Government sponsored Commissions are frequently created. Their reports are generally infrequently read. Most are ignored. The Reagan era commission on welfare reform did not catch the imagination of Congress until nearly a decade after its completion but it was the basis for the very successful welfare reform of the Gingrich-led Congress in the late 1990s. In early May, the Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States issued its report. It is about our nuclear weapons and their role in deterrence and counter proliferation. The leaders were Dr. William Perry and Dr. James Schlesinger, both former Secretaries of Defense. They are to be commended, for this is an unusually good report. And key government officials, especially members of Congress, should read it. And we cannot wait a decade to heed its message.

The Commission says a strong and robust strategic nuclear deterrent remains Job #1 for the United States. It endorses maintaining our three-legged Triad of bombers, land based ballistic missiles and submarines. It correctly notes how important it is for the United States to maintain an extended deterrent for our allies and friends. Some 30 nations, according to Senator Jon Kyl, are protected by our nuclear umbrella. They do not have to build their own arsenal as a result.

They emphasize that for too long the country neglected the nuts and bolts of our nuclear infrastructure. In key sections, the Commission explains how our nuclear enterprise of laboratories, their scientists and nuclear experts, need to be supported and strengthened. They conclude there is nothing incompatible with maintaining a strong nuclear deterrent and also at the same time seeking to stem the proliferation of such weapons, especially to rogue nations such as Iran and North Korea. And they correctly endorse missile defense against all ranges of ballistic missile threats while calling for additional work on dealing with future, more robust missile threats to the US.

Specifically, they describe in real terms the nature of deterrence. They correctly underscore that deterrence is not just preventing an initial attack against the US by a nuclear armed adversary, but also limiting the damage that could be done to our country over time. Our capability to carry out such “damage limitation” strikes underscores that those who wish to do us harm cannot expect their weaponry and leadership to remain in a sanctuary. That greatly contributes to deterrence says the Commission.

The assistant Chief of Staff for Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration at USAF Headquarters, Major General C. Donald Alston, in a recent speech hosted by the National Defense University Foundation and the National Defense Industrial Association, described this state of affairs as “Not Today.” During the Cold War, our deterrent posture was designed to clearly signal our adversaries that no matter how they calculated an attack, under any assumptions, it would not succeed. The late Ambassador Paul Nitze, author of From Hiroshima to Glasnost, once said he always wanted to Soviets to conclude after such an exercise, “Not Today Comrade.” The Commission obviously understood this principle very well.

The Commission did not agree on further cuts to our nuclear arsenal. Since 1980, the U.S. has reduced its deployed nuclear weapons from 12,000 to fewer than 2,200; the latter number a requirement of the 2002 Moscow Treaty or SORT agreement. Even with such dramatic reductions, initially called for by President Reagan, the United States was able to maintain its nuclear umbrella over its allies as well as maintain a robust deterrent. Further reductions, however, might very well put in jeopardy these requirements.

The Commission tacked the tough questions of how to deal with the proliferation of nuclear weapons to terror sponsoring states and their allied terror groups. Here the answers are less clear. It is true that any serious effort to dismantle the nuclear weapons programs in Iran and North Korea, as well as to prevent the further spread of such weapons, will require an unprecedented level of international cooperation. The lurking danger of the Taliban seeking to take over Pakistan and its nuclear arsenal makes the issue even more salient. But as Frank Miller, one of the senior nuclear policy experts in the country, noted on May 8th, the Russians and Chinese have much to answer for in their failures to prevent the proliferation of nuclear and ballistic missile technologies.

Thus it is unclear whether further reductions in the U.S. and Russian arsenals will do the trick and put non-proliferation back in the security driver’s seat. It is equally clear, however, that previous reductions in our nuclear arsenal had no discernible restraining impact on the nuclear programs run by Pyongyang and Tehran, a point underscored recently by Senator Jeff Sessions, a senior member of the Senate Armed Services Committee. And it is equally problematic to equate U.S. restraint with changes in the threat of terrorism. Overall, however, this Commission did an extraordinary job in bringing these critical issues to the attention of America’s policy makers. We all need to read the report. And then act on its recommendations. With all deliberate speed. There is no more important task “To Provide for the Common Defense.”

 

Guest columns do not necessarily reflect the views of Accuracy in Media or its staff.

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