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1           A     I provided him an outline of activities that  
2     resulted in the ultimate disappearance of a large quantity of  
3     POW-MIA people.

4           Q     Can you be more specific, please?

5           A     Sure. In 1970, I was stationed at a unit called  
6     Task Force Alpha in Nakhon Phanom, Thailand, and I was cleared  
7     for top-secret material. And we ran a very extremely  
8     classified project at the time that was called, "The  
9     Project."

10          Q     The Project?

11          A     The Project. And the Project was a code name for  
12     Task Force Alpha, which was a personal project of Defense  
13     Secretary McNamara. And its area of involvement was to  
14     coordinate the war effort throughout Laos.

15                 And in doing so, I was a targeter. My job was to  
16     supervise people and direct targeting strikes through --  
17     target requests throughout primarily an area known as Steel  
18     Tiger within Laos.

19                 And in so doing, we became aware -- "we" meaning  
20     the U.S. Air Force -- became aware of patterns of placing  
21     POW's in a very hostile, threatening environment to be used  
22     in an effort to prevent American targeting efforts in Laos  
23     and North Vietnam.

24          Q     I'm not with you. What is the hostile environment  
25     to which you refer?

1           A     Well, hostile environment I refer to is taking  
2     **small POW sites** and building them, constructing them within  
3     the interval confinement of another target complex, i.e., a  
4     **pumping station**, POL storage, ammunition storage, truck  
5     park/storage area.

6           The types of targets that we were trained to go  
7     after in Laos was exactly the type of targets that they were  
8     shipping prisoners of war to in an attempt to force us to  
9     comply with the Geneva Convention and not bomb such  
10    facilities.

11          Q     What other information did you provide to Mr.  
12    Cummings on this occasion?

13          A     **I relayed** to him a concern that I've had since  
14    **1970. And that was** that a decision was made to allow the  
15    **strikes** to actually penetrate those target complexes where  
16    **the POW's** were held. An overt decision was made to hit those  
17    targets and we did so. And resultedly destroyed a lot of  
18    material along with human life.

19          Q     **Do you** have an understanding as to when that  
20    **decision was made?**

21          A     Yes, I do. Shortly after the Kent State incident  
22    in 1970, **which** I believe was in May of 1970, if my memory  
23    serves me correctly.

24          Q     And do you have an understanding as to who made  
25    that decision?

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1           A     I was an instrument of the decision. I did not  
2 make the decision. I -- my job at the time was to -- the  
3 computerized targeting system that we utilized at Task Force  
4 Alpha -- which at that time was the world's most complex, we  
5 were told. It was an IBM 360 -- 360E system that required  
6 on-site technicians continuously from IBM to maintain it.

7           The -- a lot of this I don't wish to go into. I'm  
8 sure it's still classified. But the system itself was a  
9 guidance system using sensors buried in the ground to  
10 coordinate and conduct strikes at night and in very inclement  
11 weather conditions, primarily during the rainy monsoon season  
12 in Southeast Asia.

13           And in support of that targeting program, we were  
14 the target coordinator to Phon Phen in VNT in Laos for the  
15 CIA to conduct their activities. So we were basically the  
16 liaison or coordinator for all strike authorization within  
17 Steel Tiger and part of what was called Barrel Roll area.

18           Q     Again, do you -- do you know who made the decision  
19 in question? I understand you did not.

20           A     I know who implemented the order. I don't know who  
21 made the decision.

22           Q     Tell me, please, what is Steel Tiger?

23           A     Steel Tiger, if you have a map of Laos is primarily  
24 the area that's slender, skinny, approximately a hundred  
25 nautical miles wide that's below the large round northern

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1           And the safeguard system was very simple. If you  
2 entered in a set of coordinates and you referred into a  
3 computer code, if you listed a target as a POW-MIA possible  
4 complex or if you listed it as a hospital, for example, any  
5 other agency trying to target that unit -- that complex, it  
6 would be automatically rejected by our computer.

7           So that we would alert the other organization that  
8 they couldn't bomb there. And we had to write up a reason  
9 why. We had to relay a computerized message to that element  
10 to say what we knew that they probably were unaware of  
11 through PIREPS, pilot reports, predominantly.

12           So the safeguards were in place when I arrived.  
13 And throughout my -- I arrived in Thailand in October of  
14 1970. And throughout that dry period -- I had arrived just  
15 as the monsoon season was over.

16           And as the hostile activities increased -- which  
17 was primarily a movement of materials in massive quantity to  
18 the south in an attempt of what we in intelligence assumed  
19 was going to be another Tet offensive.

20           As we basically became crippled with our targeting  
21 activities throughout the initial onset of the dry season  
22 from October up until February or so, we could bomb less and  
23 less and hit less and less and get less and less bomb damage  
24 assessment.

25           At a unit level, I was informed that as of March,

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1 that the safeguards would be removed from the computer  
2 system. In other words, the computer would accept the target  
3 request from the other unit without alerting that unit to the  
4 fact that it was, in fact, a POW -- a potential POW location.

5 Q What else did you tell Mr. Cummings during that  
6 conversation?

7 A I told Mr. Cummings I thought this was horrendous  
8 that we did this to our people. And that I would help in any  
9 way whatsoever to -- within the framework of the law to help  
10 him do research in that area.

11 Q Did you tell him anything else on that occasion?

12 A I have outlined the bulk of what we discussed. And  
13 I believe your request -- I believe there's an affidavit or a  
14 document I have seen that discusses a source that Mr.  
15 Cummings has, and I am that source.

16 Q What did Mr. Cummings say to you during this  
17 conversation?

18 A Well, he was -- if this proved to be true, he was  
19 appalled too. He couldn't believe that a decision was made  
20 without the public knowledge of. And there's obviously been  
21 an ongoing -- I don't want to use the word "cover-up," but  
22 lack of initiative to get to the bottom of a lot of the MIA  
23 issue, in my opinion, and he wanted to pursue it. And I  
24 strongly encouraged him to do so.

25 Q How did you and Mr. Cummings happen to meet?

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