Lee Flunked Two Polygraphs
The circumstances surrounding Lee's polygraphs remain obscure. The FBI ran the espionage investigation, but for reasons still unexplained, the Bureau agreed to allow a private security firm, Wackenhut, under contract to the Energy Department, to conduct the first polygraph exam of Lee in December 1998. A June 1999 Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board investigation of the case asked, "Why DOE, rather than the FBI, conducted the first polygraph in this case when the case was an open FBI investigation." A Senate inquiry would later conclude that the "mishandling of this polygraph is one of the most consequential errors of the Wen Ho Lee matter."
On December 23, 1998, the Wackenhut polygrapher told Lee that he had passed the exam. That would become part of the lore of the Lee case and be repeatedly cited by Lee's apologists to show that the government scapegoated him. On February 4, 2000, for example, CBS Evening News correspondent Sharyl Attkisson told viewers that Lee had passed the December polygraph with flying colors. She quoted former FBI agent Richard Keifer, then chairman of the American Polygraph Association, saying "he had never been able to score anyone so high on the non-deceptive scale." Keifer would later claim that Attkisson had quoted him out of context. When he finally had the opportunity to review Lee's polygraph charts, he said that the Wackenhut exam questions were structured in such a fashion as to ensure that Lee scored well on the exam.
How Wackenhut botched Lee's December polygraph is revealed in a recently declassified FBI report on that exam. FBI agents were present at the exam and requested that copies of the transcripts be made available to the Bureau's polygraph quality control unit in Washington. But Energy Department security officials declined to forward those transcripts for at least a month.
When the Bureau finally had an opportunity to review them, it told the FBI agents "it cannot endorse the results." A declassified memo from the FBI Headquarters Polygraph Unit to the Albuquerque FBI field office concluded the Polygraph Unit "cannot officially evaluate the results of any outside exam because the FBI had no control over the quality of the exam." But the unit concluded it "would not have passed the subject. He seemed inconclusive, if not deceptive, on two of the questions, those being 'Have you ever had any contact with anyone to commit espionage against the United States?' and 'Have you ever had any personal contact with anyone you know who has committed espionage against the United States?'" The unit "observed there seems to be something wrong because the subject had huge reactions to both control and relevant questions. Subject did not pass the exam."
The Albuquerque field office was urged to conduct its own examination, which it did on February 10, 1999. The test focused on Lee's contacts with Chinese scientists and "whether or not he had compromised the W-88 warhead." It has been previously reported that he reacted deceptively to two questions as to whether he had passed specific nuclear weapons codes or W88 information to unauthorized persons. Another declassified FBI memo provides more detail about the questions; he was asked whether he had ever provided two classified codes to a PRC scientist and whether he had ever "deliberately obtained any blueprints for the W-88." The FBI polygrapher administered the exam twice and then concluded Lee's "reactions indicat[ed] deception when he answered those questions." The reference to "blueprints" is significant because, first, Lee claimed no knowledge of the W88 warhead. More significantly, the Clinton administration would later claim not to know whether China had obtained blueprints for the W88 or other warheads.
Since Lee's 2000 plea bargain, much new information about his "long history" with the FBI has been placed on the public record. We now know that the Bureau investigated Lee three times between 1982 and 1999.
Most telling was the conclusion of a federal prosecutor who reviewed the Clinton administration's handling of the case. In 2001, his report concluded there was sufficient "probable cause to believe that Wen Ho Lee was an agent of a foreign power, that is to say, a United States Person currently engaged in clandestine intelligence gathering activities for or on behalf of the PRC which activities might involve violations of the criminal laws of the United States and that his wife, Sylvia Lee, aided, abetted, or conspired in such activities."
Recently, the Public Broadcasting Service (PBS) Frontline program ran a story on the "Parlor Maid" Chinese espionage case in California. The story, "From China With Love," aired on January 15 and included an interview with Notra Trulock, AIM Report Associate Editor who is the former chief of intelligence in the Energy Department.
The program also featured interviews with former FBI special agents Edward Appel, T. Van Magers, Jack Keller, and I.C. Smith, former Ambassador to China James Lilley, and Dan Stober of the San Jose Mercury News.
The broadcast was a useful exposé of the serious problems at the Bureau and in our national security apparatus in general. It was also a useful antidote to the tendency by the media (and the Bush administration) to ignore China and the threat it poses.
Frontline made only a passing reference to the Wen Ho Lee case, citing it as one of the many Bureau frustrations in coping with Chinese spying. The next day, the Frontline producer Michael Kirk participated in an on-line Internet chat hosted by the Washington Post and was asked about the Lee case and its relation to the Parlor Maid and other Chinese espionage cases of the past twenty years. He said, "The Wen Ho Lee case remains one of the great unresolved stories in the history of American counterintelligence. Someday, perhaps someday soon, serious journalism will take a long hard look at the facts of the case."
In truth, "many hard facts" about Lee, Chinese nuclear espionage, and the Bureau's handling of this threat, are on the public record. Most of those run counter to the media's interpretation of what actually happened in this case.
The Justice Department has declassified large portions of one of its internal reviews; there is a detailed account of Lee's previous encounters with the FBI. Lee's brush with the Bureau in 1996, for example, was the third time he had been the subject of an FBI counterintelligence investigation. Similarly, congressional testimony by administration officials, like Janet Reno, has also been declassified and provides further insight into the Bureau's probe of Lee.
A Senate Judiciary committee report also provided new details and insights into the case. Among other things, the Senate report revealed that in 1994 the Bureau had already been told that Lee had helped Chinese nuclear scientists with computer codes and software. Its main conclusion-that since 1982 the government's "handling of the Wen Ho Lee affair has been an unmitigated disaster"-should have provoked intense scrutiny from the media. But Lee's apologists have persuaded many in the media that Lee was an innocent victim of an administration eager to deflect public attention from its mismanagement of national security. Add to this allegations that Lee was a victim of racism and ethnic profiling, and it's little wonder that journalists have shied away from taking that "long, hard look" at the case.
What You Can Do
Send the enclosed cards or cards and letters of your own choosing to Margaret Spellings of the White House, CNN's David Bohrman, and Frontline producer Michael Kirk.