

**AFFIDAVIT OF LARRY J. O'DANIEL**

**County of La Paz  
State of Arizona**

NOW COMES Larry J. O'Daniel, and hereby swears and affirms the following:

1. I am 61 years of age, a resident of La Paz County Arizona, and a 1968 graduate of Arizona State University with a degree in Accounting. I was commissioned in the USAR in the intelligence branch; trained as an infantry officer (IOBC 2) at Ft. Benning, GA; and as a Combat Intelligence Staff Officer (MOS 9301) at Ft. Holabird, MD. While attending the Infantry School orders were cut for my service in Vietnam. I arrived in country in January, 1969, five months after entry on active duty. In country, I graduated from the Counterinsurgency Orientation Course for Phung Hoang (Phoenix) Advisers (19 through 28 March, 1969). Post Vietnam instruction included "E" prefix (2GF8) instruction at the US Army Electronic Warfare School, described below, and I have an earned MOS as Military Historian.

2. In Vietnam, I was picked for a counterinsurgency special ops program known as Phung Hoang or Phoenix. The object of this program was to identify and "neutralize" the Viet Cong "Infrastructure" or political apparatus. A corollary part of that job was to identify the officials holding American and allied POWs; identify the locations of such camps holding American and allied POWs; and when asked or required, to participate in operations whose object it was to liberate American and allied POWs. During my tour, I personally handled three POW reports; one emanating from Air Force Intelligence, one from my own agent network, and the third emanating from a "higher headquarters." All three reports dealt with either the U-Minh Forest or the Nam Can Forest, often referred to as the lower U-Minh Forest. However, the one emanating from my agent network tied in with a series of reports, dating from 1966 to 1981 all showing American POWs in captivity in the area of a series of numbered canals along the Trem Trem River. Some of the reports are referred to only by name or extract (Sage Brush I and Sage Brush II deal with POW rescue attempts involving Provincial Reconnaissance Units, CIA paid and trained. These reports have not been released and are referred to only in passing in released reports).

3. After returning stateside in early 1970, I was transferred to Ft. Huachuca, AZ, and assigned to the command of the US Army Electronic Warfare School. While there, I advanced to the rank of Captain and earned the "E" prefix to my MOS signifying my competence to teach and work as an Electronic Warfare and Tactical Cover and Deception officer in a command. I further worked as a researcher in both fields adding to the curriculum of the school the concept of "disinformation" as practiced by the USSR and it's allies. I left active duty in December, 1972 and resigned my commission in October, 1974.

4. These specialties combined to form my ability presently as a writer of fiction and non-fiction on the subject of POW/MIA and Vietnam related subjects. Military intelligence is a discipline whose first job is to prepare for a command an estimate towards completion of a mission. That estimate is based upon facts and assumptions grounded in facts showing the best way to accomplish the mission. Tradecraft dictates that alternate solutions be presented if interpretations of the underlying information can be reasonably inferred. It then lies in the discretion of the command to pick or choose the final way to accomplish their designated mission. Any breakdown of this disciplined approach to mission accomplishment is a violation of intelligence tradecraft.

5. This affidavit is being prepared in response to a request from Roger Hall showing ties, connections, interactions, and results of operations of the CIA towards the question of Prisoners of War and Missing in Action. This is an attempt to set the record straight on this subject. This affidavit will be confined to areas I know of personally, either through training, in the field experience, or research in the fields or subjects herein specified.

6. In Vietnam, I was first assigned to the Go Cong Province Intelligence and Operations Coordinating Center (PIOCC). There, I went out into the field with my Phoenix supervisor and other Vietnamese contacts to learn more about Hoa Tan District, my assigned area of operations, as a DIOCC coordinator.

7. At Hoa Tan, I went on operations with District specialized units. Further, I ran my own agent network through operatives furnished by the OSA, Office of Special Assistant to the Ambassador, CIA, or the PIOCC. These agents, Kit Carson Scouts, or former VC who received specialized intelligence and operations training, also doubled as guides on particularly sensitive missions where their expertise from their previous VC association was needed. In Hoa Tan, I conducted armed aerial reconnaissance missions to achieve a first hand assessment of intelligence from other sources; to enforce a previously agreed upon restricted access area; and to develop further intelligence upon certain areas known to harbor VCI. This supplemented information not readily accessible from ground reconnaissance operations. Here, I attended the CIA run school in Vung Tau for Phoenix Coordinators to learn the full ins and outs

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of our duties.

8. From approximately July, 1969 until mid - January 1970, I served in An Xuyen Province, first at the PLOCC, and then Thoi Binh and Song Ong Doc Districts. This transfer came after obtaining the near pacification of Hoa Tan and in the midst of a military drawdown. An Xuyen is being targeted as a priority designation for high priority missions associated with SEALORDS. There, I was picked for Song Ong Doc, where I stayed until the end of my 12 month tour. This was a time of redeployment of troops back home, contraction in size of District Advisory Teams, and further expansion of Phoenix efforts, all being accomplished simultaneously. Operational control of certain aspects of Phoenix passed from the CIA to MACV. Song Ong Doc was 90 percent unpacified. With my Infantry training and previous field experience, I was moved to help persons or fill spots where the infantry training was lacking.

9. In Song Ong Doc I was the main District coordinator with the Swift Boat Command outside Song Ong Doc, Breezy Cove; the SEAL team, UDT team, and Duffel Bag Team all collocated at Breezy Cove; and flew armed aerial recon missions with the Sea Wolves located off shore. This was facilitated through the Naval Intelligence Liaison Officer assigned to Breezy Cove and through direct meetings at my initiation. All units and their respective intelligence were made members of the DIOCC and coordinated through myself with the Vietnamese intelligence. Field operations, outside aerial recon, were constricted due to lack of Vietnamese military. At Song Ong Doc, I ran field agents, Provincial Reconnaissance Unit (PRU) personnel who were assigned to me in a major reorganization of PRU operations. PRU were CIA trained. I coordinated with Vietnamese agents through the DIOCC.

10. Phoenix was a police type operation designed to eliminate the Viet Cong political infrastructure. A specific directive (MACV 381-41) stated District personnel, were to achieve "rapid evaluation and dissemination of infrastructure intelligence and" to form "quick reaction operations targeted on disrupting, harassing, capturing and eliminating local VC infrastructure..." Elimination meant simply, capture, cause to defect, or when unavoidable, kill. My specific orders read "... Primary duties include performance of duties as tactical advisor to ARVN/GVN infantry type military or paramilitary units in the district area of responsibility to include frequent participation in ground combat operations..." Infantry trained, I earned my CIB.

11. In flying with the SEAWOLVES, I encountered a place, designated a no fly zone, due to the presumed internment of American POWs. It was in the U-Minh forest where subsequent research showed a connection between this location and other co-locations of prisoners of war during and after the 1973 end of conflict. It was also collocated with an area where the late POW Nick Rowe saw American POWs, not returned. I was informed by his close friend and fellow POW, Dan Pitzer, verifying the details he wrote in his book. Rowe was also a source of information to me, with the late Dermot Foley being the cut-out, on my first book on POWs.

12. In writing my three books (one almost finished), I drew upon my experience in the military, read over 10,000 pages of previously highly classified documents, read hundreds of the first and subsequent reports of refugees pertaining to live prisoners of war left behind, read tens of government studies pertaining to the POW issue, and interviewed tens of families and present and former military personnel who dealt with all aspects of the POW question. This was what I called the "Phoenix" approach or sharing of "all source" intelligence so that the fullest possible picture could be obtained as opposed to the usual compartmentalization of information. In the course of this research, I formed fact based opinions of the connections of CIA, past and present, to the POW issue. Many would not be apparent except for the highly disciplined approach I used.

13. In early 1970, I was assigned to Ft. Huachuca, AZ. Upon my arrival in February, almost the first person I met was CPT John J. McCarthy Jr., who assigned me to the US Army Electronic Warfare School. It was my relationship with CPT McCarthy that was "enlightening" then and later as I found out in early 2000. I became friends with John since we were in the same command and we had "similar" military experiences. We also had similar types of "problems" with our experiences. I worked with Phoenix, a CIA creation. John refused work with Phoenix and was eventually assigned to a CIA creation called Cherry. John's predecessor in Cherry was Mike Eiland. A member of his team was William Macris. Cherry was an unauthorized CIA creation designed to overthrow and assassinate Prince Norodom Sihanouk. (It was part of SOG - B-57 - Gamma - funded by the CIA through operation Parasol Switchback).

14. Since John was the first officer I met, I determined to know him better. One of the first things that I found out was that he was a "convicted killer" of a "Cambodian double agent" and that he had "no security clearance" and that he was "guilty and had just been caught." All of this intrigued me because it did not fit the reality of what I was seeing. A "convicted killer" is not on active duty - and a person with "no security clearance" is not a training officer handling highly classified details. It was dealing with the "killing" of the "Cambodian double agent" and "getting caught" that formed the basis for our first few conversations.

15. The person he was alleged to have killed was a multiple agent for the Russians, CIA, Cherry, and Norodom Sihanouk. A colleague of Inchin Lam on Cherry (the man killed) turned up at Blackbeard, run by elements of B-57 - Gamma. Blackbeard was CIA run and had agents with free access to POW camps. (Black designates the operation as being covert). Running with Khmer Serei operatives (both Chuyen and Lam were so identified) made the operation unauthorized by Presidential orders. Eiland likewise worked on projects concerning Cambodia. The colleague of Lam, named Chuyen, was killed (body never recovered) because he was a multiple agent for the CIA, NVA, a peace group, and Blackbeard. He was killed because he lured SF patrols into traps. A document which identified him as an agent was found on an NVA intelligence Colonel's body by a SOG (Studies and Observations Group - funded by CIA) patrol. He was also identified as an agent by photos showing him with high ranking NVA personnel and members of a lost patrol (probably listed MIA) tortured to death.

During this period of time, SOG and all its patrols suffered almost instantaneous losses and compromises on cross border operations. The CIA refused to investigate these losses. They also did not report to SOG (in this I refer to all cross border teams as SOG) the existence of the moles they ran or what they knew of their activities. No reports have been released by CIA on these POW/MIA losses. Some SF were known to have been captured.

CIA also ran a project called OAK. Oak was targeted against COSVN - the Central Office for South Vietnam, the main VC/NVA headquarters running the war. Oak also targeted POW camps in Cambodia and South Vietnam (COSVN was located in Cambodia). Lost on an operation targeted against COSVN was a SOG operative, Jerry "Mad Dog" Shriver. He was believed to have been captured alive. Oak likewise (according to one of its creators, had Khmer Serei contacts, thus making it also unauthorized). The only report I saw from OAK was from inside SVN, near the Rung Sat Special Zone in 1967.

A third project of the CIA was Pine. In 1975, Arlo Gay, captured in South Vietnam and transferred to North Vietnam, and believed by Vietnam to be a CIA agent (he was not) found the name of a LTC Comb scratched on the wall of a NVA prison. The inscription was "G1//Corps/PINE/G4 FWD/CP arr from Danang Apr 23 1975 Depart" A translation could mean that for Pine he was the G-4 at the Forward Command Post at Danang and departed the cell on April 23, 1975. G1 might mean the personnel officer for I Corps at some other time. The name is not on any MIA roster. However, with Pine being a CIA creation, he would not appear on the military rolls. Someone knew the name PINE and Gay said a man with "European features" occupied the cell before he got there.

Associated projects with B-57 and other CIA run operations into Cambodia were Nantucket, Vesuvius One, Sunshine Park, and Gunboat. All these operations had a priority mission of finding American POW/MIA information. I have read some reports from these operations.

16. I have read summaries of regular CIA reports showing locations of POW camps in Laos. They give detailed numbers of "confirmed" locations of American POWs in Laos. To "confirm a location" would require a minimum of two reports, from CIA sources, detailing the same location. None of the confirming reports were released in the over 10,000 pages of reports released by DIA. However, some of the regular summarized ones were. For example, in November 1970, forty five confirmed camps were in Laos, the largest in Ban Nakay Neua holding American POWs. American POWs captured in Laos were believed to be transferred further into North Vietnam. The 1205 document showed that in September 1972 were at least 43 prisoners captured in Laos. 43 prisoners were not returned from Laos.

One summary showed in late 1972 a cave, near Kham Keut Laos, holding American POWs. This was a CIA confirmed location. Kham Keut was among locations used by DIA in developing an "all source" or utilizing reports from all agencies in the "intelligence community, including CIA," to develop a plan leading to a rescue mission in 1981. In 1979, a guerilla source of Vang Pao, a Controlled American Source (CAS), reported American POWs were moved to Nhom Marrot, near Kam Keut. In 1980, satellite imagery, tasked by CIA, showed American POWs in Nhom Marrot. Paul Bannon, and his backseater, named Pike, were believed by agent reports to be in Nhom Marrot. Multiple reports on Bannon were received. On December 30, 1980, an internal NSA memorandum (released to the Senate Select Committee on POWs) told of an interagency meeting on Nhom Marrot. In attendance were representatives of "DIA, CIA, and NSA..." All attendees would have evaluated the intelligence, then tasked to DIA, based in part upon their own sources. Only released documents from NSA and DIA are known to exist and only those pertaining to meetings and conclusions which relate to the decision to ask the President for a rescue mission.

I was personally told by a former head of DIA, Daniel Graham, and a member of the President's Intelligence transition team in March 1981, that "we know where about 20 POWs are and we are going to do something about it." Graham would have had access to this information. There were no known dissenters on American POWs being held capture in 1981 at Nhom Marrot.

A June 25, 1981 article in the New York Daily News reported "American servicemen were transferred from

a jungle stockade in Laos ... because of publicity ... Laotian mercenaries paid by the CIA went into Laos in January and May to confirm evidence from US reconnaissance photographs ...”

17. In late 1981, DIA through ISA (Intelligence Support Activity), sent a mission into Laos targeted against another camp holding POWs. I saw the affidavit of one of the participants and the results of his sodium amathol test, showing his truthfulness. On that mission were Jerry Daniels, a CIA agent; William Macris, a CIA person from Operation Cherry; the photographs taken were to be mailed to Daniel Arnold, identified as a CIA operative. When he returned with photographic evidence of American POWs in captivity, Macris told him that Bo Gritz, the DIA control, had been replaced by Michael Eiland, a CIA operative from Cherry, and the “mechandise was to be liquidated” or killed. John McCarthy Jr, Cherry case officer who succeeded Eiland and worked with Macris, asked me if the “photos might be of” persons the Agency took in Saigon of what they called “long shadows.” While technically not POWs, long shadows did not return and possibly were counted in numbers captured by VC or NVA and held beyond the 1973 time period.

To the Solarz committee, an extract of testimony showed that in 1984, the CIA submitted “the first believable story ... of live POWs in Laos... located at the foot of Ngoua Mountain (NCA)... There were 23 American POWs detained...”

18. The CIA attempted to discredit Jan Sejna, the highest ranking defector from communism on his testimony on POWs. John McCreary, a DIA analyst assigned to the Senate Select Committee on POWs and who estimated that 850 American POWs were alive in 1992, swore in an affidavit that CIA sought to discredit him before anyone knew what he was to testify about. CIA declared none of his information was verified by his former home country. None of those documents have been released. Joseph Douglass Jr., an 18 year debriefer of Sejna, testified that CIA was “surprised” by Sejna’s allegations of medical experimentation and transfer to the Soviet Union. However, he also said, “the existence of the hospital Sejna referred to in his allegations was verified by the Czech government.”

Sejna testified about medical exprimentation on American POWs in Laos and Vietnam. One location in Vietnam, N-13 or Ba Vi, was known by Bobby Garwood, whom I debriefed before anyone in government, and contained a chemical interrogation room. It was close to Bat Bat, also known by Garwood. CIA had a controlled American source on Ba Vi reporting until 1968. In developing target boards, all sources including CIA, would have been used to determine that N-13 was a POW camp from which Americans were expected to return. Mike Bosiljcevac was shot down on Ba Vi Mountain, near Son Tay, Bat Bat, and Ba Vi and did not return alive. Medical evidence showed he lived until 1978, in captivity, possibly transferred to Russia. His remains contained no organs, but showed medical experimentation consistent with the testimony of Sejna (including examining removed internal organs to evaluate the experimentation). ADM Thomas Moorer, relying upon CAS (Combined Area Studies - CIA acronym for Laos) information stated that American POWs in Laos were being attempted to “turn” by KGB interrogation. No documents from CIA have been released confirming or denying these sworn allegations. (Van Buskirk v CNN C99-2009 1/17/2000 deposition pg. 322, par. 3-7)

19. I was told that CIA operatives Eugene Weaver and James Lewis were held at various times at Bat Bat interrogation center. Lewis was there until October 1975. Weaver told his son that he thought he had been in China at one time. CIA documents from his time of captivty show possible prison camps of American POWs in Yunan Province China. CIA operative Tucker Gouggleman, imprisoned until he died under torture by NVA and KGB personnel, ran operations into North Vietnam. The 1205 document, from NVA Central Committee member Quang, declared American POWs from these “diversionary” operations were held in September, 1972. None returned. The Pentagon Papers refer to CIA run operations, OPS 34A and Hardnose, among others, went with Americans into North Vietnam. These began in 1961, the same year Sejna said transfer of Americans to Russian control began. It was also in the same time frame Ba Vi began to accept American prisoners of War, replacing French prisoners. The prison was run by the Public Security Division (a CIA target of political intelligence) and was reported on by among others, the cousin of the camp commander. CIA also had a controlled American Source giving American intelligence detailed lists of Americans held in Son Tay and probably other prisons in North Vietnam

20. I have had experience in probing the world of intelligence. I have written three full length books on the issue of the Missing in Action and Prisoners of War from Vietnam, Korea, and World War II.

21. In line with that and relevant to the subject of this current suit, I found as a result of my research into POW studies, the following material:

A. In the January, 2000 sworn deposition of ADM Thomas Moorer, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it was shown that certain military activities could be undertaken by the CIA, such as hunting down military “defectors,” and eliminating them which ordinary military units could not do without violating rules of ground

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warfare. It is believed that part of the objective of Tailwind, in Laos, was to allow CIA units, to infiltrate other objectives from the legitimate role of SOG (who created the diversion at CIA's request) and take care of such persons, identified also by Moorer as American prisoners who were attempted by KGB to be "turned." (Van Buskirk pg. 314 par. 14-19, 318, par. 9-22, 322, par. 3-7, 11-22, and 323, par. 1-9) Bobby Garwood, was identified by Marine Counterintelligence operative McKenney, as such a target on intelligence furnished by the CIA. They allowed him to think the operation was part of Phoenix. Garwood was traced by CIA into North Vietnam to allow for identification of prison camps.

B. Documents relating to Cambodia (declassified in 2000 over the objections of the CIA), it was shown that US government operatives were prohibited from associating with Khmer Serei personnel, using Khmer Serei personnel in cross border operations, or otherwise hiring or utilizing Khmer Serei personnel. The June 22, 1966 Presidential directive further implemented a policy adopted by President Kennedy and put into an NSAM as one of his first acts by President Johnson.

In the Rheault case (Blackbeard), history is repeated. A "triple agent" is killed. SOG operatives are lost. That means signal materials are probably compromised. Doing the compromising is a veteran transferred from Cherry. This person is an agent for the Agency, Blackbeard, the NVA, and possibly a peace group inside South Vietnam. The CIA "sanctions" the killing of the agent, providing no other alternative, and then refuses to testify in the court martial. Ted Shackley brags he was not "afraid" to testify since the Agency testified in the McCarthy case. (All personnel testifying swore they were military). Several men are killed as MIAs as a result of this betrayal. CIA has released no documents concerning the "trees" programs it ran.

C. For a six year period from 1964 - 1971, SOG suffered POW and MIA losses out of the ordinary. Official history only credits NVA Trinh Sat with one mole, ignoring the mole in Cherry. CIA knew of both. Neither were around after 1967 and 1969 respectively. CIA, through project OAK, officially infiltrated COSVN through a high level operative called HACKLE. Speculation was HACKLE was a double agent, since he refused to leave Vietnam. Reports on any CIA counterintelligence moves, pertaining to POW losses, have not been released. CIA knew who some of the moles were and did nothing.

22. The remains of Michael Bosiljevac were returned in 1987. Examination findings were not made public until last November. The widow specifically asked that I examine the article on it and make sure it was known. From that article, the I will summarize important findings as regards this issue:

...The CILHI photograph of Mike's skull revealed two precise, "clean" cuts...The cut is not of recent origin. [Note: Mike was shot down on September 29, 1972 and his remains were not repatriated until September 24, 1987, fifteen years later.]. The Chief Medical Examiner of one of California's largest counties explained that a human skull is sectioned in this manner in order to remove the "skull cap," which, in turn, is necessary in order to remove the brain. (possibly) or 3) **for the purpose of medical research** ....Dr. Charney was specifically asked to address the "age of death" question.... the close examination of specific bones would—and did!—reveal that Mike's age was closer to age 33 at the time of his death. ...If Dr. Charney was correct, this means that Mike Bosiljevac was alive for about six years after he was shot down— or **until possibly late 1978** . Even if CILHI was correct, Bosiljevac would have been alive up to 1975.

Such treatment would have been consistent with the testimony of Sejna. The Agency in MKULTRA attempted to duplicate some of the experimentation by illegally testing Korean POWs (In the Korean War) and CIA operatives to develop controllable agents and assassination agents. To know what to work on, they had to have something and information to duplicate.

23. Sejna's testimony was buttressed by a report by a US Commission on a similar transfer of POWs from Korea to the USSR (Sejna knew of that transfer likewise). One section of that report is of interest since the imparter of information is of similar value to Sejna. "LTC Corso's single most dramatic source was North Korean Lieutenant General Pak San Yang. Pak was a Soviet colonel of Korean ethnicity who had been seconded to the North Korean People's Army and promoted to Lieutenant General. He was also a member of the North Korean Communist Central Committee. Pak had been captured and disguised himself as a private but had been denounced by anti-Communist fellow prisoners. Under interrogation, he revealed that U.S. POWs had been sent to the Soviet Union and that they had been prioritized by specialty and that he had a list of those specialties. Pak had no information on the number of POWs sent to the Soviet Union. (This prioritizing by specialty was mentioned by Quang in the 1205 document and by Sejna. Likewise, Sejna and Quang were members of their respective countries party central committees. This gives us three high ranking communists from different countries all saying the same thing our intelligence community guessed at. The CIA, in knew of the prioritizing of prisoners from previous releases of their own documents.)

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The August 26, 1993 working paper had this executive summary: (A) U.S. Korean War POWs were transferred to the Soviet Union and never repatriated. (B) This transfer was a highly secret MGB program approved by the inner circle of the Stalinist dictatorship (C) The rationale for taking selected prisoners to the USSR was: (1) To exploit and counter U.S. aircraft technologies; (2) to use them for general intelligence purposes; (3) It is possible that Stalin, given his positive experience with Axis POWs, viewed U.S. POWs as potentially lucrative hostages. (4) The range of eyewitness testimony as to the presence of U.S. Korean War POWs in the GULAG is so broad and convincing that we cannot dismiss it. (5) The Soviet 64th. Fighter Aviation Corps which supported the North Korean and Chinese forces in the Korean War had an important intelligence collection mission that included the collection, selection and interrogation of POWs.

To know of KGB and MGB programs would have required the cooperation of the CIA who was targeted against such agencies. At a minimum, transfer of documents would have been facilitated for comments. Those comments who have been CIA originated.


This above summary could have been written by either Sejna or Quang changing only a few words and times. In addition, it matches other material uncovered by the Institute from classified and formerly classified documents. In that regard, it should be remembered that in 1981, former President Ronald Reagan authorized a rescue mission for POWs from Laos. That authorization came only after an extensive vetting of valid, confirmed POW intelligence. Some of the material also matches that from Oleg Kalugin.

24. Oleg Kalugin, a KGB operative targeted against the United States, he headed the operation that among other items recruited the Walker Spy Ring. Kalugin asserted American POWs were interrogated by KGB operatives up to 1978, the year Bosiljevac apparently died in captivity. CIA would have interrogated and asked questions of Kalugin and learned the same facts he asserted in sworn and public testimony. None of these documents have been released or made public. Kalugin also asserted military information was part of the GRU (Soviet Military Intelligence Service - the same one obtaining the 1205 information for the KGB) requirements. However, protocol dictated KGB be made aware of all information and operations were controlled by the KGB. Therefore, GRU operations targeted against military would have been known in the 1205 summary and the CIA in debriefing of all KGB defectors. Released summaries and books written by such defectors show this to be true.

Conclusions can be made in this case on a professional level, based upon my experience, research of nearly 40 years on POW matters, and research on the related materials outlined here. The important one is either bad tradecraft, denouncing of documents not of their own making, or pure political moves, the CIA has impeded the resolution of the POW question. They have released no documents showing why other intelligence is flawed. Either the documents exist and are hidden or they do not exist to hide CIA incompetence or political maneuvering (either is contrary to their own published tradecraft rules).

It is my informed position that the CIA will hide good intelligence that goes against their institutional bias. They will sacrifice careers, cause men to be imprisoned, cause men to be court-martialed, cause prisoners not to be released, and in at least one case related to POWs maybe even coverup a homicide. It is my informed position that the Agency has used authorized methods (compartmentalization) to achieve unauthorized goals of undercutting national priority programs like the resolving the POW/MIA program and other foreign policy objectives by programs like Cherry. In so doing, it has hidden behind "national security" and "classification" to keep their results from being discovered. This in reality acutally weakens our foreign policy and our national security. In the Sompongs case, an offer was made to trade American POWs for money in Laos. The CIA traced a movement of POWs identical to that intimated by Sompongs and advised the Embassy in Laos, in May, 1971, not to take the offer, although it was cash only upon verified delivery. The documents outlining the reasoning have not been released. The documents, other than the intelligence summary, outlining the move of the POWs have not been released either.

*Larry J. O'Daniel*  
Signed and Sealed This 8 Day of May, 2008.  
- Notary Public Arizona - Maricopa County



STATE OF ARIZONA  
COUNTY OF Maricopa  
This foregoing instrument was acknowledged  
before me this 8 day of May, 2008  
By Larry J. O'Daniel  
Notary Public Kathleen Kay  
My Commission Expires March 26, 2012