North Korea detonated a nuclear weapon and launched a covey of ballistic missiles on Memorial Day, no doubt in Pyongyang’s mind a fitting message to its friends Iran and Syria, as well as its enemies the United States, the Republic of Korea and Japan. The demonstration served five purposes.

First, the tests were a North Korean version of an ATM, a sort of “blast for bucks” blackmail ring. They test and the world denounces the tests. Then they demand cash payments to return to “good behavior.” We send them cash and hope they will not test again.

Second, it was also a tent sale version of “Nukes ‘R Us” and ballistic missile technology, a kind of a “reach out and touch someone” deal, equivalent to a marketing campaign. “There is nothing like ballistic missiles and a few nukes to get the attention of your friends.” Remember, the country makes $1.5 billion a year from weapons sales.  

Third, it was a message to the nomenklatura of North Korea that Kim Jong Il and his friends are firmly in charge without any intention to make concessions to the outside world. “The world doesn’t want us to test our rockets or bombs. Well, tough, we will test.”

And finally, it was an advertisement to the United States and its allies that coercion and threats were Pyongyang’s preferred version of diplomacy. “Here’s our answer to engagement.”  

Pyongyang subsequently announced that its nuclear test and accompanying missile launches were a response to the “hostile policy” of the United States and its allies. They further demanded they be recognized as a “nuclear power,” an end to economic sanctions, and a right to export its missile and nuclear technology, even as they dismissed the armistice agreement signed at the end of the Korean War. On top of which they announced that if the Republic of Korea signed the Proliferation Security Initiative, (PSI), it would be considered an act of war.

What then should the United States and its allies do? First, let’s examine the proliferation aspects of the North Korean actions. Evidence shows clearly that Iranian ballistic missiles are derived in large part from technology transferred from North Korea, although experts now believe Iran’s missile capabilities now exceed those of North Korea. To what extent the North’s nuclear weapons expertise has been or will be shared with Tehran remains unclear.

But we know North Korean missile blueprints were brought back to Pakistan by the late Prime Minister Benazir Butto in 1995. And we know that the Khan network sold centrifuge technology for uranium enrichment to Pyongyang as well. And we do know that Iranian, Russian and Chinese technicians have been present at Pyongyang’s missile and nuclear tests over the years. And we know Russian and Chinese firms are heavily involved in such technology development, witness the recent 118-count indictment in New York of a Chinese firm discovered using an American-based bank to finance the shipment to Iran of nuclear weapons and ballistic missile technology. And we know Iran recently launched a solid fueled rocket some 2,000+ kilometers.

We also know over the years the U.S. and its allies have delivered thousands of tons of fuel oil and food aid to the North Korean government, in hopes such largesse will temper Pyongyang’s drive to deploy ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons. We have, unfortunately, met with less than success in this endeavor.

In short, Pyongyang once again brandishes its nuclear ATM card, hoping in return to secure money from the mullahs in Iran for missiles and bribes in the form of fuel oil from America and the Republic of Korea. At least in the past this worked. The question that remains unanswered is to what extent will this oft-repeated tactic work once again? Will the United States work to put into place a really effective strategy, including serious economic and banking sanctions and stop this ongoing charade of giving in response to the ongoing North Korean version of “making us offers we should refuse”? Or will it be business as usual?

It is not as if we have no tools with which to make the right choice. After all, the United States did work to choke off North Korea’s access to the world’s financial system with which it laundered money earned from criminal enterprises to fuel its trade in missile technology and its efforts to build a nuclear arsenal. At one point, U.S. pressure forced Macao to freeze North Korean assets in one of its banks, and subsequently then foiled North Korea’s panicky attempts to find friendly bankers in Vietnam, Mongolia, Singapore and Europe. And after North Korea’s October 9, 2007 nuclear test, China ordered some of its major banks to cease financial transactions with the country.

Similar legislation has been introduced in the Senate by Sen. Kyl and in the House by Congressman Bartlett, to cut-off Iran’s supply of refined gasoline by giving companies a choice – do business with Iran or do business with the U.S., but not both. We should apply the same policy to North Korea. We can then add to that a full divestment policy against Iran as proposed 18 months ago by French President Sarkozy. But we also should include North Korea. Again, any company doing business with either country would not be able to sell its company stock on any American stock exchange nor could such stock be held by any pension or retirement fund. So far nearly a dozen states have made initial steps in this direction.

Over half a decade ago, the previous administration created the Illicit Activities Initiative, a classified, multi-agency effort aimed at curbing North Korea’s black-market networks. This could be put to good use once again. Evidence gathered over the decades by Washington indicates that North Korea has become what some U.S. officials call a “Soprano State.” For example, the government in Pyongyang uses its embassies to coordinate illegal activities, its ships to move heroin and other contraband, and its factories to make counterfeit $100 bills and bogus brand-name cigarettes, U.S. officials say. Kim Jong Il, the North Korean leader, uses the profits to fund his nuclear program. But without the cooperation of elements of the international banking system, he cannot keep this going. 

Washington now knows that North Korea has used these well-worn trafficking networks to sell Iran or others the hardware or know-how to make weapons of mass destruction, as well as ballistic missiles. Pyongyang built a Syrian nuclear facility with Iranian cash. In September 2007, the Israelis destroyed it. But there may be other Syrian sites for nuclear infrastructure that remain. And we know in 2007 Iranian and Chinese officials were seen at the missile test sites in NK. In short, North Korean weapons programs cannot be viewed in isolation.

We also have the tool of nuclear forensics. Almost exactly two years ago, the New York Times reported: “Every week, a group of experts from agencies around the government – including the C.I.A., the Pentagon, the F.B.I. and the Energy Department – meet to assess Washington’s progress toward solving a grim problem: if a terrorist set off a nuclear bomb in an American city, could the United States determine who detonated it and who provided the nuclear material?”

This was part of an effort to refashion the U.S. approach to American deterrence in an attempt to counter the threat posed by terrorists and terror sponsoring states to deliver a nuclear weapon on US soil.

These capabilities – bringing down the illicit banking capability of the North along with developing a strong nuclear forensics capability – are just part of what should be an overall strategy to deal with North Korea. They should first be combined with missile defenses and the existing Proliferation Security Initiative, (PSI), (which the Republic of Korea has just announced it will join). Although we might be successful in using economic pressure to get rid of the North Korean nuclear program, we know we might not succeed. Prudence would require multiple insurance policies.

To successfully prevent proliferation and to protect ourselves and our allies from attack, we need to defend, (missile defense and port/maritime security), interdict, (PSI), and to detect, (portal monitors and nuclear forensics). Even if we are successful in determining the origin of a nuclear weapon used against us using nuclear forensics, we need the dual complementary capability of missile defenses and the PSI. Forensics comes after an attack, once the “crime” has been committed.

However, if our strategy includes a policy of holding accountable those countries from which a bomb is found to have originated, we may increase deterrence at least to some degree. But we also need missile defense, because that would prevent the “crime” of a missile attack from being successful. It could also deter an attack in the first place. And because of the widespread trade in ballistic missile and weapons technology, the PSI can prevent the criminals from getting the “goods” in the first place, as it did with Libya. It can also help in taking down the network of technology suppliers, as it did with the A.Q. Khan network.

Too often we hear the U.S. “has no good options” with respect to North Korea. This is then followed with an immediate jump to the conclusion that we only have “diplomacy” left in our counter proliferation tool box. I would disagree. Diplomacy is a tactic, not a strategy. If we were serious, which we have not been for some time, we could implement an entire range of options, from divestment to missile defenses, as part of an over-arching and coherent strategic plan to denuclearize Pyongyang, a point made recently in a May 28th National Defense University Foundation and National Defense Industrial Associated sponsored speech by former Under Secretary of State Robert Joseph, one of the architects of the PSI.

Unfortunately, while most Americans are no doubt seriously concerned with the threat of “terrorists” using nuclear weapons against the United States, and agree we should be implementing these policies, some persistent critics continue to believe that a missile armed with a nuclear warhead remains a “non-threat.” In addition, these critics see the PSI as of limited value in interdicting rocket and WMD technology, especially given both the numbers of U.S. ports and the thousands of miles of U.S. shoreline and airspace.

There is the assumption that because a ballistic missile has a “home address,” any such launch would be detectable. The U.S., the thinking goes, would then retaliate. The threat of such a response is then viewed as sufficient to maintain “deterrence.” Thus, missiles won’t be used against us. And thus when some speak of nuclear “terrorism,” the threat of a missile armed with a nuclear warhead – even brandished as a weapon of terror – someone doesn’t make the grade as a “threat.”

There are a considerable number of serious weaknesses in such an argument. First, nations armed with short and medium range ballistic missiles apparently have no compunction against launching such rockets against Israel, (as by Iraq in Gulf War 1991 or by Hamas and Hezbollah on an ongoing basis), or against United States military forces (again in the Gulf war 1991 and during Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003) or in the case of Iran and Iraq during the “war of the cities” in which barrages of missiles were launched by both countries. And we should remember that both Iran and North Korea have repeatedly launched test rockets as a show of force. What is to prevent rockets in the future from being armed with weapons of mass destruction?

Second, ballistic missiles, even if not fired, can serve a threatening, coercive or blackmail role. Armed with ballistic missiles, North Korea and Iran could use such a capability as top-cover under which to carry out terror attacks. Over 70 percent of Americans in one recent national poll believe this is precisely the threat from those two countries which ballistic missiles enhance.

In addition, nations might very well be less willing to get together and adopt strong economic sanctions against missile armed nations for fear of retaliatory missile attacks or even terror attacks. In turn, even if they feared only terrorist attacks, the presence of an offensive ballistic missile capability gives such countries the confidence that they can through intimidation prevent the imposition of sanctions. This in turn increases their willingness to take risks including support for and carrying out terrorist acts against the U.S. and its allies.

Third, ballistic missiles in the hands of the regime in Pyongyang give them the capability of putting at risk American bases in the Republic of Korea and Japan and the U.S. homeland. Recent estimates are that if the latest North Korean long range rocket launch had been successful in all three of its stage separations, it would have the capability of putting a 500-650 kilogram warhead anywhere in the continental United States.

Fourth, many critics of ballistic missile defense scoff at the idea that ballistic missiles in the hands of Pyongyang represent a threat to the United States. They assert the North is not so crazy as to launch such an attack against the United States. But here they miss the point. Advocates on both the left and right are supportive of removing U.S. military forces from the Republic of Korea. The North makes such a demand a routine part of its diatribes against the United States and our East Asian allies.

A U.S. withdrawal from the peninsula would almost surely trigger an invasion of the ROK. Let us assume such an eventuality takes place. Pyongyang could thus use its capability to target American cities as a lever with which to prevent the United States from coming to the defense of Seoul. Often unnoticed is that the North has repeatedly asserted its “right” to reunify the Korean peninsula under its communist rule and to use force to do so if necessary.

And fifth, Iran has repeatedly said that they seek to destroy Israel and seek a world “without the United States.” Both the current Iranian President and the Supreme Leader subscribe to an apocalyptic vision of the future where a major conflagration kills two-thirds of the people on earth, triggering the return of the 12th Imam or Mahdi, and thus ushering in the creation of worldwide rule for the Shia Muslim minority led by Iran. As Rafsanjani as explained, a few nuclear warheads would destroy Israel. Even if a couple of nuclear warheads detonated on Iranian soil, he explained “The Khomeini revolution will continue.”  

According to Ambassador Robert Joseph, (again), nearly five and one-half years ago, on October 4, 2003, the U.S. and Great Britain received intelligence about centrifuge parts being shipped to Libya. We learned what ship was carrying the stuff, and even knew the number of the shipping container! We consequently intercepted and boarded the German freighter, “The BBC China.” It was carrying 13,000 centrifuges or centrifuge parts from Malaysia being sold by the A.Q. Khan network for the creation of a nuclear weapons program. The destination: Libya and its leader Ghadafi.

A confluence of events – the U.S. toppling of the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq, the seizure of the BBC China, the capture of Saddam Hussein himself, and the interest of Libya not to be “another Iraq” – led Tripoli to finally give up the program. During negotiations the United States knew the Libyans were serious when upon arriving at the airport to return to the United States after one such meeting, the Libyans handed our diplomats a large box filled with nuclear weapons designs purchased from the A.Q. Khan network.

According to Arnaud de Borchgrave of the Washington Times, “Colonel Ghadafi’s confession staggered the CIA, MI6…Libya’s secret nuclear purchase included the entire kit and kabootle for a nuclear enrichment plant and detailed how-to plan for assembling a nuclear weapon… supplied by Dr. A.Q. Khan’s Dubai-based holding company which controlled a nuclear centrifuge plant in Malaysia, as well as a network of 75 suppliers throughout the world…”

This successful elimination of the Libyan nuclear program led to the rapid expansion of the PSI, originally announced in May 2003 in Poland. Nearly 100 nations are now members. Since then, there have been at least 15 additional successful intercepts of nuclear related material including the prevention of two deliveries to North Korea. There has been the seizure of ballistic missile and nuclear related material to Iran, as well as nuclear material transiting the Balkans and Georgia, and Hezbollah and Tamil Tiger bound missiles, rockets and other weapons. This extraordinary capability all flowed from the initial PSI agreement with the US, Russia, Australia, Italy, Great Britain, Canada, Germany, Japan, Kazakhstan, Turkey, Morocco, China and France, all designed to prevent the acquisition of sensitive materials such as nuclear weapons and missile technology. [For an excellent review of this see Robert Joseph, Countering WMD: The Libyan Experience, National Institute Press, 2009].

We can thus use the nuclear forensics and PSI to backstop both our diplomatic efforts and strong economic sanctions should we put them into place. We can then compliment such work with the previously planned deployment by 2014 of some 1,400 missile interceptors on land and sea capable of shooting down rockets of all ranges. (This deployment roadmap is based on the plans of the previous administration). If implemented, it would include the work of cooperative allies such as Japan, Israel, Germany, Italy, England, Denmark, Australia, Taiwan, ROK, Poland, and the Czech Republic.

And we know these missile defense systems are working. Since 2005, the U.S. and allies have conducted at least 19 successful tests of hit to kill technology including 15 successful consecutive tests. As Paula DeSutter, the then Assistant Secretary of State for Verification, Compliance and Implementation, said on April 10, 2006, “Missile defenses are a key non-proliferation tool.”

The North Koreans no doubt hope their recent nuclear weapons test and missile launches will reap them a financial windfall. They hope to sell the technology. And they hope to be bribed to promise not to sell such stuff again. And they hope to coerce concessions from their enemies who fear them because they continue to possess the very weapons they both sell and promise to give up. But we do not have to play that game anymore. Just as a multi-layered chocolate soufflé on a child’s birthday has to be baked, so do the designs of the regime in Pyongyang require a “giving” world community. In short, for North Korea to get their weapons soufflé to the celebratory table requires a cooperative chef to bake it. But we don’t have to put the cake in the oven. In fact, we can throw it into the street. Or burn it. Then we’ll see how good it tastes.

 

Guest columns do not necessarily reflect the views of Accuracy in Media or its staff.

Share This

• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 

About the author