



DOMESTIC COLLECTION DIVISION  
Foreign Intelligence Information Report

E40

WARNING NOTICE—INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

FURTHER DISSEMINATION AND USE OF THIS INFORMATION SUBJECT TO CONTROLS STATED AT BEGINNING AND END OF REPORT

PAGE 1 OF 4 PAGES

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

REPORT CLASS. ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~—WNINTEL—  
NOFORN

COUNTRY USSR

DATE DISTR.

12 March 1982

SUBJECT Alleged Soviet Incarceration of U.S. Vietnam Prisoners of War (DOI: 1970)

REFERENCES

SOURCE

SUMMARY: According to [redacted] Grigoriyev, specially selected U.S. prisoners of war were being received into the Soviet Union circa 1970 for long term or lifetime incarceration and "ideological retraining." He implied the number involved to be about 2,000. The goal of the program was indefinite, but involved intensive psychological investigation of the prisoners and retraining to make them available as required to serve the needs of the Soviet Union. [redacted]

1. (Headquarters Comment: This report should be read with caution. CIA records contain no confirmation of the alleged intelligence affiliation of the subsource cited below, despite the source's assertion that Grigoriyev held a leading position in the KGB. Several other persons named in the text likewise cannot be identified. We have never before encountered even vague rumors among Soviet dissidents or other informants that any U.S. POW's from Vietnam are incarcerated in

5  
4  
3  
2  
1

C O N F I D E N T

E440 41



~~WARNING NOTICE~~  
~~ORIGIN SOURCE AND METHODS L~~  
**FURTHER DISSEMINATION AND USE OF THIS INFORMATION SUBJECT**  
**TO CONTROLS STATED AT BEGINNING AND END OF REPORT PAGE 2 OF 4 PAGES**

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~



the USSR, much less that 2,000 such individuals are leading "reasonably normal lives" in the same region where numerous Soviet political prisoners have resided in exile. In short, while the source may be reporting his recollection of an actual conversation, we strongly believe that this report merits little if any credence from analysts. However, in light of continuing high interest in the question of U.S. personnel still listed as missing in action in Southeast Asia, this report is being disseminated with appropriate caveats to concerned members of the U.S. Intelligence Community.)

2. In a private conversation which was held circa 1970, KGB Lieutenant General Petr Ivanovich ((Grigoriyev)) stated that many specially selected U.S. prisoners of war were being received from North Vietnam for long term or lifetime custody and "ideological re-training" in the Soviet Union. (Source Comment: Grigoriyev did not state specifically the number of prisoners involved. The term he used was "v poriyadke neskol'kikh tysyach v nas tozhe yest" which translates as "on the order of several thousand," implying the number to be about 2,000). The prisoners were destined for confinement at a facility near Perm. Grigoriyev, who learned of the program from an unnamed high level KGB colleague, understood that Soviets rather than North Vietnamese were involved in the initial selection process and that participants were to be continually assessed for suitability. He implied that individuals determined to be unsuitable would be eliminated and replaced with other candidates. (Source Comment: Grigoriyev made his comment while serving as a political ideologist and personnel officer at the All-Union Scientific-Technical Information Center of the State Committee for Science and Technology in Moscow. He had previously served as Chief of the KGB's Personnel Directorate and in that capacity would have very likely made contacts among KGB officials subsequently responsible for organizing any such prisoner program.)

3. According to ~~Grigoriyev~~, the goals of the U.S. prisoner program were indefinite but involved intensive psychological studies of the individuals and utilization of them as required to serve the needs of the Soviet Union. ~~Grigoriyev~~ understood that the detention facility was not a standard prison, but rather one in which inmates could lead reasonably normal lives. During the conversation ~~Grigoriyev~~ recalled that precedents existed for such a program in the Soviet Union and cited similar previous efforts with Spanish, Japanese, and Chinese nationals. He stated that in past programs, participants were encouraged to marry Soviet women.

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

5  
4  
3  
2  
1

INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS

FURTHER DISSEMINATION AND USE OF THIS INFORMATION SUBJECT TO CONTROLS STATED AT BEGINNING AND END OF REPORT PAGE 3 OF 4 PAGES

CONFIDENTIAL

4. [redacted] Comment: Source described Grigoriyev as a very professional and security-conscious person who confided in source because of their unique personal relationship. Grigoriyev, in his capacity as an institute personnel officer, was the first individual to interview source upon his transfer to the information center. Grigoriyev requested basic biographic data and acknowledged being acquainted with several individuals listed by source, particularly [redacted] General Feodor Petrovich ((Skrynnik)), who had a GRU officer serve as Deputy Chief of Intelligence for the Far Eastern Military District in the early 1950's. Skrynnik and Grigoriyev owned dachas near each other and while not close friends, held each other in high respect. In addition to Skrynnik, Grigoriyev was acquainted with (FNU) ((Prudnikov)) who was active in Western Europe and Germany for the KGB, (FNU) ((Gradoselskiy)) who had served as a KGB official in Poland and Germany, and (FNU) ((Gridniyev)) who served as KGB Deputy Chief for Administration and Supply. A sense of trust had therefore been developed over many years of mutual association with top level KGB and GRU officers.) (Headquarters Comment: Prudnikov may be identical with Mikhail Sidorovich Prudnikov, dob circa 1912, a senior Soviet intelligence official whose memoirs of operations during and after World War Two have been published in the USSR. CIA records do not identify any individual named Grodoselskiy or Gridniyev as having served in Soviet intelligence.)

5. Grigoriyev volunteered the information regarding the Vietnam prisoners during one of many private conversations during the late 1960's and early 1970's. His duties were not particularly demanding after his years as an administrator in the KGB. He was often finished with his work in the early afternoon and, rather than go home or engaged in outside interests, held informal discussions in his office. [redacted] Comment: Source stated that he was the person most frequently chosen by Grigoriyev for private conversations.) Topics primarily involved Grigoriyev's personal affairs and health, but also included political topics. During one of these sessions the subject of prison camps arose, in particular those which furnished labor for Siberian economic development. The conversation then shifted to Vietnam and the apparent increase in strength of South Vietnam at the time and the apparent instability in the North. Grigoriyev agreed, citing the massive U.S. commitment to the South, but added that the Soviets were also making gains. He then described the program involving U.S. prisoners.

CONFIDENTIAL

5  
4  
3  
2  
1

**INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED**  
**FURTHER DISSEMINATION AND USE OF THIS INFORMATION SUBJECT**  
**TO CONTROLS STATED AT BEGINNING AND END OF REPORT PAGE 4 OF 4 PAGES**

**C O N F I D E N T I A L**

6. Grigoriyev was trained as a professional military officer and served in the tank troops during World War II. After the war he was assigned to the Party Central Committee as an army representative. In the period 1953-1954 he became KGB Deputy Chief for Personnel. He subsequently became critical of the recruitment policies of KGB head Vladimir Yefimovich ((Semichastnyy)) and was transferred from his position to that of KGB Security Chief for Soviet Bloc nations. Soon thereafter he developed a heart ailment and retired. In the late 1960's he accepted the position at the Information Center.

7. General Skrynnik joined the Russian cavalry in 1917 and subsequently entered the Odessa artillery school. Upon graduation he was assigned to the Zhitomir military district. In 1931 he entered the Frunze Military Academy. He advanced rapidly and in the 1933-1934 period was sent to China as Deputy Military Attache. He joined Mao's long march and began to establish intelligence agent networks for the Soviet Union. He remained in China until 1942 except for a brief return in 1939 to establish an intelligence school in Moscow for China operations. In the spring of 1942 he was recalled from China to become chief of intelligence on the northwestern front, where he remained for the duration of the war. After the war he was assigned as Soviet representative to the Berlin Joint Commission for Repatriation. After serving in Berlin from 1945 to 1949 he returned to Moscow as either chief or deputy chief for intelligence at the Frunze Academy. He then served as Deputy Intelligence Chief of the Far Eastern Military District. He retired from the military in 1953. Skrynnik was subsequently recalled to duty to re-establish agent networks in China after the China-USSR split but refused to leave retirement. (Headquarters Comment: CIA records contain no independent confirmation of the details of Skrynnik's career provided here.)

**REPORT CLASS C O N F I D E N T I A L--WARNING NOTICE--INTELLIGENCE**  
**SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS--**  
**RWV 16FEB02 ORG RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER EXT SAME RSN 3D3. ALL**  
**PORTIONS CARRY CLASSIFICATION AND CONTROLS OF OVERALL DOCUMENT.**