDUCATION WAS LYING BECAUSE THE REEDUCATION CAMP INMATES WERE STRICTLY CONTROLLED.


3. THE CAMP WAS OPENED IN AUGUST 1975 AND CONTAINED FORMER RLG OFFICIALS FROM LUANG PRABANG AND XIENG KHOUANG PROVINCES. THE CAMP CONTAINED ABOUT 750 PERSONNEL, INCLUDING 400 REEDUCATION INMATES AND 350 RLG MEMBERS. THE CAMP WAS DIVIDED INTO FOUR COMPANIES; THE FIRST COMPANY WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAINTAINING THE PERSONNEL RECORDS, MEDICAL TREATMENT, AND CAMP MAINTENANCE; THE SECOND COMPANY WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR PLANNING, CONSTRUCTION, EDUCATION AND CLASSES; THE THIRD COMPANY WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR CROP CULTIVATION, ANIMAL HUSBANDRY AND FISHING; AND THE FOURTH COMPANY WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR WOOD CUTTING, BOAT BUILDING AND METAL WORKING. THE INMATES WERE SENTENCED TO THE CAMP FOR FIVE YEARS AFTER WHICH THEIR CASES WOULD BE REVIEWED AND EACH PERSON WOULD BE PLACED INTO ONE OF THREE CATEGORIES; THE FIRST CATEGORY WAS COMPRISED OF PERSONS WHO WERE TO BE RELEASED FROM REEDUCATION; THE SECOND CATEGORY WERE THOSE WHO WERE TO REMAIN IN REEDUCATION AS SECURITY/GUARD PERSONNEL; AND THE THIRD CATEGORY WERE THOSE TO BE SENTENCED TO FURTHER REEDUCATION. THE CAMP WAS CLOSED IN 1980 BECAUSE OF BORDER PROBLEMS BETWEEN THE LAO AND CHINESE GOVERNMENTS AND THE INMATES WERE EITHER RELEASED OR SENT TO REEDUCATION CAMPS IN XIENG KHOUANG OR ATTOPEU PROVINCES. SOME LPA PERSONNEL REMAINED AT THE CAMP AND SOME INMATES WERE KEPT AT THE CAMP TO TEND THE GARDENS AND WORK FOR THE LPA.

WARNING: REPORT CLASS CONFIDENTIAL
Ms. Frances Zwenig  
Staff Director  
Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs  
United States Senate  
Washington, D.C. 20510  

Dear Ms. Zwenig:  

Enclosed are the CIA documents selected by the POW/MIA Committee from the State Department's "Sievert's Collection" that we have reviewed. Of the entire package, source redactions were made on a very small number of documents. Let me know if I may be of further assistance.  

Sincerely,  

/s/ Stanley M. Moskowitz  
Stanley M. Moskowitz  
Director of Congressional Affairs  

Enclosure
SUBJECT: Letter to Frances Zwenig re "Sievert's Collection"
Letter to Frances Zwenig re: "Sievert's Collection".

Should we be a little clearer in explaining what we mean by "source reductions"? It may not be obvious to the reader.

See attached router.

For your signature
FROM: James D. Anders, Jr. 
C/EA/ICOG 

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building) 

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>OFFICER'S INITIALS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Checked by Chief, EA</td>
<td>18/3/92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>C/ORMS/CCA</td>
<td>18/3/92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>DC/ORMS</td>
<td>19 MAR 1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>AC/ORMS</td>
<td>19 MAR 1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>SA/DDO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>ADDO</td>
<td>3/19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>DDO</td>
<td>✔</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>C/OCA/S</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

RETURN TO: 

SUSPENSE DATE: 

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after comment.)

These documents have been reviewed individually by IC/EA. Approximately 5-6 have been redacted to remove references that could pinpoint sources or sub sources.
MEMORANDUM FOR: Robert W. Magner
Chief, Senate Liaison Division
Office of Congressional Affairs

VIA: Office of the Deputy Director for Operations

FROM: James D. Anders, Jr.
Chief, Indochina Operations Group

SUBJECT: CIA Documents from the "Sieverts Collection"
at the Department of State, Requested by Senate
Select Committee for POW/MIA Affairs

The Senate Select Committee for POW/MIA Affairs recently
reviewed 43 boxes of documents at the Department of State,
known as the "Sieverts Collection". The Committee indicated it
wished to have certain CIA documents it selected from the
collection. Attached are the CIA documents selected by the
Committee.

James D. Anders,
June 10, 1992

Mr. Stanley Moskowitz  
Director  
Congressional Relations  
Central Intelligence Agency  
Washington, DC 20505

Dear Mr. Moskowitz:

It has come to the attention of this Committee, that the Central Intelligence Agency may have, as a matter of policy or in the interest of protecting sensitive sources, reported certain intelligence information to policy makers and other intelligence consumers as "collateral" information, when in fact it may have been collected by technical means.

In particular, we are interested in COMINT information pertaining to U.S. POWs in Southeast Asia, that CIA may have obtained directly which were reported by CIA to be from collateral, i.e. HUMINT, sources.

It is, therefore, requested that CIA identify all such reports and their original source, and provide this Committee with all supporting documentation related to each individual case. We request this information be provided by 22 June, 1992. The Committee point-of-contact for this request is Mr. Robert P. Taylor, 202-224-2317.

Sincerely,

[J. William Codinhnah  
Chief Counsel]
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OFFICE OF CONGRESSIONAL AFFAIRS ROUTING SLIP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACTION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D/OCA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DD/OCA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPECIAL ASSISTANT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DD/LEGISLATION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DD/SENATE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DD/HOUSE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DD/CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DD/INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ISSUES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONSTITUENT INQUIRIES OFFICER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOIA/PA OFFICER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SECURITY OFFICER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCA/COMPT/ISC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SUSPENSE 19 JUNE

DATE

ACTION OFFICER: Bob MAFNER

REMARKS: (ND)

CONTROL NUMBER: OCA-0843/52

FILE: CNA 0843-9211

FORM 4422

Rev. 21
Mr. J. William Codinha  
Chief Counsel  
Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs  
United States Senate  
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Bill,

In response to your letter of June 3, 1992, please find an analysis of the "USA" photograph prepared by the Agency's Office of Imagery Analysis. I trust this will be helpful as you continue to study this particular issue.

Please feel free to contact me should you require any additional information.

Sincerely,

Robert W. Magner  
Deputy Director for Senate Affairs

Enclosure
SUBJECT: Response to 3 June Letter from POW/MIA Affairs re Photograph dated 22 January 1988
16 June 1992

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Analysis of Surface Markings at Sam Neua, Laos

REFERENCE: Letter to D/OCA, Same Subject, dtd June 3, 1992

1. Several unusual markings—the letters "USA" and what resembled a US Air Force escape and evasion symbol known as a "Walking Kilo"—on the ground west of Sam Neua, Laos. We are uncertain as to who may have made those markings, but recently completed analysis gives us a better understanding of how the markings were made, how long the markings may have been present, and what activity may have been going on concurrently in the surrounding region.

- The USA letters were newer by an undetermined period of time (but not more than a few months) than the possible Walking Kilo.
The USA markings were manmade. Because of the apparent age and decay of the possible Walking Kilo, it could not be determined if it was manmade, although that possibility cannot be ruled out.

No other markings or symbols were identified in the Sam Neua area.

The markings appear to have been created by forming slight depressions in the ground—either stamped, or more likely dug—that were then filled with water. The light tone surrounding the letters may indicate recently-dug soil, and the narrow portions of the "S" may indicate that the water was drying up. The markings do not appear to be formed from manmade material or from vegetation.

Since the markings were constructed in a rice paddy, it is likely that the USA was formed after the harvest season, which ends in December, and would have been obliterated by the beginning of the rainy seasons in May, when rice shoots are transplanted into the flooded paddies.

3. In related analysis, our study indicates that the markings may have been visible from a portion of Route 6 just to the northeast. The letters were positioned so that an individual traveling along Route 6 from northeast to southwest could have seen them. In addition, the markings would have been clearly visible to an aircraft or helicopter taking off from the airfield at Sam Neua, which is 3.2 km to the west northwest, if that aircraft took off from east to west into the prevailing winds and flew in the direction of Vientiane or Xiangkhoang.

4. Finally, we studied other available information to assess contemporaneous related activity in Hua Phan Province in general and the Sam Neua area in particular and reached the following conclusions:
SUBJECT: Analysis of Surface Markings at Sam Neua, Laos (C)

- There was a substantial amount of reporting on sightings of American POWs in the region during this time, much of it probably prompted by DIA's effort to follow up on the discovery of the Sam Neua markings. However, in no case did further analysis or source vetting confirm any of this reporting.

- Reporting indicated that there was in 1988, and continues to be to this day, a certain amount of insurgency activity--best described as low-level and hit-and-run--in the vicinity of Sam Neua. This in turn prompted some counterinsurgency operations by Lao government forces, and may account for some reports of unusual activity.

- It is very likely that a small number of Soviet personnel (mainly pilots) occasionally visited Sam Neua as late as 1988. A limited number of other Westerners similarly traveled to the town, sometimes up Route 6 past the site of the Sam Neua markings.

- Finally, an historical precedent exists for suggesting the presence of American POWs in the Sam Neua area. Photographs taken by a reconnaissance aircraft on 11 October 1969, shows what may be as many as 20 non-Asians accompanied by Pathet Lao guards near caves at Ban Nakay Teu (UTM VH197561), 20 km east of the Sam Neua markings. Sam Neua at that time was a major Pathet Lao stronghold.
Markings in Rice Paddy
Near Sam Neua, Laos
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OFFICE OF CONGRESSIONAL AFFAIRS ROUTING SLIP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>D/OCA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DD/OCA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPECIAL ASSISTANT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DD/LEGISLATION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DD/Senate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DD/House</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DD/Congressional Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DD/Intelligence Community Issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constituent Inquiries Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOIA/PA Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCA/COMPT/ISC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SUSPENSE** 22 June '92

**DATE**

**ACTION OFFICER:** Rob M.

**REMARKS:** (PW 6-7-92)

**CONTROL NUMBER:** OCA 0833-92

**FILE:** OCA 0833-92/1
June 3, 1992

Mr. Stanley Moskowitz, Director
Congressional Relations
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Mr. Moskowitz:

Your agency provided this Committee a copy of a photograph, referred to as the "USA" photograph, pertaining to a site in Southeast Asia, dated 22 January 1988. The Committee intends to achieve a complete understanding of all the circumstances surrounding this occurrence, as well as evaluate the steps taken by the Defense Intelligence Agency to fully investigate the case.

Accordingly, the Committee is requesting that the Central Intelligence Agency perform an independent technical evaluation of the photograph. Precisely, we ask that CIA/OIA determine, from whatever photography available, the probable means of construction of the symbols; whether the symbols appear to have been made at the same time or in stages; the probable identity of the symbols (letters or numbers); possible meaning of the symbols (i.e. military evader symbols); and contemporaneous activity in the immediate area.

Again, we ask that this be an independent CIA assessment, without consultation with DIA. If this assessment can be made available to the Committee by 19 June, it would be greatly appreciated.

Sincerely,

J. William Codinha
Chief Counsel
Mr. J. William Codinha
Chief Counsel
Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Codinha:

In response to your letter of June 8, 1992, we have searched Agency records for data on Mr. Deen Iadtrong and found no information. If it were possible to identify the position cited in the letter with greater precision, we could possibly search further.

Sincerely,

Robert W. Ma
Deputy Director for Senate Affairs
SUBJECT: Response to POW/MIA Committee re Deen Iadtrong
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OFFICE OF CONGRESSIONAL AFFAIRS ROUTING SLIP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>D/OCA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DD/OCA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPECIAL ASSISTANT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DD/LEGISLATION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DD/SENATE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DD/HOUSE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DD/CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DD/INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ISSUES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONSTITUENT INQUIRIES OFFICER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOIA/PA OFFICER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SECURITY OFFICER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCA/COMPT/ISC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUSPENSE N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DATE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACTION OFFICER: NO ACTION Request</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REMARKS: RB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONTROL NUMBER: ER 3285-92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FILE:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FORM 4422</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
June 8, 1992

Mr. Robert Gates
Director of Central Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505

Dear Mr. Gates:

I am writing to request your assistance in obtaining any information the Central Intelligence Agency may have on a Laotian individual reported to us as having information about Americans held captive in Laos.

His name is Deen Iadtrong, reportedly a Laotian "director". Biographical information, especially a description of his official status and duties, would be most useful. If this is in classified form, it can be delivered to Senate Security at S-407.

We would like to have this information by June 15, 1992. Thank you for your continued assistance.

Sincerely,

J. William Codinha
Chief Counsel

JWC/kb/jdh
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting Between Senate POW/MIA Committee Investigator and DI/OIA Personnel

1. On Thursday, 30 April 1992 at 1000 in OHB, Senate Select Committee for POW/MIA Affairs investigator, Bob Taylor, met with DI/OIA analysts to discuss various imagery issues related to the Committee's work. Attending from OIA were represented OCA.

2. In summary, the meeting was largely a discussion of the limits on CIA's capability to provide imagery support for POW/MIA issues and of the complexities involved in analyzing information such as manmade letters on the ground detected by imagery.

3. Taylor began by citing the 1988 imagery near Sam Neua, Laos that showed the letters "USA" in a rice paddy. He noted the presence of a faded letter "K" below "USA" which, according to Taylor, caused analysts at JSSA--DOD's escape and evasion training group--"to almost fall off their chairs." Taylor said the "K" was a well-known pilot's distress signal and that the JSSA analysts felt that a US person must have made the letters. He added that since the "K" was faded, the more distinct "USA" might have been added later in desperation. Taylor asked if OIA was familiar with such signals. responded that OIA was not cognizant of such codes, and noted the letter was too faded to determine how it was made or its relationship to "USA."

4. Taylor asserted that in the 1980 in which the numbers "52" were detected, a "K" was also present. He also recalled a 1973 case in which the letters "TH" (possibly for [____]) were detected along with a four digit number which could have been an authenticator code. The OIAers could not recall the latter case.
Regarding the _______, ______ noted it was unclear whether the imagery actually showed "52." ______ countered that CIA humint had POWs leaving the area near the time the numbers were imaged and that the numbers had faded the following month. Taylor went on to describe other instances where he had learned of symbols picked up by imagery, including an "AS" southwest of the "USA" area and a "555"--the designator of a reconnaissance group that had flown over Laos--at another location. He suggested that OIA should be more sensitized to looking for such signals in imagery.

5. ______ then explained that DIA was designated as the focal point on POW matters to avoid duplication of effort by government agencies. DIA had the necessary databases, resources and expertise. OIA would only get involved when it detected something unusual and even then the information would go to DIA for action. CIA's only major involvement in the issue came around 1983-84 when DO reporting indicated some Caucasians might be at a facility in Laos, but there was no subsequent imagery to confirm the information. Otherwise OIA was not officially involved in POW/MIA intelligence. The analysts also noted that the size of Indochina made looking for POW signals a daunting task and that only one OIA analyst was devoted to Indochinese military issues. Even "USA" was not discovered until several months after the imagery was taken. Asked by Taylor where the POW issue stood on OIA's collection priority list, the OIAers noted it was not there. OIA's job was more order of battle military analysis. Taylor then noted that even DIA lacks the resources to do initiative-type work and only responds to specific reports or requests. He saw this as a "big hole" in the process and that if there were POWs that might be leaving signals no one was watching for them. The OIAers did agree that imagery analysts needed to be sensitized to looking for possible MIA signs when reviewing imagery.

6. Taylor then described the Committee's recent visit to the "USA" area, noting that they actually landed in the wrong valley and never saw the site. The area was populated on a seasonal basis, but one permanent resident noted that prisoners--inferred by the codel as Asians--occasionally moved through the area.
7. Taylor continued that he did not blame CIA for shortfalls in POW intelligence, but saw a problem in that information was not adequately shared or cross-checked. He noted that JSSA never saw the "USA" imagery until he showed it to them and that CIA did not know the significance of "K" until now. Taylor then asked if OIA could help him locate some imagery of "explicit" POW signals in Vietnam in the early 1980s that CIA retiree Bill Graver had recalled in an earlier interview. The analysts were skeptical but said they would check. Taylor then asked how frequently sites like "USA" were imaged and whether, for example, the area was imaged a week or so before the letters were seen. Merritt noted the infrequency of such coverage. They could only go over previous imagery of the site taken long before the letters were imaged but found nothing. Taylor then noted that he found a POW "tasking" from late 1988-early 1989 in DIA files apparently for covering the Thai-Lao border area and asked if OIA knew about it. Merritt responded we didn't, adding that DIA neither informed nor coordinated with us on all of its activities. Taylor then noted seeing an imagery report from 1983 at Ft. Bragg which noted a "high probability" of US prisoners being at one site in Vietnam. The drafter was someone named Adams. The OIAers could neither recall the document nor the name. Taylor then asked how frequently Kontum in Vietnam was imaged, noting the source had said some POWs had been moved there and perhaps they might have left some signs. respondent that we look at Kontum now and then to monitor military forces there.

8. Returning to the need to sensitize imagery analysts to watch for POW signals again, Taylor provided the name and number of Bob Dussault of JSSA who could brief on military distress signals. The meeting ended at 1115.
SUBJECT: Meeting between Senate POW/MIA Committee Investigator and DI/OEA Personnel

(5 May 92)
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Executive Director

FROM: Stanley M. Moskowitz
Director of Congressional Affairs

SUBJECT: POW/MIA Issues

1. According to a staff investigator of the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs, a telephone call to you from either Sen. Kerry or Sen. Smith concerning Agency operational files is "imminent." Specifically, the purpose of the call is to request again that Committee staff have direct, unrestricted access to POW/MIA operational files.

2. Because this request has been flatly denied in the past, and based on a proposal previously floated by Committee staff, we expect that a compromise will be suggested that would allow a "trusted third party" to review the files and report to the Committee. The third party that has been mentioned is a Senate Intelligence Committee staffer on detail to the Senate POW/MIA Committee. Apparently, the Committee Staff Director, Frances Zwenig, believes that he would identify and report all relevant information, and would also be trusted by the CIA to handle source and method information appropriately.

3. If we agree to consider the compromise idea, I should add that the suggestion of is not one supported by the entire Committee. Some of the staff do not believe he would be an objective neutral, and may insist on substituting one of their own. We have no information on whether Sen. Smith concurs in the choice of

Stanley M. Moskowitz
SUBJECT: POW/MIA Issues
## Routing and Record Sheet

**Subject**: POW/MIA Issues

**From**: Stanley M. Moskowitz
Director of Congressional Affairs

**TO**: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Officer Designation</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Officer's initials</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Executive Registry</td>
<td>07 Dec 1992</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Executive Director</td>
<td>07 Dec 1992</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Deputy Director of Central Intelligence</td>
<td>12/07/92</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Director of Central Intelligence</td>
<td>10 Dec 1992</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Return to Director of Congressional Affairs</td>
<td>12/14/92</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Date**: 7 December 1992

**Extension No**: OCA 3371-92

**Comments**: (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. Sen. Kerry/Smith agree to appointing one "trusted third party". We would prefer (from what we know) that this person be Zwag's candidate - Art Grant.

2. That we have a substantive member of the East Asia POW/MIA Task Force work with Grant in going through the files.

In sum, while the access to the files would not be "unrestricted" - Grant will have access to the entire body of information he needs to see.

Ted.
TO: D/OCA

FROM: [Blank]

SUBJECT: POW/MIA Issues

DATE OF REQUEST: OCA 3371-92

NOTES: [Signature]

COORDINATED WITH (list names as well as offices)

NAME | OFFICE | DATE
---- | ------ | ----

ACTION REQUIRED BY D/OCA

Please sign
TO: D/OCA
FROM: OCA

SUBJECT: POW/MIA Issues

NOTES: Signed hand carried

11/27/92 to EP

COORDINATED WITH (list names as well as offices)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>OFFICE</th>
<th>DATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ACTION REQUIRED BY D/OCA
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
VIA: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
     Executive Director
FROM: Stanley M. Moskowitz
      Director of Congressional Affairs
SUBJECT: POW/MIA Issues

1. This is to advise you of a recent development in the Senate POW/MIA Committee's investigation. (U)

2. To date, the CIA--in sharp contrast to the DIA--has not been the focus of Committee criticism, even from Senator Smith, the harshest critic of the government. The performance of Agency personnel (current and former employees, etc.) in depositions and in the Committee's closed hearings on issues and has been very good. (S)

3. According to a Committee staff attorney, however, the CIA may be the target of criticism in the Committee's final report, due to be issued in mid-December. This criticism apparently would stem from (1) the CIA's continued refusal to grant Committee staff direct unrestricted access to operational files; and (2) a perception that the CIA "hid" information concerning the transfer of American POWs from both Vietnam and Korea to the Soviet Union. (U)

4. As to the former issue, Committee staff have reviewed POW/MIA operational files here at Headquarters where we have determined that the files are responsive to a specific Committee request for information. There hasn't been and isn't now any compelling reason, however, to accede to Committee requests for comprehensive unrestricted access to all such files. (U)
SUBJECT: POW/MIA Issues

5. As to the latter issue, one Committee source is Czech defector Jan Sejna. Mr. Sejna, now 65 and a contractor for DIA, defected in 1968. He had been a member of the Czech Parliament, Secretary of the Communist Party from 1964-1968, and Secretary of the Defense Council. (U)

6. He stated that he had given the CIA this information during his post-defection debriefings. (S)

7. Prior to Mr. Sejna's deposition, we advised the Committee that our records show not only that Mr. Sejna never mentioned POW issues to the CIA during or since his debriefings, but also that in 1968, he explicitly denied having any knowledge about American POWs in North Vietnam. We further advised the Committee that the CIA could not corroborate Mr. Sejna's information. Nevertheless, elements of the Committee staff are likely to believe Mr. Sejna. (S)

8. The Committee appears to be internally split on several important issues, including whether or not the Committee should be reauthorized in the new Congress. We do not, however, believe that there is any internal obstacle to including criticism of CIA in the final report. We will provide additional information on the Committee's intentions as it becomes available. (U)
SUBJECT: POW/MIA Issues

OCA 3344-92
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Possible Call to DCI from Senator Kerry

1. Senator Kerry (D-MA) may phone the DCI in the next few days to make a pitch for access to DO operational traffic relating to the POW/MIA issue, according to POW/MIA Committee staff director Frances Zwenig.

2. The Committee staff is aware that East Asia Division has a considerable quantity of operational traffic relating in some way to the POW issue. They have sought direct access in the past, most recently in a letter from Senator Smith in September. Copies of that exchange of letters are attached.

3. The procedure we have worked out with the Committee investigators and staff is that DO operational reporting is made available in response to specific requests for material relevant to individual incidents, reports, sightings and the like. The Committee staff has been given access to the unredacted traffic at Headquarters but not to the full range of files. Ops traffic thought important by the Committee staff has also been made available to them to retain in redacted version, even unclassified form where possible. The attachments show some of the material made available to the Committee.

4. There is, of course, great curiosity among the staff about the contents of the files the Committee has not seen, and the abiding suspicion that we are somehow covering up some report, action or opportunity. Frances Zwenig said she appreciates the DCI's legal need to protect sources and methods, yet hopes that some compromise might be possible. The Committee's need is to be able to certify to the public that it has pursued every possible lead. She suggested one compromise could be the naming of a third party who enjoys the confidence of the Committee and of the Agency, who would be given access for this purpose. Her nominee is Senator Rudman's designee on the SSCI staff (and well known to us). She also observed that the Agency does not need another source of criticism on the theme of cover-up at this moment. If the Committee does not find a satisfactory solution, the Agency can expect to be criticized in hearings in December and in the Committee report.

John L. Breckenridge
Deputy Director for Senate Affairs

Attachments
SUBJECT: Possible Call to DCI from Senator Kerry
The Honorable John F. Kerry  
Chairman  
Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs  
United States Senate  
Washington, D.C. 20510  

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Your letter of June 24, 1992 complimenting the Agency on its support to the work of your Committee was greatly appreciated. I want to assure you that this level of cooperation will continue as your investigation moves ahead. The letter makes two requests, however, with which it will be difficult to comply completely, but which I hope we will nonetheless be able to accommodate in a meaningful way.

The letter requests complete access to all Directorate of Operations files on the POW/MIA issue. While there is much routine data in such files, they also contain sensitive material that would identify sources and methods, which in some instances relate to ongoing intelligence activities. Because of that, I am reluctant to provide such unlimited access. Additionally, these files contain material provided by liaison services or third agencies of our government, for which we would have to request approval for the requested review.

I believe, however, that we can be supportive of the Committee's interest. Over the past months, we have regularly drawn material from these files in response to specific Committee requests and I understand this has proven to be a satisfactory arrangement with Committee staff. I can assure you that your staff will be provided access to available data in our operational files that is not source sensitive relative to its areas of specific interest.
The Honorable John F. Kerry

An original of this letter is also being sent to Vice Chairman Smith.

Sincerely,

Robert M. Gates
Director of Central Intelligence
The Honorable John F. Kerry  
Chairman  
Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs  
United States Senate  
Washington, D.C. 20510  

Dear Mr. Chairman:  

I appreciate greatly the comments in your letter of September 1992 praising the Agency for its support to the POW/MIA Committee's investigations.  

As you know, I had my staff pull together for you a summary of information relating to POW/MIA issues from the President's Daily Brief (PDB). I am advised that both you and Senator Smith reviewed this material personally, as did other members of your Committee staff. Pursuant to your request, I also had the Executive Registry review its files and extract pertinent documents for your Committee staff to review. We have found no other "Special Briefs" or additional notes (as, for example, any that former Director William Casey might have made) related to these issues. We have, however, responded to other questions submitted by Mr. Taylor of your Committee, and will continue to work closely with your staff on this matter.  

I would like to reiterate at this juncture remarks I made in a letter of July 24, 1992 to you. I have a statutory responsibility to protect sources and methods, including material shared with us by other governments. I cannot therefore accede to your request for unrestricted access to operational or source files. To meet the needs of the Committee, however, we have made available to your staff as requested all reporting relative to specific reports, sightings and incidents, and have declassified as much of this information as possible.
The Honorable John F. Kerry

Your letter asked that all files relating to three specific reports be made available to the Committee. My staff has prepared for your background a summary of source vetting information which underlie the specific intelligence disseminations on which you requested additional information in your letter. We will make arrangements with your staff to review this material. I hope these summaries will meet your needs.

An original of this letter is also being sent to Vice Chairman Smith.

Sincerely,

Robert M. Gates

Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Response POW/MIA Affairs Cite re 10 Sep 92
Letter from Vice Chairman Smith
The Honorable Bob Smith  
Vice Chairman  
Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs  
United States Senate  
Washington, D.C. 20510  

Dear Mr. Vice Chairman:  

I appreciate greatly the comments in your letter of September 1992 praising the Agency for its support to the POW/MIA Committee's investigations.  

As you know, I had my staff pull together for you a summary of information relating to POW/MIA issues from the President's Daily Brief (PDB). I am advised that both you and Senator Kerry reviewed this material personally, as did other members of your Committee staff. Pursuant to your request, I also had the Executive Registry review its files and extract pertinent documents for your Committee staff to review. We have found no other "Special Briefs" or additional notes (as, for example, any that former Director William Casey might have made) related to these issues. We have, however, responded to other questions submitted by Mr. Taylor of your Committee, and will continue to work closely with your staff on this matter.  

I would like to reiterate at this juncture remarks I made in a letter of July 24, 1992 to Senator Kerry. I have a statutory responsibility to protect sources and methods, including material shared with us by other governments. I cannot therefore accede to your request for unrestricted access to operational or source files. To meet the needs of the Committee, however, we have made available to your staff as requested all reporting relative to specific reports, sightings and incidents, and have declassified as much of this information as possible.
The Honorable Bob Smith

Your letter asked that all files relating to three specific reports be made available to the Committee. My staff has prepared for your background a summary of source vetting information which underlie the specific intelligence disseminations on which you requested additional information in your letter. We will make arrangements with your staff to review this material. I hope these summaries will meet your needs.

An original of this letter is also being sent to Chairman Kerry.

Sincerely,

Robert M. Gates
Director of Central Intelligence
SECRET

SECRET
SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR: C/EA/ICOG
DC/EA/SEA

FROM: C/EA/ICOPOW


REFERENCE: Sen. Smith's letter, attached

17 September 1992

1. The Senator's first request concerns three (attached), which the Committee already has. They all relate to Note that all three are from 1977 (four years after Operation Homecoming). The first, (acquired by EA officer and the third, the famous report (later declared a fabrication when the was asked about it, and responded that he had never said such a thing) have been of continuing interest to the Committee, and have been studied, restudied, analyzed and reexamined ad nauseam. Former Congressman Hendon has claimed that we obtained the report via an audio operation (not true). We can take the unredacted reports to show the Committee, and we can leave them copies without the source descriptions.

2. When Sen. Smith talks about "all files and actions relating to the three reports", he is probably assuming (most likely on the advice from investigators Taylor and that we launch a major investigation every time we get such a report, just as we did with the reports and the reports. That of course is not true. I will try to contact to see whether there was any followup with her source (I recall he was a We'll review the MPVANISH files to see if they say more on the report; somewhere there is a fabrication notice on it, I know. The middle report comes from NE, and we will have to ask them whether there was any followup to that one. These are reports that just will not die.
4. With regard to the Reference Para 3 request, this of course is for the Director to decide. See the attached memorandum concerning the POW file holdings in ICOPOW. What the Committee is most interested in are the [ ] files. If the decision is made to let them see them, we will still need to look at every document in all the files (quite a time-consuming process, and best done by ops-type [ ] As I noted earlier, the files demonstrate that we did not hide or cover up anything, and show the extent of the efforts undertaken by the Agency to follow up on POW reports.

5. Sen. Smith also refers to the Executive Registry. Actually the Committee made that request earlier. Some weeks ago, working with two OGC lawyers and [ ] we reviewed all the items in the Executive Registry which pertained to POW/MIA matters, and marked those we thought perhaps should not be passed for one reason or another ("deliberative process", etc.). OCA's Bob Magner then reviewed them all, and I believe he was going to send the items to the Committee for review. However, I never saw his response to them on it, [ ] said he would check on that for me. In any case, the Executive Registry project has been done, and presumably to the satisfaction of the Committee. (I cannot believe the Committee would be given free access to the entire Executive Registry itself.) Finally, I checked with the DDI on whether any "Special Briefs" had been prepared for the Director on POW/MIA matters, and was told they had not. An occasional DDI study was written on the POW question, but I believe Sen. Smith is talking about items prepared for the Director alone. (For some reason, Taylor thinks such briefs must have been written for the Director.)

6. With regard to the Reference Para. 4 request, here again they seem to be looking for things that don't exist. Taylor told me the Director must have kept notes on NSC meetings, for example. (He also thought there should have been some notes or approvals from the Director in the [ ] files.) I told him we had reviewed the Executive Registry, and had found no such items.

7. I related the above to [ ] this morning. I also told him how we planned to respond to the other two Committee requests we received this week. He is going to the
SECRET

Committee tomorrow, and he will review several of the above items with Committee staffers.
September 10, 1992

The Honorable Robert Gates
Director of Central Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Bob:

I am writing concerning three important matters relating to my work as Vice Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs. As you know, I deeply appreciate the cooperation your agency has given the Committee during the course of its investigation. I am hopeful that your cooperation will continue into the following areas of the Committee’s work:

1. I would appreciate the opportunity to review the following three reports originated by your agency, in addition to all files and actions relating to the three reports:

It is my hope that these reports and materials can be provided to my office in unclassified form, although I wish to review any redacted portions.

2. I am informed by staff that, with the exception of your Agency’s ________ file, the Committee has had almost no access to CIA’s operational files, the Executive Registry, and any "Special Briefs" which may contain important information on the POW/MIA issue. I ask that you take steps to ensure the Committee has access to these materials.
The Honorable Robert Gates  
September 10, 1992  

page 2

4. Finally, it is my understanding that former CIA Director William Casey kept notes on many of his meetings and discussions during his tenure at the Agency. I would ask that you ensure that any relevant POW information from these notes are provided to me for review.

Bob, I want to underscore the importance that I place on your permitting full access by the Committee to this information. I know that neither of us wants the Committee to fail in its mission to review all potential POW/MIA information in the possession of our government. Both of us have worked too diligently this past year to become vulnerable to legitimate criticism that the investigation was incomplete.

I believe your cooperation to date has been excellent, and I look forward to working with you in the months ahead as we complete our investigation.

With warm regards,

[Signature]

BOB SMITH, USS  
Vice Chairman, Select Committee  
on POW/MIA Affairs

BS/dc
September 10, 1992

Mr. Bob Magner  
Central Intelligence Agency  
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Bob:

I am writing to request your assistance in obtaining from the Central Intelligence Agency all cable traffic, correspondence, and memoranda, as well as any collateral materials which may be in the DDO's files, relating to the debriefing of the source of the following reports:

Please make this available to the Committee, at S-407 if it is classified, no later than September 17, 1992. Alternatively, the point of contact for this request, Dr. Jon Holstine, can review the files at your office. Thank you for your assistance.

Sincerely,

J. William Codinha  
Chief Counsel

JWC/kb/jh
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Deputy Director for Operations

FROM: Chief, East Asia Division

SUBJECT: Response to The Honorable Bob Smith

REFERENCE: Letter to DCI from Bob Smith, dated 10 September 1992


2. **Background:** While the Agency continues to be complimented by members of the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA affairs, and committee investigators have been gracious in their praise of our prompt and in-depth responses to formal and informal queries, Senator Smith has now requested access to a growing number of operational files and a variety of executive level publications. We have complied with almost every request and have granted committee investigators sweeping access to unvarnished operational file holdings. I believe, however, that it is imperative at this point to reiterate to Senator Smith the DCI's responsibility to protect sources and methods and to deny further unrestricted access to operational files. This position is consistent with your 24 July 1992 letter to Senator John F. Kerry, and in no way impedes ongoing committee investigations.

3. **Recommendation:** I recommend that you sign the attached letter to Senator Smith, as well as the copy for Senator Kerry.

Attachment: As stated

SECRET
SUBJECT: Response to The Honorable Bob Smith
MEMORANDUM FOR: AC/EA/ICOG
FROM: C/EA/ICOGPOW
SUBJECT: Our POW/MIA File Holdings

1. We have volumes of files, dating from 1967 comprising about (For some unknown reason, there is no material for the period from though no sequentially numbered file is missing.) These are the chronological files containing all the POW/MIA traffic from and it is these files that Bob Taylor has twice expressed an interest in examining in toto, or at least looking through. He feels he will find in them some leads which he can explore with us and other agencies, such as references to sightings, intercepts, and other "evidence" of POW's. I have no objection to his seeing them, though that is a policy decision. I do not feel there is anything embarrassing to the Agency in them. To the contrary: they show how much effort has been expended by Agency officers over the years in running down every lead to POW/MIA information. One thing they show convincingly is that the Agency never "covered up" any information on POW's or MIA's.

2. Also in the category of operational files are our volumes of files, which Bob Taylor has already examined, and two soft files (plus some photos) on the loss of Site 85 in Laos. The Site 85 files contain a few somewhat sensitive items, but they can be examined if necessary. In fact we had expected the Committee to be asking us about Site 85, but so far they have not done so.

3. We have a miscellaneous collection of other files as well. Some of them relate to POW matters,
4. In our move up here, our office also inherited a number of sensitive files, such as files on the last days of the Saigon and Vientiane Stations, and individual files on Agency employees who were imprisoned and/or died in Vietnam. I believe these files should definitely be considered internal and privileged Agency information.

6. We also have a number of other files, such as "Casualties in Southeast Asia", listing losses of Air America, Continental and Bird Air. The Committee can see those. We have also created a number of our own internal Branch files since our Branch was created in December. I don't feel those should be shown to the Committee, since they concern our work and do not constitute information on POW's as such. The only soft file which might contain critical remarks about the Committee is our CDO (DoD Central Documentation Office) file, specifically my reports on the CDO weekly meetings. In the course of our work we have also opened some soft files on individuals we have had correspondence on, such as but there is nothing in those files that the Committee cannot see. In fact such files show how conscientiously we have pursued every potential source of POW/MIA information.
Bob Taylor, the Senate Select Committee investigator who has concentrated on the operation, described plans for the forthcoming Committee hearings on when he visited Headquarters on 16 September.

Four days of Committee hearings in mid-October will start with a two-day open hearing with DIA on ground symbols and imagery. A separate day (tentatively set for 14 October) will be devoted to The morning session will be open, to discuss the intelligence reporting which led to the operation. For this session Taylor requested a sanitized description of and an unclassified summary of the information she provided. The open session will also include declassified line drawings of overhead imagery. The afternoon session will be closed, as it will cover operational aspects.

Taylor also mentioned that Committee Vice Chairman Senator Smith had written the Director to ask (again) that CIA open its operational files to perusal by Committee staffers. We expressed the belief that some mutually satisfactory solution could be worked out.
MEMORANDUM FOR:  
Director, Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia  
Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs  
Department of State  

Deputy Coordinator for Prisoner of War and  
Missing in Action Matters  
Department of State  

Commander, USN (R)  
Chief, Prisoner of War/Missing in Action Branch  
Resources and Installations Division  
Directorate for Intelligence (Research Center)  
Defense Intelligence Agency  

FROM: Deputy Director for Operations  

SUBJECT: Comment by  
Possibility of U.S.  
Prisoners Being Held by the SRV for Use in  
Negotiations on Aid from the U.S. for the SRV  

Attached as of possible interest to you is a report  
early March 1977. We are giving this report no further  
dissemination.  

Attachment:  
Report as Stated
COUNTRY: Vietnam

DOI: Late February 1977

SUBJECT: U.S. Prisoners Being Held by the SRV for Use in Negotiations on Aid from the U.S. for the SRV

said that Hanoi naturally knows where U.S. pilots shot down over North Vietnam are buried. In response to a statement that the SRV no longer has any Americans still under detention, the demurred and said that there are American prisoners of war (POW's), some of whom are members of wealthy families, still in the SRV and they would not be released until U.S. financial aid for the SRV was forthcoming.

2. The indicated that the information on MIA's was one trump card the SRV held in the forthcoming negotiations with the U.S. and explained that the SRV, as the victor in the Vietnam war, would take advantage of this situation in negotiating with the U.S. for aid in economic reconstruction. He said that some wealthy prominent American families had been in direct contact with Hanoi in an effort to acquire information about family members who were MIA's.
However, the SRV had not released such information on the assumption that more could be gained by the SRV economically by awaiting the opening of formal negotiations with the U.S. Government.
MEMORANDUM FOR:

Director, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia
Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Department of State

Deputy Coordinator for Prisoner of War
and Missing in Action Matters
Department of State

Commander, USS (M)
Chief, Prisoner of War/Missing in Action Branch
Resources and Installations Division
Directorate for Intelligence (Research Center)
Defense Intelligence Agency

FROM:

Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT:

Comments
on
Relations with the United States and the
Presence of Americans in the SAV

The attached report, which is of possible interest to you,
was obtained in March 1977. We are
giving this information no further dissemination.

Attachment:

cc:
MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Vice Director for Collection Management
Department of Defense
Principal Advisor for Prisoner of War Missing in Action Affairs
(International Security Affairs)
Director, Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Department of State

SUBJECT: Comments of Indonesian Ambassador to Hanoi on American Prisoners of War Remaining in Vietnam

NO HARD COPY FOLLOWS

Attached is a notice to recall the report bearing this title and number.

Deputy Director for Operations
THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Comments of ____ on American Prisoners of War Remaining in Vietnam

On 16 March 1977 a memorandum report bearing the above subject and the number ____ was disseminated. It has been subsequently learned that the source, who was described as ___ officials," has provided fabricated information, and the then ____ has said that he never received any information while in ____ (1976 - 80) that live U.S. prisoners of war were being held by the Socialist Republic of Vietnam Government. Therefore, the information in the memorandum should be disregarded and all references to the report should be removed from computer listings and file holdings.
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs Department of State

Deputy Coordinator for Prisoner of War and Missing in Action Matters Department of State

Commander, USN (R) Chief, Prisoner of War/Missing in Action Branch Resources and Installations Division Directorate for Intelligence (Research Center)

Captain, USN Principal Advisor for Prisoner of War and Missing in Action Affairs (International Security Affairs) Office of the Secretary of Defense

FROM: Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT: Comments on American Prisoners of War Remaining in Vietnam

Attached as of possible interest to you is a report resulting from information obtained late January 1977. We are giving this report no further dissemination.
COUNTRY: Vietnam

DOI: January 1977

SUBJECT: Comments on American Prisoners of War Remaining in Vietnam

ACQ:

SOURCE:

1. There were American prisoners of war (POW's) still remaining in Vietnam and that these POW's posed a problem to the opening of diplomatic relations between the SRV and the United States (U.S.). These POW's included some who did not want to return to the U.S.

2. Comment: Other than one American civilian who was arrested in Saigon after its fall in 1975, the SRV is not known to have any live American military or civilian prisoners. Nevertheless, several unconfirmed reports have appeared since May 1975 on the possibility of some U.S. prisoners still remaining in Vietnam.)
16 June 1992

MEMORANDUM FOR: Robert W. Magner
Chief, Senate Liaison Division
Office of Congressional Affairs

VIA: Office of the Deputy Director for Operations

FROM: James D. Anders, Jr.
Chief, Indochina Operations Group

SUBJECT: Response to Request from Senate Select Committee for POW/MIA Affairs Investigator Mr. Robert Taylor

Attached for Mr. Robert Taylor are the following items which he requested during his visit to our Headquarters on 12 June 1992:
Response to Request from Senate Select Committee (b)(3) for POW/MIA Affairs Investigator Mr. John McCreary

FROM: James D. Anders, Jr.
C/EA/ICOG

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE RECEIVED</th>
<th>DATE FORWARDED</th>
<th>OFFICER'S INITIALS</th>
<th>COMMENTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. C/EA/RR</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Chief, EA</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. C/TWMD/OIA</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. DC/ORMS/INT</td>
<td>6/18</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. C/ORMS/CCA</td>
<td>6/18/92</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. DC/ORMS</td>
<td>19 JUN 1992</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. AE/ORMS</td>
<td>19 JUN 1992</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. SA/DDO</td>
<td>19 JUN 1992</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. ADDO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. DDO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. O/OCA/S</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
17 June 1992

MEMORANDUM FOR: Robert W. Magner
Chief, Senate Liaison Division
Office of Congressional Affairs

VIA: Office of the Deputy Director for Operations

FROM: James D. Anders, Jr.
Chief, Indochina Operations Group

SUBJECT: Response to Request From Senate Select Committee for POW/MIA Affairs Investigator

1. Attached are the items requested during his visit to Headquarters the end of May 1992:

   -- A copy of CIA report

   -- The provided the attached 1976 map of "Detention Camps in Laos Identified From Imagery," which identified the approximate locations of several camps, including one west of Muang Xepone, Savannakhet Province.

2. We have also located information from an asset who visited in December 1986. We are prepared to show this material when he next visits our office.

James D. Anders, Jr.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WARNING: INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

REPORT CLASS CONFIDENTIAL

DIST: 30 OCTOBER 1986
COUNTRY: LAOS
SUBJ: ABSENCE OF AMERICAN POWS, AT HAT CHAM REEDUCATION CAMPT IN LUANG PRABANG PROVINCE, LAOS; ITS LOCATION AND OPERATION

SOURCE: 1975-1985

SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR ELIZABETH RINDSKOPF  
Central Intelligence Agency  

RON KNECHT  
OSD/C3I  

FRED GREEN  
Special Counsel POW/MIA  
Department of Defense  

JIM HERGEN  
Department of State  

FROM: STEPHEN G. RADEMAKER  

SUBJECT: Supplemental Request from POW/MIA Committee  

The attached supplemental request was received in this office today. Please let us know if compliance with this request will adversely affect the compliance estimates you previously provided us.
United States Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE ON POW/MIA AFFAIRS
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510-6500

July 14, 1992

BY HAND AND FACSIMILE

Steve Rademaker
Deputy Legal Adviser

Ginny Lampley
Special Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Senior Director for Legislative Affairs
Room 375

National Security Council
Washington, DC 20506

Dear Mr. Rademaker and Ms. Lampley:

As you are aware, we have issued numerous document requests to various agencies to this date. In that the NSC has taken on the lead role as the clearing agency for our requests, I would like to submit the following additional document requests through NSC. In addition to the requests for declassification made by the Select Committee in its 9 July 1992 letter, we request that the following additional items be located and declassified on or before August 31, 1992.

Agency Request

DoD 1) All policy memoranda not previously designated originating in the office of the Secretary of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, or the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, pertaining to the POW/MIA issue since December, 1972. This would include, but not be limited to, background papers, decision memoranda, talking points, meeting summaries, personal notes, weekly activity reports and briefing material.

DoD/State 2) All daily intelligence briefings not previously designated published for the Secretary of Defense and Secretary of State containing POW/MIA content since December, 1972.
All "Breakfast Item" papers not previously designated prepared for the Secretary of Defense and Secretary of State on the POW/MIA issue since December, 1972.

All National Security Council documents, not previously reviewed by this Committee, to include all memoranda, decision papers, background papers, and notes prepared by NSC members of staff on the POW/MIA issue after January 1973. This would also include any Presidential Memoranda, National Security Council Memoranda (NSM), National Security Decision Directives (NSDD), or National Security Directives (NSD) pertaining to the POW/MIA issue.

This should include copies of all "Prof Notes" in hard copy or retrieved from backup tapes pertaining to POW/MIA issues from the NSC or White House Communications Agency database.

All meeting minutes prepared by the NSC staff or meeting summaries prepared by various agencies of senior interagency meetings on the issue of POW/MIA since December, 1972, not previously provided, to include, but not be limited to, Special Interagency Group (SIG), Deputies Coordinating Committee (DCC) and Principal's Coordinating Committee (PCC) meetings.

Excerpts of POW/MIA related intelligence briefs prepared for the President by CIA not previously provided in the President's Daily Briefing (PDB) since December, 1972.

All POW/MIA related information in daily briefs not previously provided prepared for the Director, National Security Agency since December, 1972.

All Joint Service organizations, Joint Command or Defense Agency files, memoranda, assessments, intelligence reports, background papers, inactive intelligence operational files not previously provided pertaining to the POW/MIA issue since December, 1972. This would include, but not be limited to, the Joint Services SBRE Agency (JSSA) at Ft. Belvoir, the National Photographic Interpretation Center (NFIC) and CINCPAC.
Page 3
Steve Rademaker
Ginny Lampley
National Security Council

9) All reports or investigative reports prepared by the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, Department of State, CIA or DIA related to the handling of the POW/MIA issue or the activities of government officials involved in the POW/MIA issue not previously provided since December, 1972.

10) All "backchannel" message traffic, including but not limited to "SPECT" "Personal For" Eyes Only or "LIMDIS" cables pertaining to the POW/MIA issue not previously provided that were sent by the White House, NSC, State Department, DoD, JCS, any military command, any U.S. Embassy, consulate or field station assigned to any USG entity during the Vietnam war years to present.

11) All Interagency Group (IAG) policy briefs, meeting minutes, decision memoranda or issue papers not previously provided prepared since its inception.

12) All "tank briefs" prepared or provided to the Joint Chiefs or Operations Deputies not previously provided on the issue of POW/MIA during the Vietnam War to the present. This would include both intelligence and operational briefs. Information detailing sensitive operational methods or plans need not be provided. All joint staff documents of memoranda, files on inactive special operations, search and rescue operations or intelligence operations pertaining specifically to POW/MIAs.

Please contact me at (202) 224-2306 if there are any questions about this letter or the specific requests.

Sincerely,

J. William Codinha
Chief Counsel

JWC/kb
MEMORANDUM FOR: Robert W. Magner  
Chief, Senate Liaison Division  
Office of Congressional Affairs  

VIA: Office of the Deputy Director for Operations  

FROM: Chief, Indochina Operations Group  

SUBJECT: CIA Intelligence Reports on Comments of Vietnamese and Lao Government Officials on POW/MIA's and Diplomatic or Foreign Policy Issues  

1. This is in response to the request by the Committee for information on the policies of the Vietnamese and Lao governments toward the POW/MIA issue. We have identified 116 intelligence reports beginning in February 1977 thru June 1992 which contain comments by officials of these governments on this topic. Some of the reports describe other foreign policy or diplomatic issues involving the Lao and Vietnamese governments in their relations with the U.S. and other regional countries. As this information was obtained from some of whom are still active and producing intelligence on topics other than POW/MIA, these reports will be retained at CIA headquarters for review for appropriately cleared and designated investigators from the Committee.  

2. These reports have all been cleared for Committee review by the responsible reports components in the appropriate area divisions.
The Honorable John F. Kerry  
Chairman  
Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs  
United States Senate  
Washington, D.C. 20510  

Dear Mr. Chairman:

This is in response to the Committee's April 3, 1992 request for information on the organization, structure and management of the prison camp system in Laos which is enclosed as Tab 1. A study which should also be of interest to the Committee on the Ministry of National Defense Enemy Military Proselytizing Department in Vietnam is enclosed as Tab 2.

An original of this letter is also being sent to Vice Chairman Smith.

Sincerely,

Stanley M. Moskowitz  
Director of Congressional Affairs

Enclosures
1. Laos Prison Camp Information  
2. Ministry of National Defense Study
The Honorable Bob Smith  
Vice Chairman  
Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs  
United States Senate  
Washington, D.C. 20510  

Dear Mr. Vice Chairman:

This is in response to the Committee's April 3, 1992 request for information on the organization, structure and management of the prison camp system in Laos which is enclosed as Tab 1. A study which should also be of interest to the Committee on the Ministry of National Defense Enemy Military Proselytizing Department in Vietnam is enclosed as Tab 2.

An original of this letter is also being sent to Chairman Kerry.

Sincerely,

Stanley M. Moskowitz  
Director of Congressional Affairs

Enclosures
1. Laos Prison Camp Information
2. Ministry of National Defense Study
SUBJECT: Response to 3 April Letter from POW/MIA Cmte re Laos Prison Camp System

OCA/Senate/RWMagner:jah (8 Sep 92)
1. The Lao Peoples Democratic Republic (LPDR) Ministry of Interior (MOI) was responsible for the administration and management of all labor reform, reeducation, rehabilitation, seminar, prison, interrogation, and temporary detention facilities for various categories of domestic civil and political criminals, including civilian and military LPDR government and communist party officials who committed criminal and political offenses. The MOI was also responsible for the detention and interrogation of non-Lao foreign nationals in special central-level detention and interrogation facilities. These facilities were usually reserved for national-level political, espionage, and national security-related cases. Cases involving ethnic Vietnamese residents of Laos and ethnic Vietnamese resistance group members captured in Laos were turned over to Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) MOI jurisdiction; captured Vietnamese resistance group personnel were transferred to SRV MOI control in Vietnam. Although fragmentary reporting noted that the MOI had picked up various foreign nationals (Australian, British, French, Thai, West German) after 1975 who were eventually released and allowed to leave the country, reporting did not identify or name the facilities in which they were detained in Vientiane City for questioning.

2. Reporting has indicated the LPDR MOI went through several reorganizations since December 1975 under the guidance and direction of the SRV MOI Specialist Group in Vientiane, and that the LPDR MOI was organizationally structured on the model of the SRV MOI. Reference was made in reporting to a Police Interrogation-Investigations Department under the General Department for Peoples Police (GDPP), which, like the SRV MOI's GDPP Police Interrogation-Investigations Department, would have central-level pre-trial detention and interrogation facilities for the interrogation, investigation and future disposition of major civil criminal cases. Since the LPDR MOI's General Department for Counterintelligence (GDCI) is modeled after the SRV MOI's GDCI, it should also have a Security Interrogation-Investigations Department with its own central-level pre-trial interrogation and detention facilities. These facilities would hold domestic anti-regime political (counterreactionary, counterrevolutionary, economic security, resistance, sabotage, espionage, national security) suspects, as well as foreign nationals, for interrogation, investigation and further disposition.
3. The GDCI's predecessor organization, the Political Security Bloc, had at least two pre-trial detention and interrogation facilities in Vientiane City which appear to fit the profile of central-level GDCI Security Interrogation-Investigations Department facilities. One was known as the That Dam Detention and Interrogation "Center," and the other as the Phonthan Prison. Domestic political cases were held at both facilities, where officers from at least Foreign Counterespionage (Political Security) Department 53 were involved in questioning and investigating political cases with documented or suspected foreign connections. Although no foreign nationals were specifically noted in reporting at these two facilities, one of them may have been involved, for example, in the detention of a West German in 1987. In early September 1987, the Pakse police in Champassak Province arrested a West German female passport holder (not further identified by name) for entering Laos illegally. The woman had papers stating she was a Buddhist nun, who had been ordained in Sri Lanka and was a resident of Ubon Province, Thailand. The Pakse police suspected she was a foreign intelligence agent, and detained and questioned her for 15 days before transferring her on 23 September to the MOI in Vientiane where she was still held as of 28 September 1987; no further information is available.

4. The General Department for People's Police (GDPP) sat on top of a chain of command which was responsible for the MOI prison system. It was headed by General Saisompheng Sengsoulignavong (1981-1990) and his deputies, Lieutenant Colonels Phosai Saipanya (1981-1987), Onsa Vilavong, Sali Phailot, Souban Keophila, and Champa. As of late 1987, Lieutenant Colonel Phosai Saipanya was also in charge of the That Dam Interrogation Center in Vientiane. As of June 1986, the GDPP had about 2,200 personnel. Personnel were assigned to one of at least eight subordinate departments—general staff research, administrative management police, criminal police, traffic and firefighting police, prisons police management (rehabilitation), economic police, security guards police, police interrogation-investigations. The GDPP had two SRV MOI advisory specialists assigned to its main GDPP staff office, as well as two SRV MOI advisory specialists assigned to each department under the GDPP. As of June 1981, the GDPP also had three East German advisory specialists/technicians. Reporting noted that, during the year 1985, 704 persons were arrested for criminal behavior, 154 were sent to prison, 464 were sent to "seminar" camps, 667 civil prisoners were released from prison, 74 prisoners received commuted sentences, and 70 detainees were
released from "seminar" camps.

5. The GDPP Prisons Management (Rehabilitation) Department was headed by Colonel Bounthien (1981) or Lieutenant Colonel Souban Keophila and his deputy, Major Bounmai Sivin. Two SRV MOI advisory specialists were assigned to the Prisons Management Department. The Department administered all central-level prisons, the reeducation seminar camp system for former Royal Lao Government (RLG) and Royal Lao Armed Forces (FAR) personnel, and provided staff guidance and direction to the prisons management police offices of the Vientiane City Public Security Office (PSO) and all provincial PSO's. Provincial PSO prisons management police offices, as well as subordinate district PSO's, had at least one detention facility. Central facilities included the Sam Khe Prison in Vientiane Province, the That Dam Center in Vientiane City, and the Phonthan Prison in Vientiane City. The Central Sam Khe Prison was French-built at Kilometer Marker-6 (KM-6: TE-5492), was commanded by Than Sounphy (1977-1978), and held about 600 inmates; an unknown number of Thai nationals were held at the Sam Khe Prison during 1977-1978. The Phonthan and That Dam facilities were pre-trial interrogation and detention facilities for criminal and political suspects. The Phonthan and That Dam facilities were associated with the MOI's General Department for Counterintelligence (GDCI). Political counterreactionary, counterrevolutionary, economic security, sabotage, espionage, and national security-related cases were held at these facilities for interrogation, investigation, and further disposition. As of May 1983, the Prisons Management Police Department had 75 headquarters staff personnel; none reportedly had any extensive legal training or background.

6. The Department also had a "rehabilitation" camp complex in Keo Oudom District, Vientiane Province, at the Nam Ngum Dam reservoir (TF 4250): Thao Island (male detainees only), Nang Island (female detainees only), Setthakit, Nampho and Thong Islands. The island camp complex was built in March 1976. It received its first group of 1,500 inmates on 9 April 1976, who had been picked up in massive arrests in Vientiane. Thao Island, formerly known as Ling (Monkey) Island, held about 800 FAR captains and majors as of May 1976. According to the 18 October 1976 issue of the "New Vientiane" daily, the island "reeducation centers" were for drug addicts and for the rehabilitation of "victims of the old regime." In November 1976, the second phase of mass arrests of undesirables in Vientiane began. Among those arrested were teachers, merchants, and foreign mission employees on CIA spy charges;
about 750 to 1,000 political prisoners were first held at the MOI's Central Sam Khe Prison before being transferred to the island camp complex for rehabilitation. According to the 29 November 1976 issue of the "New Vientiane" daily, about 2,300 persons had undergone reeducation at the island camps (500 women and 1,800 men). The paper noted that 100 men and 100 women had requested to remain on the islands. By December 1976, the camp complex held about 2,000 inmates; 1,500 on Thao Island and 500 on Nang Island. The camps were referred to by the LPDR as being "drug rehabilitation" islands; "32-year-old welfare official Sichan Sirivong" acted as deputy chairman of the committee running the islands.

7. As of 1978, the island camp complex held about 1,200 inmates in what the LPDR called "rehabilitation centers" and "reeducation centers for social evils." As of mid-1985, the island camp complex held about 1,200 inmates. The Thao Island Camp was commanded by MOI Lieutenant Colonel Inthong and his deputies, Major Bouathin and Captain Khamphet; the camp held 125 male inmates. The Nang Island Camp was commanded by a female named Khamtao, and held 300 female inmates. The Setthakit Island Camp held about 30 individuals who had attempted to escape from the Thao and Nang Island Camps. The Nampho Island Camp was the largest; it was a maximum security hard labor camp with about 600 detainees. The Thong Island Camp held several hundred male inmates who had been transferred from the Thao Island Camp. The LPDR claimed the camps only held common civil prisoners, drug addicts, prostitutes, gamblers, "hippies," and juvenile delinquents. The LPDR used the camps as model showcases for visiting foreigners. No foreign nationals were reported in detention on this island camp complex.

8. In October 1983, the MOI completed construction of a new central-level prison for political prisoners at Phonthan Village, Vientiane City; the prison was more commonly known as the Phonthan Prison. The Phonthan Prison was a pre-trial temporary detention facility, where criminal suspects were interrogated and investigated by the GDPP and where political suspects were interrogated and investigated by the GDCI. The Phonthan Prison consisted of two 8 by 40 meter concrete buildings with corrugated metal roofs; each building had ten cells. No foreign nationals have been reported in detention at this prison.

9. The Reeducation or "Seminar" System of the LPDR dates back to June 1975 when Pathet Lao security forces began taking
over power from Royal Lao Government (RLG) authorities. RLG civil officials and FAR officers were placed in political criminal categories and were sent to seminar camps for reeducation. Responsibilities for the seminar camps were shared by the LPDR MOI and by the LPDR Ministry of National Defense (MND). MND seminar camps were believed to be run by the MND Political Staff Department. In 1977, seminar camps were renamed "production units" to avoid international condemnation. In June 1983, all MND seminar camps, also known as "production units" and as "construction battalions," were turned over to the MOI GDPP's Prisons Management (Rehabilitation) Police Department, which delegated authority for their administration to the prisons management police offices of its provincial public security offices (PSO's). Although the LPDR denied the existence of reeducation and seminar camps, a reeducation camp system continued to exist in Laos under the guise of "production" camps. The LPDR currently prefers to use the term "rehabilitation" when referring to detention facilities. Although the total number of detainees is subject to debate, the following information was available on various types of detention facilities in Laos.

10. FAR field and general grade officers and RLG civil officials of equivalent rank were placed in a maximum security detention camp system in Houa Phan Province, near the Vietnamese border. The Houa Phan seminar camp system was initially established in July 1975 with seven camps (Camps 1 through 7). It was the worst camp system in Laos, and was more commonly known as the Vieng Sai or Sop Hao camp system. Detainees were categorized as dangerous and unlikely to be released. About one-third of all inmates reportedly died from malnutrition, starvation or were executed during the period 1975-1986. After the MND turned over control of the camp system to the MOI in July 1983, the camps were operated by the Houa Phan Province PSO, which established a central camp headquarters at Sop Pan Village (VH 2064) under the command of a MOI lieutenant colonel. No foreign nationals were reported in detention in this camp system. Comments on this camp system are as follows:

A. Seminar Camp 1 was also known as the Sop Ka, Na Ka and "Soun Phiseth" (Special) Camp, and as the Sop Hao Prison. Camp 1 was located at Na Ka Neua Village (VH 441737) on the east side of the Nam Mo (Nam Ma) River across from Sop Hao Village (VH 4373) in a valley about 21 kilometers from Vieng Sai District Town. Camp 1 was a secret political prison which held 39 Lao prisoners. Camp 1 was intended by the LPDR to be a
"death camp" with no survivors of reeducation. The camp held
the Royal Lao family, 14 generals, and 11 other senior RLG
officials. If inmates did not die from malnutrition or
dysentery, they were executed. The deceased included: King
Sisavang Vatthana (1979); Crown Prince Vongsavonang (1977);
Queen Khampoui Vatthana (1981); Crown Prince Sisavang Vatthana;
Lieutenant Generals Bounpon Makthephalak; Major General Phasouk
Solatsaphak; Brigadier Generals Kan Insxiengmai, Itsala
Kataidonsasoulit, Li Litthilusa, Lammgueun Phasavat; Colonels
Heng Saithavi, Touby Lyfoung, Khamchan Padid, Lian
Pavongviangkham; Luang Prabang Province Governor Chao Souk
Bouavong; Lao Ambassador to China Balien Phavongviengkham;
Minister of Religious Affairs Soukan Vilaysan; and, Minister of
Posts and Telecommunications Toubi Li Foung. Camp 1 was closed
down in April 1985 after the last two generals (not· further
identified) were executed on 7 April 1985. No foreign
nationals were reported in detention in this camp.

B. Seminar Camp 2 was located at Nouei Nong Tao
Village (VH 463704) on the west side of the Nam Mo River near
the Houai Vong tributary (VH 4769), and was north of Camp 1.
As of August 1986 Camp 2 held about 150 Lao inmates. Of this
number, 53 were residents of Vientiane who were not allowed to
mix with other inmates. The 53 prisoners from Vientiane were
charged with attempts to stage a coup d'etat in 1977; six
received life sentences, 13 received 20 year sentences, and 34
received 10 to 15 year sentences. An unknown number of Camp 2
inmates were transferred to Camp 5 in March 1981. No foreign
nationals were reported in detention in this camp.

C. Seminar Camp 3 was initially located on the west
side of the Nam Mo River near the Houai Vong tributary (VH
4769) at Houei Nong Tao Village (VH 467702). Camp 3 was
relocated by late 1980 to Ban Sop Phan (VH 2166) near Ban Loune
Village (VH 1868) in Vieng Sai District. Camp 3 was situated
on the northern bank of the Nam Pan River, west of its junction
with the Nam Hao River, and was about 38 kilometers northeast
of Sam Neua City (VH 0157). Route 6 ran along the extreme
eastern side of the camp area. In late 1978, Camp 3 held about
330 FAR and police majors and lieutenant colonels from FAR
Military Region 1 (MR-1). In 1979, Camp 3 received another 110
FAR MR-1 majors and colonel who had been held in the Phong Saly
Province camp system. Camp 3 was commanded by Khamang and his
deputy Bounpheng, and had a 50-man guard force. In mid-1983,
Camp 3 became a temporary holding camp for others in the Houa
Phan seminar camp system who were being considered for
release. During the 1983-1985 period, Camp 3 grew to about 300
inmates, plus 800 dependents. As of August 1986, Camp 3 held about 150 inmates who were being considered for release in Vientiane, and was reportedly closed down later (date unknown). No foreign nationals were reported in detention at this camp.

D. Seminar Camp 4 was established in September 1975 and held about 520 FAR and police majors to colonels, and civilian grade equivalent inmates, who had been categorized as "progressive" educateses. Until late 1976 the camp was located on the south side (VH 3883) of the Nam Mo River in Xieng Kho District on Route 6 between Muong Hang and Muong Ham Villages. In late 1976, Camp 4 was relocated to a new site at Ban Nam At (former Kok Pho) Village (UIJ 9303) about three kilometers south of Muong Et (Muong Het) Village (UIJ 9703) on the west side of the Nam Et (Nam Het) River, about 18 kilometers from Xieng Kho District Town (VJ 1202). In 1977, about 100 colonels and civilian grade equivalents were transferred to Camp 5. In 1978, about 250 inmates were transferred to Camp 6. In 1981, Camps 4 and 6 were moved from their Nam Et River site to the original Camp 4 location (VH 3883) on the south side of the Nam Mo River on Route 6. The two camps were consolidated and called "Sawmill Production" Unit 6. Seminar Camp 4 was officially closed down with the merger. No foreign nationals were reported in detention at this camp.

E. Seminar Camp 5 was initially established in June 1975 on the south side (VH 6311) of the Nam Sam River (VH 5212) across from Sam Tai District Town (VH 6211), and moved permanently in early 1976 to a natural cliff area near Ban Sop Phua Village (VH 8325). Camp 5 was a maximum security facility for "incorrigible" hardliners, holding about 700 FAR and police colonels, general grade officers, and senior-level civilian ministers and equivalent ranking officials. On 12 October 1977, 26 senior ranking colonels, generals and ministers were transferred from Camp 5 to Camp 1. Camp 5 received an unknown number of incorrigible "hardliners" from three reeducation camps in adjacent Phong Saly Province in December 1978 when these camps were closed down in fear of Chinese attack. In September 1979, about 25 general grade officers and civilian equivalent grades were accused of plotting to overthrow the LDPDR, and reportedly were later executed. By 1982, Camp 5 was known as the Houay Ta-Ngeua Road Construction Unit. As of June 1983, Camp 5 held about 400 inmates who were assigned to hard labor construction gangs in Sam Tai District. Camp 5 was still in existence as of August 1986, and was later reportedly closed down (date unknown). No foreign nationals were reported in
detention at this camp.

F. Seminar Camp 6 was established on 21 July 1975 about five kilometers west of Muong Et (Muong Het) Het Village (UJ 9703) on the south side of the Nam Et (Nam Het) River between Muong Et Village and Na Kham Village (UH 9698) in Xieng Kho District. Route 67 ran through the camp. Camp 6 had the distinction of having been originally used by the Pathet Lao as a prisoner compound as early as 1969. In August 1975, about 600 FAR and police field and general grade officers, and civilian grade equivalents (ministers and province chiefs) were detained at Camp 6, where they were informed that they would not be eligible for release. Later, surviving detainees were categorized as "progressive" éducateurs. In 1978, Camp 6 received about 250 inmates from Camp 4. Camp 6 then held about 800 inmates, including the FAR Supreme Commander, the FAR G-2 Chief, the FAR Inspector General, and other FAR generals, plus about 200 dependents. Camp 6 was commanded by Colonel Bounlert and had at least a 35-man guard force. In 1981, Camps 4 and 6 were moved from their Nam Et River site to the original Camp 4 location (VH 3883) on the south side of the Nam Mo River between Muang Hom and Muang Hang Villages on Route 6, where the two camps were consolidated and called "Sawmill Production" Unit 6. By June 1982, Camp 6 was known as "Production Unit 6." Inmates were assigned to bridge and road construction and repair, and timber-cutting crews. Camp 6 was still in existence as of March 1987, and was later reportedly closed down (date unknown). No foreign nationals were reported in detention at this camp.

G. Seminar Camp 7 was located in an area (VH 422752) about 1,200 meters north of Camp 1 on the east side of the Nam Mo River across from Sop Hao Township (VH 4373), Vieng Sai District. Camp 7 inmates waited six months to three years for trial which found them guilty and sentenced them to long terms of hard labor. The number of detainees at Camp 7 was 350 to 400 during 1976-1978, 450 to 500 during 1979-1980, 250 to 300 during 1981-1982, 150 to 200 during 1983-1984, and 180 to 250 during 1985-1986. Only a few detainees were released and only a few successfully escaped. Two or three prisoners died daily from starvation, disease or were executed. The dead included Lieutenant General Bounleut Sanichan; Brigadier Generals Nouphet Daoheuang, Atsaphangthong Pathammavong, Bounchan Savatphaiphan, Thongphan Khanoksi, Bounthieng Venvongsot, Chao Sin Saisana, Rattanabanlang Chounlamonti; Colonels Amkha Khanthamisai, Phom Phanthavong, Kavin Keonakon (Police), Khammouk Pengsiaroon (Police); Director of Public Works
Itsara Donsasourith. As of August 1986, Camp 7 held about 250 inmates; inmates included FAR/RLG and LPDR military personnel. Camp 7 may be identical with the Thong Fek Prison which was about 14 kilometers east of Sam Neua and which was a pre-trial sentencing facility. No foreign nationals were reported in detention at this camp.

H. The Pha Deng Camp (VH 2335) was located at Phou Pha Deng about two kilometers east of Viengsai Sai District Town on the road to Nameo (VH 6644). The Pha Deng Camp encompassed a 100 by 200 meter area which was bordered by steep cliffs on one side and a deep valley on the other side. Inmates were kept in caves, and harsh conditions inside the camp led to a number of cases of insanity. As of early 1986, it held about 25 FAR/RLG survivors, who were scheduled for release. Other FAR/RLG inmates had been moved to Seminar Camps 2, 5 or 7. After the last survivors were released in 1986, the Pha Deng Camp was converted into a camp for LPDR personnel. No foreign nationals were reported in detention at this camp.

I. One Vietnamese boat refugee provided hearsay information about a detention camp which held six U.S. POW's (including two blacks) as of April 1982 in a small valley where Thao La La Hamlet was situated in Houa Phan Province.

11. In June 1983, under MOI direction, the Houa Phan Province Camp complex was consolidated into a composite seminar production battalion headquarters at the Sop Phan Camp near Na Luong Village (VH 3866), Muang Poua Canton, Viengsay District. The composite battalion headquarters staff was commanded by MOI Lieutenant Colonel Maisin Misai (Maysing Meesay), and had four guard companies and two special independent platoons. Each guard company was responsible for the security of one camp. Company 1 was unlocated. Company 2 was colocated with the battalion headquarters and guarded about 100 inmates who were involved in constructing agricultural settlements and roads. Company 3 was located at Houay Ngum Village, Muang Hang Canton (VH 3981), Xieng Kho District (VJ 1101), and guarded inmates who were involved in road construction in remote areas near the Vietnamese border. Company 4 was located at Sop Long Village (VH 3192), Muang Hom Canton, Xieng Kho District, and guarded inmates doing road and bridge repair. The 1st Special Platoon was located in the remote Lao Huong mountainous area, and the 2nd Special Platoon was colocated with the Viengsay District Military Headquarters (VH 2949), where inmates constructed and repaired buildings. Prison inmates of the Sop Hao camp system
were assigned to two production groups which worked on a road and bridge construction project at Sop Long Village (VH 0261), an irrigation project at Houei Tao (VH 0461), and on a hospital, school and residential construction project at Lao Houng Village. No foreign nationals were reported in detention at these camp sites.

12. As of December 1986, Camp 14 was newly established in Houa Phan Province. It was located about one kilometer from Sam Neua District Township (VH 0057), held about 300 inmates, and was operated by the Houa Phan Province PSO as a pre-trial temporary detention facility. The camp was constructed of bamboo and had more than 20 buildings to house inmates and guards. The camp was surrounded by three barbed wire fences, and was divided into light, medium and heavy security areas. Inmates included former RLG officials, and LPDR political prisoners and civil criminals. The camp had a 90-man guard force. As of May 1988, Camp 14 held only civil criminals and LPDR officials on various charges; no RLG inmates were detained there. No foreign nationals were reported in detention at this camp.

13. Phong Saly Province had a seminar camp complex between August 1975 and November 1978, which held about 2,000 RLG/FAR inmates and about an equal number of family dependents in one of five seminar camps. Each camp had a 50-man staff, including a 35-man guard force. By August 1986, only Camp 5 existed in Phong Saly Province with about 150 FAR enlisted and NCO detainees. No foreign nationals were reported in detention in the Phong Saly Province camp system, which had consisted of Seminar Camps 1 through 5.

A. Seminar Camp 1, also known as the Thong Nam Noi and the Muang Khoua Seminar Camp, was established in August 1975 along Route 19 near Sop Kai Village (TJ 3429), about ten kilometers southwest of Muang Khoua District Town. The camp was located on the east side of Route 19 at Kilometer Marker-91 (possibly TJ 5329) along the Pak River. Initial inmates included about 500 RLG police and FAR lieutenants and captains. Inmates were allowed to be accompanied by dependents to discourage escape attempts. In December 1976, 200 inmates were moved to the Pak Nam Noi Camp (TJ 1334) and to Muang Yo Seminar Camp 4. In June 1977, about 200 FAR enlisted and NCO personnel from Camp 2 were moved to Camp 1. In December 1978, all remaining officer inmates (number unknown) were transferred to the Pak Beng Camp (QC 2302) in Oudomsai Province and then to the Pak Xuang Camp (TH 1110) about 25 kilometers northwest of
Luang Prabang Township. From Pak Xuang, they were flown in two C-47 and C-123 aircraft to the Phonsavan Camp (UG 1253) in Xieng Khoang Province, Sepone in Savannakhet Province, and Attopeu Province, where they were placed in southern seminar camps. They were replaced at Camp 1 by 300 FAR enlisted and NCO inmates with dependents from Camp 2. In April 1982, 300 FAR enlisted and NCO inmates with dependents from Camp 4 were transferred to Camp 1. Inmates were used during the 1980-1986 period to build a laterite road (Provincial Route 48) from Nam Noi to Muang Yo Village in Boun Neua District. Camp 1 was closed down sometime in 1986. No foreign nationals were reported in detention at this camp.

B. Seminar Camp 2, also known as the Muang Mai District (TJ 6942) Seminar Camp, was located near the SRV border about 20 kilometers northeast of Muang Khoua District Town on the north side of Route 19 near the Nam Noua River. Camp 2 held about 900 RLG/FAR inmates and dependents. All were FAR and RLG police enlisted and NCO personnel from Louang Namtha, Luang Prabang, and Sayaboury Provinces. Inmates were used on road construction work. In June 1977, about 200 inmates were transferred to Muang Khoua Seminar Camp 1, replacing junior grade officers who were moved to Muang Yo Seminar Camp 4, and about 700 inmates were moved to a new Camp 2 site at Pak Nam Noi (TJ 1334). During 1979, Camp 2 had 300 enlisted and NCO inmates; 300 enlisted and NCO inmates were transferred to Muang Yo Seminar Camp 4. Inmates were used during the 1980-1986 period to build a laterite road (Provincial Route 48) from Nam Noi to Muang Yo. Camp 2 was closed down sometime in 1986. No foreign nationals were reported in detention at this camp.

C. Seminar Camp 3, also known as the Boun Neua Camp, was located about five kilometers south of Boun Neua Township (RD 0198) between Route 49 and the Nam Roun River. Camp 3 initially held 435 inmates (200 from Vientiane and 235 from Luang Prabang Provinces); all were former RLG politicians and national assemblymen; about 45 inmates died at Camp 3. In December 1978, all remaining inmates were transferred to the Houa Phan Province seminar camp system, and Camp 3 was closed. No foreign nationals were reported in detention at this camp.

D. Seminar Camp 4, also known as the Muang Yo Seminar Camp (QD 9580), was located at Kilometer 65, Muang Yo Village, Boun Neua District (RD 0095), and held about 110 FAR MR-1 (Luang Prabang) field grade officers. In December 1976, about 200 FAR junior grade officers were transferred from Camp 1 to
Camp 4. In December 1978, all field grade officers were transferred to the Houa Phan Province seminar camp system. All junior grade officers were gradually transferred to the Pak Beng Camp (QC 2302) in Oudomsai Province and then to the Pak Xuan Camp (TH 1110) about 25 kilometers northwest of Luang Prabang Township. From Pak Xuan, the inmates were flown in two C-47 and C-123 aircraft to Phonsavan (UG 1253) in Xieng Khoang Province, Sepone in Savannakhet Province, and Attopeu Province. They were replaced by about 300 FAR enlisted and NCO inmates from Camp 2. Inmates were used during the 1980-1986 period to build a laterite road (Provincial Route 48) from Nam Noi to Muang Yo. Camp 4 was closed down in 1986. No foreign nationals were reported in detention at this camp.

E. Seminar Camp 5 was located at Bouam Phan Village, Khao Canton (TJ 0535) in Muang Khoua District. As of August 1986, Camp 5 held about 130 inmates from Camps 1 and 4 who had not been released. Inmates were used during the 1980-1986 period to build a laterite road (Provincial Route 48) from Nam Noi to Muang Yo. No foreign nationals were reported in detention at this camp.

14. The Xieng Khoang Province seminar camp system detained about 3,000 detainees as of 1986. Each camp had a 50-man staff, including a 35-man guard force. The Nachong Seminar Camp (UG 134 623), also known as Seminar Camp C.157, was established in June or July 1975 and was located near the Napa River; it was a maximum security camp. Seminar Camp 3 (UG 154 628) was located about three kilometers north of the Nachong Camp; it held about 750 inmates (not including dependents); over 200 inmates died in the camp. Beginning in February-March 1979, Seminar Camp 3 inmates were reassigned to Seminar Camps 515, 518 and 523 for production work. Seminar Camp 4 was located at UG 158 638 and detained "incorrigible" prisoners. In 1980, Seminar Camp 4 inmates were relocated to the Ban Hou area (UG 5964) about two kilometers from Route 7 where it had Subcamps 55, 56, 57 and 58. The Longkai Seminar Camp was located near Ban Ban (UG 5070). It had seven subcamps designated C1 through C7 along the Nam Mat River. Seminar Camp 5 was located on the bank of the Napa River, a few kilometers from its junction with the Nam Ha River, with about 600 detainees; 300 had been transferred from the closed down Camp 4. Seminar Camp 6 was unlocated with about 300 detainees. Seminar Camp 5 and Camp 6 inmates were assigned to Construction (Seminar) Battalions 575 and 611, which were involved in the reconstruction of the Thong Hai Hin (UG 0651) Airfield; each battalion had about 300 inmates. The Bansone
Seminar Camp (UG 292 610) was located about three kilometers from Route 7 between Phonsavan and Nong Pet (UG 310640; it held LPDR inmates who had been transferred from Subcamp 58 of the Longkai Seminar Camp. The Nong Het Seminar Camp (UG 944 550) held about 90 former Royal Lao Air Force officers through the rank of captain. No foreign nationals were reported in detention at any of these camps.

A. The Phonsavan Camp (UG 1351) was established in December 1975 near Lee Village (UG 1052) for about 200 Royal Lao Air Force personnel (privates through captain) and their dependents, and was also known as the 702nd Seminar Battalion. Beginning in early 1986, inmates were gradually released. As of February 1987, about 98 inmates of the Houa Phan Province seminar camp complex had been transferred to the Phonsavan Camp, where they were grouped for onward movement to Vientiane for release. No foreign prisoners were reported in detention at this camp.

B. Seminar Camps 515, 518, 523, 575 and 611 have also been reported as Construction Battalions; each had about 150 inmates. Camp 515 was located at deserted Pha Pang Hang Village (TG 6558) along Route 7 in Pek District; most inmates were FAR Military Region 5 (Vientiane) personnel who had been detained at the Vang Vieng Camp. Camp 515 inmates were used for Route 7 road and bridge repair and construction. Camp 515 was commanded by Major Bounli, had four companies composed of inmates, and a 30-man guard force. Inmates who were too old or ill for hard labor were sent to Hat Village (UG 6657) where about 20 inmates raised vegetables and livestock. Captured escapees were sent to the Phonsavan-Longkai Prison (UG 5566). Only prisoners in poor health were released. In early 1986, Camp 515 companies were sent in rotation to help build the Joint Armed Forces School at Paen (TG 9869), Pek District. In August 1986, Camp 515 was relocated to the Paen area, and had about 50 inmates. Camp 575 was located at Ban Nam Khao (UG 1050) near the end of the Thong Hai Hin Airfield; it had 700 inmates including dependent family members as of 1981. The 606th Seminar Battalion was located about four kilometers east of Phonsavan. Camp 611 was located near Xiang Houng (TG 8262), and had about 600 inmates including dependents. The 705th Seminar Battalion was located at Nam Chat (UG 8107), and was involved in the construction of the Lao Armed Forces Officers Academy at Paen Village (TG 9369). No foreign prisoners were reported in detention at any of these camps.

C. As of spring 1987, the 518th Seminar Battalion
with 145 inmates was building a new runway to handle MIG-21 aircraft at the Thong Hai Hin Airfield (UG 1251) under the supervision of 20 Soviet engineers. The 575th and 611th Seminar Battalions, composed of 150 inmates each, were also involved in the construction. Each of the three battalions were augmented by about 100 dependent females. About 1,000 laborers (inmates and dependents) were involved in the construction. Airfield construction also included plans for over 80 permanent buildings, including 42 three-storey buildings. Construction began in January 1985, and was scheduled to be completed in 1988. Two radar stations were built, one at Phou Keng Mountain (UG 0450) and one at Phou Seu Mountain (TG 9938). Another radar station had previously been built in an area near Bam Ghouan (UG 0953). All construction materials and heavy equipment were provided by the Soviets. No foreign nationals were reported in detention at any of these sites.

D. One Lao resistance member, whose reliability was undetermined, provided information about six U.S. POW's being held in a camp in early March 1986 at the Tham Pha Leung Cave near Phou Sao Village (UG 3918).

15. Vientiane Province had several detention and seminar facilities. The Vang Mieng Seminar Camp was established between February and July 1976, and was located at Vang Mieng Village (TF 136627), and held about 1,000 RLG/FAR detainees in mid-1976. The Ban Thangon Seminar Camp was located about 25 kilometers north of Vientiane City, and held minor political offenders and NCO's who were sentenced to a maximum of three years of imprisonment. The Sammune Muang Fenang Seminar Camp (SF 9772) held FAR company grade officers and NCO's until mid-1979 when the camp was moved to Muang Heuang (UF 6373) in Bolikhamsai Province. As of mid-1984, the Don Pho Seminar Camp was in the area of TF 5055 near the Nam Ngum Dam Reservoir and held FAR NCO's and low level political prisoners. The Thongkheng Seminar Camp was in the area of TF 3439 about 62 kilometers north of Vientiane City. As of mid-1985, seminar laborers were assigned to constructions units at the Basic Joint Operations School at the Dan Mouang Camp (TF 2626), Phon Hong District, and to LPAF Sawmill Enterprise No. 1 at Ban Keun Village (TF 4431), Thoulakhom District. About 120 seminar laborers were assigned to the 582nd Engineering Battalion which was building a Joint Operations School at the Dan Mouang Camp. As of mid-1985, the MND General Logistics Department's Camp Barracks Department used about 350 seminar personnel who were assigned to a transportation company, a brick kiln, two
sawmills, and three construction enterprises. Another 1,000 released seminar inmates were assigned to Production Unit 2, which had four sub-units. Sub-unit 1 fished at the Nam Ngum Dam (TF 4250); Sub-unit 2 bred fish; Sub-unit 3 was tasked with animal husbandry; and Sub-unit 4 cultivated flowers and industrial plants. No foreign nationals were reported in detention at any of these camps.

16. Bolikhamsai Province had an unknown number of detention and seminar camps. In mid-1979, the Vientiane Province Sammune Muang Fenang Camp (SF 9772) moved to Muang Heuang (UF 6373) in Bolikhamsai Province with an unknown number of FAR company grade officer inmates. As of the mid-1980's, about 1,000 released FAR seminar inmates were assigned to Production Unit 1 in Paksane District (UF 5832). Production Unit 1 built roads, bridges, buildings, and cleared wood from the junction of Route 4 at Paksane to Route 401 at Thong Phan Kham (UF 6450). No foreign nationals were reported in detention at any of these camps.

17. Luang Namtha and Sayaboury Province had an unknown number of detention facilities and no known seminar camps. Several hundred former RLG civil servants and FAR personnel from these two provinces were initially sent to the Pak Beng Seminar Camp (QC 2302), Oudomsai Province, in July-August 1975. The Pak Beng Camp was a temporary holding facility for RLG and FAR personnel. FAR personnel were sent to the Nam Bac Seminar Camp (TH 3582) in Luang Prabang Province before being further transferred to the Phong Saly Province Seminar Camp system. In December 1978, FAR junior grade officers in the Phong Saly Province Seminar Camp system were gradually transferred to the Pak Beng Camp and then to the Pak Xuang Camp (TH 1110) about 25 kilometers northwest of Luang Prabang Township. From Pak Xuang, the inmates were flown in two C-47 and C-123 aircraft to Phonsavan (UG 1253) in Xieng Khoang Province, Sepone in Savannakhet Province, and Attopeu Province. The Oudomsai Province camp (not further identified) was closed in early 1979, and all inmates (mostly FAR MR-1 officers), were transferred to an unknown camp in Xieng Khouang Province. No foreign nationals were reported in detention at these camps.

18. Luang Prabang Province had several detention and seminar camps. Between 1975 and 1985, there were two main seminar camps, two smaller ones, and a jail in Muang Ngoi District Town. All were located along the Nam Ou River or along its tributaries. The two main seminar camps were Hatchan
(TH 5890) and Nam Bac (TH 3582), which was across the Nam Bak River from Ban Nakhon Village (TH 4680). In 1976, about 500 FAR NCO's were transferred from Luang Prabang Province to the Nakay Seminar Camp in Khammouan Province, and several hundred FAR MR-1 NCO's were held at the Nam Bac Camp (TH 3582). Most NCO's were usually released after two to four years of imprisonment. Comments are available on the following camps:

A. The Ban Hatchan Seminar Camp (TH 5890) was established in August 1975 for RLG civil servants from Luang Prabang, Xieng Khouang and Sayaboury Provinces. The Hatchan Camp was located south of Muang Ngoi District Town in a valley formed by the Phaboun and Phapae Mountains along the Nam Ou River; it was bordered on the south by the Nam Kong River and on the north by the Nam Ngoi River. The Hatchan Camp held about 400 inmates plus 350 dependents. Inmates were usually released after two to four years of imprisonment. The Ban Hatchan Seminar Center was noted in the overt Vientiane press in June 1977, and was closed down in 1980 after remaining inmates were transferred to seminar camps in Xieng Khouang and Attopeu Provinces. No foreign nationals were reported by former inmates in detention at this camp.

B. The Nam Bac Seminar Camp (TH 3582) was established in August 1975 for FAR personnel, and was also known as the Oudomsai (Nam Bac) District Seminar Camp, in Luang Prabang Province. FAR MR-1 officers were initially held at the camp. On 31 November 1975, 110 FAR MR-1 field grade officers were transferred to Phong Saly Province Seminar Camp 4. Lieutenants and captains were also sent Phong Saly Province Seminar Camp 1, and NCO's were sent to Phong Saly Province Seminar Camp 2. The Nam Bac Seminar Center was noted in the overt Vientiane press in June 1977. The Nam Bac Camp held several hundred NCO's and a few officers until it was closed down in 1980 after remaining inmates were transferred to seminar camps in Xieng Khouang and Attopeu Provinces. No foreign nationals were reported by former inmates in detention at this camp. However, one individual, whose reliability was undetermined, provided information about 12 U.S. POW's who were held at the Nam Bac Camp after being captured there during the war years; five U.S. POW's were reportedly moved to the USSR in 1985 and seven were reportedly still kept at the Nam Bac Camp as of mid-1986 with about 30 alleged former Armed Forces of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) POW's.

C. The Ban Hatxao Seminar Camp or Jail (TH 5226 or TH
C06001229

SECRET

5477) (2035N/10230E) was located on the bank of the Nam Ngu River, and held about 60 RLG civil servants. In December 1978, Ban Hatxao Camp inmates were moved to the Ban Pakchim Seminar Camp (2026N/10238E) and were gradually released after about four years of imprisonment. The Ban Hatxao Camp held about 200 prisoners as of September 1986. No foreign nationals were reported in detention at this camp.

D. The Ban Nama Camp (TH 0012) held about 200 captured Lao resistance members as of late 1983. No foreign nationals were reported in detention at this camp.

E. Two small seminar camps (Nos. 193 and 196) were respectively located near a bridge over the Nam Bak River near the junction of the Nam Bak and Houei Ngeu Rivers, and at Nanongxung. No foreign nationals were reported in detention at these two camps.

F. A camp for returning Lao refugees was located about 40 kilometers northeast of Luang Prabang Township near the Nam Ai River. Another camp for returning Lao refugees was built in the Ban Gnhok Van area (TH 1808). No foreign nationals were reported in detention at these camps.

G. Another individual, whose reliability was undetermined, provided information about having seen two Caucasians in leg irons, who had been captured before 1972, along the main road about 8.0 kilometers east of Muang Ngoi (TH 5891) in April 1986. This person also provided information (FIR-317/09341-86 of 22 July 1986) about a detention camp at Ban Don Lae (TH 5085) in Muang Ngoi District, which held two male and four female Americans in a cave guarded by eight People's Armed Forces of Vietnam (PAVN) and 14 LPAF personnel; the cave camp was called the Widow's Cave (Tham Mae Mai). Other than this, no foreign nationals were reported in detention at any camp in the province by former inmates.

20. In Khammouan Province, the camp system held about 2,300 RLG and FAR inmates as of July 1985, including about 500 FAR and police officers. In 1975, field grade officers were sent to the Sepone Seminar Camp in Savannakhet Province. About 50 RLG police enlisted and NCO personnel, and second lieutenants were sent to the Phonkhen Seminar Camp (WE 1738) in September 1975, where they were assigned to agricultural and road repair tasks on Route 8. In September 1976, 43 surviving inmates were relocated to the Thoen Douan (Theun Douan) aka...
Nakay Seminar Camp (WE 2554), Gnommalat District, where it was also known as the 74th Production Group. About 500 NCO's were transferred from Luang Prabang Province to the Nakay Camp in 1976. As of late 1979, the Nakay Camp held about 2,000 enlisted and officer personnel through captain rank from Khammouan and Savannakhet Provinces. Inmates were assigned to one of six production battalions under the 74th Production Group. Inmates performed hard labor, clearing forests, cultivating rice paddy fields, and repairing roads. Dependents began joining the inmates in 1980. As of mid-1984, inmates at the Na Kai province camp (WE 3060) were used as the labor force for State Forestry Enterprises Nos. 4 and 5. The Mahaxai 75th Production Subgroup (1725N/10512E) had about 400 inmates who performed road construction and repair work on Route 12 between Gnommalat District and Thakhek District Town. The Naden Camp (1729N/10525), also known as the 70th Production Group, was relocated in 1980 to new quarters about 2.5 kilometers east of Ban Naden between Route 12 and the Xe Bang Fai River. About 25 percent of all inmates in the Khammouan Province camp system either died or escaped. As of January 1986, the camp system held about 200 inmates and dependents who were assigned to one of four 50-man companies. Although no foreign nationals were reported by former inmates in detention at any of these camps, Lao resistance members claimed to have information on live U.S. POW's in various areas of Khammouan Province as follows:

A. One Lao resistance member, whose reliability was undetermined, provided information about four U.S. POW's at the Nadeng Prison in Khammouan Province as of February 1983. This same report also noted that the Lao resistance member had obtained information from an escaped inmate who reportedly had met two U.S. POW's at this prison during the period mid-1981 to January 1983.

B. Another Lao resistance member, whose reliability was undetermined, provided information about 17 U.S. POW's being held at a detention camp near Phahoi Village (possibly WD 4598), which was about two kilometers southwest of the junction of Routes 122 and 123 (WD 4799) and about 50 kilometers southeast of Mahaxai District Town.

C. This same Lao resistance member had earlier claimed to have information on one U.S. POW who was being protected and guarded by villagers at Napeng Village (WE 7115), Talong Canton (WE 7019), Boualapha
District, in October 1986. The subsorce for this Lao resistance member was also debriefed and claimed that one U.S. POW was being held by Napeng villagers as of November-December 1986.

21. In Savannakhet Province, about 3,500 seminar camp inmates (with dependents) from the ranks of sergeant to major were assigned to five road construction and two bridge construction units along Route 9 from Xa Thamouak (WD 9732), Phin District, Savannakhet Province, east to the Vietnamese border, and west to Phalane Canton (WD 6014), Atsaphangthong District, Savannakhet Province. Production work camps were located near Xa Thamouak (WD 9732), Sepone (XD 3242), Senkua Toulouang (XD 1753), Lako (XD 5857), and Ban Buk (XD 6152). In July 1975, all FAR personnel in FAR Military Region 3 (MR-3) were ordered to report for indoctrination training. About 300 FAR MR-3 officers from the ranks of major to colonel were held at the Fa Ngum School (1634N/10445E) in Savannakhet City for a one-month preliminary seminar before being sent in mid-August and September 1975 to the Sepone Seminar Camp by C-47 aircraft. Twelve senior officers, including Brigadier General Nouphet Daoheuang (FAR MR-3 Commander), Police Colonels Chanpheng Phetsomphou and Sisouvan, Colonels Souloung Phetsomphou and Kamko, and Lieutenant Colonel Sivisai, were transferred to the Houa Phan Province seminar camp complex. On 7 September 1975, 290 majors to colonels were sent to the Sepone Seminar Camp, which held about 1,000 inmates and dependent families. By March 1978, the Sepone Seminar Camp was closed down because of repeated escape attempts. About 190 Sepone Seminar Camp inmates were transferred to the Senkua Tonglouang Seminar Camp (XD 1884) near Ban Senkua (XD 1753), about 30 kilometers northwest of Sepone near the Nambok/Nam Xe Kok River (XD 1854). The Senkua Seminar Camp held about 1,000 inmates and dependent families. Again, because of repeated escape attempts, about 100 surviving inmates of the Senkua Seminar Camp were relocated in April 1979 to the Lako Seminar Camp (XD 5957), also known as the Vinko Camp, about seven kilometers from the Vietnamese border. During February-June 1983, about 30 Lako Seminar Camp inmates were relocated to the Ban Buk (Ban But) Seminar Camp. The Ban Buk Seminar Camp (XD 6152) was located about 10 kilometers south of the Lako Seminar Camp, and was about five kilometers from the Vietnamese border. As of late 1986, there were only 16 inmates and one family left at the Ban Buk Camp. Other inmates either had died, were shot attempting to escape, or had been transferred.
to the district jail for disciplinary action. Camp officials never spoke of release, and it appeared that the policy was to let the inmates gradually die off. The Ban Phabang Seminar Camp (1653N/10619E) held about 600 elderly and retired RLG civil servants and FAR personnel with dependents who had been transferred from camps at Ban Kengkhan and Ban Xieng Hom (1647N/10619E); inmates did agriculture and husbandry work. The Ban Dong Seminar Camp (1638N/10625E) initially held about 900 officers through captain rank, and by late 1984 held about 300 surviving inmates. The Ban Dong Camp was located about 22 kilometers east of Sepone District Township along Route 9. The Savannakhet Province Public Security Office (PSO) administered the Kaeng Khan Prison (XK 221530) in Sepone District, which held about 200 inmates in harsh conditions; about 50 inmates were held in solitary confinement on espionage charges. Although no foreign nationals were reported by former inmates in detention at any of these camps, Lao resistance members claimed to have information on live U.S. POW's in various areas of Savannakhet Province as follows:

A. One Lao resistance member, whose reliability was undetermined, provided information about 19 live American POW's at a site near Dong Kok, Muang Angkham (1701N/10602E).
22. The Saravane Province seminar camp system existed between July 1975 and at least 1980. In July 1975, about 900 RLG police and FAR Military Region 4 (MR-4) officers and NCO's were initially concentrated in a temporary seminar camp at the Saravane Town Airfield (XC 5738). All were moved to the Ban Bung Kham Seminar Camp (XC 2238) in August 1975. In September 1979, about 200 officers were flown by C-47 aircraft from Luang Prabang Province to the Pakse Airfield, Champassak Province, where they were then taken by truck and on foot to the Dakchung Seminar Camp (YC 4211 or YC 5010) near the Vietnamese border. As of 1980, all seminar camps in Saravane Province became known as "production" camps. In 1980, the Dakchung Camp was closed down; half of the inmates were sent to Attopeu Province and half were reportedly sent to an unlocated camp in Vietnam. About 2,000 RLG police and FAR MR-4 NCO's had been assigned to agricultural and road repair "production" units in the Thateng (WC 4907) area of Saravane Province and in the Paksong (XB 3278) area of Champassak Province. Saravane Province was later split in two with the eastern half being currently known as Sekong Province. Sekong Province includes the areas of the Dakchung and Thateng camps. Although no foreign nationals were reported by former inmates in detention at any of these camps, Lao resistance members claimed to have information on live U.S. POW's in various areas of Saravane Province as follows:

A. One Lao resistance member, whose reliability was undetermined, provided information about two U.S. POW's at the Dakchung Camp in November 1986.

B. 

C. 

21
D. Another individual, whose reliability was undetermined, provided hearsay information on sightings of American POW's in Saravane Province, two live Americans at a detention camp in Ta-Oy (Ta-Oi) District (XC 6148) of Saravane Province in 1985, and on six Americans being held in Hue, Vietnam.

23. The Attopeu Province "seminar" system held about 600 inmates as of September 1986 who were detained in the 402nd and 979th "Seminar" Battalions. An unknown number of inmates were detained at the 981st "Seminar" Battalion which is unlocated in Attopeu Province. The camp system was established in June 1975 for the detention of FAR Military Region 4 (MR-4) civilian and military personnel. No foreign nationals were reported in detention in this camp system. Comments are as follows:

A. The 402nd Seminar Battalion was established in June 1975 in Attopeu Province at the Houai Phok Camp (YB 0238) and consisted of four seminar companies in subcamps of about 150 detainees each. In June 1975, about 600 FAR MR-4 Region 4 officers from second lieutenant to colonel rank were concentrated at the Teacher's College at Kilometer 3 (WB 8971) east of Pakse District Town (WB 8671), Champassak Province, for preliminary indoctrination. Upon registration, about 100 majors, lieutenant colonels, and colonels were flown directly to Attopeu (XB 9838) on 27 July 1975; an unknown number of these officers were later transferred to the Houa Phan Province seminar camp system. After completing a one-month course, 400 second lieutenants and captains detainees were assigned to "Seminar" Companies 1 through 4. On 15 August 1975, the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Seminar Companies were flown by C-47 aircraft from Pakse to the Attopeu Airport. The 4th Seminar Company of 100 detainees was sent to Samakkhisai (Attopeu) District (XB 9837). No foreign nationals were reported in detention at any of these sites.

B. During the first three months in Attopeu Province,
about 10 officers tried to escape; all were captured and executed. The 1st Seminar Company of junior grade officers was located at the base of the Phou Saphong Mountain and the Nam Xe Kong River (XB 9882), Saisettha District; the 2nd Seminar Company of 180 lieutenants and captains was at Houai Phok (YB 0238), Saisettha District; the 3rd Seminar Company of 180 lieutenants and captains was at Ban Bung along the Nam Xe Kong River, Saisettha District. In early 1976, the 3rd Seminar Company was relocated to Ban Hatliang (YB 0636) where it received inmates from the dissolved 4th Seminar Company which had been located at Ban Hom (XB 9824). In 1977, the 1st Seminar Company was relocated across from the Attopeu Province Military Command and the 2nd Seminar Company was relocated to Ban Kengpok. In mid-1977, about 120 inmates from the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Seminar Companies were assigned to a road construction unit which repaired a twelve kilometer section of the road to Ban Fangdeng (YB 0932). The 2nd Seminar Company was located opposite Fangdeng Village at YB 0839, moved in 1977 to Houei Pok Village (YB 0238) to work on Route 16, and worked on an airstrip at XB 9638. The 2nd Seminar Company had 100 inmates plus dependents and was still located near Fangdeng Village in January 1987. No foreign nationals were reported in detention at any camp sites.

C. In September 1979, a group of 600 RLG police and FAR officers, students and air force pilots were moved from camps in northern Laos (Phong Saly, Xieng Khoang, Louang Namtha, Oudomsai) and from the Sam Khe Prison in Vientiane to an unknown location in Sansai District, about 30 kilometers from Attopeu Township near the SRV border. This group was the 979th Seminar Battalion. Chao Chanthalangsy, a younger brother of the Lao King, was killed at the Attopeu Camp in March 1985, and was buried in a cemetery for seminar inmates near the Attopeu Airport (XB 9638). In 1981, the 979th Seminar Battalion with about 300 inmates was relocated to the Dakkoum Camp near the Vietnamese border. Inmates performed hard labor on road and bridge construction crews. No foreign nationals were reported in detention at any of these camp sites.

D. In 1981, the Attopeu Province Seminar Camp system was reorganized. A 160-man production group was formed with inmates from the 979th and 402nd Seminar Battalions. As of 1981, the 402nd Seminar Battalion held about 500 RLG civilian and FAR inmates, and the 979th Seminar Battalion had about 400 inmates. The 1st Company was relocated to the former FAR military headquarters in Attopeu Township where it was known as the "municipal construction unit;" the 2nd Company was.
relocated from the Houai Phok Camp (1448N/10653E) to the Ban Hom Camp (XB 9824); and the 3rd Company was relocated from Ban Hat Liang Village (YB 0636) to the Attopeu Airport area where 150 inmates grew crops, cut timber, built housing, and did road construction and repair work. The 4th Company was reformed with inmates from the 979th Seminar Battalion, and was colocated with the 1st Company. As of September 1986, the 402nd Seminar Battalion still held about 300 inmates with no plans for release. No foreign nationals were reported in detention at any camp sites.

E. The Attopeu Province Public Security Office Prison had a 25-man guard force and held about 50 prisoners in three cells. One cell held civil criminals, another held seminarcamp inmates, and the third cell held a mix of civil prisoners and reeducatees. The Attopeu Province Public Security Office also had another prison (YB 6525) in Sansai District near the Tri-border area of Laos-Cambodia-Vietnam. The Sansai District Prison, which also had a 25-man staff, held 26 RLG police and FAR officials and former ethnic Lao local USAID employees under maximum security detention until late 1981 when 24 survivors were transferred to the Attopeu Prison. No foreign nationals were reported in detention in these facilities.

23. In the case of Champassak Province, about 1,000 military and police NCO's from FAR MR-4 were assigned to "production" camps which performed agriculture and road repair work in the Paksong (XB 3278) area, Champassak Province. Otherwise, no permanent seminar camps were reported in this province, because of its immediate proximity to the Thai border. On 4 July 1985, Champassak Province authorities established a camp for returning Lao refugees at Nongsip Village (WB 9685), Bachiang Chaleunsouk District. MOI Order 1-553 (1 June 1985) stipulated that Lao residents with homes in Champassak, Saravane, Attopeu or Sekong Provinces would be concentrated at this camp. No foreign nationals were reported in detention at these camps.
Ministry of National Defense
Enemy Military Proselytizing Department

1. The Enemy Military Proselytizing Department (Cuc Binh Dich Van) is a Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) military intelligence and security service, which has historically been involved in various aspects of the the administration, handling, interrogation, indoctrination, and psychological warfare exploitation of POW's. It was also known as the Military Proselytizing Department (Cuc Binh Van), and was more commonly referred to as being the Enemy Proselytizing Department (Cuc Dich Van/CDV or EPD). Although overtly under the General Political Department of the Ministry of National Defense (MND), the EPD was covertly subordinate to the Ministry of Interior (MOI) and its pre-June 1975 predecessor Ministry of Public Security. The EPD was a staff-line department with the cover number designation K-30 through at least mid-1981, and was subordinate to the MOI's Protection Bloc (Khoi Bao Ve). In October 1981, the MOI underwent a major reorganization, which resulted in the upgrading of its professional blocs into a general department (tong cuc) structure with subordinate departments. The MOI's Protection Bloc was dissolved with subordinate departments placed under the MOI's General Department for the Development of Forces, the General Department for People's Police, and the General Department for People's Security, which was further reorganized and renamed the General Department for Counterintelligence in 1989.

2. The EPD was the only known service with responsibilities for psychological warfare and recruitment operations against enemy military forces. Recruitment operations were conducted under the name of military proselytizing (binh van). During the Vietnam War, the EPD, in fulfilling its psychological warfare responsibilities, was involved in the administration, handling, interrogation, indoctrination and psychological warfare exploitation of former Armed Forces of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN), U.S., and Allied Forces POW's. In doing so, the EPD worked closely with the Ministry of Public Security and its K-32 Military Security Department (Cuc Bao Ve Quan Doi/MSD). Like the EPD, the MSD was also overtly subordinate to the MND General Political Department. The Ministry of Public Security and its MOI successor provided the MSD and the EPD with professional guidance, equipment, personnel, and training.
3. In North Vietnam, the EPD had the primary responsibility for the indoctrination of U.S. POW's, and for supervising the implementation of party-sponsored POW policies. Although the EPD was responsible for the administration and indoctrination of U.S. POW's, they were physically detained in Ministry of Public Security detention facilities. U.S. POW's captured in North Vietnam were transferred to the Ministry of Public Security's Central Hoa Lo Prison in Hanoi. Ministry of Public Security prison authorities informed the EPD of U.S. POW arrivals, since the EPD had no permanently assigned personnel at Hoa Lo. EPD Policy Office cadre were sent to Hoa Lo, where U.S. POW personal efforts were turned over to the EPD Policy Office for storage and where EPD Policy Office cadres conducted preliminary debriefings. EPD preliminary debriefings focused on the collection of psychological assessment data. Psychological assessment results were used to draft indoctrination plans and to determine which methods of interrogations would be used against a POW by Military Intelligence Department, also known as the Research Department (Cuc Nghien Cuu/CNC), interrogators of the MND General Staff Department. Debriefings and interrogations were designed by the EPD to assist in the preparation of psychological warfare materials against enemy forces; emphasis was placed on obtaining handwritten letters and statements, and taped recorded anti-war messages from POW's for replay over Radio Hanoi. The EPD Policy Office also maintained a central listing of all U.S. POW's, who were processed and detained at Ministry of Public Security detention facilities, and had direct input into recommending who was to be released early.

4. The EPD sat on top of a vertical chain of command over all enemy proselytizing components in the PAVN down to the regimental level. Enemy proselytizing components were subordinate to the political staffs of PAVN corps, military regions, special regions, divisions, regiments, provincial and major city military commands. The involvement of these components with U.S. POW's in North Vietnam has not been determined. Although enemy proselytizing components had no known detention facilities in North Vietnam during the Vietnam War years, EPD forward commands in South Vietnam administered a detention camp system for captured ARVN and Allied/U.S. personnel.

5. With few exceptions, the EPD forward commands were the responsible authorities in South Vietnam with detention facilities for enemy military personnel, foreign
civilian and foreign military personnel under the name of Hanoi's National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NFLSVN) and Hanoi's Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam (PRG). During the 1973 Operation Homecoming, 122 U.S. POW's were released under the banner of Hanoi's PRG. All had been held at one time in EPD forward command camps in South Vietnam. After Operation Homecoming, the EPD forward commands in South Vietnam continued to be responsible for a detention camp system for ARVN personnel.

6. The EPD had five major forward commands in South Vietnam during the period. Three forward commands were responsible for Central Vietnam: the Tri-Thieu-Hue Military Region (TTHMR) Political Staff's Enemy Military Proselytizing Section, which had military proselytizing (recruitment), psychological warfare propaganda, and prisoner (military and foreign) handling functions; the Region 5 Enemy Military Proselytizing Section, which had military proselytizing (recruitment), psychological warfare propaganda and prisoner (military and foreign) handling functions; and the B-3 Central Highlands EMPS which also had similar functions. Two forward commands were responsible for the remainder of South Vietnam. They were: the Party's Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN) Military Proselytizing Section, which was responsible only for proselytizing (recruitment) operations against enemy military personnel; and, the Enemy Proselytizing Office (Phong Dich Van) of the PAVN's South Vietnamese Liberation Armed Forces (SVNLA) Political Staff Department, which was responsible for the detention handling and psychological warfare exploitation of captured enemy military personnel (Vietnamese, U.S., Allied Forces). Captured foreign civilian personnel were categorized and treated as foreign military personnel.

The Tri-Thien-Hue Region (TTHR)

7. The Tri-Thien-Hue Region (TTHR) Party Committee was established in early 1967 as part of the reorganization of the Inter-Region 5 (Lien Khu 5), which was renamed Region 5 (Khu 5). The TTHR Party Committee assumed control over the Quang Tri Province Party Committee (also known as Front 7), the Thua Thien Province Party Committee, and the Hue City Party Committee. The Military Affairs Committee of the TTHR Party Committee was known as the Tri-Thien-Hue Military Region (TTHMR). The TTHMR had three staff offices (military,
political, logistics). The Enemy Military Proselytizing Section (EMPS) was subordinate to the TTHMR Political Staff. As of late 1968, the EPMS was headed by Lieutenant Colonel Le Quoc Chinh (1967-1968) and his deputy, Major Nguyen Thieng, and was organized into administrative, enemy situation research, penetration (fifth column), American proselytizing, and detention camp subsections. Its seven-man American Proselytizing Subsection was established in April 1967 under Captain Ngo Thong. Its detention camp subsection had two camps (not further identified), which were segregated temporary holding facilities for U.S. POW's and ARVN officers before they were moved onwards to North Vietnam. American Proselytizing Subsections were formed during the April-June 1967 period under the political staff enemy military proselytizing sections of the Quang Tri and Thua Thien Province Military Commands and the Hue City Military Command.

8. As of June 1968, the TTHMR's Quang Tri (Front 7) Province EMPS was headed by Captain Phan Huu Them (captured 19 June 1968) and his deputy, Senior Lieutenant Nguyen Tung. The Quang Tri EMPS had about 25 personnel who were assigned to its six-man American Proselytizing Subsection headed by Senior Lieutenant Nguyen Hoi, its three-man Propaganda Subsection headed by Senior Lieutenant Nguyen Muon, its six-man Penetration Subsection headed by Senior Lieutenant Trinh Dinh Tu, and its six-man Detention Camp Subsection headed by Senior Lieutenant Nguyen Xuyen. Its Detention Camp Subsection had two temporary camps for U.S. and ARVN POW's in Trieu Phong District. One was a small temporary holding camp for U.S. POW's in an area (YD 2235) near the EMPS Headquarters. The other camp (YD 3436) had a 12-man staff and held only ARVN personnel. ARVN officers and U.S. POW's were escorted to the TTHMR Political Staff's EMPS and ARVN enlisted personnel and deserters were usually released after being indoctrinated. The Quang Tri EMPS provided direction and guidance to district-level EMPS and to combat unit political staff enemy military proselytizing components. The Quang Tri EMPS was later headed by Captain Nguyen Tung (June 1968-July 1969) and Senior Lieutenant Nguyen Muon (July-December 1969). The Thua Thien Province EMPS was similarly organized and staffed with two detention camps; one for foreign prisoners and one for ARVN. Captured ARVN officers and U.S./foreign personnel were moved up the chain of command to the TTHMR EMPS.

9. The TTHMR EMPS detention camp system did not handle foreign prisoners captured by PAVN forces. Based on accounts from former U.S. POW's, American personnel captured by PAVN
units in Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces were transferred through temporary detention facilities to North Vietnam, and not through the TTHMR EMPS system. The following examples illustrate the handling and movement of American personnel in this geographical area.

10. U.S. Army Special Forces Captain Floyd James Thompson was captured on 26 March 1964 near Khe Sanh in Quang Tri Province, and was taken to a small camp which was built for him in northwestern Thua Thien Province near the Lao border. Thompson was the only prisoner in the camp. During the fall of 1967, Captain Thompson was sent to a camp in North Vietnam, which was about 90 miles north of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) and about 20 miles inland from the coast. At the time Thompson arrived, the camp had no cellblock buildings. Three thatch-roofed cellblock buildings were built before the next American civilian and military prisoners arrived at the camp in spring 1968. U.S. POW's named the camp "Portholes."

11. On 8 February 1968, PAVN forces overran the Langvei Special Forces Camp which was located along Route 9 near Khe Sanh in the northwestern corner of Quang Tri Province near the Lao border. PAVN forces captured U.S. Army Special Forces Sergeants Dennis L. Thompson, Harvey G. Brande and William G. McMurray. Brande was taken to a camp in Laos about 30 miles southwest of Langvei, which held about 100 South Vietnamese and Lao prisoners, many of whom had been captured at Langvei. Thompson was taken with Montagnard prisoners to a different jungle holding camp which also held U.S. Army Special Forces Sergeant John A. Young who was captured on 31 January 1968. Thompson was moved to Brande's camp without Young. Brande and Thompson were recaptured after escaping and were taken in early March to another camp just north of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) which also held U.S. Army Special Forces Sergeants William G. McMurry and John A. Young, and U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) Private Ronald L. Ridgeway who had been captured on 25 February 1968 near Khe Sanh. In mid-April 1968, the five were moved to the "Portholes" Camp which held Special Forces Captain Floyd Thompson and other American civilian and military prisoners. Air Force Captain Edward W. Leonard, a search-and-rescue pilot captured on 31 May 1968, arrived later at the "Portholes."

12. In mid-summer 1968, Captain Floyd Thompson and others were moved out of the "Portholes" to a French-built prison on the southwest outskirts of Hanoi, which was named "Skidrow" by
its American inmates. Captain Thompson was accompanied by several American civilians who had been captured in Hue City during the Tet offensive. "Skidrow" was the Ministry of Public Security administered Thanh Liet Prison (WJ 851178), which was located about 10 miles south of downtown Hanoi near Bang Liet and Thanh Liet Villages in Thanh Tri District, Hanoi.

13. On 1 February 1968, PAVN forces captured over 20 foreign military and civilian personnel in Hue City. The group included some 14 American civilians: five Pacific Architects and Engineers (PA&E) personnel; International Voluntary Service (IVS) English teacher Gary Daves; IVS worker Sandra Johnson (released 31 March 1968); Quaker missionary doctor Marjorie Nelson (released 31 March 1968); Thomas Ragsdale; U.S. State Department Senior COORDS Representative Philip Manhard; USG COORDS Advisor Eugene Weaver; U.S. Navy civilians Lewis Myer and Lawrence Stark; and, Voice of America Station Manager Charles Willis. The Hue captives were taken within a few days to a temporary camp in the mountains of western Thua Thien Province. About 20 remaining captives (including 10 of the above noted American civilians) were marched to their first permanent camp in North Vietnam in April 1968 - the "Portholes." In June 1968, Captain Floyd Thompson and 14 American civilian prisoners (including Manhard, Myer, Stark, Willis, Cloden Adkins, Robert Olsen) were transferred from the "Portholes" to the "Skidrow" Prison (Thanh Liet). In March 1971, Captain Thompson and 13 American civilians were moved to the "Rockpile" annex of the Central Nam Ha Reeducation Camp, which was located near Ba Sao and Phu Ly Villages, 10 kilometers east of Kim Bang (Phu Ly) District Town, Ha Nam Ninh Province, about 65 kilometers south of Hanoi. They were the only U.S. POW's held at the "Rockpile;" all were captured in Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces of South Vietnam. Philip Manhard was kept behind in isolation at "Skidrow", and was later held in isolation during the period December 1971-January 1973 at the "Mountain" Camp, about 40 miles north of Hanoi.

14. In late August 1968, the remaining "Portholes" inmates were transferred to a new camp about 25 to 30 kilometers southwest of Hanoi, which was known as the D-1 Camp and named Camp "Farnsworth" by American inmates. The D-1 Camp (WJ 689017) was located some 30 kilometers southwest of Hanoi in former Hoa Binh Province, and was a Ministry of Public Security facility, which held some 34 U.S. POW's at one time during the period of its existence from 28 August 1969.
to 25 November 1970. With one exception (USAF Lieutenant Colonel Theodore W. Guy, captured 22 March 1968 by PAVN in Laos), the D-1 Camp held only Americans captured in the Tri-Thien-Hue Region and in Region 5 of central South Vietnam. The D-1 Camp was closed after the 21/22 November 1970 Son Tay Raid, and all D-1 POW's were moved to the "Plantation" Camp in Hanoi on 25 November 1970. In April 1971, the "Plantation" received U.S. Army Special Forces Major Artice W. Elliott, who was captured on 25 April 1970 in Pleiku Province. On 7/8 July 1971, the "Plantation" received six Americans who were captured by PAVN in Laos, including USG civilian Ernest C. Brace.

Region 5 - Central Vietnam

15. Following the reorganization in early 1987, Region 5 had geographical jurisdiction in central South Vietnam over GVN Quang Nam, Quang Tin, Quang Ngai, Kontum, Pleiku, Phu Bon, Binh Dinh, Phu Yen, Dar Lac, and Khanh Hoa Provinces. Region 5's B-3 Front (Central Highlands) included GVN Kontum, Pleiku, Phu Bon and Darlac Provinces. Region 5's Quang Nam Province included GVN Quang Tin Province and Que Son District of GVN Quang Nam Province. Region 5's Quang Da Special Region (QDSR) included all of GVN Quang Nam Province except Que Son District.

16. As of January 1969, the Region 5 Enemy Military Proselytizing Section (EMPS) sat on top of a vertical party chain of command over subordinate provincial enemy military proselytizing sections, and was headed by Senior Colonel Nguyen Thanh aka Tri (1968-1969) and his deputy, Lieutenant Colonel Thai (1969). The EMPS had subordinate administrative, enemy situation research, propaganda, penetration, military proselytizing, and detention subsections.

17. The Region 5 EMPS also had a detention subsection which supervised two regional-level detention camps that held U.S. POW's of all ranks and ARVN officers for interrogation, indoctrination, and psychological warfare exploitation. One camp held U.S. and foreign POW's, and the other camp held ARVN officers. The Region 5 EMPS detention camp for U.S. and foreign POW's was operated by the Quang Da Special Region (QDSR) Party Committee's Enemy Military Proselytizing Section (Ban Binh Dich Van). Subordinate Region 5 Provincial EMPS' had
at least one detention camp for ARVN enlisted personnel, and were not authorized to hold foreign military and civilian prisoners. Region 5 combat subordinates and Region 5 provincial military command combat subordinates were required to transfer foreign military and foreign civilian prisoners up to the Region 5 EMPS detention camp. Foreign prisoners captured in the B-3 Front Central Highlands Provinces of Dak Lak, Pleiku, Kontum and Phu Bon were not processed through the above noted Region 5 EMPS camp system, and were instead moved to the B-3 Front EMPS regional-level camp for foreign POW's.

18. During the period May 1968-November 1970, the Quang Da Special Region (QDSR) Enemy Military Proselytizing Section (Ban Binh Dich Van/EMPS) was headed by Colonel Than Tan Trinh aka Tri (1967-1969), Tran Vinh Quoc (1970 killed in an air strike) and Lieutenant Colonel Le Quan (March-November 1970), and deputy chiefs, Ngo Xuan Ha (1970) and Lieutenant Colonel Nguyen Luong Dao (1969-1970). As of mid-1970, the EMPS was organized into administrative, enemy situation research, propaganda, penetration, and detention subsections, and was located in the mountains of Xuyen Hiep Village, Duy Xuyen District (BT 0242). Its detention subsection had a 15-man temporary prison camp, which was located at Loc Son Mountain, Loc Son Village (AT 8349), Dal Loc District, GVN Quang Nam Province. The Loc Son Camp had been in existence since at least 1966, and held U.S. POW's who were moved to the Region 5 EMPS permanent camp for foreign and U.S. POW's. USMC Private "Bobby" (Robert R. Garwood) was initially held and interrogated at the Loc Son Camp by QDSR EMPS cadres Ho An and Chin, who convinced "Bobby" to join the liberation forces. The Loc Son Camp was closed down in late 1968.

19. In Region 5 Quang Nam Province (GVN Quang Tin Province and Que Son District of GVN Quang Nam Province), capturing units escorted U.S. and foreign POW's (regardless of rank) and ARVN officers to the Hon Tau Camp which was located in the Hon Tau Mountains of Que Son District. The Hon Tau Camp guards escorted U.S. and foreign POW's to the same above noted Region 5 EMPS camp for foreign POW's. ARVN officers were moved to a separate Region 5 EMPS camp. Although information on other Region 5 provincial EMPS is not available, the provincial EMPS were presumably similar organized with foreign POW's transferred up the chain of command to the Region 5 EMPS camp for foreign POW's.
20. The MR-5 EMPS detention camp (cover designation unknown) for foreign and U.S. POW's was moved periodically between 1965 and February 1971 to avoid enemy military actions. The camp was located in the following areas by approximate dates with camp commanders noted: location unknown (December 1965-February 1966, Camp Commander Ninh; Tra Khe Village, Tra Bong District, GVN Quang Ngai Province (February 1966-February 1967 and January-December 1968), Camp Commander Duong or Phuong); Xa Ngheo aka Xa Rieng Village (BS 1392), Tra My District, GVN Quang Tin Province (February-December 1967), Camp Commander Khoang or Quang, and December 1968-April 1969, Camp Commander unknown; Tra Giac Village (AS 9990), Tra My District, GVN Quang Tin Province (1 May 1969-4 February 1971), Camp Commander Duong or Phuong. The Tra Khe Camp site was located in a heavily forested area northwest of the Na Nieu River, about six hours walking distance from the point where the Vieng Stream flowed south into the Na Nieu River, and about 15 kilometers southwest of Tra Bong District Town.

21. During the period of its existence, this Region 5 EMPS camp held 32 foreign prisoners (28 U.S. military and four West German civilian medical team members). Of the 32, five U.S. military were released (two on 23 January 1968 and three on 5 November 1969), 12 died (ten U.S. military and two West German civilians). On 4 February 1971, fourteen camp survivors (including two West German civilians) were marched to North Vietnam, arriving at the Hanoi "Plantation" on 1 April 1971; all were released during 1973 Operation Homecoming. Former USMC Private Robert Garwood, who was converted from POW to collaborator status by the Region 5 EMPS, was moved separately to North Vietnam in late 1969, and returned to the U.S. on 22 March 1979.

B-3 Front - Central Highlands

22. The Region 5 EMPS camp for foreign POW's did not hold any foreign U.S. POW's captured in the B-3 Front Central Highlands, which encompassed GVN Dar Lac, Pleiku, Kontum, and Phu Bon Provinces. Although there is no reporting available on the B-3 Front EMPS structure, it was probably organized like the TTHR EMPS and the Region 5 EMPS. Based on fragmentary information from returnees, U.S. POW's, who were captured within this geographical area, were moved to a regional-level camp in Cambodia across from Kontum and Pleiku.
Provinces in the tri-border area of Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam. The camp held an unknown number of U.S. POW's. In early November 1969, U.S. Army Special Forces Lieutenant Stephen R. Leopold, USAID agriculturist Michael D. Benge, and other surviving U.S. POW's (number unknown) were marched to North Vietnam. With the exception of Benge, Leopold and others arrived at the above mentioned D-1 Camp ("Farnsworth") on 25 December 1969. All were transferred on 25 November 1970 with all D-1 Camp inmates to the Hanoi "Plantation." Benge was taken directly to a formal prison on the outskirts of Hanoi where he was kept in an isolation cell until November 1971, when he was placed in a cell with two other U.S. POW's. All returned in 1973 Operation Homecoming.

23. U.S. Army Special Forces Lieutenant Stephen R. Leopold was captured on 9 May 1968 when his camp was overrun by PAVN forces in the tri-border area. USAID official Michael D. Benge was captured by PAVN forces on 1 February 1968 in Ban Me Thuot City, Dar Lac Province, and was moved with two other civilian captives who died en route to the regional camp where he met Leopold. While en route to the camp with Benge, Summer Institute of Linguistics missionary Henry F. Blood (captured 1 February 1968) died in July 1968, and Christian Missionary Alliance nurse Betty Ann Olsen (captured 1 February 1968) died in September 1968. Benge finally arrived at a large PAVN complex in Cambodia in October 1968, and was put in a cage-like hut next to Leopold in a stockade area. In early November 1969, Benge and Leopold marched together with other camp survivors to North Vietnam. The group included U.S. Army Sergeants Martin Frank, Nathan Henry, Cordine McMurray, Stanley Newell and Richard Perricone who were captured on 12 July 1967 while on patrol near Pleiku, and Carroll Flora (U.S. Army--rank unknown) who was captured on 21 July 1967 in Pleiku. U.S. Army Special Forces Major Arlice W. Elliott (captured 26 April 1970 in Pleiku) arrived separately at the Hanoi "Plantation" in April 1971.

COSVN - Southern Vietnam

24. For the remainder of South Vietnam which was under COSVN jurisdiction, military proselytizing recruitment functions were separated from enemy proselytizing psychological warfare and POW handling functions. Under COSVN, the Enemy Proselytizing Office (Phong Dich Van/EPO) of the PAVN's SVNLA Political Staff Department was the highest central authority
with primary responsibility for the administration, detention, indoctrination, and psychological warfare exploitation of foreign civilian, foreign military, and ARVN prisoners. All captured foreign civilian personnel were categorized as enemy "spies," and were treated as captured foreign military personnel.

25. The EPO administered a central-level detention camp system for U.S. and other foreign POW's, as well as a segregated central-level camp system for ARVN personnel. The EPO had at least one camp which held a small number of U.S. POW's as early as late 1963. The EPO had no responsibilities for the detention of communist personnel, captured Vietnamese civilians, or captured GVN civil officials, which fell under the jurisdiction of COSVN's Security Office camp system.

26. The EPO issued guidance and monitored the implementation of POW guidelines within the PAVN's SVNLA through the Enemy Proselytizing Sections (EPS) of subordinate Military Region, Sub-Region and Provincial Military Command Political Staffs, and through the enemy proselytizing subsections of subordinate combat division and regiment political staffs. Combat division and regiment political staff enemy proselytizing subsections had temporary POW holding facilities. The enemy proselytizing subsections of provincial military command political staffs had at least one POW detention camp for ARVN enlisted and NCO personnel. Capturing units were required to transfer foreign POW's and ARVN officers up through channels to the EPO. Although foreign POW's were to be transferred by the various Military Region EPS to the SVNLA Political Staff's EPO, U.S. and foreign POW's captured in Region 3 were reportedly not transferred to the COSVN-level SVNLA EPO camp system. Region 3 was responsible for the southernmost Mekong Delta area of South Vietnam, which included GVN An Xuyen, Ba Xuyen, Bac Lieu, Chuong Thien, Kien Giang, Phong Dinh, Sa Dec, Vinh Binh, Vinh Long Provinces, and parts of GVN An Giang and Chau Doc Provinces.

27. As of April 1970, the EPO was commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Ngo Dao Trai (Ngo Dat Tai aliases Le Trai, Muoi Tai) and his deputies, Major Pham Ban (Pham Tran Ban alias Ba Ban), Major Bui Thanh Ngon (alias Ba Ngon), and Major Bui Thiep. Lieutenant Colonel Le Hoa headed the EPO during 1964-1966. The EPO was located in the Bridge 48 area within the COSVN/SVNLA Headquarters complex in the Fishhook area of Kompong Cham Province, Cambodia, across the border from GVN Phu Khuong District, Tay Ninh Province. The EPO was organized into a
command group and five major sections: policy (ban chinh sach), propaganda (ban tuyen truyen), cadre (ban can bo), enemy situation (ban dich tinh), and the in-combat or battlefied proselytizing section (ban dich van trong chien dau). The EPO reception station was located in an area about a one-hour walk southeast in GVN Phu Khuong District, Tay Ninh Province. The EPO Headquarters had the cover number designation J-2 with Letter Box Number 86,300/YK, and about 350 personnel. About 50 personnel were assigned to the EPO Headquarters and about 300 personnel were assigned to its subordinate detention facilities. With few exceptions, all command cadre and officers were professional PAVN officers of ethnic North Vietnamese or southern regroupee origin. Southern regroupee officers were persons born in South Vietnam, who were sent to North Vietnam after 1954, where they were trained and assigned as commissioned PAVN officers, and sent back to South Vietnam by PAVN to fill command and control positions in the PAVN's SVNLA structure.

28. The EPO Policy Section was the most important staff section. The EPO Policy Section was headed by Major Tran Van Luc (Nguyen Tan Luc) alias Nam Luc. Key cadres included Senior Captain Vo Dau alias Ba Dau, Senior Captain Phu Long alias Sau Phi Long, Senior Captain Ngu, Captain Tran Chau, and Senior Lieutenant Thai Thanh Phong alias Quyen. Major Luc was later killed in a B-52 air strike in December 1972, and was replaced as head of the EPO Policy Section by Major Dao Si To. The EPO Policy Section was responsible for supervising the administration of subordinate detention facilities, interrogating and indoctrinating POW's and deserters, recommending POW's for release, arranging POW release ceremonies, maintaining a central registry of POW's and deserters processed through and/or detained by the EPO, and monitoring the implementation of POW guidelines on the treatment and handling of POW's and deserters by all enemy proselytizing field units within its area of jurisdiction. The EPO Policy Section directly supervised three major detention units, which were called Inter-Units A, B, C (Lien Doi A, B, C) before the EPO camp system was reorganized in spring 1970.

29. Detention Inter-Unit A was established around May 1968 in the Cut Spring area about 12 kilometers southeast of Katum in GVN Phu Khuong District, Tay Ninh Province, near the Cambodian border. In October 1969, the Cut Spring area was bombed by B-52's with no casualties suffered by Inter-Unit A. Inter-Unit A was relocated to the Phum Trapang Phlos/Phum Dar
area (vicinity XT 203977) of Kompong Cham Province, Cambodia, across the border of Tay Ninh Province. Inter-Unit A had a 25-man staff headed by Senior Captain Le Hong Bien (Le Binh) alias Hai Bien and his deputy, Captain Le Hue alias Ut Hue. Inter-Unit A supervised four small detention subcamps (Units 1A, 2A, 3A and 4A) and Escort Unit 23A, which are described as follows:

A. Unit 1A was known as Unit A20 (Camp 20/Trai 20/T-20) before April 1968. Unit 1A had a 25-man staff headed by Captain Ba Manh, and was located in the Bo Tuc area of GVN Binh Long Province. It was the only EPO camp in existence before January 1968 for all categories of ARVN, U.S. and Allied personnel. No ARVN prisoners were held in Unit 1A after April 1969. As of early 1970, it held an unknown number of U.S. and foreign POW's.

B. Unit 2A was known as Unit 21 (Camp 21/Trai 21/T-21) before April 1968. Unit 2A had a 25-man staff headed by Senior Lieutenant Huy, and was located in the Katum area of GVN Phu Khuong District, Tay Ninh Province. It was established before Tet (January) 1968 as a detention facility for foreign civilian and military POW's. As of early 1970, it held about seven or eight U.S. POW's. Three U.S. POW's were released in January 1969. U.S. Army James W. Brigham, Thomas N. Jones and Donald G. Smith were released at Ta Xiem in Tay Ninh Province on 1 January 1969.

C. Unit 3A was designated Unit 22 (Camp 22/Trai 22/T-22) before April 1968. Unit 3A had a 25-man staff headed by Senior Lieutenant Tung, and was located in the Katum area of GVN Phu Khuong District, Tay Ninh Province. It was established before Tet 1968 as a detention facility for foreign civilian and military POW's. As of early 1970, it held seven U.S. POW's. One unidentified Caucasian U.S. POW died from malaria in October 1969.

D. Unit 4A was established before Tet 1968 to detain foreign military deserters. Unit 4A had a 10-man staff headed by Lieutenant Quang, and was collocated with the Inter-Unit A Headquarters. As of early 1970, it held only one U.S. Army deserter, who was identified as McKinley Noland. Noland, his Vietnamese-Cambodian wife, and two step children were detained at Unit 4A with relative freedom of movement between at least April 1968 and March 1970.

E. Unit 23A was designated Unit 23 (Camp 23/Trai
Unit 23A had a 25-man staff headed by Senior Lieutenant Vo Van Thang alias Nam Thang, and was also located in the Katum area of GVN Phu Khuong District, Tay Ninh Province. Unit 23A picked up and detained 35 ARVN enlisted POW's in May 1968 who were released in August/September 1968, and picked up one U.S. POW in June 1968 who was turned over to Unit 3A for detention. Unit 23A also picked up 28 ARVN enlisted POW's in December 1968 who were released in February 1969, as well as 12 ARVN enlisted POW's in February 1969, eight of whom were released in March 1969 and four of whom were transferred to Inter-Unit B. In April 1969, Unit 23A was relieved of its detention functions and became a POW escort unit for ARVN prisoners. Between April 1969 and March 1970, Unit 23A picked up and escorted ten ARVN POW's who were detained by EPO Headquarters elements for interrogation before transfer to Inter-Unit B for permanent detention and/or later release.

30. Inter-Unit B was established in May 1968 in the Xom Giua area (vicinity WT 9869) of Svay Rieng Province, Cambodia, opposite GVN Phuoc Ninh District, Tay Ninh Province. Inter Unit B had a 25-man staff headed by Senior Captain Dau, and supervised three subcamps (Units 1B, 2B and 3B) for ARVN officers and enlisted personnel. Units 1B, 2B and 3B had 25-man staffs, and held unknown numbers of ARVN detainees.

31. Inter-Unit C was established in May 1968 in an unknown area. Inter-Unit C had a 25-man staff, and supervised at least three 25-man subcamps for foreign civilian and military POW's.

32. Between March and early April 1970, the above noted EPO camp system was reorganized and consolidated after large numbers of anticipated ARVN and foreign prisoners never materialized. Inter-Unit A was reorganized with U.S. and foreign POW's consolidated into two camps with 25-man staffs directly subordinate to the EPO Policy Office; the Unit 1A Camp (T-20) was kept intact, while other inmates were consolidated into the Unit 2A Camp (T-21) headed by Captain Le Hue alias Ut Hue; the Inter-Unit A Headquarters, along with Units 3A, 4A and 23A were disbanded with personnel reassigned to other but unknown PAVN SVNLA units. Inter-Unit B was disbanded and consolidated into one camp for ARVN prisoners with a 25-man staff directly subordinate to the EPO Policy Office. Inter-Unit C was also disbanded and formed into at least one or possibly two camps for foreign prisoners with 25-man staffs.
directly subordinate to the EPO Policy Office. This EPO camp system was moved deeper in Cambodia prior to the May 1970 U.S./ARVN incursion into Cambodia. As of April 1972, the EPO camp which held USAID official Douglas K. Ramsey was located near the large city of Kratie in Kratie Province, Cambodia.

33. EPO Propaganda Section and EPO Enemy Situation Research Section personnel also had direct access to U.S. and foreign POW's held in the EPO Policy Section's detention camp system. Key cadres in the EPO Propaganda Section, who had direct access to U.S. POW's, included Senior Captain Nguyen Van So alias Bay Tuoi, and Captains Duy Hoa alias Ba Hoa, and Dao Si To alias Tam To. Propaganda Section cadres conducted political indoctrination sessions, and proselytized U.S. POW's to write anti-war statements, which were used to develop indoctrination materials, including psychological warfare leaflets. U.S. POW statements were sent to the EPD Headquarters in Hanoi where they were used to assist in the indoctrination of U.S. POW's in North Vietnam. Enemy Situation Research Section indoctrinators were responsible for interrogating U.S. POW's for information on the history, morale, and biographic backgrounds of U.S. division-level units and commanders. Attention was placed on the degree of racism and segregation in U.S. units and on the relationship between enlisted and officer personnel. Special emphasis was placed on identifying the psychological, morale and ideological status of key U.S. unit commanders, and on the effectiveness of their units in combat. The Enemy Situation Section had ten personnel headed by Senior Captain Hai Ca; Senior Lieutenant Nguyen Hung Tri was fluent in English and was used as an English interpreter and interrogator with U.S. POW's.

34. On 12 February 1973, 27 U.S. military and civilian personnel were released from the EPO camp system at Loc Ninh, GVN Binh Long Province, during Operation Homecoming. USAID official Douglas K. Ramsey (captured 17 January 1966) later commented on the deaths of fellow camp inmates U.S. Army Major John R. Schuman (captured 16 June 1965) from pneumonia and U.S. Marine Captain Donald G. Cook (captured 31 December 1964 in Tay Ninh Province) from malaria in fall of 1967. U.S. Army Special Forces Sergeant Issac Camacho was captured on 24 November 1963 with U.S. Army Special Forces Sergeants Claude D. McClure, Kenneth M. Roraback and George E. Smith at the Hiep Hoa Special Forces Camp in GVN Hau Nghia Province. They were held in camps near the Cambodian border of War Zone "C" in Tay Ninh Province with Major John R. Schuman, Captain Donald G. Cook and Army
Sergeants Charles Crafts (captured 29 December 1964) and Harold G. Bennett (captured 29 December 1964). Sergeant Bennett was killed in 1965 by escorting guards after an attempted escape with Captain Cook; Camacho escaped on 9 July 1965; McClure and Smith were released on 28 November 1965; Roraback's execution was announced by Radio Hanoi on 26 September 1965; and Crafts was released on 7 February 1967.

Region 3 - Southern Mekong Delta

35. As noted in paragraph 26 above, U.S. POW's captured in COSVN's Region 3 area were not transferred to the COSVN-level SVNLA Political Staff Department's Enemy Proselytizing Office (EPO) camp system. The Region 3 Party Committee was responsible for the southernmost Mekong River delta area, which included GVN An Giang (minus Cho Moi District), An Xuyen, Ba Xuyen, Bac Lieu, Chuong Thien, Kien Giang, Phong Dinh, Sa dec, Vinh Binh, Vinh Long Provinces, and only that portion of Chau Doc Province which was on the west side of the Mekong (Hau Giang) River. The Region 3 Party Committee's Military Affairs Section provided party guidance and direction to its military apparatus, which was more commonly known as Military Region 3 (MR-3). The Region 3 Party Committee and its MR-3 had nine provincial party committees and provincial military commands whose boundaries differed from and overlapped GVN provincial boundaries as follows:

A. Ca Mau Province: GVN An Giang Province; western portion of GVN Bac Lieu Province Gia Rai District; southern portion of GVN Kien Giang Province Hieu Le District; and a western portion of GVN Kien Giang Province Kien An District.

B. Can Tho Province: GVN Phong Dinh Province; GVN An Giang Province Thot Not District; GVN Chuong Thien Province Long My District; portions of GVN Chuong Tien Province Duc Long, Kien Thien and Kien Long Districts; GVN Ba Xuyen Province Ke Sach and Thuan Hoa Districts.

C. Rach Gia Province: GVN Kien Giang Province; GVN Chuong Thien Province Kien Hung and Kien Long Districts; part of GVN GVN Chuong Thien Province Duc Long District; southern part of GVN An Giang Province Hue Duc District; GVN Chau Doc Province Tinh Bien and Tri Ton Districts. Rach Gia Province was reorganized in 1973 with Ha Tien, Kien Luong, Tinh Bien and Tri Ton Districts transferred to the new Long Chau Ha Province.
D. Soc Trang Province: GVN Bac Lieu Province (minus western portion of Gia Rai District); GVN Ba Xuyen Province minus Ke Sach and Thuan Hoa Districts; and parts of GVN Chuong Thien Province Kien Long and Kien Thien Districts. Soc Trang Province was reorganized in November 1973 when Bac Lieu Province was created. Soc Trang Province then included afterwards only GVN Bac Lieu Province Vinh Chau District, GVN Ba Xuyen Province minus Ke Sach and Thuan Hoa Districts, and parts of GVN Chuong Thien Province Kien Long and Kien Thien Districts.

E. Vinh Long Province included the following up to mid-1973: GVN Sa Dec Province; GVN Vinh Long Province Binh Minh, Chau Thanh and Cho Lach Districts; and portions of GVN Vinh Long Province Minh Duc, Tam Binh and Tra On Districts west of the Song Mang Thu River. Vinh Long Province was reorganized in August 1973 with all of GVN Sa Dec Province, and portions of Vinh Long Province Binh Minh and Chau Thanh Districts west of National Route 4 transferred to the newly created Sa Dec Province.

F. Tra Vinh Province included: GVN Vinh Binh Province; GVN Vinh Long Province Vung Liem District; and portions of GVN Vinh Long Province Minh Duc, Tam Binh and Tra On Districts east of the Song Mang Thu River.

G. Sa Dec Province evolved out of Vinh Long Province in August 1973 with all of GVN Sa Dec Province, and portions of Vinh Long Province Binh Minh and Chau Thanh Districts west of National Route 4.

H. Long Chau Ha Province was formed in autumn 1973 out of Rach Gia Province with Ha Tien, Kien Luong, Tinh Bien and Tri Ton Districts.

I. Bac Lieu Province was established in November 1973 out of Soc Trang Province and included: GVN Bac Lieu Province (except Vinh Chau District); GVN Ba Xuyen Province Nga Nam and Thanh Tri Districts; and parts of GVN Chuong Thien Province Kien Thien and Long My Districts.

36. Military proselytizing (recruitment) operations were separated from military psychological warfare propaganda and detention functions in Region 3. The Region 3 Party Committee's Military Proselytizing Section received guidance and direction from the COSVN Military Proselytizing Section, and was responsible only for military proselytizing operations,
providing staff guidance and direction to provincial party committee military proselytizing sections and their subordinate district party committee military proselytizing subsections. The MR-3 Political Staff's Enemy Proselytizing Section (EPS) received guidance and direction from the COSVN SVNLA Political Staff Department's Enemy Proselytizing Office (EPO), and was responsible for military psychological warfare propaganda and detention functions for ARVN and U.S. POW's. The MR-3 EPS, in turn, sat on top of a chain of command over provincial military command political staff enemy proselytizing sections, which had at least one detention camp for captured enemy military personnel. Provincial military command political staff enemy proselytizing sections provided staff guidance and direction to subordinate district unit political staff enemy proselytizing subsections, which also had a detention camp for low-ranking enemy military personnel. Capturing units were required to move foreign prisoners and ARVN officers up the enemy proselytizing chain of command to the MR-3 Political Staff's EPS, which placed these categories of prisoners in segregated detention camps.

37. Based on returnee and escapee accounts, eight U.S. POW's were held in segregated MR-3 EPS camps during the period November 1963–December 1968. These pre-1969 U.S. POW's were the only major grouping of U.S. POW's in the MR-3 area. None were transferred from MR-3 to the COSVN SVNLA EPO.

38. Although no information is available on where Robert White (U.S. Army—rank unknown) was detained, other U.S. POW's captured in MR-3 were grouped together before 1969 in one of two MR-3 EPS camp sites. U.S. Army Special Forces Major James N. Rowe described his experiences with other U.S. POW's in this camp system in his book, "Five Years to Freedom." On 29 October 1963, then U.S. Army Special Forces Lieutenant James N. Rowe, Special Forces Captain Humbert Roque (Rocky) Versace and Special Forces Sergeant Daniel L. Pitzer were captured by the MR-3 306th Main Force Battalion near the Tan Phu Special Forces Camp in Thoi Binh District, about 26 kilometers north of Ca Mau City in GVN An Xuyen Province. Rowe, Versace and Pitzer arrived on 18 November 1963 at their first formal prison camp which was located south of Ca Mau City in a large mangrove swamp near the Song Qua (Cua) Lon River in the Lower U Minh Forest. The camp was commanded by Major Hai, deputy/political officer Mr. Muoi, and English interpreter Mr. Ba. Although
wounded, Captain Versace tried to escape alone on 19 November and was recaptured. The three were later joined by U.S. Army Master Sergeant Edward Johnson (captured 21 July 1964) on 9 September 1964, and another U.S. POW in December 1964, who later died in the next camp site. In late January 1965, the five were moved to a new camp site near the Song Trem Trem River, northwest of Thoi Binh District Town in the Upper U Minh Forest. The new camp site was in the vicinity of a larger MR-3 EPS camp for ARVN personnel. Captain Versace was moved in 1965 to an unknown location. On 26 September 1965, Radio Hanoi announced the execution of Captain Versace and U.S. Army Special Forces Sergeant Kenneth M. Roraback (captured 24 November 1963 at the U.S. Army Special Forces Hiep Hoa Camp in Hau Nghia Province) in retaliation for the GVN "executing three patriots." Sergeant Roraback was held at a COSVN SVNLA Political Staff EPO camp after his capture and prior to his execution. Two more U.S. POW's arrived at Rowe's camp in February 1966; both died in the camp. U.S. Special Forces Sergeant James Jackson (captured 5 July 1966) arrived on 13 August 1966. On 18 October 1967, Sergeants Pitzer, Johnson and Jackson were moved out to be released, leaving only Lieutenant Rowe as the surviving U.S. POW at the Camp. Pitzer, Johnson and Jackson were released on 13 November 1967. On 31 December 1968, the camp area was hit by a U.S. helicopter attack, and Rowe took the opportunity to escape and was rescued on the scene by a U.S. helicopter. No further reporting is available on the MR-3 EPS camp system. Of the eight U.S. POW's held in these two MR-3 EPS camps, three died in the camp, three were released, one was executed, and one escaped.

39. Later, one individual, claiming to be a former prison camp interpreter for eight days in February 1970 and whose reporting reliability could not be established, claimed he saw three U.S. POW's in February 1970 in a prison camp which was located at the junction of the Cai Ngay Canal and Canal No. 5 at WQ 144745 in Tan An Village, Nam Can District, GVN An Xuyen Province, in the Lower U Minh Forest. The three U.S. Army POW's (one captain, one lieutenant, and one sergeant) had been captured at the same time in 1965 or 1966 in the vicinity of Thoi Binh District, An Xuyen Province, by the 303rd Main Force Battalion. At the time of capture, a U.S. Army major was reportedly killed. The lieutenant said he had been an engineer advisor in Saigon before he was assigned to An Xuyen shortly before he was captured. The captain was a wounded ARVN advisor, who had attempted to escape and who was uncooperative during interrogation. The 20-man camp staff was headed by Muoi
Hung, deputy commander Muoi Ve, and chief interrogator Ba Sanh. This story appears to have several similarities with the above account given by U.S. Army Lieutenant James N. Rowe, since Rowe, Captain Versace and Sergeant Pitzer with the only three U.S. POW's captured together in the same Tan Phu area mentioned by this source. Rowe also told his captors that he had been an engineer advisor in Saigon before being recently assigned to the Tan Phu Special Forces Camp.

40. In follow-up debriefings, the same source later claimed that MR-3's A-8 POW Detention Camp (designation unconfirmed) had been located on the banks of the Cai Ngai River (WQ 1573) in Dam Doi District, GVN An Xuyen Province, between 1964 and 19 July 1970, when the camp commander received orders to move the camp to the COSVN base camp area. The camp held three U.S. POW's (one captain, one lieutenant and one sergeant) between at least January 1970 and 19 July 1970, who had been capture in Tan Phu and Tan Loc Villages in An Xuyen Province. Source claimed he worked on the camp staff during this period, and did not accompany the camp move with the three U.S. POW's on 20 July 1970. The camp staff also had a 35-man guard platoon, and was commanded by Muoi Hung, deputy commander Muoi Ve, and English interpreter Ba Sanh. Source was unable to make a positive identification from photographs of all U.S. personnel missing or suspected of being captured in GVN An Xuyen Province.

41. At least one other foreign national was captured in Region 3; however, he was handled by the Security Section of Region 3's Ca Mau Province Party Committee. The Ca Mau Province Party Committee Security Section was subordinate to the Region 3 Party Committee Security Section, and had one province-level prison camp and seven District Security Section camps. As of June 1969, the Province Security Section's prison camp was located at VQ 947723 under the command of Tu Quan aliases Luong Hoang Ngoi and Bay Ngoi. In February 1969, a Japanese newspaperman named "Shahashi" (phonetic spelling) was held in the camp after he was captured traveling on the road from Ca Mau City to Dam Doi District. The Japanese was later taken to Cambodia and released about seven months after his capture. Shahashi may be identical with a Japanese national named Sahashi Yoshihiko who was captured on 28 December 1968 and released on 4 June 1969. Although the camp was moved frequently, it always stayed within the area of the Nam Can Forest, which was more commonly referred to as the U Minh Ha or Lower U Minh in mangrove swamps. All other inmates were ethnic
Vietnamese. The Ca Mau Province Security Section reported to the Region 3 Party Committee Security Section which was located in Muoi Te District (VR 9020) in the Upper U Minh Forest.

Post 1973 Operation Homecoming

42. The EPD camp system continued to exist in South Vietnam after Operation Homecoming ended on 1 April 1973. Subordinate EPD commands in South Vietnam continued to be responsible for the detention of ARVN personnel in its established camp system. Following the communist takeover of South Vietnam in April 1975, the EPD commands in South Vietnam shared responsibilities with the Ministry of Public Security (now known as the Ministry of Interior) for the handling of massive numbers of ARVN and civilian GVN officials. COSVN's PAVN SVNLA Headquarters was installed in the former ARVN Joint General Staff (JGS) Headquarters compound in Saigon, where it became the Ministry of National Defense (MND) Forward Command for South Vietnam. The SVNLA Political Staff Department's Enemy Proselytizing Office (EPO) became the MND Forward Command General Political Department's EPD.

43. Senior COSVN SVNLA EPO command officers assumed key positions in the PAVN-administered reeducation camp system for ARVN in the southern portion of Vietnam. EPO Deputy Chief Lieutenant Colonel Bui Thanh Ngon became chief of the MR-9 (former MR-3) Political Staff's Military Reeducation Management Office in Can Tho. EPO Deputy Chief Lieutenant Colonel Bui Thiep became chief of the MR-7 Political Staff's Reeducation Management Office with the rank of colonel, and EPO Deputy Chief Lieutenant Colonel Pham Ban became deputy chief of the MR-7 Political Staff's Reeducation Management Office with Lieutenant Colonel Phan Dinh Thu. Under Colonel Bui Thiep, the MR-7 Reeducation Management Office's Group 500 administered and supervised a number of PAVN-run reeducation camps for ARVN in Dong Nai, Song Be and Tay Ninh Provinces.
MEMORANDUM FOR: Frances Zwenig
Staff Director
Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs
United States Senate

FROM: Robert W. Magner
Deputy Director for Senate Affairs

SUBJECT: Information on Organization of the Vietnamese Government and Communist Party

1. Attached are three unclassified reference aids prepared by the CIA Directorate of Intelligence's Office of Leadership Analysis (LDA) dealing with the organization of the Vietnamese Government and the Communist Party of Vietnam which the Committee may find useful in understanding the organization of these entities:

   -- Government Structure of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam: The Machinery of State (April 1990);
   -- Communist Party of Vietnam (May 1987);
   -- Director of Officials of Vietnam (February 1992).

2. Additional copies are available should they be desired.
SUBJECT: Memorandum to Zwenig, POW/MIA re Information on Organization of Vietnamese Government and Communist Party

OCA/Senate/RWMagner:jah (15 Jun 92)
Congressional Request for Information on Organization of the Vietnamese Government and Communist Party

From: James D. Anders, Jr.  
C/EA/ICOG  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TO: (Officer designation, room number, building)</th>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>OFFICER'S INITIALS</th>
<th>COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after comment.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Chief, EA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. C/ORMS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. DC/ORMS</td>
<td>06 JUN 1992</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. DC/ORMS</td>
<td>06 JUN 1992</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. O/OCA/S</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Suspense Date:  

RETURN TO:  

Congressional Action
The Honorable John F. Kerry  
Chairman  
Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs  
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

In response to the Committee's letter of April 3, 1992 requesting more detailed responses to some aspects of its January 17, 1992 letter, the enclosed report on the Lao People's Democratic Republic's Ministry of Interior has been prepared. I trust this will be of particular value to the Committee in its work.

We will also be forwarding separately additional materials pertinent to the April 3, 1992 request.

This letter is also being sent to Vice Chairman Smith.

Sincerely,

Stanley M. Moskowitz  
Director of Congressional Affairs

Enclosure
11 June 1992
OCA 2258-92/1

The Honorable Bob Smith
Vice Chairman
Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Vice Chairman:

In response to the Committee's letter of April 3, 1992 requesting more detailed responses to some aspects of its January 17, 1992 letter, the enclosed report on the Lao People's Democratic Republic's Ministry of Interior has been prepared. I trust this will be of particular value to the Committee in its work.

We will also be forwarding separately additional materials pertinent to the April 3, 1992 request.

This letter is also being sent to Chairman Kerry.

Sincerely,

Stanley M. Moskowitz
Director of Congressional Affairs

Enclosure

ALL PORTIONS CLASSIFIED
OCA 2258-92

SUBJECT: Letter to Kerry/Smith, POW/MIA Cmte
(incoming ltr dated 3 Apr 92)

OCA/Senate/RWMagner:jah/ (8 Jun 92)

OCA 2258-92/1
1. The Lao People's Democratic Republic (LPDR) Ministry of Interior (MOI) headquarters compound is located on Nong Bon Street, Vientiane City, about 500 meters from the US Embassy. A 12-man guard force guards the compound and access to the Ministry itself is tightly restricted. The Minister and Vice Ministers of the LPDR MOI are Asang Laoly, Lieutenant General (two-star) Khamphon Boudakham and Bounma Mithong, respectively.

2. The Ministerial Secretariat was headed as of July 1990 by Colonel Boupheng Vongmachanh; Somboun Vongphachanh headed it from 1975-1977 when it was known as the General Affairs Department. As of 1986, the Secretariat employed about 200 personnel. The Secretariat has an unknown number of subordinate offices and departments. The Communications Department was headed by Lieutenant Colonel Thongsay or Major Khamsai, had 80 communicators and technicians as of 1981 who had been trained by the SRV MOI, and operated its own "police signals school" according to the overt press. The Records Department was headed by Souvanakhamphong Vanthanouvong (1975-1981), and had about 100 personnel as of 1981.

3. The General Department for the Development of Forces was headed by Colonel Soutchai Thammasit. As of 1986, it had about 600 personnel. Personnel were assigned to one of at least six departments: cadre organization, party development, inspectorate, propaganda-training, political affairs, or training.

A. The Cadre Organization (Personnel) Department drafted and supervised the establishment of reorganization plans and table of organization strength levels for the ministerial secretariat, general departments, departments, offices, and training schools, as well as for the Vientiane City Public Security Office and for all provincial public security offices. As the personnel management staff of the MOI, it assigned, reassigned, or transferred personnel to meet current organizational strength levels and requirements. The department was also involved in recommending training programs for cadres before their assignments to components within the ministry. Colonel Sout Chi was cited in the overt Vientiane press in August 1981 as Chief, Cadre Organization Department.
B. The Party Development Department was headed by Lieutenant Colonel Bouangeun.

C. The Propaganda and Training Department was headed by Lieutenant Colonel Khamla Keophithoun.

D. The Inspectorate was headed by Major Khampha.

E. The Political Department, headed by Major Somsai, administered a political indoctrination school at Huai Saimoun, Phon Hong District (TF 2746), Vientiane Province.

F. The Training Department, headed by Lieutenant Colonel Kongoi and Captain Sengmani, operated the Don Tiou Police Officers School (TE 5398); the Non-Commissioned Officers (NCO) Police School at Nam Yoi (vicinity TE 4193); and two Cultural Schools for ministry personnel and their dependents at the Nam Ngum Reservoir (TF 4150).

4. The General Department for People's Police (GDPP) was headed by General Saisompheng Sengsoulignavong (1981-1990) and his deputies, Lieutenant Colonels Phosai Saipanya (1981-1987), Onsa Vilavong, Sali Phailot, Souban Keophila, and Champa. As of late 1987, Lieutenant Colonel Phosai Saipanya was also in charge of the That Dam Interrogation Center in Vientiane. As of 1986, the GDPP had about 2,200 personnel. Personnel were assigned to one of at least nine subordinate departments: general staff research, administrative management police, criminal police, traffic police, firefighting police, prisons police management (rehabilitation), economic police, security guards police, or police investigations-interrogation. As of 1981, the GDPP had three East German advisory technicians.

A. The Administrative Management Police Department, also known as the People's Police Department and as the Population Census Police Department, was headed in 1984 by Lieutenant Colonel Sali Phailot. As of 1981, the department was staffed by 20 personnel who handled the MOI's countrywide family registration and identification card system, and managed the LPDR census program.

B. The Criminal Police Department was headed by Lieutenant Colonel Soubane. The department was responsible for preparing criminal cases for prosecution. It had 60 personnel trained by SRV MOI specialist personnel.
C. The Prisons Management (Rehabilitation) Department was headed by Colonel Bounthiem (1981) or Lieutenant Colonel Souban Keophila. It administered all central-level prisons, including the Sam Khe Prison in Vientiane Province, and the reeducation "seminar" camp system for former Royal Lao Government detainees. It sat on top of a chain of command which provided staff guidance and direction to all detention facilities in Laos which were administered by the Vientiane City and 16 Provincial Public Security Offices (PSO's) and their district PSO temporary detention facilities. As of 1983, the department had 75 staff personnel. None had any extensive legal training or background.

D. The Economic Police Department was headed by Major Thongpan.

E. The Security Guards Police Department was headed by Lieutenant Colonel Champa and has been referred to in the overt press as the Capital Defense or Security Guards Brigade. It had at least five 250-man security guard police battalions (203rd, 206th, 207th, 208th and 209th) under its operational direction. The 203rd Battalion performed unspecified functions in Sikhattabong District (TE 4588), Vientiane City. The 206th had four companies and was responsible for providing external security to seventeen state and party installations in and around Vientiane City. The 207th Battalion was based at Kilometer 3 on Route 13 near the residence of the Soviet Military Attaché in Vientiane City, and had four companies responsible for manning thirty-eight checkpoints in and around Vientiane City, and for guarding state offices and socialist bloc diplomatic missions. The 208th Battalion was based at Kilometer 6 near the Sam Khe Prison in Vientiane City. The 208th was a mobile reaction battalion with four companies and was responsible for countering resistance activities in Vientiane Province and for guarding the external perimeter area of the Sam Khe Prison. The 209th Battalion was established in November 1983 at Nong Nieng Village, Saithani District, Vientiane City, where it had five companies under the command of Major Phan and his deputy, Captain Vandi.

5. The General Department for Counterintelligence (GDCI) was headed by Vice Minister Khamphon Boudtakham and his deputies, Colonels Bounpheng Vongphachan and Phetsamone
Vongphathon. The GDCI was previously known as the General Department for People's Security (1982-1989) and as the Political Security Bloc (1976-1982). The GDCI, like its predecessors, came into being when the MOI was reorganized along Vietnamese MOI lines with the direct participation of the SRV MOI Specialist Group in Vientiane. It is the "secret police" or "KGB" side of the MOI, and occupies the former USAID "Silver City" housing complex in Vientiane, where most of its command and departmental staff personnel work. The GDCI has about 1,000 personnel who are assigned to one of at least ten staff departments: general staff research, political security aka foreign counterespionage, counterreactionaries aka domestic counterespionage, economic security, internal security, leadership security, security investigations-interrogation, technical radio, border security aka border guards, or intelligence. As of 1986, the GDCI had about 1,000 personnel.

The GDCI operated its own training facilities in Vientiane City. Its Political Security School was located near the Wat That Luang (TE 5088), Phonthan Village (TE 5086), Saisettha District. The school conducted six-month courses for groups of 60 police and military personnel from the rank of sergeant. Although its curriculum is not known, all trainees were required to study the Thai language. Graduates were assigned to cover positions with state enterprises and other agencies which dealt with foreigners. Other trainees were sent to the Ministry's Don Tiou School (TE 5398), Saithani District, Vientiane City. Graduates of "intelligence" courses were dispatched as refugees to penetrate refugee camps in Thailand, and to collect intelligence on anti-LPDR resistance groups.

A. Leadership Security Department 11 was located next to the Setthathilat Hospital near the That Louang Pagoda in Vientiane City, and worked closely with the SRV MOI Specialist Group in providing security escorts to visiting Vietnamese party and state dignitaries. Department 11 provided bodyguard security personnel to senior state and party officials, and visiting foreign dignitaries. As of 1981, it had about 300 personnel who had been trained by SRV MOI instructors. Leadership Security Department 11 was also known as Political Security Department 11, and was referred to in the overt press as "Public Security Department 11".

B. Internal Security Department 32 provided chauffeurs, cooks, and some guard personnel to senior Lao
officials. As of 1981, it had about 70 staff personnel who had been trained by SRV MOI specialists, and was also known as Political Security Department 32.

C. Technical Department 95 was established in 1980 with SRV MOI, Soviet and Cuban technical assistance, and initially had about 40 personnel who had been trained by SRV MOI specialist personnel. It was responsible for the intercept and analysis of civilian and foreign diplomatic communications.

D. The Border Security or Border Guard Department, as of 1981, had about 150 personnel in Vientiane. Personnel were assigned to border guard posts at the Wattay Airport and at the Tha Deua–Thanaleng ferry crossing point (TE 6179) with Thailand. Several border guard posts have been noted in Sayaboury Province with ethnic Hmong tribesmen. All border guard posts had the mission of ensuring border security against penetration by hostile forces, proselytizing hill tribe villages, collecting tactical intelligence, and harassing Thai border police outposts along the Sayaboury Province border.

E. Foreign Counterespionage or Political Security Department 53 reported directly to Vice Minister/GDCI Director Khamphon Boudakham and to the Minister himself. It was the professional foreign counterintelligence staff of the MOI, and was located on the fifth floor of the MOI headquarters building where 50 staff officers were assigned in 1983. Most operational components and personnel were located in the former USAID "Silver City" compound. Department 53 regularly dispatched agents into refugee camps in Thailand to collect intelligence on anti-LPDR resistance movements. Department 53 was also heavily involved in the recruitment and dispatch of commercial assets abroad to at least Australia, Canada, France, and the United States, and actively targeted U.S. facilities in Thailand. More importantly, Department 53 is responsible for the penetration of all foreign missions in Laos.

Department 53 was responsible for the 1976 indoctrination seminar courses for and arrests of local employees of foreign embassies (U.S., French, British,
etc.). All Lao employees of foreign embassies were required to fill out detailed personal history statements, and were told that they were now employees of the Foreign Ministry's Diplomatic Corps Service Department (DCSD). From its inception, the DCSD was staffed and directed by professional Department 53 personnel who proceeded to organize all foreign embassy local employees into agent and informant networks with instructions to collect information on their foreign employers. Department 53 has similarly penetrated every foreign non-diplomatic representation and international organization present in Laos.

As of 1983, Department 53 was organized into an unknown number of subordinate staff offices. The General Staff Research Office supported the operational needs of departmental offices. The Cadre Organization Office handled all personnel affairs for Department 53. Economic Security Office 3 was responsible for ensuring the security of central-level ministries and state agencies. Office 3 also investigated LPDR corruption cases. Foreign Capitalist Countries Office 4 collected information on Western Capitalist countries; handled agent assets inside and outside Laos; conducted surveillance on foreigners; and monitored Lao nationals in contact with foreigners. Office 4 maintained liaison with the LPDR Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) to obtain information collected by LPDR diplomatic missions. Offices 5 and 6 have unknown responsibilities and cannot be further identified. Emigration-Immigration Office 7 handled emigration-immigration affairs, issued passports and visas, and approved or disapproved the foreign travel of officials and residents.

F. Counterreactionaries Department 74 (also known as Political Security, Domestic Counterespionage or Political Enemies) evolved out of Department 53 in mid-1983. Department 74 is the professional domestic counterintelligence staff of the MOI. By mid-1986, all Department 74 personnel had received SRV MOI training in Vietnam. Department 74 dispatched staff personnel and agents who were tasked with collecting intelligence on Thai-based refugee and resistance camps. Intelligence collected by Departments 53 and 74 enabled LPDR authorities to successfully intercept resistance forces.
when they crossed the border. Collected intelligence was passed to the Lao People's Armed Forces (LPAF) for joint actions against resistance forces in Laos.

G. The Intelligence Department had about 100 personnel as of 1981. By mid-1985, plans were being implemented to assign staff officers to various but unstated LPDR diplomatic missions abroad. As of September 1985, several staff officers had been assigned to LPDR embassies to monitor diplomatic personnel and to counter anti-LPDR activities.

6. The General Department for Logistics (GDL) had about 500 personnel as of 1986. Personnel were assigned to one of at least six subordinate departments: general staff research, construction, finance, medical, supplies, or transportation. The Medical Department operated a medical school which opened its first course in 1979. The Transportation Department had at least one transportation battalion and a driver's training school.

7. The Vientiane City and Provincial Public Security Offices: The MOI provided professional guidance, training and equipment to the Vientiane City Public Security Office (PSO) and to 16 Provincial Public Security Offices in the LPDR. All are similarly organized with staff and operational components like the MOI, and have subordinate public security offices established in every district. The Vientiane City Provincial PSO and subordinate district PSO's have at least one prison detention facility.

8. Control of foreign tourists and officials: An MOI GDCI Lieutenant Colonel concurrently headed the Department of Tourism and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries (TCRFCD), Ministry of Information, Propaganda, Culture and Tourism. The TCRFCD submitted all foreign tourist visa applications to the MOI and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and routinely cabled name trace requests to the SRV MOI in Hanoi. The MFA was instructed to issue visas only after the visa applications were approved by the SRV MOI in Hanoi and its MOI surrogate in Vientiane. All tourist groups were assigned MOI tourist guides. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs Consular Department was also headed by a professional MOI officer. Visa applications for foreign officials to be assigned in Vientiane were similarly sent to the MOI and to the SRV MOI in Hanoi for approval. In this manner, the SRV MOI monitored the entry of all foreign tourists and officials to Laos.
In March 1985, the MOI and its subordinate PSO's began enforcing new regulations on the travels of foreigners in Laos. Foreigners were required to stay in the homes of residents who vouched for them after their sponsors received PSO approval. Visiting foreign businessmen were required to stay in designated hotels. In Vientiane, the MOI compiled surveillance report information on foreign nationals from the Vientiane PSO, LPRP Youth Group members, employees of foreign residences and offices, shopkeepers, and area residents.

9. The Reeducation "Seminar" Camp System: The Reeducation "Seminar" System of the LPDR dates back to June 1975 when Pathet Lao security forces began taking over power from Royal Lao Government (RLG) authorities. RLG civilian and military officers were categorized into political criminal categories and were placed in seminar camps for reeducation. Responsibilities for the seminar camps were shared by the LPDR MOI and by the LPDR Ministry of National Defense (MND). MND "seminar" camps were believed to be run by the MND's Political Staff Department. In 1977, reeducation seminar camps were renamed "production units" to avoid international condemnation. All MND "seminar" camps aka "production units" aka "construction battalions" were turned over to the MOI General Department for People's Police (GDPP) Prisons Management (Rehabilitation) Police Department in June 1983. Although the LPDR has denied the existence of reeducation camps, a reeducation camp system continued to exist in Laos under the guise of "production" camps. The total number of detainees is unknown.

10. Soviet Bloc Advisory and Technical Assistance: As of 1989, the LPDR MOI had an unknown number of Soviet, East German, and Cuban advisory personnel, and had received a variety of technical and training assistance from the Soviet Bloc. Soviet aid to the MOI was coordinated through the Soviet Embassy's economic attache in Vientiane. In 1979, the Soviets provided trucks, cars, motorcycles, uniforms, blankets, sweaters, and mosquito nets, and the East Germans provided truck radios, other vehicle radio equipment, and unknown types of communications equipment. The MOI expected about U.S. $300,000 in aid from East Germany for the 1984-1985 period. By March 1985, the MOI had improved its ability to conduct effective security operations in the Vientiane Capital area due to Soviet assistance which enabled them to monitor telephones and to link isolated security incidents which had earlier evaded detection.
Soviet personnel participated as instructors at several central-level LPDR MOI schools. A Soviet communications technician taught at a two-month course for MOI Communications Department personnel at the MOI's Don Tiou NCO and Officer School in 1983. In early 1986, an unknown number of MOI officers were sent to the USSR for unspecified training. In early October 1986, the MOI sent 100 security officers to the USSR for a short advanced training course of unknown duration and content. At least two Cubans were assigned to unknown advisory positions with the MOI in Vientiane and three East German advisory technicians were assigned to the overt police as of 1981.

11. SRV Ministry of Interior (MOI) Influence Over the LPDR MOI: The SRV MOI controlled and directed all covert and overt operations of the LPDR MOI which functioned as an extension of the SRV MOI. The SRV MOI headquarters in Hanoi supervised operations in the LPDR; maintained radio communications with an unknown size MOI Specialist Group in Vientiane and with the LPDR MOI; operated a special school in Hanoi, which trained SRV MOI personnel for assignment in the LPDR; and operated another school in the Hanoi area which trained LPDR MOI officers and noncommissioned officers (NCO's).

12. All LPDR MOI mail censorship personnel were selected and trained by the SRV MOI General Department for People's Security (GDPS) at a compartmented training facility in Hanoi. All LPDR MOI mail censors spoke fluent Vietnamese and received six-month courses in mail reception-selection, opening, research, and chemical-photographic systems and techniques. The same applied to LPDR MOI audio and surreptitious entry personnel. The LPDR MOI Mail Censorship Office censored all international mail to and from foreign countries other than the SRV. All mail between the LPDR and the northern SRV was censored in Hanoi, and all mail between the LPDR and the southern SRV was censored by the Ho Chi Minh City Public Security Office.

13. By 1985, the SRV MOI Specialist Group had about 200 personnel assigned to the LPDR MOI; all held second lieutenant to colonel officer rank. The group had eight five- to 10-man specialized teams on two- to six-month rotational assignment, in addition to two officers assigned to each general department and subordinate department. Senior specialists assigned to the four LPDR MOI general departments held lieutenant colonel or colonel rank. One 10-man team was assigned to the LPDR MOI General Department for People's Police.
TO : D/OCA

FROM: Bob Magner, DD/Senate Via DD/OCA

SUBJECT: Response to POW/MIA Cmte re 3 Apr 92 Letter re Lao People's Democratic Republic Ministry of Interior

NOTES

COORDINATED WITH (list names as well as offices)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>OFFICE</th>
<th>DATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ACTION REQUIRED BY: D/OCA

Signature please
SUBJECT: Senate Select Committee for POW/MIA Affairs Request for Information on the Lao Ministry of Interior

FROM: James D. Anders Jr. C/EA/ICOG

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date Sent</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20 May 92</td>
<td>(b)(3)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Congressional Action □
MEMORANDUM FOR: Robert W. Magner  
Chief, Senate Liaison Division  
Office of Congressional Affairs

VIA: Office of the Deputy Director for Operations

FROM: James D. Anders, Jr.  
Chief, Indochina Operations Group

SUBJECT: Senate Select Committee for POW/MIA Affairs  
Request for Information on the Lao Ministry of Interior

This is in response to a request by the Committee for information on the Lao Peoples Democratic Republic (LPDR) Ministry of Interior (MOI) organization and structure. We hope the Committee finds the attached study useful and we are prepared to answer additional questions they may have on this subject. We are in the process of preparing the information on the Lao prison system and will forward the study as soon as it is completed.

James D. Anders, Jr.
April 3, 1992

Mr. Stanley Moskowitz, Director
Congressional Relations
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Mr. Moskowitz:

We are writing to express our concern with your 23 March 1992 response to the Select Committee's attached detailed request of 17 January 1992 for assistance in preparing briefings on several aspects of the Vietnamese governmental structure and prison camp system.

The Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) material delivered with your 23 March response satisfies only a small portion of our 17 January request. We still need information on Vietnam Communist Party organization, Ministry of Interior organization, structure and management of the prison camp system, POW/MIA related policy documents, policy on treatment of prisoners and any documents relating to possible Americans in confinement after 29 March 1973.

We expect that the CIA will provide considerably more detailed information on the issues presented in our 17 January request in the very near future. Our Investigative Staff is ready to work with your office in compiling and reviewing the available information. If you have any questions regarding the 17 January 1992 request, please contact Bill Codinha, Chief Counsel to the Select Committee at (202) 224-2306.

Additionally, we are hereby asking for all similar information outlined in our original 17 January request, available to CIA on the country of Laos.

Thank you for your assistance.

Sincerely,

Bob Smith
Vice Chairman

John F. Kerry
Chairman

TL/JK
The Honorable John F. Kerry  
Chairman  
Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs  
United States Senate  
Washington, D.C. 20510  

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Your letter of June 24, 1992 complimenting the Agency on its support to the work of your Committee was greatly appreciated. I want to assure you that this level of cooperation will continue as your investigation moves ahead. The letter makes two requests, however, with which it will be difficult to comply completely, but which I hope we will nonetheless be able to accommodate in a meaningful way.

The letter requests complete access to all Directorate of Operations files on the POW/MIA issue. While there is much routine data in such files, they also contain sensitive material that would identify sources and methods, which in some instances relate to ongoing intelligence activities. Because of that, I am reluctant to provide such unlimited access. Additionally, these files contain material provided by liaison services or third agencies of our government, for which we would have to request approval for the requested review.

I believe, however, that we can be supportive of the Committee's interest. Over the past months, we have regularly drawn material from these files in response to specific Committee requests and I understand this has proven to be a satisfactory arrangement with Committee staff. I can assure you that your staff will be provided access to available data in our operational files that is not source sensitive relative to its areas of specific interest.
Concerning access to the President's Daily Brief, I am sure that you can appreciate the sensitive nature of this communication and the difficulty in providing access to this material to Committee staff. I have, however, asked that all items in that publication dealing with the POW/MIA issue be retrieved and that a chronology and summary of those items be prepared for staff review. In those instances in which an item was also published in the National Intelligence Daily, we will provide the Committee a copy of the latter. I trust this will be satisfactory. Your staff will be advised when the material is available.

An original of this letter is also being sent to Vice Chairman Smith.

Sincerely,

Robert M. Gates
Director of Central Intelligence
The Honorable Bob Smith  
Vice Chairman  
Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs  
United States Senate  
Washington, D.C. 20510  

Dear Mr. Vice Chairman:  

Your letter of June 24, 1992 complimenting the Agency on its support to the work of your Committee was greatly appreciated. I want to assure you that this level of cooperation will continue as your investigation moves ahead. The letter makes two requests, however, with which it will be difficult to comply completely, but which I hope we will nonetheless be able to accommodate in a meaningful way.

The letter requests complete access to all Directorate of Operations files on the POW/MIA issue. While there is much routine data in such files, they also contain sensitive material that would identify sources and methods, which in some instances relate to ongoing intelligence activities. Because of that, I am reluctant to provide such unlimited access. Additionally, these files contain material provided by liaison services or third agencies of our government, for which we would have to request approval for the requested review.

I believe, however, that we can be supportive of the Committee's interest. Over the past months, we have regularly drawn material from these files in response to specific Committee requests and I understand this has proven to be a satisfactory arrangement with Committee staff. I can assure you that your staff will be provided access to available data in our operational files that is not source sensitive relative to its areas of specific interest.
Concerning access to the President's Daily Brief, I am sure that you can appreciate the sensitive nature of this communication and the difficulty in providing access to this material to Committee staff. I have, however, asked that all items in that publication dealing with the POW/MIA issue be retrieved and that a chronology and summary of those items be prepared for staff review. In those instances in which an item was also published in the National Intelligence Daily, we will provide the Committee a copy of the latter. I trust this will be satisfactory. Your staff will be advised when the material is available.

An original of this letter is also being sent to Chairman Kerry.

Sincerely,

Robert M. Gates
Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Letter to Kerry/Smith, POW/MIA re DO Files and PDB

OCA/Senate/RWMagner:jah (20 Jul 92)
June 24, 1992

The Honorable Robert Gates
Director of Central Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, DC 20505

Dear Director Gates:

As you are aware, the Senate Select Committee is committed to an exhaustive and thorough investigation of the POW/MIA issue. Above all, our Committee is resolved to formulate its final conclusions, truthfully, based on the knowledge that no potential body of evidence has been overlooked or shielded from scrutiny. Anything less will invite severe and justified criticism of both the Administration and this Committee.

The Committee, therefore, requests your continued assistance in making available further relevant sources of information to Committee investigators for review. Thus far, your staff has been superb in its support of this investigation; we thank you for that assistance. We ask, however, for even greater latitude and access to areas which have been previously circumscribed by traditional security procedures.

Specifically, it is important that appropriately cleared investigators be able to review actual files in their entirety. Unlike the other intelligence agencies, CIA has not, as a rule, made available its complete files for review. While CIA has been very helpful in extracting specific documents if previously identified or known, this does not resolve the key question of what other information may reside in CIA's files.

We would, therefore, ask you to begin by permitting access to two areas critical to this investigation; DDO's operational files on the POW/MIA issue, and the President's Daily Intelligence Briefing, and "Special Briefs" prepared by CIA from 1972 through at least 1989. Obviously, we are only interested in reviewing POW/MIA related briefs and will work with you to establish the necessary procedures to protect sensitive sources and methods.
Again, this Committee appreciates your continuing spirit of cooperation and looks forward to working with you toward the successful conclusion of this investigation.

Sincerely,

Bob Smith
Vice Chairman

John F. Kerry
Chairman

JFK/kb/bt