The United States and Russia want to reduce their stockpiles of nuclear weapons. Currently, they each deploy 2,200 warheads on bombers, submarines and missiles. A variety of proposed numbers have been discussed as to what new level we should move, the most common being 500, 1000 or 1,500. Many Americans probably believe that since a few nuclear weapons can ruin your whole day, any of these numbers are more than adequate to maintain our security. So the $64,000 question is: “Do these numbers matter?”

 

First, to put this debate in context is important. Around 1980, the U.S. and the then Soviet Union each had between 10-12,000 deployed warheads. We had others in reserve. Today that number has dropped over 80%, a remarkable achievement. But critics argue we need to drop even lower. They assert that we should do so to lead the world toward a world free of nuclear weapons. And, they add, the sooner we get there the better.

Second, by making a “dramatic move” toward nuclear disarmament, it is assumed we will markedly change the political debate over North Korea and Iran. Nations previously unwilling to help us will change their minds. The moral authority of our righteous policy will translate into political power. “World opinion” will successfully pressure Tehran and Pyongyang to give up their nuclear weapons programs.

Now, what are the dangers in such a policy? The most obvious, of course, is that the U.S. and Russia dramatically cut their arsenals and others decide to build up to match our new lower numbers. Another problem is that our low numbers will be perceived by our friends as the U.S. backing away from extending our nuclear deterrent umbrella over them. Countries such as the Republic of Korea, Japan, Germany and others may then seek nuclear weapons of their own, which would then add to proliferation, making our security worse, not better.

But there are two additional and profound dangers that need to be seriously examined. One is whether going to very low numbers is in fact a “rush to danger,” and not a move toward better security, because of the very nature of current Russian nuclear policy. And the second is that very low numbers might very well require the U.S. to give up two of the three legs of our nuclear triad, which would consequently heighten nuclear dangers and crisis instability.

Let’s examine each of these. Under the rule of President Putin, the Russians have proclaimed that there nuclear weapons will play an increasing role in their security. They assert the right to use nuclear weapons in regional conflicts even against non-nuclear powers. They see the battlefield and tactical use of nuclear weapons as not only necessary for their security but as a “de-escalatory” move. They have threatened to deploy nuclear tipped missiles in the Kaliningrad enclave near Poland to stop a NATO endorsed missile defense plan.

In addition, low levels of strategic nuclear weapons – launched on long range bombers or missiles – would leave the Russians with something on the order of 5,000 more tactical or short range nuclear weapons than the United States. However, these weapons can easily be interchanged and added to Russia’s strategic inventory. That would leave Russia with a potentially significant strategic advantage.

But of equal importance is the eventual structure of the U.S. nuclear deterrent, not just its size. Currently we have 450 Minuteman missiles dispersed across some five western states; we have two each submarine and bombers bases while at any one time four of our 14 submarines are at sea. This three-legged structural stool has been our nuclear “triad” for half a century. It has maintained the peace.

Now let us assume we decide to have only 1,000 warheads. Our triad now consists roughly of 450-600 Minuteman, 1,152 Trident submarine and 350-500 bomber warheads and/or cruise missiles. Under 1,000, we might get rid of the Minuteman missiles and bombers. Or we might get rid of the submarines. But the first option would leave us with four submarines at sea and the remaining subs at two bases – one in Georgia and one in Washington. If an adversary could find our submarines at sea, our entire deterrent would be at risk. The second option places everything on the back of our land based missiles. A technological failure in our ICBM fleet would leave us with the air breathing deterrent alone. But bombers are susceptible to air defenses and require hours to respond.

A deployment ceiling of 500 would be even worse, and might push the US to eliminate at least two legs of the Triad. If submarine based only, the number of boats might have to be reduced to 2-3 as each submarine can carry almost 200 warheads. Or we could keep only the ICBMs or bombers, but either option would risk a technological failure leading to a seriously diminished U.S. deterrent, with all the attendant security risks that would entail.

A much better option would be a range of say 1,500-1,700, trading the floor of the 2002 Moscow Treaty for a new ceiling. Reasonable “counting” rules would allow the US to keep all 450 Minuteman, 14 submarines and a robust contingent of bombers, with warheads roughly divided 450, 720 and 330, respectively. No adversary could de-nuclearize the U.S. by a sneak or pre-emptive attack unless all 450 silos, four submarine and bomber bases and Trident boats at sea were eliminated simultaneously. As we used to say during the Cold War, we wanted our adversaries to wake up each day and say, to paraphrase General C. Donald Alston, the Assistant Air Force Chief of Staff for strategic deterrence, “Not Today Comrade.” The deployment of 450 Minuteman missiles ensures that, today and tomorrow.

In short, why make the job of an adversary any easier? In the nuclear deterrence business, there is no room for miscalculation or mistakes. An imperfect analogy might help. A Russian bad guy comes into an American town looking to rob a bank. But he learns there are 450 sheriffs in town each armed with a 44 magnum. How is he going to disarm 450 lawmen, and do so before they draw and fire? And there are only a few banks, which mean most banks will be well protected. So our bad guy leaves town and the banks are saved.

A year goes by. The town’s mayor calls for putting all the sheriffs in one building rather than being disbursed throughout the city on patrol. “We could save a lot of money,” he tells the City Council. And save on shoes! And sunscreen. And we won’t be accused of militarizing the streets! So all the sheriffs are called back from patrol. They get to sit at a desk, with plenty of air conditioning. Word gets out. The Russian bad guys find out the sheriffs are not on patrol. The banks all get robbed.  Moral of the story: keep your sheriff by your side, outside, visible with his 44 Magnum in sight. The bank you save may be your country.

 

Guest columns do not necessarily reflect the views of Accuracy in Media or its staff.

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